

Sigma

Journal of Political and International Studies

FALL 2001



Sigma

Journal of Political and International Studies

Fall 2001

Sigma

Journal of Political and International Studies

Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies is a multidisciplinary journal that serves as a publishing forum for undergraduate student papers in the fields of political science and international studies. Sigma is sponsored by BYU chapters of Pi Sigma Alpha (the Political Science Honors Society) and Sigma Iota Rho (the International Studies Honors Society). For more information on these student organizations, please see their respective web pages at http://fhss.byu.edu/polsci/psa.htm and http://kennedy.byu.edu/student_programs/sigma. Please see the online version of *Sigma* at http://byusigma.homepage.com.

Papers for the Winter 2002 issue of *Sigma* may be submitted to 745 SWKT. We accept papers written on a broad range of topics related to political science or international studies. There is no page limit. Please submit three copies of papers (double-sided preferred). The author's name should not appear anywhere on the pages of the paper. Authors will fill out an information sheet at the time of submission. The journal is published at the end of Fall and Winter semesters. Sigma also welcomes students of all levels of experience who are interested in assisting with the selecting, editing, and publishing processes. For more information on these issues, email the editors at Sigma@byu.edu.

Contents

Articles

Book Review

THE JEWISH CONNECTION: JUDAISM, JERUSALEM, AND THE TEMPLE

RICHARD LIVINGSTON

Jerusalem's intrinsic holiness within Judaism has its roots in the history and mythology of the religion. Even as the world was created, Jerusalem was intended to be the sacred site for the Temple. Scriptural accounts often reverence that future site as a place for divine experiences to occur. In time the holy Temple was built, finally allowing the Jews a chance to worship. Yet, the magnificent structure was destroyed and the Jews scattered, destroying the Jewish dream. Continuing until today, the Temple and the city of Jerusalem have remained holy in Judaism.

INTRODUCTION

"If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget [her cunning]. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy" (Psalm 137:5–6)* Such were the sentiments of the Psalmist almost three millennia ago, and these feelings are still carried within the soul of the religious Jew to this very day.[1] Rabbinic tradition teaches that "there is no beauty like that of Jerusalem," and that, "of the ten measures of beauty that came down from heaven, Jerusalem received nine." Additionally, whoever has not seen Jerusalem in all its splendor has never seen a beautiful city in his or her life.[2] From the time it began its greatest rise in prominence during the reigns of King David and Solomon (c. 1000–950 B.C.E.), Jerusalem has been the center of Judaism both physically and spiritually. In fact, at least twice each day the orthodox follow the example of Daniel when they face Jerusalem to pray. The sacred character of the city is simply unparalleled within the faith.

Three of the world's most influential religions—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—all revere Jerusalem with the warmest affection. Christianity and Islam share a common thread in that the greatest individuals within both faiths participated in their most significant spiritual experiences there. Within the minds and hearts of the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, it was the ministry, crucifixion, and resurrection of their Lord and Savior that forever imbued the city with absolute holiness. For Muslims, the spiritual prominence of Jerusalem was established as a result of the night-vision of Muhammad, who was carried from Mecca, across the Arabian desert, and ascended into the highest heaven from Mount Moriah (where the *al-Aksa* mosque and the Dome of the Rock are currently located). This event later established Jerusalem second only to Mecca in importance within Islamic tradition. Although Abraham is often viewed as the father of Judaism, practically speaking the role of founder was filled by Moses when he became their great prophet and priest. For all intents and purposes, the Jewish religion was born

*All biblical scriptures are quoted from the King James Version of the Bible, unless otherwise noted.

at Mount Sinai, where he received the divine law that would come to govern their lives to this very day.

If the Jewish nation was born at Sinai, then the forty-year journey through the barren wilderness was the babe's cradle, Canaan was its childhood, and Jerusalem would become its highest school of learning. Even today, it provides and teaches the most difficult lessons of human life. The events that took place anciently provided Jerusalem's inhabitants and the Jews in general with extreme tests of faith. Today, even when all the other issues seem to have a possible resolution, Jerusalem is the biggest sticking point in negotiations. Thus, the city remains a crucible in the sometimes painful tests of one's faith. What is most important to this discussion, however, is that, unlike Christianity and Islam, the place where the foundational event in Jewish history took place, Mount Sinai, is not given the greatest veneration. Granted, this may have a lot to do with the fact that no one knows for sure exactly where Mount Sinai is, that the Sinai peninsula is currently controlled by an Arab nation, or even, as David Goldstein suggests, that it may be due to the original prohibition against drawing close to the mountain (Exodus 19:12, 21–24).[3] Regardless, the fact that Mount Sinai is not given the most veneration remains true nonetheless. Then what is it that sets Jerusalem apart from the rest of the world? The holiness and sanctity of Jerusalem within the Jewish psyche can be attributed to its most sacred shrine—the Temple.

JERUSALEM IN THE JEWISH COSMOS

"The concept of 'holy site,' with the exception of Jerusalem and the Temple, hardly figures in early rabbinic literature," observes Goldstein.[4] This is most certainly true, and where there are exceptions, they almost always deal with temple-types, such as Mount Sinai and the tabernacle. Jewish lore and legends are rich in discussions of the cosmological significance of Jerusalem (i.e., the geographical layout of this planet and the entire universe in relationship to the city). These traditions provide us with some of the most vivid proofs that the Temple is the axiom around which the holiness of Jerusalem spins within Judaism. Therefore, I would like to begin by reviewing several examples, each of which have become models or paradigms that illustrate the centrality of the Temple and by extension, Jerusalem. As Joshua Leibowitz observes, "When the universal character of the center of divine worship is emphasized, . . . there is no clear distinction between the Temple and the city."[5] These are not to be taken as literal presentations of the way things physically are, though it is almost certain that anciently many individuals accepted them as such. Rather, this is meant to present a spiritual or philosophical understanding of the relative importance of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the Temple, to the rest of creation.

Our first legend is based upon a biblical idiom dealing with interpersonal relationships, which has even carried into the modern Hebrew language. This phrase is scattered throughout the scriptures, and it speaks of finding favor in the eyes of another, whether the other is an individual or even God. Tucked within the legends surrounding the creation of Adam, Louis Ginzberg reports a tradition that says that "the world resembles the ball of his [God's] eye: the ocean that encircles the earth is like unto the white of the eye, the dry land is the iris, Jerusalem the pupil, and the Temple the image mirrored in the pupil of the eye."[6] In Western tradition, the eye has become "the window" to one's soul. In modern Hebrew, to find favor in the eyes of someone is typically used in context of the expressions of affection between a man and a woman. The eye is the organ which provides the ability to visibly perceive the world. If the Temple is mirrored in God's eye, that means it is ever-present in His eyes. The implication should be clear, then, that in the eyes of the Lord, the most holy and significant spot on earth is the Temple of Jerusalem.

The Temple of Jerusalem is also viewed as that which provides nourishment and order to the rest of the world. In other words, without the sustenance which flows from the Temple, the world would be in utter chaos and eventually die from "starvation." A pseudepigraphic writing attributed to Philo called *Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum* (*LAB*) presents this concept through a fascinating metaphor. Moses pleads on behalf of the Children of Israel following the golden calf incident:

> Thou art God who has planted one vine, and hast set its roots in the abyss, and hast stretched out its branches up to Thy highest seat. . . . And now, if Thou be angry with Thy vine, and uproot it from the abyss and dry up its branches from Thy highest and everlasting seat, never again shall the abyss come to nourish it, nor shall Thy throne come to refresh that vine of Thine which Thou hast burned. For Thou art He who art all light, and hast decorated Thy house with precious stones and with gold, and also with perfumes, spices and balsam-wood, and cinnamon, and with roots of myrrh and costum Thou hast

> decorated Thy house. . . . If therefore Thou hast no pity on Thy vine, O Lord, all things have been made for nothing, and Thou shalt not have anyone to glorify Thee. . . . For if Thou shouldst abandon the world completely, then who will perform for Thee what Thou hast spoken as God?[7]

Notice that, in this passage, the concept of the vine of Israel is intertwined with the Temple. Just as Jerusalem and the Temple are inseparable, so are these two ideas. In fact, the Bible supports the notion that this concept did actually originate at the time of the Exodus. In a song of triumphant exultation after the Children of Israel miraculously passed through the Red Sea, they proclaimed, "Thou [God] shalt bring them [the Israelites] in, and *plant them* in the mountain of thine inheritance, in the place, O Lord, which thou hast made for thee to dwell in, in the Sanctuary, O Lord, which thy hands have established" (Exodus 15:17, emphasis added). Thus, the vine could never be fully planted without a sacred shrine, or in other words, *holy ground* in which to plant it. Furthermore, not only is Israel dependent upon this planting, but the vine is also the link between the three cosmic zones—the abyss or underworld, the earth, and the heavens. It is essentially an *axis mundi*, or center around which the world rotates, and if God removed it, the world would cease to exist.

Hayward sums up the intimate connection between the Temple, the vine, and the physical world this way: "If Israel is uprooted, the earthly sanctuary which Moses has been ordered to construct according to an heavenly exemplar will never be built, and then creation will have been in vain, to no purpose, for God will have no one to glorify Him. The vine-symbol belongs firmly in the realm of beliefs about the Temple."[8] In later verses, the *LAB* also teaches that after the Fall of Adam, chaos was unleashed into the world, and order was only re-established following the Flood through the sacrificial offerings made by Noah. Further, the sacrifices of Noah were simply precursors to those prescribed in the Law of Moses, which can only be properly performed in a temple. Thus the festivals, along with their sacrificial rites, both of which took place at the Temple, were viewed not only as providing seasonal harmony and agricultural success, but order to the entire world. If the vine were to be cut down and, as a result, the Temple left desolate, it would then mean "the end of the world as they knew it," because as long as the Temple "stands, and the Service is maintained, Jews provide for non-Jews an order providing the food and sustenance without which human life would be impossible."[9]

This tradition becomes even more intriguing when placed next to one of our oldest firsthand descriptions of the Temple given by Aristeas, a Greek courtier of Ptolemy II (285–246 B.C.E.). The Temple has always been perceived as a conduit, so to speak, reaching into the heavens and carrying forth the petitions of humankind, which is the reasoning behind praying in the direction of the Temple. It is as if one's prayer traverses horizontally until it reaches the Temple where it is then carried upward into the celestial realms. However, the Temple's opposing connection to the abyss or underworld has not always been as clear. The vine metaphor mentions that its branches stretched high into the heavens, and its roots reached deep below into the watery abyss, which has often been associated with the chaotic waters of creation from which the world was created and land first emerged. Whether he intended to or not, Aristeas helps provide a possibility for the missing link. He writes that the Temple had an "endless supply of water, as if indeed a strongly flowing natural spring were issuing forth from within."[10] He appears to be absolutely awestruck and then describes in some detail the underground reservoirs which flowed in and around the foundations of the Temple.

When water is mentioned in a mythical or religious context, there are often two dichotomous symbols that emerge. John Lundquist points out that "water has a two-fold imagery, life-giving and destructive."[11] Isaiah uses the concept of water to teach that whoever is not in line with the "sure foundation" or cornerstone of the Temple will be swept away by destructive waters (Isaiah 28:16–17). Ezekiel's prophecy, on the other hand, illustrates the life-giving power of water as it flows from the Temple eastward and heals the most mineral encumbered liquid on the planet—the Dead Sea (Ezekiel 47). Aristeas' description seems to illustrate both concepts at once; that life-giving waters flow forth from the Temple to the rest of the earth, as well as the notion that the Temple was founded upon the waters of chaos from which the earth was created.[12] Therefore, the Temple has its roots in the primordial waters of creation, which provide the cosmos with nourishment, as previously noted by Philo in his vine metaphor. This leads nicely to the most vivid cosmological models of all—certainly they have become the most famous—each of which may be placed within the category of Jewish creation mythology.

Whether it be the world itself, a city, a sacred shrine, or even one's home, Mircea Eliade argues that

"a universe comes to birth from its center; it spreads out from a central point that is, as it were, its navel . . . *every construction or fabrication has the cosmogony as paradigmatic model.*"[13] Hebrew tradition supports this paradigm stating that "The Most Holy One created the world like an embryo. As the embryo grows from the navel, so God began to create the world by the navel and from there it spread out in all directions."[14] Where is the navel of the earth? According to the Midrash, "As the navel is set in the middle of a person so is *Eretz* Israel the navel of the world, as it is said: 'That dwell in the navel of the earth' [Ezekial 38:12]. *Eretz* Israel is located in the center of the world, Jerusalem in the center of *Eretz* Israel, the Temple in the center of Jerusalem, the *heikhal* in the center of the Temple, the ark in the center of the *heikhal*, and in front of the *heikhal* is the *evan shetiyyah* ["foundation stone"] from which the world was started."[15] Though it is debated amongst scholars, one will notice the implication here that Ezekiel is the source of this concept.[16] Regardless of the source, the ultimate center of centers is the stone upon which the ark of the covenant was placed in the Holy of Holies. One end of the umbilical cord of the earth is connected to the Temple: the opposite end is connected to its source of life—the heavens. One Rabbi summarized the idea this way: "It is called the Foundation Stone of the Earth, that is, the navel of the Earth, because it is from there that the whole Earth unfolded."[17]

Ginzberg helps explain the source and reasoning behind this myth. He writes that the Holy Land was "created before all other parts of the world. . . . Instead of Palestine in general, Jerusalem . . . or the site of the temple is designated as the beginning of creation. The widespread popular notion that the earth came into being as a result of a stone which God had thrown into the water . . . was subsequently brought into relation with the view that creation began with the site of the temple; hence the legend that creation began with the stone found in the holy of holies."[18] Seth Kunin spends some time in his book *God's Place in the World* debating the question of whether or not Jerusalem is holy intrinsically or contextually. In other words, did the Temple imbue the city with holiness (contextually) or is it holy in and of itself (intrinsically), regardless of whether or not the Temple was built there?[19] Kunin argues against the notion of Jerusalem's intrinsic holiness. However, if these myths carry a kernel of truth, they, along with other historical eventsI will mention later, would certainly indicate otherwise.

In modern Hebrew, there are several verbs used to describe movement from one location to another. To go somewhere is to *halákh*. To travel somewhere, as on a trip, is to *nasáh*. However, there are unique verbs used to describe going to and from Jerusalem. The word used for going there is *aláh*, which literally means to go up or ascend. It is from this root that the noun *aliyáh* comes, which is emigration to Israel from any other country. The verb used to describe leaving the city, regardless of destination, is *yarád*, which literally means to go down or descend. Therefore, one does not simply go to the city of Jerusalem—one ascends to the city of Jerusalem. This can best be seen in the Book of Psalms, where the author asks, "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place?" (Psalm 24:3), which is a clear reference to the Temple. The reasoning for this is two-fold. First, the Temple Mount actually is a hill one may physically ascend from all sides. Even more importantly, according to tradition, Jerusalem is the highest spot on earth, and, by extension then, when individuals leave, no matter where they are going, they always descend from the city.

This notion has its roots in the legends that associate the Temple Mount with the primordial mound and cosmic mountain. "In ancient Israel . . . it was the first solid material to emerge from the waters of creation, and it was upon this stone that the deity effected creation."[20] Donald Parry notes the following: "Identified as the consecrated topos, the primordial mound represented order and definition amidst the unruly chaotic waters."[21] Logically, the first land to emerge as the waters receded would have been the tops of the mountains, they being the most physically high. It stands to reason that they would also be viewed the highest spiritually because of their proximity to the heavens. The top of the mountain is the highest point on earth and the lowest point in the heavens, and therefore it serves as the meeting place between the two—the place where the human may commune with the divine. In fact, according to "the ancient Hebrew conception of the universe, God was thought to reside near the North Star, 'the point around which the constellations turned, where was located the summit of the heavenly mountain and the throne of the Most High.'"[22] This heavenly prototype came to be known as Mount Zion; Isaiah, having had direct and personal interaction with God in the temple built there, beautifully intertwined the concept of a mountain-building when he called it "the mountain of the Lord's house" (Isaiah 2:2).

Whether or not the above legends are historically, cosmologically, or astronomically accurate is not important. Myths, legends, and symbols reach beyond the scientific mind, filling the soul with concepts that greatly enhance one's awareness, and in this particular case, reveals Jerusalem's *hierophantic* nature within Judaism.[23] Each model serves to heighten the cosmic sacrality of Jerusalem psychologically. When Jews speak of the sanctity of the city, they do so with the idea that philologically the *ultimate* center of the world itself is the foundation stone upon which the ark of the covenant rested in the Holy of Holies. It is the naval of the earth, linking the heavens, the earth, and the underworld as an umbilical cord or vine, providing all creation with physical and spiritual nourishment. In fact, it is the very place from which all creation sprang forth, including humankind. According to tradition, Adam himself was formed out of the dust of Jerusalem.[24] Therefore, in every way conceivable, Jerusalem's Mount Zion is *the* center place.

JERUSALEM'S HISTORICAL TRADITION

As I have just mentioned, according to one rabbinic tradition, the father of the human race was not simply created from dust of the earth, but rather, as expected, the dust of Jerusalem's Temple Mount. An original and somewhat unique Rabbinic tradition states that "Adam was created from the dust of the place where the sanctuary was to rise for the atonement of all human sin, so that sin should never be a permanent or inherent part of man's nature."[25] Adam is also viewed as the first high priest in a line of succession reaching all the way down to Aaron, whose family carried the burden of performing all the sacrificial rituals of the temple. Lastly, not only was Adam created in Jerusalem and later offered sacrifice on an altar there as the first priest, he was laid to rest there as well. The *Encyclopedia of Freemasonry* notes a prophecy that says Adam's body was to be kept above ground "till a fullness of time should come to commit it to the middle of the earth by a priest of the most high God." According to tradition, this apparently came to pass as the body of Adam was "preserved in a chest until about 1800 B.C., when 'Melchizedek buried the body in Salem (formerly the name of Jerusalem), which might very well be the middle of the habitable world.'"[26]

If Adam's birth, life, and death all centered in the area of Jerusalem and the Temple, what might that imply about the Garden of Eden? Ancient texts written by Jesus ben Sira and the Book of Jubilees both, "in their different ways, bring Adam into direct association with the Temple understood as Eden."[27] However, Ezekiel is apparently the earliest author to provide a possible connection. Speaking to the King of Tyre metaphorically as if the King were Adam, he wrote: "Thou hast been in Eden the garden of God. . . .Thou art the anointed cherub that covereth; and I have set thee so: thou wast upon the holy mountain of God. . . . Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day that thou wast created, till iniquity was found in thee . . . therefore I will cast thee as profane out of the mountain of God" (Ezekiel 28:11–16). There is clearly an implied connection between the holy mountain, which is the Temple Mount, and the Garden of Eden. Donald Parry has summarized succinctly the association of the Garden with the cosmic mountain and the Temple.

> The temple became "the architectural embodiment of the cosmic mountain." More importantly, however, the temple building was constructed upon a mountain or hillock of known importance. The temples of Jerusalem . . . all being constructed upon the identical mount, were part of a continuing tradition of sacred events that occurred there. What once was a sacred *topos* now became a sacred *topos* with a sacral architecture superimposed upon it.[28]

Thus, from Adam's days in the Garden of Eden, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem was established as the holiest spot for Judaism.

The theme of the Book of Jubilees centers in and around the Israelite calendrical and sacrificial system. One of its unique characteristics is that it draws upon the lives of the ancient patriarchs to provide an implied timing for the institution of the ritual practices that eventually became part of the Law of Moses. Thus, the author seems to imply that the lives of the individuals mentioned have a strong connection to the temple or temple worship. For example, Enoch "burnt the incense of the sanctuary, (even) sweet spices, acceptable before the Lord on the Mount. For the Lord has four places on the earth, the Garden of Eden, and the Mount of the East, and this mountain on which thou [Moses] art this day, Mount Sinai, and Mount Zion (which) will be sanctified in the new creation for a sanctification of the earth; through it will the earth be sanctified from all (its) guilt and its uncleanness throughout the generations of the world" (Jubilees

4:25–26).* Notice that although four holy places are mentioned, it is from Mount Zion that purity will flow, cleansing the whole earth. This reference has clear implications connecting the offering made by Enoch to the most holy day of the year within Judaism, the Day of Atonement, during which offerings were made for the benefit of the entire world.

The Book of Jubilees goes on to teach that Noah "knew that the Garden of Eden is the holy of holies, and the dwelling of the Lord, and Mount Sinai the centre of the desert, and Mount Zion—the centre of the navel of the earth: these three were created as holy places facing each other" (Jubilees 8:19).* Therefore, it is understood that even Noah recognized the importance of the Temple Mount, seeing it as the center of the world. The *Tamid*, or the "continual" sacrifice offered in the morning and evening each day in the Temple, is also linked to Noah, along with several other sacrificial rites in the Law of Moses. Hayward summarizes:

> When the . . . Tamid is sacrificed, therefore, the writer of Jubilees expects his readers to recall, first, Noah's sacrifice on leaving the ark and its biblical consequences; second, the covenant which Noah made not to eat blood; third, the covenant renewed with blood by Moses on Mount Sinai; fourth, the Feast of Weeks on which this covenant was ratified; and fifth, the forgiveness which the Tamid itself implores from God.[29]

The suggestion that is important is the connection between the sacrifices offered in the Temple and those offered by the ancient patriarch, which were viewed as bringing order to the entire universe. Once again it illustrates the prominence of the Temple with its connected rituals; just as one cannot separate Jerusalem from the Temple when speaking of the city's sanctity, one cannot speak of the Temple without its constituent ordinances. Thus, the Temple adds to the city's intrinsic holiness to the Jewish psyche.

Many years later, Melchizedek ruled in the Jerusalem area. The Old Testament provides us with precious little information about Melchizedek other then the fact he was the king of a city called Salem, as well as the fact that "he was the priest of the most high God" during the days of Abraham (Genesis 14:18). The extra-biblical sources, rabbinic literature, and modern scholars all provide ample support for the thesis that Salem and Jerusalem are the same city.[30] According to *Jerusalem: The Eternal City*, "there is an apparent connection between the name-title *Shalem* and *Salem*, where Melchizedek . . . reigned as king in a city called 'Peace.' The toponym *Salem* seems to be a short form of the later Jerusalem."[31] What does this have to do with the Temple that was built there some 800–1000 years later? One Jewish legend says, "Melchizedek, priest of God, King of Canaan, built a city on a mountain called Sion, and named it Salem."[32] Mount Zion was destined to become the future location of Solomon's Temple. This is significant when considered together with the mountain-building typology I have already noted, along with the following statement by Josephus: "But he who first built it [Jerusalem] was a potent man among the Canaanites, and is in our tongue called [Melchisedek] the Righteous King, for such he really was; on which account he was [there] the first priest of God, and *first built a temple*, [there,] and called the city Jerusalem, which was formerly called Salem."[33] Perhaps, then, the Temple of Solomon wasn't the first "architectural embodiment of the cosmic mound" to be constructed on that site. Apparently, physical temples were the center of Jerusalem long before him.

Next is one of the most important events within the history of Judaism—Abraham and Isaac (Genesis 22). The ultimate sacrifice of Isaac was never required, therefore "the episode in Jewish tradition is called the binding (*Akedah*) of Isaac, not the sacrifice of Isaac."[34] Regardless of the reasoning behind why God put Abraham through one of the most agonizing experiences imaginable, it is viewed in "the Jewish mind as the supreme example of perfect faith."[35] If the act was the supreme example of faith, then what can be said about the location where it took place? Abraham was over 100 years old, living in Beersheba at the time, which was at least several days journey south of Mount Moriah. Clearly there had to be something significant, even sacred, about the place God had designated. I will first note the biblical tradition. When the events of that day were complete, Abraham renamed the place, "Jehovah-jireh [The Lord-Will-Provide]: as it is said to this day, In the mount of the Lord, it shall be seen [provided]" (Genesis 22:14). A vicarious sacrifice, a ram, was provided. Notice also, as with the previous traditions, there is a reference to "the mount of the Lord."

As with Melchizedek's city of Salem, the extra-biblical legends about this event are replete. Goldstein says that "the actual site of the altar which Abraham

*All references to Jubilees are from *The Apocrapha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English*, ed. R. H. Charles (London: Oxford University Press, 1913).

had constructed was the very same place where Abel and Noah had offered their sacrifices, and the very site of the Temple that was to be erected in years to come."[36] The famous Jewish Sage *Rambam* (Moses Maimonides) was even more specific when he explained the crucial significance of the altar's location: "The location of the altar is pinpointed with extreme precision and it may never be moved to another place . . . [for] we have a universally recognized tradition that the place upon which David and Solomon built the altar . . . is the exact place upon which Abraham built the altar and bound Isaac upon it."[37] It should be very clear with this statement alone, that no other location could possibly carry such significance, bolstering the notion that the Temple Mount has profound intrinsic sacredness.

This may prompt a question: if Melchizedek had built a temple on the same spot, why doesn't the Bible mention it, and why wasn't Abraham instructed to offer the sacrifice there? Within Jewish tradition there is simply no answer. I am aware of only one dogma that provides a possible explanation. According to the doctrine of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, just as Enoch "was not; for God took him," translating him with his entire city (Genesis 5:24; see also Hebrews 11:5; Moses 6–7), thus removing them physically from this world, the city of Melchizedek also "wrought righteousness, and obtained heaven" (JST Genesis 14:34). Therefore, because of the holiness of the city of Melchizedek, its people (city and temple included) may have been translated (that is, removed from this world and taken into a higher spiritual realm of existence). It may even be possible that this took place while Abraham was in Egypt. If this is true, the mount would have been left barren but would have retained its qualitative sanctity as a holy place, and therefore, at least figuratively, Abraham was instructed to go to the Temple to endure his soul-defining test.

Genesis chapter 28 recounts the fascinating experience of Jacob, as he began a journey to Haran in search of a wife in his family's homeland. One night, as he slept, he had a dream or vision in which he saw a ladder, which was likely a step-pyramid type of temple, that had angels ascending and descending on it. One can easily recognize the obvious models mentioned already, such as the primal mound, the *axis mundi*, and the sacred space which is the meeting place between heaven and earth. To understand the significance of the vision the most important thing to notice is what happened when Jacob woke up the next morning. He said, "How dreadful [awesome] is this place! This is none other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven" (Genesis 28:17). He then set up the stone which he had slept on as a pillar, poured oil on it, consecrated the stone as holy, and then named the site Bethel—The House of God. What is so fascinating to me about this is that there was no physical building at all, simply "sacred *topos*," to use Parry's words. Yet, he called it the House of God. Menachem Haran has argued that "in general, any cultic activity to which the biblical text applies the formula 'before the Lord' can be considered an indication of the existence of a temple at the site, since this expression stems from the basic conception of the temple as divine dwelling-place and actually belongs to the temple's technical terminology."[38] Thus, the experience with deity makes the space around it holy, and it is in this way that "the idea or meaning of the Temple transcended its ephemeral form."[39] However, as has been illustrated so far, this particular space had long since become sacred, and it should come as no surprise that, according to Jewish legend, the stone upon which Jacob slept and afterward setup as a pillar is the very same foundation stone which effected creation and upon which the ark of the covenant would one day rest.[40]

Following the four-hundred-year slavery of the Children of Israel in Egypt, their subsequent exodus to the Promised Land, and the era of the judges, Jerusalem was still significant in the time of King David and Solomon (c. 1000 B.C.E). Prior to David's conquest of Jerusalem, the Jebusites were using the area of Mount Zion as a threshing floor: "Then Solomon began to build the house of the Lord at Jerusalem in mount Moriah, where [the Lord] appeared unto David his father, in the place that David had prepared in the threshingfloor of Ornan the Jebusite" (2 Chronicles 3:1). The fact that the Jebusites were using the sacred site as a threshing floor is significant when one considers the traditions of the times. First of all, a threshing floor is a place where stalks of wheat are piled up to crush and separate out the chaff. This in and of itself carries with it a tremendous amount of religious symbolism (Psalm 35:5; Isaiah 5:24). Secondly, Lundquist and others have noted a fascinating statement by the scholar Ad de Vries which says, "The threshing floor is an omphalos, at once a navel of the world (with the hub of ears in the middle) and a universe-emblem (a round piece of earth, with the earth in the middle, and the sun-oxen going round)."[41] That David may have had these symbols in mind when he selected the location is certainly an intriguing possibility, and it is even more interesting given the fact that in the ancient Near East Temple sites are always revealed by deity.

Certainly, the God of Israel had long since placed his stamp of holiness upon the site.

Thus, it was several centuries after entering the Promised Land before the Children of Israel finally put "the capstone" of their society in place. As is elaborated so beautifully by John Lundquist in his article *The Legitimizing Role of the Temple*,

> the state, as we presently understand that term as applying to archaic societies . . . did not come into being in ancient Israel—indeed, could not have been perceived to have come into being—before and until the temple of Solomon was built and dedicated. Solomon's dedicatory prayer and the accompanying communal meal represent the final passage into Israel of the "divine charter" ideology that characterized state polities among Israel's ancient Near Eastern neighbors.[42]

Leibowitz sums the importance this way: "The conception of the eternity of Jerusalem in the Bible is related to the monarchy of the House of David, and must be understood as part and parcel of it. During the reign of Solomon, the unique status of Jerusalem as the royal city was established by the erection of the Temple, which invested the monarchy, as well as the site, with an aura of holiness."[43] The central focus of worship throughout the forty year wandering in the wilderness and the settling into their lands of inheritance was indeed a temporary temple—the tabernacle—but that was simply a preparation for what their God had been anxiously anticipating: a permanent house on earth.

This was certainly a watershed moment in the history of Israel. Unquestionably, the entire Land of *Eretz* Israel was considered sacred space, for it was all part of the divinely decreed Land of Promise. However, as soon as the Temple of Solomon was built, the psyche permanently changed. Leibowitz observes further that "the Temple is perceived as the eternal seat of the Lord . . . and there is no doubt that this conception of a double eternity—that of the dynasty of David and that of the symbolic residence of the Lord—imparted sanctity to the whole city."[44] In the minds of the Israelites, the holiest city became Jerusalem and the most sacred plot of land became the Temple Mount. Although the nation of Israel had been somewhat established and the tribal lands of inheritance had long since been assigned, according to the vine typology, if they would have stopped there, this would have only completed their *physical* gathering. The full planting of God's chosen people in their promised land requires a *spiritual* gathering as well. As mentioned previously, according to Exodus 15:17, this would have never taken place unless the temple had been erected. Therefore, the kingdom of Israel was not fully established (and will not be in modern times) until the temple was (or is) built and dedicated. Their King could not fully claim his right to the throne until a "footstool" for the throne of their Heavenly King was built.

That is not to say, as I have suggested above and as Kunin would argue, that the Temple Mount has a contextual sacrality—that it was only after the building of the Temple that the site became holy. Rather, this actually serves to *solidify* its sacral character, once again illustrating the reason for the city's sanctity within the Jewish consciousness. Maimonides (1135–1204 C.E.), who has been characterized as "the most illustrious figure in Judaism in the post-talmudic era, and one of the greatest of all time,"[45] strongly concurs that the city has carried intrinsic holiness since the morning and evening that became known as "the first day" (Genesis 1:5). He summarized this chain of sacred events as follows:

> By a universal tradition, we know that the Temple which David and Solomon built stood on the site of Araunah's threshing floor; and that is the place where Abraham had built an altar to sacrifice his son Isaac; and that is where Noah built an altar when he emerged from his ark; and that Cain and Abel offered sacrifices on the altar there, and that Adam offered a sacrifice there when he was created, and that indeed, it was from that spot that he was created . . . and why do I say that the original sanctity of the Temple and Jerusalem applies forever? Because it stems from the Divine Presence, and the Divine Presence is never abrogated.[46]

This brief summary of several events from the ancient past—from before God created the world until the construction of Solomon's Temple—has again solidified the continual sanctity of the Temple Mount throughout Jewish history.

DESTRUCTION & EXILE, RETURN & REBUILDING

Following the death of Solomon in 921 B.C.E., the northern tribes of Israel declared themselves independent from the Davidic Dynasty of the southern tribes. The northern Kingdom was continually

plagued with internal and external turbulence, and exactly two hundred years later, they were destroyed and taken captive by the Assyrian Empire. The Assyrians were known for their policy of trans-population, which is exporting one population and importing a replacement set of immigrants. The southern Kingdom of Judah had submitted to Assyria rather than fight. Therefore, they were spared a similar fate and remained somewhat autonomous for the time being. However, one hundred thirty-five years later (586 B.C.E., almost four hundred years since David moved the Israelite capital to Jerusalem and Solomon constructed the religious icon par excellence), the city fell to the Babylonians led by King Nebuchadnezzar, and the Temple was left in ruins.

> And he [Nebuchadnezzar] carried out thence all the treasures of the house of the LORD, and the treasures of the king's house, and cut in pieces all the vessels of gold which Solomon king of Israel had made in the temple of the LORD, as the LORD had said. And he carried away all Jerusalem, and all the princes, and all the mighty men of valour, [even] ten thousand captives, and all the craftsmen and smiths: none remained, save the poorest sort of the people of the land. (2 Kings 24:13–14)

Thus, not only was the city and the Temple destroyed, but the majority of the population was exiled to Babylon.

The lament of Lamentations centers in and around the Babylonian exile. Two themes dominate the text: the mourning of the pathetic condition of the Israelites and the yearning to return to their Promised Land. "The ways of Zion do mourn, because none come to the solemn feasts: all her gates are desolate: her priests sigh, her virgins are afflicted, and she [is] in bitterness" (Lamentations 1:4, emphasis added). Why were none able to come to the solemn feats? The answer is that there was no temple in which they could perform the sacrificial rites associated with the festivals. The female in the verse is the city of Jerusalem, and that very dilemma—not being able to completely live the law exactly as it was revealed to Moses because there is no temple—still faces the Jews today. As if that was not bad enough, "The adversary hath spread out his hand upon all her pleasant things: for she hath seen [that] *the heathen entered into her sanctuary*, whom thou didst command [that] they should not enter into thy congregation" (Lamentations 1:10, emphasis added). The sentiment of the loss of the Temple is further presented in the following verses:

> And he hath violently taken away his tabernacle, as [if it were of] a garden: he hath destroyed his places of the assembly: the LORD hath caused the solemn feasts and sabbaths to be forgotten in Zion, and hath despised in the indignation of his anger the king and the priest. The LORD hath cast off his altar, he hath abhorred his sanctuary, he hath given up into the hand of the enemy the walls of her palaces; they have made a noise in the house of the LORD, as in the day of a solemn feast. (Lamentations 2:6–7)

The defeat and deportation of many people within the southern Kingdom was a tremendous blow in and of itself, but nothing wrenched their hearts more than the desecration and destruction of the Temple. The bitter irony here is that it was Israel's own God that was responsible for the defeat because of his extreme displeasure with their actions. In other words, they were unable to save that which meant the most to them because they had already desecrated it.

Amidst the changes that took place culturally and religiously amongst the Jews during the next sixty years in Babylon, one thing never changed: their yearning to see the Temple rebuilt. Certainly there were many who had grown accustomed to life in a foreign land and who were as content to remain there as return, but this attitude did not reflect the majority. By 538 B.C.E., Cyrus II of Persia had established the largest empire in the Near East to that point, and he defeated the Babylonians without shedding one drop of blood. The Persian rulers were much more beneficent and humane to their subjects and even allowed local autonomy and freedom of religion. The Bible records that

> in the first year of Cyrus king of Persia, that the word of the Lord [spoken] by the mouth of Jeremiah might be accomplished, the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia, that he made a proclamation throughout all his kingdom, and [put it] also in writing, saying, Thus saith Cyrus king of Persia, All the kingdoms of the earth hath the Lord God of heaven given me; and he hath charged me to build him an house in Jerusalem, which [is] in Judah. Who [is there] among you of all his people? The Lord his God [be] with him, and let him go up. (2 Chronicles 36:22–23)

According to Galbraith, Skinner, and Ogden, authors of *Jerusalem: the Eternal City*, "few events in all of ancient Near Eastern history can parallel in

importance the events that Cyrus set in motion."[47] The first chapter of the Book of Ezra indicates that the primary concern of the exiles upon returning was the Temple. As soon as they set foot in the city they immediately ascended the Temple Mount, rebuilt the altar, and resumed all the sacrificial rites: "From the first day of the seventh month began they to offer burnt offerings unto the LORD. But the foundation of the temple of the LORD was not [yet] laid" (Ezra 3:6). Even before they built homes for their own families, they began work on rebuilding the most important house of all.

The work on the Temple was antagonized by the Samaritans, who wanted to participate but were rejected by the Jews. The Samaritans, remnants of the northern tribes, were viewed as nothing more than half-breeds who had intermarried with the Assyrian peoples imported into the area when the Israelite tribes were deported to the north. The Samaritans took their issues to the courts but were eventually defeated by King Darius himself. Following a search for the original proclamation of his father (Cyrus), Darius decreed, "Let the work of this house of God alone; let the governor of the Jews and the elders of the Jews build this house of God in his place" (Ezra 6:7). The work then continued, and the Temple was constructed under the leadership of Zerubbabel. Unfortunately, the structure wasn't nearly as impressive or beautiful as its predecessor. Nonetheless, exactly seventy years after their exile they completed the building, and the dedication took place in 515 B.C.E. Assuming Josephus's statement about the Temple of Melchizedek to be true, Zerubbabel's Temple would become at least the third formal structure to grace the Temple Mount and once again firmly established God's people in their land of divine inheritance.

The last of the Hebrew prophets was Malachi (c. 400 B.C.E.). He indicated that by this time temple worship had become entirely corrupted: "But ye are departed out of the way; ye have caused many to stumble at the law; ye have corrupted the covenant of Levi, saith the Lord of hosts" (Malachi 2:8). Nonetheless, with very few exceptions, for the next four hundred seventy years, the Temple Mount remained in Jewish hands. This was a time of significant changes within the Jewish faith, most of which are well out of the scope of this article. Hellenistic cultural influences, the creation of the governing body of elders that would later become the Sanhedrin, changes in the priesthood lines of succession, the evolution of a number of Jewish sects, and the emergence of the synagogue all played key roles in Jewish life during these years. In 20 B.C.E. Herod, famous for his building programs throughout the Holy Land, began an incredible construction project on the Temple Mount that would last nearly eighty years. During his lifetime, he nearly doubled the size of the Temple Mount through a massive landscaping project and completely re-constructed Zerubbabel's Temple. By the time it was finished, "no other temple complex in the Graeco-Roman world compared with it in expansiveness and magnificence."[48] It even surpassed Solomon's Temple, but unfortunately its physical prowess did little to add anything of spiritual significance.

Amidst the ever-changing face of the religion and the landscape, Jerusalem remained the center of Judaism politically and spiritually. That the Temple maintained its sacred status can be seen in the life of Paul the apostle: he was almost killed by the Jews, because they *thought* he had brought a Gentile into the Temple precincts (Acts 21:26–30). Nevertheless, the city as a whole remained relatively stable until about 55 C.E. A band of assassins, known as the Sicarii, initiated fifteen years of political and miliary upheaval in Jerusalem and the cities in the Judean countryside. By the summer of 69 C.E., the Jews found themselves in a full-scale revolt against the Roman Empire. The following year, the most powerful Roman legions were sent in to squelch the rebellion. By mid-August, the Romans sieged the Temple Mount, and on August twenty-eighth (the ninth of Ab), they burned the holy sanctuary to the ground. Notice especially the reaction of the Jews in Josephus's summary.

> As the Temple burned, frenzy gripped both attackers and defenders. Roman shock troops burst through, and Titus was able to dash into the Temple just long enough for brief look; then heat forced him out. His soldiers continued burning whatever could be kindled, and killing all they could reach, whether combatants, women, or children. *Many Jews flung themselves into the fire and perished with their Temple.* Others, hiding in corners, were burned to death as Roman torches set new flames. [Emphasis added][49]

Within a month, the upper and lower portions of the city were razed to the ground, and the inhabitants were either massacred or taken captive. The only parts of the entire Temple Mount left intact were the huge retaining walls that supported the forty acre platform. One of those walls is the southern most section of the western retaining wall, which serves as an outdoor synagogue today, a place where Jewish

pilgrims come to worship, mourn the loss of the Temple, and pray for its rebuilding. These lamentations led to its nickname—The Wailing Wall.

The ninth of Ab subsequently came to be an annual day of mourning. It has also come to be associated with several other devastating events, such as the day in which Solomon's Temple was destroyed by the Babylonians: "Grief greater than words could express afflicted the faithful as they recalled what had been the fate of their temple and its defenders. Some rabbis were said to have suffered permanent facial wounds, so furrowed were their cheeks by tears shed for the temple. . . . A sorrow that seemed to grow with passing generations became part of the memorial of the vanished temple."[50] When the city is glorified, it is glorified because of the Temple. When it is mourned, it is mourned because of the Temple. There has been no mourning like this expressed for the loss of any other city or religious shrine. The only thing that might come close in comparing with such sorrowful sentiments is Yom ha'Shoah, or Holocaust Day, in which the six million victims of Hitler's genocide are remembered each year. "My heart is in the East [where the Jerusalem is and the Temple should be], while I remain in the depths of the West," wrote the twelfth-century Jewish poet Judah Halevi. Truly, there is simply nothing that adequately compares to the yearnings for the Temple.

LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE

As we have seen so far, the reason for the incomparable adulation by the Jewish people for Jerusalem is unquestionably a result of the Temple. It would be expected that the future hopes and dreams for such a city centers around it as well. The prophecies of such prominent Jewish prophets as Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Zecharia, and others provide some of the most vivid examples of Judaism's eschatological and esoteric aspects. According to Leibowitz, "all the prophets share the expectation of an exalted future for Jerusalem—a loftiness which includes both physical splendor and a sublime religious–spiritual significance."[51] Though most modern Jews don't concern themselves with such prophecies, they are nonetheless real and therefore impact the Jewish consciousness just as much as the legends and traditions of the past. Just as the historic statements link the Temple with Jerusalem, so also the prophetic utterances inseparably connect the two. Additionally, the prophesies include a unique aspect—the long-awaited Messiah.

Speaking of the Messiah, Zechariah prophesied, "And speak unto him, saying, Thus speaketh the LORD of hosts, saying, Behold the man whose name [is] The Branch; and he shall grow up out of his place, and he shall build the temple of the LORD: Even he shall build the temple of the LORD; and he shall bear the glory, and shall sit and rule upon his throne; and he shall be a priest upon his throne: and the counsel of peace shall be between them both" (Zechariah 6:12–13). In contrast to bringing about the city's destruction and the people's exile, as He did when the Babylonians conquered it, in the last days, a Messianic figure will arise and lead the construction of the final Temple. In his concluding statements, Zechariah wrote that the Lord would step forward as Israel's battle master and bring peace to the city: "And it shall be in that day, [that] living waters shall go out from Jerusalem; half of them toward the former sea, and half of them toward the hinder sea: in summer and in winter shall it be. And the Lord shall be king over all the earth: in that day shall there be one Lord, and his name one. . . . And [men] shall dwell in it, and there shall be no more utter destruction; but Jerusalem shall be safely inhabited" (Zechariah 14:8–11). Just as the vine of Israel provides the world with nourishment when it is planted in the holy ground of the Temple Mount, the establishment of the city and its Temple provides order and peace to the entire world.

As mentioned previously, Ezekiel also discussed the concept of living and healing waters which flow forth from the Temple:

> These waters issue out toward the east country, and go down into the desert, and go into the sea: [which being] brought forth into the sea, the waters shall be healed. And it shall come to pass, [that] every thing that liveth, which moveth, whithersoever the rivers shall come, shall live: and there shall be a very great multitude of fish, because these waters shall come thither: for they shall be healed; and every thing shall live whither the river cometh. (Ezekiel 47:8–9).

As a matter of fact, a significant amount of Ezekiel's writing deals directly with his tour or vision of what turns out to be veritable blueprints for this magnificent structure that is yet to be built (Ezekiel 40–44). Clearly both he and the Lord are very concerned with this future edifice yet to be built. Lastly, from the prophet Malachi comes this powerful statement: "Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall

suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight in: behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts" (Malachi 3:1). As he appeared on Mount Sinai to Moses and the seventy elders of Israel when the nation of Israel was born, the Lord will personally visit the final Temple to establish his people once and for all. Simply put, every major event associated with the last days—the final wars, the coming of a Messiah, the judgment day, and the resurrection—are all intertwined with reestablishment of the last Temple.

CONCLUSION

Jerusalem is one of the most intriguing cities in the world. It is uniquely held sacred by three of the world's great religions. Historians have suggested that more blood has been spilt over this city than any other. Even today, it is the impossible barrier to peace between the Arab-Palestinians and Israelis. The city is also unique, because, in the midst of the turmoil and centuries of Diaspora, and perhaps even to a certain extent because of it, it has maintained its sacral character within the Jewish psyche. In fact, if one has lost their bearings and is in doubt as to which direction they should pray, "then they should incline their hearts towards the Holy of Holies."[52] Jewish traditions provide ample evidence to support the idea that the past, present, and future of Jerusalem are bound up in the establishment of the Temple. According to Jewish theology, in the last days God's chosen people will once again build a temple on Mount Zion, which will coincide with the coming of the long-awaited Messiah. This will usher in an era, which will finally fulfill the city's long-awaited destiny to live up to its name-sake—The City of Peace.

ENDNOTES

[1] I must take a moment to make clear one vital point regarding Judaism in general. It should be understood at the outset that in discussing the significance of the city of Jerusalem to Jewish people, in no way do I assume or assert that all Jews feel the same way. I learned early on in my Judaic studies that to ask the question "What do the Jews believe about such and such?" is extremely open-ended and subject to any number of responses—not very wise to say the least. It would be much more proper to ask, "What do halachic Jews believe about such and such?" I know of only one dogma that is universal among all Jews, and beyond that, everything becomes subjective. The single belief held in common by all Jews is this: there is a God. Therefore, let me make it clear that when I speak of the sentiment of the Jewish people towards anything, I am speaking in very broad terms, but particularly of religious or orthodox Jews. If this paper were written in the 1600s, perhaps I could speak generally with a little more confidence, but after the major movements such as Hasidism, the Enlightenment, and the Reform, beginning a statement with "Jews believe . . . ," or "Jewish people feel that . . . ," has become more or less impossible.

[2] "Jerusalem," *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1972), 9:1556.

[3] David Goldstein, *Jewish Legends* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1996), 15.

[4] Ibid., 15.

[5] "Jerusalem," 9:1553.

[6] Louis Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946–1947), 1:49–50.

[7] C.T.R. Hayward, *The Jewish Temple: A Non-Biblical Sourcebook* (London: Routledge, 1996), 159–60.

[8] Ibid., 160–61.

[9] Ibid., 167.

[10] Ibid., 28.

[11] John M. Lundquist, *The Temple: Meeting Place of Heaven and Earth* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1993), 6.

[12] Ibid., 6–7, 11.

[13] Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1987), 44–45 (cf. 65).

[14] Ibid., 44, emphasis added.

[15] "Jerusalem," 9:1558–59. Bracketed "foundation stone" defined in the original.

[16] For further arguments, see Seth D. Kunin, *God's Place in the World: Sacred Space and Sacred Place in Judaism* (New York: Cassell, 1998), 38; see also Hayward, 176 n. 7.

[17] Eliade, 44.

[18] Ginzberg,, 5:14.

[19] Kunin, 38–42.

[20] Lundquist, *The Temple*, 6 (cf. 6–10); see also Donald W. Parry, ed., *Temples of the Ancient World* (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1994), 86.

[21] Donald W. Parry, "Garden of Eden: Prototype Sanctuary," in *Temples of the Ancient World*, 136–37.
[22] Matthew B. Brown, *The Gate of Heaven: Insights on the Doctrines and Symbols of the Temple* (American Fork, Utah: Covenant Communications, 1999), 112.
[23] Eliade, 12. *Hierophany* is a term coined by Mircea Eliade to describe an object in the physical world, which, for whatever reason, is revealed as sacred. Thus a stone may be simply a stone to one person, while to another, it reveals something divine or transcendent.
[24] Ginzberg, 5:39.
[25] *The Jewish Encyclopedia* (London: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1901), 1:177.
[26] *Encyclopedia of Freemasonry* (London: Masonic History Co., 1921), 1:15.
[27] Hayward, 90.
[28] Parry, "Garden of Eden," 137.
[29] Hayward, 95.
[30] David B. Galbraith, D. Kelley Ogden, and Andrew C. Skinner, *Jerusalem: The Eternal City* (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1996), 35 n. 12.
[31] Ibid., 27.
[32] Ibid., 35 n. 12.
[33] Josephus, *Wars of the Jews*, 6.10.1. Brackets are original, emphasis added.
[34] Goldstein, 57.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid., 58.
[37] Galbraith, 35 n. 9.
[38] Haran, as quoted by Parry, in "Garden of Eden," 144–45.
[39] Galbraith et al., 8 n. 4.
[40] Lundquist, *The Temple*, 7.
[41] de Vries, as quoted by John M. Lundquist in "What Is a Temple? A Preliminary Typology," in *Temples of the Ancient World*, 90.
[42] John M. Lundquist, "The Legitimizing Role of the Temple," in *Temples of the Ancient World*, 180.
[43] "Jerusalem," 9:1550.
[44] Ibid., 9:1550.
[45] Ibid., 11:754.
[46] Qtd. in Galbraith et al., 9 n. 25.
[47] Ibid., 119.
[48] Ibid., 186.
[49] Ibid., 215.
[50] Ibid., 217.
[51] "Jerusalem," 9:1551.
[52] Goldstein, 13.

Who Are the Non-Respondents?

A Deterministic Approach to Modeling Non-Response in Exit Polls

A Collaborative Project
By Students in Dr. Magleby's
Political Science 317 Class*

While exit polls have come under scrutiny, especially since the recent election cycle, one area that has not been adequately studied is the effect of non-response on their accuracy. We use a unique dataset to measure whether individuals who refuse to respond to an exit poll systematically differ from respondents. We find that the voter's age and race impact their likelihood to not respond. We also find that, despite previous finding to the contrary, the time of day does not influence response rates when the respondent's demographic characteristics are controlled for. If an individual's race and age are correlates of their vote choice, then higher levels of non-response are likely to bias survey results.

Exit polls are surveys of selected voters as they leave the voting place. These studies generally collect information on how people voted, political attitudes, and demographics. News organizations use these data to predict election results and scholars use them to study patterns of voting behavior. Exit polls generally provide accurate predictions within a reasonable margin of error. Like all survey instruments, getting good results from an exit poll requires a survey design that reduces systematic biases, the successful implementation of the study, and the proper interpretation of the results. As the recent presidential elections demonstrate, failure in any one of these areas will compromise the poll's ability to correctly predict the election winner. For example, the Voter News Service poll's predictions for Gore's vote share in Florida was too high because it underestimated the number of absentee voters and used the wrong model to predict turnout when designing its sample.[†]

Pollsters use scientific sampling techniques that include some aspect of random selection to prevent any group from being under-represented in the sample. These techniques, if used correctly, ensure that pollsters contact a sample of voters that is representative of the larger voting pool. However, those individuals who choose not to respond to a survey will always be under-represented in a survey, no matter how well the sample is designed. The exclusion of the non-respondents' opinions would not impact an exit poll's results if non-response were random, i.e., if there were no differences in opinion between respondents and non-respondents. However, studies have shown that non-response is not random; certain groups are less likely to respond to surveys than are others.

Systematic non-response is problematic for pollsters unless controlled for by advanced statistical methods (Holt & Elliot 1991; Filion 1975–76) because systematic variation in response rates between groups will systematically bias a poll's results if the characteristics influencing the decision to respond also influence how the individuals vote. For example, exit polls predicted that George Bush's margin of victory over Pat Buchanan in the 1992 New Hampshire Republican Primary would be only a few points. The final ballot count gave Bush a 16% margin. Bush's predicted vote total was suppressed because Bush voters were less likely to respond to

*Matt Singer, C.W. Ross, Elizabeth Esty, Jim Jeffries, Beth Snell, Brigham Cannon, Brant Lillywhite, Doug Devore, Jessica Steed, Steve Christensen, Brianne Bogumill, Brent Stoddard, Aaron Renfro, and Brooke Ollerton.
Thanks to Drs. Magleby and Patterson for their encouragement and help.
†For a summary of the errors made in creating the VNS sample and in the mathematical models used to interpret its results, see Kurtz 2000. See Traugott & Price 1992, Clymer 1989, and Fienberg & Murray 2000 for other examples of biased exit polls.

exit polls than Buchanan voters (Fienberg & Murray 2000). Because the respondents and non-respondents systematically differed in a way that was correlated with how they voted, the failure to correct for the impact of non-response on the survey's results biased its predictions. This is not an isolated incident; Fienberg & Murray (2000) document several other recent examples when variations in response rates between groups might explain the incorrect predictions of exit polls.

Because non-response bias is of concern to all surveyors, there has been considerable scholarship about the causes of non-response and the differences between non-respondents and respondents. However, these studies of non-response have been limited to telephone, mail-in, and face-to-face studies; there has been only limited scholarship on the characteristics of non-response in exit polls and the potential biases that non-response might introduce to exit poll results. In the 2000 KBYU/Utah College Exit Poll, we collected data on the demographic characteristics of non-respondents to correct for this deficiency. Using this unique dataset, we show that non-respondents in exit polls differ systematically from respondents in ways that potentially alter the accuracy of the data exit pollsters collect.

CAUSES OF NON-RESPONSE

Non-response is part of a larger problem of undercoverage bias. Scholars of non-response have categorized non-respondents as individuals who refuse to answer a survey's questions, who lack the ability to respond, or who are inaccessible to the researcher (Cooper & Yu 1983, 36). In the case of an exit poll, those individuals who vote by mail are, by definition, inaccessible to the pollster. Their exclusion is a continual bias in exit polls and one that researchers take into consideration when analyzing a poll's results. The VNS uses phone surveys and previous election returns to predict the number and content of absentee ballots. For the purpose of this study, we define a "non-respondent" as a voter who either refuses to respond or who is not able to respond. The pollster has access to these individuals but they all decline to participate when selected to receive a survey.

Studies of non-response have focused on whether or not there is a "hard-core" group of non-respondents in the population who, due to personal attributes, are more inclined to refuse to participate. There are several schools of thought on what cognitive processes might cause people to respond to surveys (Groves, Cialdini & Couper 1992). We propose that a general framework for this discussion is that survey participation, like voting, is an act that has tangible costs (time and hassle) and no apparent benefits; a single opinion does not determine a poll's outcome. Just as voters perceive that they receive intangible benefits from voting (from complying with a personal or societal norm of civic participation or from "making your voice heard," for example), survey respondents also weigh the costs of participating in a survey, such as the intangible benefits that they can receive by feeling that they are helpful, feeling that they have contributed to the poll's results, or supporting the survey's sponsor.

The reasons individuals give for choosing to respond or not to a survey provide evidence in support of this theory. The most common reasons given for refusing to respond to surveys are concerns with the cost of participating (concerns with individual privacy, fear that information will not be kept confidential, a lack of time, survey length, personal illness or stress) and beliefs that there is no benefit from participating (worries that the survey is actually a marketing ploy or beliefs that their response is inconsequential) (DeMaio 1980; Goyder 1987; Brehm 1993; Groves, Cialdini & Couper 1992). Other research has also found that conscientiousness or a sense of civic duty, a willingness to be helpful, and pleasurable association with the questionnaire's source make people more willing to respond (Pace 1939; Clausen & Ford 1947). Just as the theories predict, non-respondents cite relative costs while respondents cite social benefits and norms.

Empirical research, much of it conduced in controlled experimental settings, has isolated several factors that influence the decision to participate in a survey. These include the survey's methodology, the survey's content, the context in which the survey is administered (inside or outside, urban or rural area, time of day, survey length, etc.), and the respondent's socio-economic status. A model of costs and benefits potentially unites these factors into concerns of costs and benefits.

The way in which a survey is administered influences response rates. Face-to-face interviews have the highest response rates, while telephone surveys and mail-in surveys have lower response rates (Weisberg et al. 1996, 121). Face-to-face and telephone surveys have higher response rates than mail-in surveys because participation is limited to answering questions instead of mailing a questionnaire. Because face-to-face and telephone surveys are less inconvenient for the respondent, the costs of participating are lower. Mail-in survey non-respondents cite

inconvenience as their reason for not completing the questionnaire 81% of the time, four times more frequently than they cite the survey's content (Goyder 1987, 138). The percentage of non-respondents who refuse to respond because of inconvenience drops to 63% in face-to-face interviews and to 55% in telephone surveys.

The survey's content also influences response rates. People are more likely to respond to a survey on a subject in which they are interested. Individuals are also more likely to respond to a survey if it addresses an issue about which they feel strongly, or if they identify with, or trust the survey's sponsor (Groves, Cialdini & Couper 1992). This has serious implications for interpreting survey results: if survey respondents are more interested in a given topic than non-respondents are, then respondents are not representative of their social class, and variations in response rates suppress the true magnitude of opinion differences between groups (Brehm 1993, 186).

The context in which voters receive the survey influences non-response rate by influencing the cost calculations of voters. For example, non-response might be more frequent in precincts where the exit poll is administered outside or in bad weather conditions than in precincts where the pollster is stationed indoors because potential respondents are less willing to fill out a questionnaire if it requires becoming cold or wet. These factors should influence non-response rates among all demographic groups and in all types of surveys.

In Utah, there is no law about where organizations can conduct polls as long as they do not hamper the voting process. Generally, our goal is to place our pollsters just inside the doorway of the building where voting is occurring in order to keep them and the respondents warm while they take the poll. However, where pollsters are located at any given voting location is at the discretion of the election officials at each precinct. Often, these officials request pollsters be located outside the building or in the parking lot, citing concerns with pollsters disrupting the voting process or potentially compromising the secrecy of the voting decision. One might suspect that pollsters at any given polling station are equally likely to be inside or outside and that this is independent of the characteristics of the precinct. If the location of the pollster is random, then increases in non-response due to being outside will have no systematic impact on the survey's accuracy. If, however, the ideological characteristics of a precinct are related to the ideological characteristics of the election official, and if the ideological characteristics of the election official are related to his or her propensity to refuse to allow pollsters to be inside the building where polling is taking place, then increased non-response at precincts where the poll is conducted outside will bias the results.

Likewise, the time of day might influence non-response rates, with people being less willing to respond in the morning when they are rushing to work and in the evening when they stop at the polling place after work and are in a rush to go home. If the time of day influences non-response in an exit poll, then there is a systematic bias because different groups of voters vote at different times (Busch & Lieske 1985).

Despite the fact that it is one of the most commonly cited excuses, there is some debate as to whether the length of the survey impacts non-response. Some studies have found that survey length has a slight, negative effect on response rates; increasing survey length increases non-response (Brown 1965; Dillman, Reynolds & Rockwood 1991; Sletto 1940). Conversely, other research has shown that there is no relationship between the two factors (Heberlein & Baumgartner 1978; Scott 1961). Because an individual can only be certain of a survey's length once he or she has accepted it, we think that it is likely that a survey's length influences only the probability of an individual not completing it once they have accepted it instead of influencing the probability that an individual will not accept it at all. However, in the KBYU survey, all the forms appear to be the same length, so we cannot test this proposition.

One significant contextual factor is whether the person is contacted in a rural or urban area. A Census Bureau Survey found that "rural people were significantly more likely to cooperate than were urban dwellers" (DeMaio 1980, 229).[1] Charlotte Steeh likewise found that the lowest refusal rates were obtained in small towns and the highest in large metropolitan centers (1981, 46). One reason for why those that live in urban areas are less willing to be interviewed is that they generally are busier and live in areas with higher crime rates (Brehm 1993, 35).

Another contextual factor, emphasized by Groves, et al. (1992), is the interaction between the respondent and the interviewer. They theorize that an individual's likelihood of not responding depends more upon the characteristics of the interviewer that approaches him or her than the interviewer's technique. People are more positively disposed to people whom they perceive to be like them. Studies of "social desirability" have shown that an interviewer's

[1] The Census Bureau's definitions are: "urban" comprises all persons living in urbanized areas and in places of 2,500 or more outside urbanized areas; "rural" includes all the remaining population (DeMaio 1980, 228).

characteristics and demeanor can influence how a subject fills out a survey. In races between a white and a black, white individuals contacted by a black pollster are more likely to report that they voted for the black candidate even if they did not (Traugott & Price 1992; Davis 1997; Anderson et al. 1988). Likewise, the interviewer's characteristics and techniques influence whether or not an individual is likely to respond to the survey. While this theory is beyond the scope of this paper, its central tenet is that similarity of attitude, appearance, background, and dress between the interviewer and the subject will lead to more willing compliance by respondents (see Groves, Cialdini & Couper 1992, 484, for a summary of the literature; see also Singer et al. 1983). We will test this theory in a subsequent work.

Most other theories about non-respondents link non-response tendencies to socio-economic status because education, wealth, and group experiences are linked to feelings of efficacy and of civic responsibility. These factors also influence response rates by affecting interest in a given survey's content or sponsor, as we explained previously. However, while theorists focus on socio-economic variables, empirical studies generally focus on the demographics of non-respondents. This is, in part, due to the ease with which researchers can observe and measure these characteristics of non-respondents, an important consideration when the subject is unwilling to give any information. For example, because we can observe the non-respondent's race and not his or her socio-economic status, race must serve as a proxy for all the causal variables with which it is correlated. Plus, demographic characteristics are related to the social groupings, the socialization processes, and thus often the variables that socioeconomic theories emphasize. Scholars have focused on three characteristics that potentially influence response rates:

Age: Several studies have shown that response rates decline as age increases (DeMaio 1980; Herzog & Rodgers 1988). Goyder hypothesizes that older individuals are less likely to respond because they have less education and less personal efficacy than younger individuals (1987, 85). It is also possible that older voters are less likely to respond because older voters have more difficulty filling out the forms than younger voters (Brehm 1993, 50).

Gender: Studies between an individual's gender and the likelihood of response have produced conflicting results. Brehm's historical data show that since sampling methods switched from quota sampling to probability sampling, there have been declining proportions of men represented in surveys (1993). He speculates that this is due to the fact that "men are slightly less likely to be contacted than women, as well as more likely to refuse" (1993, 31). However, in their experiment with telephone surveys, Dillman, Gallegos & Frey do not find a significant relationship between the sex of the respondent and the likelihood of non-response (1976).

Race: Whites are less likely to respond than any other race (Brehm 1993). One possible explanation is that traditionally suppressed or disenfranchised minorities are more likely to be concerned with having their opinions heard, which increases the perceived benefits from responding to a survey. Blacks have higher response rates than Hispanics, possibly due to language barriers (Brehm 1993, 186).

These three potential causes of non-response are important because each of them is also correlated with differences in voting behavior: blacks vote differently than whites (Bolce et al. 1993; Williams & Edy 1999), men vote differently than women (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999), and older voters vote differently than younger voters (Center for Political Studies, 1996; Friedman et al. 1972). Hence, systematic non-response in any of these groups causes bias.

This is only a short summary of the numerous studies and speculations on non-response. We have previously discussed how a model using costs and benefits can potentially unite the previous findings on non-response in other survey types. However, it is not clear from these findings which factors have greater influence on whether an individual responds to a survey. It is possible that individuals compare the costs to the potential benefits, only consider the costs, or only consider the benefits. It is also possible that different groups weigh these costs differently. For example, the population studied in an exit poll consists entirely of voters, individuals who have already exhibited socially conscious behavior by choosing to vote. Hence, these individuals view intangible benefits differently than their non-voting peers, which could dilute the influence of some social costs.

In our study, the survey's content (political behavior) is a constant, as is its methodology. However, our data allow us to examine several questions about non-respondents. First, do demographic factors influence response rates? Second, do contextual factors influence response rates? Third, if both demographic factors and contextual factors influence response rates, which has the larger impact? Fourth, if there is systematic non-response, in what direction does that non-response potentially bias a poll's results?

RESEARCH DESIGN

The data for this project comes from the 2000 Utah Colleges Exit Poll. Political science and statistics students at Brigham Young University have collaborated to design a sample of Utah voters in every election cycle since 1982. We use the exit poll's data to predict election results for KBYU television and to study voter characteristics and behavioral trends in the state of Utah. David B. Magleby and Howard Christensen chair the project.

The Utah College Exit Poll is a multistage stratified random sample. There are 28 counties in Utah; we include 9 of those counties[†] automatically in the sample because excluding these largest counties would automatically bias our results and because there is a university in these counties from which we draw our pool of interviewers. To select the rest of the sample, we stratify the remaining counties by the percentage of the votes in the previous election that were cast for Democrats and select nine additional counties[‡] within their strata by probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling, weighting each one by its estimated voter turnout. We take another PPS sample of the polling places within each county to determine the locations at which we would poll. Through this process, 93 precincts are selected for the sample. We design our sample to poll approximately 100 people per precinct, dividing the estimated voter turnout at each precinct by 100 to obtain the sampling interval for each precinct, with the initial voter selected at random.

Our sample instrument is a legal-sized, one-page, two-column questionnaire. There are five versions of the questionnaire; four of the five are double sided. This questionnaire is long by exit poll standards. All five versions begin with questions about how the respondent voted and end with demographic questions. The four double-sided questionnaires also contain a series of questions measuring the voter's attitudes on policy concerns and testing models of voting behavior. The remaining questionnaire consists of only the voting and demographic questions.

The questionnaire also contains a box marked "official use only." In this box, the interviewer records the time of the interview, the interviewer's ID number, and the precinct at which the pollster contacted the voter. Interviewers also record information about the characteristics of non-respondents in this box.

Students from nine Utah colleges participated as interviewers, with 250 coming from BYU and another 300 coming from the other colleges. The majority of these students were undergraduates in political science. All interviewers attended a training session about interviewer responsibilities, interviewing techniques, and how to answer questions asked by voters. Instruction was provided via PowerPoint and video. In these training sessions, role-plays were used to help the interviewers practice approaching voters. The interviewers also received an instruction sheet that contained a script for contacting the voter (see appendix).

In most cases, three interviewers were assigned to each polling site.[§] On Election Day, the interviewer contacted each designated voter and asked if he or she would be willing to participate in the study. If the voter accepted, he or she was given one of the five questionnaires to fill out. If he or she refused, then his or her questionnaire was marked "non-response" and left blank. For the purpose of our analysis, only voters who refused to accept a questionnaire are considered non-responses; partial responses are included with questionnaires that were completed because the respondent was initially willing to participate.

The interviewer recorded information about the non-respondent's age, gender, race, his or her attitude, and what reason the individual gave for not responding in the "official use only" box. We restricted the categories of age to 18–40 years, 40–60, and above 60 because we wanted to make judgment of the non-respondents' ages as simple as possible for the interviewers. Similarly, we restricted the categories of race to white and non-white to make judging the respondent's race easier for the interviewer and because Utah's population is not very ethnically diverse; according to the 2000 U.S. Census, whites make up 88% of Utah's population, with Hispanics comprising 7% and other minorities comprising less than 5% (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Hence we felt that the most important dynamic would be white/non-white.

We also collected data on three contextual variables. The first was whether the interviewers were stationed inside or outside the polling place. We gathered this data from a questionnaire the interviewers completed describing their experience. To compare the response rates in urban areas to those in rural areas, we coded counties as either predominantly urban or rural. The interviewers recorded the time of the interview to the nearest 15 minutes in the "official use only" box; we coded the interviews as "morning" (interviews that occurred between 7:00 A.M. and 12:45 P.M.), "afternoon" (1:00 to 4:45 P.M.), and "evening" (after 5:00 P.M.).

[†]Cache, Salt Lake, Utah, Weber, Davis, Washington, Carbon, Sanpete, and Iron Counties.
[‡]In the 2000 sample, Millard, Box Elder, Tooele, Kane, Sevier, Uintah, Duchesne, Wasatch, Summit were selected.
[§]Several participating universities were only able to provide interviewers to work in shifts at their assigned precincts, so these precincts had a different combinations of pollsters throughout the day. We will be examining the causes of non-response from the interviewer side in a subsequent work.

DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1 summarizes our data about the number of respondents and non-respondents in each demographic and contextual category. From this information, we calculate the non-response rates by dividing the number of individuals in that category who did not respond by the total number of individuals in that category who were contacted. In doing so, we control for the number of contacted individuals in each group.

TABLE 1:
NON-RESPONSE RATES BY DEMOGRAPHIC CATEGORIES AND BY CONTEXT

Variable	Category	Number of respondents	Number of non-respondents	Non-response rate
Gender	female	3128	1605	0.34
	male	3066	1536	0.33
Age	18-40	2750	1286	0.32
	40-60	2293	1553	0.4
	60+	794	895	0.53
Race	white	5723	3337	0.37
	other	428	127	0.23
Where Polled	inside	4315	2402	0.36
	outside	1437	828	0.37
Location	urban	4202	2318	0.36
	rural	2799	1634	0.37
Time	morning	2653	1744	0.4
	afternoon	1853	1037	0.36
	evening	2149	1029	0.32
Congressional District	district1	2303	1298	0.36
	district2	2039	1098	0.35
	district3	2794	1481	0.35

The data in Table 1 suggest that there are relationships between non-response rates and race, age, and time of day in the direction the theory predicts. Non-response rates appear to be positively associated with age, negatively associated with the time of day, and higher among whites than non-whites. In Table 2, we test whether these perceived differences in non-response rates between categories of demographic variables are statistically significant with a Z-test, comparing response rates within each variable as proportions.

TABLE 2:
IMPACT OF VARIABLES ON NON-RESPONSE RATES

Variable	Category 1	Category 2	Non-Response Rate Category 1	Non-Response Rate Category 2	Z Statistic
Location	Inside	outside	0.36	0.37	-0.85
Where Polled	Urban	rural	0.36	0.37	-1.07
Time	Morning	afternoon	0.4	0.36	3.45***
	Afternoon	evening	0.36	0.32	3.29***
Congressional District	District 1	District 2	0.36	0.35	0.83
	District 2	District 3	0.35	0.35	0
	District 1	District 3	0.36	0.35	0.89
Gender	Female	male	0.34	0.33	1.02
Age	18-40	40-60	0.37	0.4	-2.74**
	40-60	60+	0.4	0.53	-8.97***
race	White	other	0.37	0.23	7.54***

*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001

Table 2 confirms that non-response rates increase as age increases, with the most frequent non-respondents being more than 60 years old. Likewise, the non-response rate was higher among white voters than among non-white voters. These relationships are the same as those found in studies of non-response to other types of surveys. Hence, it is probable that the same mechanisms that make older individuals and whites less likely to respond to surveys in general are what make them not respond to the exit poll.

Gender was the only demographic variable that did not significantly influence non-response rates. Males and females were equally likely to not respond to the exit poll. Previous studies show that the relationship between gender and the propensity to not respond in other types of surveys was either weak or nonexistent, so this finding is not surprising.

Time of day is the only contextual factor that has a significant impact on non-response. The significance tests confirm that non-response rates are highest in the morning and decline throughout the day. Interestingly, there is no difference between non-response rates at urban and rural polling places, which contradicts previous findings about response rates in other types of surveys. While this finding might be specific to Utah, more analysis is needed to explain why rural polling places have response rates that were just as high as those in urban areas.

There also are no significant differences between response rates at polling places where the interviews were conducted outside and places where interviews were conducted indoors. This finding is surprising because the outdoor temperatures were below freezing for most of Utah on Election Day. Further research is needed to explain why the survey's context did not impact response rates. We also tested to see if response rates differed between

TABLE 3:
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSIDE/OUTSIDE AND NON-RESPONSE,CONTROLLING THE TIME OF DAY

Three Different Time Periods				In/Out		
				Outside	Indside	Total
Morning	RESPONSE	responded	Count	780	1588	2368
			% within in/out	60.3%	59.8%	60.0%
		did not respond	Count	513	1067	1580
			% within in/out	39.7%	40.2%	40.0%
	Total		Count	1293	2655	3948
			% within in/out	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Afternoon	RESPONSE	responded	Count	531	1159	1690
			% within in/out	61.5%	65.7%	64.3%
		did not respond	Count	333	604	937
			% within in/out	38.5%	34.3%	35.7%
	Total		Count	864	1763	2627
			% within in/out	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Evening	RESPONSE	responded	Count	606	1311	1917
			% within in/out	66.9%	67.4%	67.2%
		did not respond	Count	300	634	934
			% within in/out	33.1%	32.6%	32.8%
	Total		Count	906	1945	2851
			% within in/out	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

precincts where polling occurred outside and those where it was done inside throughout the day, with the assumption being that temperatures would be coldest in the morning and evening. The results of that cross-tabulation are in Table 3. Interestingly, significant differences in non-response occurred only in the afternoon, when temperatures would have been highest and contextual-type costs would have been lowest.

These preliminary analyses show that age, race, and the time of day have significant impacts on non-response rates. However, these variables are not independent. For example, older voters are more likely to vote in the morning than at any other time of the day. Table 4 shows how the apparent relationship between the time of day and the non-response rates might be picking up the effect of age on non-response. As the column percentages show, older voters make up a disproportionate amount of the voters contacted in the morning. So, are non-response rates higher in the morning because people are more likely to be busy in the morning than at night, or is it because older voters vote in the morning and the elderly are less likely to respond?

TABLE 4:
WHO WAS CONTACTED: AGE BY TIME OF DAY WHEN CONTATCTED
Three different time periods *AGE3 Crosstabulation

			AGE3			Total
			18-40	40-60	60+	
Three Different time periods	Morning	Count	1283	1501	1001	3785
		% within three different time periods	33.9%	39.7%	26.4%	100.0%
		% within AGE3	33.6%	41.2%	62.4%	41.7%
	Afternoon	Count	1109	1030	397	2536
		% within three different time periods	43.7%	40.6%	15.7%	100.0%
		% within AGE3	29.0%	28.3%	24.8%	28.0%
	Evening	Count	1432	1113	206	2751
		% within three different time periods	52.1%	40.5%	7.5%	100.0%
		% within AGE3	37.4%	30.5%	12.8%	30.3%
Total		Count	3824	3644	1604	9072
		% within three different time periods	42.2%	40.2%	17.7%	100.0%
		% within AGE3	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE 5:
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

Variable name	1	0
Response	If non-response	Otherwise
Inout	Inside	Otherwise
Urban	Urban	Otherwise
Age12	If between the ages 40 and 60	Otherwise
Age13	If over the age of 60	Otherwise
Gender1	Male	Female
Time3	Morning	Otherwise
Time 5	Evening	Otherwise
Race1	White	Otherwise

We use a binomial logistical regression to control for interactions between variables and in order to compare the relative effects of each independent variable on non-response rates. Table 5 lists the variables included in the regression and how we coded each variable. The regressions results are presented in Table 6.

TABLE 6:
LOGISTICAL REGRESSION RESULTS

Variable	B	S.E.	Sig	Exp(B)
Urban	0.0042	0.0536	0.9382	1.0042
Inout	-0.0465	0.055	0.3975	0.9545
Race1	0.4212	0.1293	0.0011**	1.5237
Gender1	-0.0328	0.0506	0.3967	0.9677
Time5	-0.0998	0.0668	0.1353	0.905
Time3	0.0589	0.0614	0.3376	1.0607
Age12	0.3911	0.0569	0.0001***	1.4786
Age13	0.9389	0.072	0.0001***	2.5572
Constant	-1.4219	0.1366	0.0001***	
R-Square	0.046			
***p≤.001				

When we control for the age of the respondents, neither time variable is statistically significant. So even though the common perception is that response rates are lowest in the morning when people are trying to get to work, there is no evidence that this is the case; the most likely non-respondents are equally likely to not respond at all hours of the day. These data also rule out any hypothesis of interviewer learning during the day leading to improved techniques that decrease non-response rates. It appears that, holding the race and age of the potential interviewers constant, an individual is equally likely to reject an interviewer who is approaching a voter for the first time that day as he is to reject an interviewer who is approaching his one hundredth voter of the day in the evening.

Table 6 also shows that age has the largest impact on non-response rates. The most likely non-respondents are those over the age of 60, with those between the ages of 40 and 60 less likely to not respond than older voters but more likely to not respond than voters between the ages of 18 and 40. Likewise, white voters are 50% more likely to not respond to an exit poll than non-white voters. While further research is needed to determine the cause of these trends, these data lead us to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that respondents and non-respondents do not have equal characteristics. Instead, our findings lead us to conclude that non-response rates are positively associated with age and are higher among whites than among non-whites, taken as a group.

CONCLUSION

Our findings have both theoretical and practical applications. Since no contextual variables were significant when we controlled for the individual's demographics, we conclude that the context in which a survey is administered is less important than the demographic characteristics of the potential respondent in causing them not to respond. In his model of a potential voter's decision-making calculus when deciding whether or not to respond to a survey, Brehm emphasizes the costs imposed by contextual factors. If our finding that context does not matter holds up in further studies, we propose that a refinement of his model will be necessary.

Our results also lead us to conclude that exit polls are likely to over-represent the opinions of younger and non-white voters. Because non-white voters tend to vote for Democrat candidates, over-representation of this social class will skew an exit poll's results in that direction. In Utah, this might not be a large concern; because minorities make up such a small proportion of the state's population, their impact on a poll's results is small. However, in other states this is something that needs to be taken into account when using exit polls. We encourage further study of this pattern and modeling of its impact in other states. The impact of age-bias is less clear. However, because the non-response patterns are systematic, we would encourage exit pollsters to use statistical methods to control for non-response biases in these specific directions when using data to predict election results. We believe that understanding these potential biases will improve the quality of exit polls' predictions and their usefulness in studying public opinion and voting behavior.

APPENDIX (THE INTERVIEWER'S SCRIPT)

Each of the interviewers was instructed to use the following to approach when contacting a possible respondent:

> Hello my name is (Your name). I am a student with the Utah College Exit Poll. College students across the state are conducting a survey today in order to predict the election results and to study political attitudes in Utah. You have been selected at random to participate. The survey takes only a few minutes and any information you give us will be kept completely confidential. Would you be willing to fill out this survey for us?

WORKS CITED

Anderson, Barbara A., Brian D. Silver, and Paul R. Abramson. 1988. The effects of the race of the interviewer on race-related attitudes of black respondents in SRC/CPS National Election Studies. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52 (Autumn): 289–324.

Bolce, Louis, Gerald De Maio, and Douglas Muzzio.1993. The 1992 Republican "Tent": No Blacks Walked In. *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Summer): 255–70.

Brehm, John. 1993. *The phantom respondents: Opinion surveys and political representation.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Brown, M.L. 1965. Use of a postcard query in mail surveys. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 29 (Winter): 635–37.

Busch, Ronald J., and Joel A. Lieske. 1985. Does time of voting affect exit poll results? *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (Spring): 94–104.

Center for Political Studies. The University of Michigan. 1996. *American National Election Study.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Clausen, John A., and Robert N. Ford. 1947. Controlling bias in mail questionnaires. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 42 (December): 497–511.

Clymer, Adam. 1989. Election day shows what polls can't do. *New York Times.* November 12. *Week in Review,* 1.

Cooper, Harris, and Julie Yu. 1983. A quantitative review of research design effects on responses rates to questionnaires. *Journal of Marketing Research* 20 (February): 36–44.

Davis, Darren W. 1997. The direction of race of interviewer effects among African-Americans: Donning the black mask. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (January): 309–22.

DeMaio, Theresa J. 1980. Refusals: Who, where and why. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44 (Summer): 223–33.

Dillman, Don A., Jean Gorton Gallegos, and James H. Frey. 1976. Reducing refusal rates for telephone interviews. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 40 (Spring): 66–78.

Dillman, Don A., Robert W. Reynolds, and Todd Rockwood. 1991. *Focus group tests of two simplified decennial census forms.* Pullman, WA: Social and Economic Sciences Research Center.

Fienberg, Howard, and Iain Murray. 2000. Last voter out, please turn of the TV. *Stats Spotlight.* Nov 6. At

<http://www.stats.org/spotlight/exitpolls.htm> . Accessed Jan. 27, 2000.

Filion, F. L. 1975–76. Estimating bias due to nonresponse in Mail Surveys. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 39 (Winter): 482–92.

Friedman, Lucy N., Alice R. Gold, and Richard Christie. 1972. Dissecting the Generation Gap: Intergenerational and Intrafamilial Similarities and Differences. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (Autumn): 334–46.

Goyder, John. 1987. *The silent minority: Nonrespondents on sample surveys.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Groves, Robert M., Robert S. Cialdini, and Mick P. Couper. 1992. Understanding the decision to participate in a survey. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56 (Winter): 475–95.

Heberlein, Thomas A., and Robert Baumgartner. 1978. Factors affecting response rates to mailed questionnaires: A quantitative analysis of the published literature. *American Sociological Review* 43 (August): 447–62.

Herzog, A. Regula, and Willard L. Rodgers. 1988. Age and response rates to interview sample surveys. *Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences* 43 (no. 6): 200–05.

Holt, D., and Elliot D. 1991. Methods of Weighting for Unit Non-Response. *Statistician* 40 *Special Issue: Survey Design, Methodology and Analysis* (2): 333–42.

Kaufmann, Karen M., and John R. Petrocik The changing politics of American men: Understanding the sources of the gender gap. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (July): 864–87.

Kurtz, Howard. 2000. Errors plagued election night polling service. *Washington Post.* December 22, A1.

Pace, C. R. 1939. Factors influencing questionnaire returns from former university students. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 23: 388.

Scott, Christopher. 1961. Research on mail surveys. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,* ser. A, 124: 143–205.

Singer, Eleanor, Martin R. Frankel, and Marc B. Glassman. 1983. The effect of interviewer characteristics and expectations on response. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47 (Spring): 68–83.

Sletto, R. 1940. Pretesting of questionnaires. *American Sociological Review* 15 (February): 193–200.

Steeh, Charlotte G. 1981. Trends in nonresponse rates, 1952–1979. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45 (Spring): 40–57.

Traugott, Michael, and Vincent Price. 1992. Exit polls in the 1989 Virginia gubernatorial race: Where did they go wrong? *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56 (Summer): 245–53.

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. Population Estimation Program. *Population Estimates for Counties by Race and Hispanic Origin: July 1, 1999.* At <http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/county/crh/crhut99.txt.> Accessed Jan. 29, 2001.

Weisberg, Herb, Jon Krosnick, and Bruce Bowen. (1996). *An Introduction to Survey Research, Polling, and Data Analysis.* 3d ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Williams, Bruce, and Jill A. Edy. 1999. Basic beliefs, democratic theory, and public opinion. In *Public Opinion,* ed. Carrol J. Glynn, Susan Herbst, Garret J. O'keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro, chapter 7. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST CHINA

ANNE CLAYTON

The focus of this article addresses the issues as to why collective action on the part of important states in the international arena has not been a viable option for encouraging China to enforce international human rights standards following the Tiananmen Square massacre. Government leaders are vulnerable to domestic pressures and pursue policies in accordance with their current self-interest. Therefore, the failure of collective enforcement of human rights standards in China is due to self-interested motivations on the part of government leaders. To support this conclusion, analyzes of empirical evidence from four states including the United States, Japan, France, and the Netherlands are provided.

INTRODUCTION

In June of 1989, the Chinese government cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, killing, according to official Chinese government statistics, at least three hundred unarmed protestors.[1] Citizens throughout the world were appalled by this display of repression, and many states felt a need to respond to the abuse.[2] As human rights have increasingly become a part of foreign policy for many states, traditional power and security relationships have been altered. Human rights may be encouraged by governments through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or, in extreme cases, through military intervention. In the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, many states, including the U.S., Japan, and most European countries, placed economic sanctions on China in protest of the abuses. However, as time passed, governments began to reinstate normal trade relations with China, despite a lack of marked improvement in the human rights situation. This poses several questions for observers. First, why was collective action against China, manifest through sanctions and condemnations, not effective in promoting improvement in the human rights situation? Second, what motivates states to pursue certain foreign policies and then to reverse their policies without first achieving their aims? I argue that government leaders are vulnerable to domestic pressures and will pursue policies in accordance with those pressures they perceive to be most salient and most critical to their self-interest at the time. Therefore, the failure of collective enforcement of human rights standards in China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident is due to self-interested motivations of government leaders, not simply power or security relationships. Leaders support or defect from supporting policies against China according to their perceived self-interests. This explains why state policies towards China, in light of its consistent human rights abuses, have been so varied over time. Through analyzing the policies of the United States, Japan, France, and the Netherlands towards China since the Tiananmen Square incident, I will demonstrate how their choices have been determined largely by perceived government interests and how identity may play a role in human rights support.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The failure to collectively push China to uphold human rights standards is explained by analyzing both collective action theory and perceived government interests. Democratic governments are subject to many domestic pressures. Because government leaders are essentially rational actors, they will succumb to the pressures that they perceive as most important to their aims. Particularly in democratic states, leaders feel compelled to respond to these pressures so as to maintain legitimacy and promote their political survival.[3] Concepts of political survival and legitimacy determine leaders' interests and will, therefore, influence their policy making. Leaders will make foreign policy decisions by choosing what they perceive as the best option among the available alternatives, given the political/institutional environment.[4] State's policy choices may vary over time because they reflect the varying pressures that leaders feel. Domestic pressures may come from constituents, lobbyists, or the overall political climate. Transnational actors are also able to influence states and leaders through persuasion and socialization using techniques such as information gathering, citizen/government education methods, and leverage politics.[5] When these transnational actors are unsuccessful in encouraging states to engage in certain policies, this may be either due to ineffective framing of the issue as being part of the interest or simply that other interests posed to the governments have taken precedence. Whether it is in response to domestic or international pressure, government leaders act according to the most salient issues that affect their perceived interests.

The identity of the state, or state self-image, plays a significant role in determining whether or not states will respond to human rights pressures. States have certain identities which government leaders seek to maintain and are generally supported by public opinion. Virtually all states maintain a self-image that reflects attitudes towards political values and processes.[6] The self-image or identity emerges out of the domestic political culture, and this identity will largely determine state aspirations and policy preferences and often will affect choices of decision makers.[7] States will participate in human rights regimes to the extent that their self-image requires this emphasis over others. As the state identity encompasses human rights, leaders must choose policies that conform to that identity in order to legitimize their rule. On the other hand, state identity may be reflected in values that conflict with human rights, such as economic values. Additionally, there may exist conflicting identities within one state, which is demonstrated quite aptly by the U.S. and its varying policies. The dynamics of state identity will be discussed in relation to each of the chosen cases and their corresponding identities.

Other theories have been advanced to explain the same phenomena in the international sphere. Realist theories argue that international responses to human rights abuses have been weak because powerful states are not concerned with the enforcement of these rights.[8] According to realist theory, states are also considered rational actors, but their overall goals are concerned only with power relationships and the stability of the state.[9] In that case, human rights would be of concern only to powerful states if they threatened to undermine stability or security. Therefore, the inefficacy of other states enforcing human rights in China results from powerful states determining that the issue does not play a major part in their own security or self-interest. Only if the situation led to instability in the balance of power would states determine enforcement and intervention to be prudent. This theory, however, does not sufficiently explain why so many states did, in fact, initially enforce economic sanctions against China in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre and have continued to push for U.N. resolutions condemning China for several years after.

Another argument to explain the state actions taken towards China may include ideas of economic dependency. That is, the states most dependent on China economically are most likely to defect from collective action. However, in reviewing trade statistics between China and the four states considered in this study, I found little evidence to support this hypothesis. Japan and China demonstrated a significant trade relationship, which is to be expected.[10] The only other state that showed China as one of the leading trade partners between 1989 and 1997 was the United States. In order to lend substantial support to this hypothesis, it would be necessary that a significant trade relationship be documented between China and France, the second state in this study to completely abandon collective action. Therefore, I reject this hypothesis according to the lack of conclusive evidence.

Despite the enforcement of sanctions against China, this attempt at collective action was unsuccessful. After only a short time of economic sanctions, states began to repeal the economic restrictions before China had made any improvements in its human rights situation. Japan was the first state to

end its aid suspension in July of 1990, and most other countries followed Japan's lead. By 1993, nearly all governments had resumed normal trade relations with China while still verbally criticizing its human rights record.[11] Governments began to view their interests changing with respect to China, and their policies corresponded to those changes.

The power in collective action strategies lies in the unified behaviors of actors, which provides sufficient pressure on those targeted to force them to undertake the desired changes. When the front becomes disunified, however, through defectors or divisions, the strategy loses its persuasive abilities as the targeted party is provided with additional options for action where they were once restricted. Collective action presupposes rationality for a group. Actors behave in a rational fashion when they weigh the available alternatives and choose the options which best serve their interests. Therefore, it is not surprising that members of these groups, if truly rational, may weigh their own interests too heavily to cooperate in a collective sense.[12] Moreover, in any collective behavior where actors make sacrifices to achieve an end, the prisoner's dilemma looms as a challenge to overcome. If the collective good is not achieved, the benefits of participation will not outweigh the costs, and thus actors may be weary of participation or may defect in pursuit of individual interests.[13]

In the case of China, states such as Japan and France defected from the sanctions, which allowed China alternative trade partners and allowed it to more easily ignore the pressures from those states continuing with the negative trade policies. It served the economic interests of the defector states as it provided them with economic rewards at the expense of those states continuing with the punitive policies, as the trade between the countries increased greatly and important business relations were established. Finally, it allowed China to play actors against each other for its own gains with little incentive to continue with the negative economic policies towards China. As the collective action strategy broke down, the remaining sanctions enforcers were left with few incentives to continue with their policies, and thus, the interest of those governments also began to change. Therefore, the actions of the first defectors also altered the interests of the remaining states.

While arguments may be made that even the defector states continue to encourage human rights standards in China, even if only through different methods such as economic liberalization, they are, nonetheless, still motivated by domestic government interests. In other words, the government leaders' perceptions on how to best enforce human rights in China change according to the policies that the leaders perceive to be in their interest. It is the leaders' self-interest that determines whether or not to participate in collective action and largely guides foreign policy.

THE UNITED STATES

The United States has pursued inconsistent policies towards China since the Tiananmen Square massacre, which have been manifest by placing sanctions against China, only to later grant Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, and a continuation of condemnation through United Nations resolutions. Why has the U.S. policy towards China been so inconsistent? The answer to this question lies in the interests of American leaders and their attempt to pursue policies that best serve their interests. Their interests may be served through various means that must be balanced and prioritized in policy choices and decision making. Analyzing the U.S. response to the Tiananmen Square incident demonstrates this.

Following the Tiananmen Square massacre, the United States (along with many other Western countries) was quick to place sanctions on China to demonstrate support for democracy. The very essence of the massacre contradicted the American image and ideal of a democratic and freedom-loving country. The domestic population, as well as citizens of other nations, was outraged at the scenes it saw on the news and anti-China protests sprung up in many large cities throughout the world.[14] American leaders felt compelled to respond through punitive measures, and President George Bush was the first major world leader to condemn the 1989 crackdown in China.[15] It was in the interests of the American leaders to take such actions so as to represent the general public sentiment and embody those American values. Concepts of democracy and freedom form an integral part of the American identity and Americans saw these values violated through the massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators in China. However, when these values were not being threatened so directly and visually, government interests shifted to other priorities, particularly economic concerns. Interestingly, the shift of American government leaders to support economic engagement rather than economic punishment correlates greatly to American public opinion on this matter, as well as pressure from interest groups.

Prior to 1989, overall public opinion towards China was growing increasingly warm, following the

Cold War distrust, but this changed in light of the massacre. Public opinion polls show a severe drop in the numbers of those who held favorable opinions of China following the Tiananmen Square massacre. Moreover, those favorability ratings also corresponded to sharp increases in public support for pursuing human rights in foreign policy as a major objective.[16] However, public opinion generally rises and falls with major events or crises, and as memories of the Tiananmen Square massacre generally subsided, other interests took precedence in American foreign policy. Public opinion is indicative of government decisions regarding foreign and trade policy towards China. In the height of distrust and resentment of the American public, government leaders sharply criticized human rights abuses. As the outraged of the public ebbed, government policies towards China turned to those of engagement through economic liberalization and trade.

Several active interest groups were also working to influence U.S. policy towards China. Following the Tiananmen Square massacre, business groups were very reluctant to lobby for trade relations with China because of the negative outlash of public opinion and media coverage of the incident. As time wore on, however, both the general public and businesses began to recognize the importance of the Chinese market, and businesses began mobilizing to lobby for trade with China.[17] R. D. Folsom, a representative of Hong Kong business interests and an active member of the Business Coalition for U.S.–China Trade said, "In 1990, CEOs were reluctant to move forward since no one wanted to be an apologist [for China's behavior in the Tiananmen Square incident]. By 1994, companies were almost willing to stake anything."[18] In addition to U.S. business groups and trade associations, American and Hong Kong Chambers of Commerce, Hong Kong-hired law firms and consulting groups, and even the Chinese government worked to lobby the U.S. in favor of profitable trade relations with China.[19] These groups were effective in framing the issues in a manner consistent with government leaders' interests, whereas opposing groups experienced difficulty mobilizing resources and presenting a unified front in order to frame the issues within the constructs of those interests.[20]

The nature of the United States government helps to explain why interests perceived by government leaders may change. The U.S. government is elected democratically, which leaves candidates and incumbents at the mercy of voters to gain or maintain leadership. If Americans are dissatisfied with some aspect of government policy, they have a natural tendency to vote against the incumbent party.[21] Therefore, government decisions will largely reflect the influence of domestic forces, whether lobbies, public opinion, or interest groups, as these groups will affect the interests of leaders. The main interest of leaders is to retain or gain power; their interests will be that which will help them to achieve this. Therefore, shifting interests and policies may occur according to those things that best suit their needs, whether this includes economic concerns or promoting the national identity.

The American national identity is deeply rooted in the founding of the country. The original settlers often came to America in search of political, religious, or economic freedom. The founders of America saw this country as unique and morally superior to other nations from the beginning.[22] While this may serve as a glorified, and perhaps a sometimes skewed view of reality, it has been deeply ingrained in the American psyche. As time passed, U.S. leaders advanced ideologies that reflected the ideal of the United States as a champion of freedom, democracy, and rights, the U.S. serving as a shining example to all other countries throughout the world.[23] This is evident in statements from American presidents such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, who declared, "We are fighting today for security, for progress, and for peace, not only for ourselves but for all men, not only for one generation but for all generations."[24] More recently, Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated, "The American public has clearly understood the importance of standing up for sound principles and continues to take the lead in promoting freedom, democracy, and security at home and throughout the world. That is in America's interest. It reflects the kind of people we are, and it is right."[25] The national identity has led to both involvement and isolation in international affairs; it is a force that government leaders must face when determining policy options.

President Bush's original condemnation of China was in line with the national identity, but then other issues took precedence. Bush worked to promote positive trade relations with China as business interests grew and perceptions of the Chinese market became increasingly favorable, and he sought to justify these actions through concepts of engagement as promoting human rights. President Bush stated, "No nation on earth has discovered a way to import the world's goods and services while stopping foreign ideas at the border." And in 1991, Secretary of State James Baker said that cutting trade relations with China would "dismantle our leverage."[26] In other words, the Bush administration promoted trade as

a means of encouraging China to achieve democracy and human rights standards.

Although the Clinton administration criticized Bush's dealings with China on human rights, claiming that more needed to be done, the new administration's policies soon closely resembled those of Bush.[27] In fact, Clinton's rhetoric eventually changed to support engagement of China.[28] In 1997, after renewing China's MFN status, Bill Clinton stated, "I believe if we were to revoke normal trade status it would cut off our contact with the Chinese people and undermine our influence with the Chinese Government."[29] Through this means, the Clinton administration was able to best serve its interests by framing human rights support in a manner consistent with business interests. Concepts of economic liberalization emerged as one way in which government leaders could combine the two variables of human rights and economic interests into the overall perceived government interests. In this manner, leaders could pursue pro-business policies, while still maintaining ideas congruent with the national image of a democracy and human rights supporting nation. Thus, they were able to maintain business interest support as well as legitimacy in terms of the American national identity. If human rights can be linked to self-interest or somehow support that self-interest, then it is possible to build wide support for them in policy.[30] Through this means, these leaders were able to gain broad support rather than be pressured by more radical pro-human rights organizations.

Non-governmental human rights organizations (NGOs) and networks serve to influence political leaders (or the public who in turn influence political leaders) only when they are sufficiently able to frame human rights issues in a manner that supercedes other interests.[31] They must frame them so that they are perceived to be part and parallel to the other pursued interests. For example, the case of the United States sanctioning China following the Tiananmen Square massacre was framed in such a manner that condemning China was affiliated with promoting democracy and freedom throughout the world.[32] However, these NGOs failed to sufficiently influence either the public or the government at later times when the issues were framed along the lines of economic liberalization as a means of achieving improved human rights practices.

Overall, collective action between the United States and other Western powers in response to China's human rights abuses was unsuccessful in its attempts to bring about change, mainly because coordinated actions were limited by self-interest. Following the 1989 massacre, the G-7 allies developed a common position in terms of restricting arms exports to China, as well as international bank lending and setting limitations on senior-level diplomatic exchanges. In June of 1990, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon said, "Solidarity between the Western countries on this position has sent a powerful message to the Chinese leadership."[33] However, business interests eventually reigned supreme in light of China's protests and threats regarding economic matters. None of the Western powers, including the United States, was willing to end MFN status for China as that would have put them at a great economic disadvantage, unless done so collectively.[34] In his argument to grant MFN to China, Richard Solomon declared, "United States firms that have worked hard over the last 10 years to develop business ties and a market share in China would lose that business perhaps permanently to other suppliers mainly from Europe and Japan. No other Western country . . . is planning to deny China MFN status . . . it would eliminate a key means of influencing China in the direction of reform."[35] As this statement demonstrates, there existed a fear of losing opportunities by engaging in unilateral action, and collective action was uncertain. By engaging in collective action, the likelihood of influencing policies through leverage is increased, but the United States was weary of the commitment on the part of other states to participate. The U.S. leaders did not deem promotion of human rights in China through disciplinary economic measures to be in their interest, as other options such as engagement theories were available, which both supported economic considerations and maintained the national identity.

JAPAN

Japanese–Sino relations carry a different tone than do those of any other state that invoked sanctions against China. Japan has special interests in China for several reasons. First, the two countries are culturally similar and they have a long history of trade and cultural interactions. The geographical proximity of the two countries adds an important dimension to the Sino–Japanese equation. China looms as a potential geopolitical threat, and the Japanese want to integrate China as much as possible into the international arena as a stable partner so as to minimize the threat that it poses. Moreover, economics are an important factor in their relationship. Regional economic stability and integration will

improve relations and reduce the threat of China by making it a responsible power with vested interests in maintaining the stability of the system. In addition, this would provide lucrative opportunities for Japanese investors and businesses.[36] A stable geo-political environment leads to better financial endeavors as businesses and investors have more confidence. Because of these important issues, Japan also reacted to the Tiananmen Square massacre in a different manner than did many of its allies.

In order to understand the interests of the Japanese government, it is important to first understand the governing structure. The Japanese governing structure is set forth in the 1947 Constitution, which was essentially imposed upon the Japanese people by the United States at the end of its occupation of Japan. Constitutionally, the Japanese system greatly resembles the British system in that the Diet (parliament) is composed of two houses, the lower house being more powerful, with the executive power lying mostly with the Cabinet and prime minister.[37] In practice, however, the ruling party, the bureaucracy, and interest groups have largely merged together to constitute the main feature of Japanese governance.[38] Therefore, government decision making is greatly affected by the influence these groups are able to assert on the government leaders.

Analyzing the interaction of these groups in policy making helps observers to better understand the perceived government interests. Because of the close relationship between the bureaucracy, businesses, and the government, governmental policies largely reflect the interests of theses combined groups. In order for the ruling party to maintain leadership in the government, they must chose policies which appease the desires of these powerful domestic groups. "Money is the lubricant which oils the Japanese political machine, and every . . . Diet member needs money by the suitcase full, in order to preserve his or her (usually his) standing and ensure re-election."[39] Where does this money come from? Most of the money that funds the political machine comes from businesses, which are often guided by the bureaucracy.[40] Thus, it lies in the interest of the political parties to pursue policies that serve business interests so that those members of the Diet may receive the necessary financial support to be re-elected.

However, at times, other interests may be perceived as salient for the government to pursue, even when they are contrary to the desires of the business groups. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, economic sanctions against China did not serve the Japanese economic interest. Although Japan initially engaged in sanctions against China, it was mainly due to pressures from Japan's allies, particularly the United States.[41] At this point, the government's economic interests were overshadowed by security and strategic interests and the importance of maintaining positive relations with its allies by showing its support of such values as freedom and democracy.[42] Japan works to cultivate its economic power as well as cooperation with the West.[43] Had Japan not responded to the massacre with some punitive actions, the government would have faced major criticism from abroad and perhaps domestically. Moreover, national identity issues also had an important impact upon the minds of Japanese leaders.

To understand why Japan initially imposed sanctions, it is important to look at the national identity that Japanese leaders hold, which largely made it susceptible to its allies' influences. Japan generally sees itself as an advanced economic and political partner with Western nations, as well as an Asian leader.[44] Japanese leaders have repeatedly stated that they are committed to pursuing common values with Western countries, such as democracy and human rights.[45] These commitments demonstrate the saliency of liberal values in the Japanese national identity. Japanese leaders felt compelled, particularly when pressure was applied by their allies, to uphold those stated commitments. The nature of the national identity is such that political embarrassment is liable to prompt policy changes.[46] Initially, Japanese Prime Minister Uno responded to the massacre by stating on 6 June 1989, "In essence, we are not thinking about taking punitive actions."[47] The following day, however, the Japanese government did freeze aid to China in response to foreign and domestic critics.[48]

It was Japan, however, that first repealed the sanctions, beginning with an end to its aid moratorium and finally by removing all sanctions by the end of 1990.[49] This reversal in policy can be explained in light of the diminished pressure by its allies as well as perceived ruling elite interests.

Japan's actions lie in both perceived strategic interests as well as economic interests. Japan, in addition to cutting its own sanctions, worked to end the sanctions by other states as well.[50] Strategically, Japan perceived an isolated China as dangerous and desired to integrate them into regional relationships. The lack of interdependence leaves few restraints on a potentially aggressive country and this could be destabilizing economically as well as in terms of power relationships. In addition, beginning in the 1970s,

China emerged as a great economic market with considerable potential. Economic opportunities with China were great, and Japanese firms and the government leaders wanted to ensure that they were able to take advantage of this as much as possible.[51] Because of the government/business relationship, the government leaders' perceived interest paralleled that of domestic business pressures.

Therefore, government leaders' interests, defined in terms of economic and strategic interests, are served by economic integration with China rather than isolation. Because of overriding concerns for regional stability, which would affect financial situations as well as security, and potential economic ventures, Japanese officials defined their interests as continuing positive economic relations with China. These interests were largely influenced by the bureaucratic and business interests exerting their influence through interdependent relationships.

The action that Japan took in terms of ending its sanctions towards China is significant in the effect that it had on the collective action strategies to pressure China to improve its human rights record. Japan was the first to end sanctions, doing so in 1990, and in the space of only a few years, nearly all of the remaining states followed Japan's lead.[52] China had emerged as a very important and promising market, and the Japanese economic interests prevailed.[53] Other states were not willing to allow that market to be bypassed because of human rights issues. The concept of the prisoners' dilemma, where those states that defected would benefit from the enormous economic opportunities took hold and incentives to continue with sanctions rapidly diminished. Moreover, the efficacy of the sanctions diminished with each defector, as it allowed China additional avenues in pursuing economic goals and displayed disunity among the actors that China could use to play the actors against each other. Therefore, Japan was the beginning of the end of a successful collective action strategy against China.

FRANCE

For France, the most significant turning point in collective action against China was in 1997 when France declared that it would not support the United Nations' resolution condemning human rights abuses in China. France, as part of the European Union, had backed resolutions condemning China for its human rights policy each year since the Tiananmen Square massacre. However, beginning in late 1994, France began to turn from its critical stance.[54] In June of 1994, China's minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation sponsored activities in France to solicit trade and investment and expressed the hope that France would compete to gain a share of the Chinese market.[55] France moved even further from condemnation of China when, in early 1997, it engaged in two significant gestures to improve its trade relations with China. The first was the blocking of resolution in the European Union that would condemn China's human rights abuses, and the second was President Jacques Chirac's diplomatic visit to China.[56]

Analyzing developments within the French government lends understanding to why France backed away from the condemning of China for human rights abuses. France is a parliamentary democracy, with three main branches including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. As part of the executive branch, the president serves as the head of state and manages foreign affairs. The president also appoints a prime minister who, as the head of the government, manages its daily operations and appoints a cabinet of ministers.[57] Due to the democratic nature of the French government, as with the other countries discussed, it behooves the government leaders to choose policies that will gain support for their re-election. Therefore, we can assume that the interests of government leaders are to maintain their rule, or at least their party rule, through the next elections. Those methods that help leaders to achieve this, such as economic or foreign policies, are then conceived to be in their self-interest.

One of the greatest looming domestic challenges for French leaders in recent years has been the economy, in which economic policies have been constrained by the increasing interdependence of the European states. In 1993, France signed the Maastricht Treaty, which called for certain economic reforms to be made in the process of European monetary unification.[58] In fact, for France to abide by European Monetary Union (EMU) criteria, several austerity measures would have to be increased, including deregulation and greater competition in the public sectors, as well as privatization of certain utilities.[59] This had the potential to place great strain on an already struggling economy.

As French economic policies have been somewhat restricted by the European integration in monetary policies, other areas, such as international trade, have been targeted as areas in which policies can be made that favor the French economy. In April of 1994, French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur had traveled to China in hopes of developing better

trade relations with that country; however, his attempts proved unsuccessful. Instead, Chinese officials mainly insulted Balladur for meddling in human rights issues.[60] From this point onwards, French criticism towards China was curbed. With a quelling of criticism about Chinese human rights violations, China's prime minister, Li Peng, visited France in April of 1996 and placed an order for approximately $1.5 billion worth of French-built passenger planes.[61]

In 1995, the right-wing oriented Jacques Chirac won the presidential election with pledges to assist the unemployed, the homeless, and the poor, but conditions did not improve.[62] France continued to face severe economic challenges which eventually were manifest by an unprecedented 12.8 percent unemployment rate at the beginning of 1997.[63] Despite the economic difficulties, and fearing that he would lose power in the 1998 elections, Chirac chose to dissolve the National Assembly on 21 April 1997 and called for new elections to be held at the end of May. The purpose of this was to hold elections in a time in which his competing parties would not have sufficient time to campaign for support enough to win the elections.[64]

In light of the economic difficulties, Chirac's 1997 campaign again centered on the pledge of job creation and economic growth.[65] He tried to blame the economic problems on the previous socialist government with such statements as, "We are behind, and this delay has cost us dearly in terms of jobs, taxes, debts, and illusion too."[66] Coincidentally, it was in May of 1997 that France declared that it would not back the U.N. resolution condemning China.[67] Then, later in that month, Chirac visited China to sign several contracts worth about $2 billion for French companies.[68] The steps that Chirac took in relation to China and the economy were done within the month that campaigns were being held. If these measures did not serve his interest as a political figure, it is unlikely that he would have taken them at such a critical time. The economic benefits were too great for the government to continue its human rights-critical policies with China at the expense of Chinese market advantages. Chirac, as president of France, deemed it in his best interest to develop favorable trade relations with China, which would help to improve economic conditions, in order to increase his chances of political survival at home.

In the case of France, a national identity that focused on human rights was salient in 1989 and in subsequent years when France and the rest of the European Union condemned China by introducing U.N. resolutions against it. China's actions were contrary to perceived French values and culture. However, as economic issues became more dominant in French domestic politics and the memories of the Tiananmen Square massacre faded, human rights support took a back seat to economic interests. Nonetheless, the idea that human rights remained an important aspect of French identity is evidenced by the fact that, rather than ignoring human rights issues in China altogether, the French government claimed to be taking a new approach towards the encouragement of human rights in China through the "engagement" process.[69] Government leaders altered the context of the values of the state identity so that it legitimized decision-making interests.

France was the first to break the European Union's previous consensus condemning China which the EU had presented to the United Nations Human Rights Commission each year following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.[70] Shortly thereafter, other European countries, including Germany, Italy, Spain, and Greece, each of them with growing economic interests in China, backed away from the resolution. Even Canada backed away.[71] Once France had broken the collective European action, little incentive was left for other European countries to maintain the condemnation, particularly when economic markets were at stake. Moreover, France's action gave China more options and leverage to use in their international economic ventures. France, acting as a defector state from the collective condemnation of China, set the ball rolling for further defections and ineffective consequences of those countries that continued the condemnations. However, the French defection did not sway two European states, Denmark and the Netherlands, from backing the resolution. In the following section I shall discuss the reasons the Netherlands took the actions that they did.

THE NETHERLANDS

From the Tiananmen Square massacre until the 2000 United Nation Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) conference, the Netherlands had supported UNHRC resolutions, in conjunction with the European Union, condemning China for human rights abuses. Even when other European states broke the consensus in Europe and chose not to support the resolution in 1997, the Netherlands stood firmly behind Denmark's move to introduce the resolution despite blatant Chinese threats. China warned Denmark and the Netherlands that their relations would be damaged should they go through with the sponsorship of another resolution before a U.N.

Commission in Geneva. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang, commented, "We still hope Denmark will think seriously about the consequences of such action. I can say relations will be severely damaged in the political and economic trade areas."[72] This same threat was applied to the Netherlands as well. One Chinese academic, who was asked why the Dutch and Danes had been singled out, as opposed to threatening the U.S. who was another sponsor commented, "These are small countries."[73] Despite such threats, these small states never backed away from their intentions to sponsor the resolution.[74]

The day before the resolution was to be introduced, China further threatened that they would "delay important exchanges of officials that are under discussion and halt exchanges and cooperation."[75] Following the attempt at introducing the resolution in April 1997, Dutch business interests were indeed harmed in relation to Chinese diplomatic and economic ventures. A trade mission scheduled for June worth between $750 million to $1 billion in deals with China was indefinitely postponed the day following the attempt of the Netherlands foreign minister, Mr. Hans van Mierlo, to use his country's influence as holder of the European Union presidency to encourage others to support the resolution condemning China.[76] The resolve on the part of the Netherlands to continue with their active support of human rights in the face of real economic and diplomatic threats from China is significant. It leads observers to question why these values were so important to this country, even with the risk of losing profitable economic gains, whereas they are not so important to other states.

The Netherlands provides an interesting analysis of international actions as it is a small European state, consisting of only approximately 15 million people, and yet it consistently champions human and social rights throughout the world.[77] The Netherlands was one of the twelve European countries that backed Denmark on the 1997 United Nations resolution condemning China after the larger European states had rescinded their support in light of economic arrangements.[78] The Netherlands has depended on international trade and commerce for many years and has been very active internationally.[79] If considering only economic and diplomatic concerns, one would likely predict that the Netherlands would attempt to maintain positive relations with China rather than being singled out against them. However, the national identity has prevented the government from choosing these options in the past.

The Netherlands' focus on human rights as part of the national identity largely explains why the Netherlands has taken the actions that it has. As explained previously, state identity reflects domestic values and political processes. In the Netherlands, there exists a strong domestic public opinion which favors pro-human rights foreign policies. Domestic pressures are placed on the government through NGOs and are embodied in political parties.[80] Human rights have obtained nearly a sacred status in Dutch political life.[81] The Dutch government largely responds to human rights pressures because of the influence of non-governmental organizations, and political party acceptance and support of human rights in foreign policy. Because of the public opinion in favor of such policies, government leaders find it within their interest to support active human rights policies in foreign relations so as to gain public support. One of the greatest manifestations of the overall public and government support of human rights promotion is the government Advisory Committee on Human Rights, which was established on a provisional basis in 1983 and then on a permanent basis in 1985.[82] While this committee has never made any recommendations diametrically opposed to the policies of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, its existence is significant in that it represents the government and public acceptance of human rights norms in foreign policy.

Non-governmental organizations have long played an important role in Dutch policy and are largely responsible for making human rights an important policy issue. They have been formed around human rights issues beginning around the 1970s, often rallying around situations in particular countries.[83] NGOs are able to influence policy by submitting suggestions and proposals to the government on how they can better pursue human rights issues in foreign policy. Some of the important human rights NGOs in the Netherlands include the Netherlands Jurists Committee for Human Rights, the Humanist Committee on Human Rights, and Amnesty International, who boast membership of approximately 185,000 in the Netherlands.[84]

All of the four main political parties represented in the Dutch parliament include the pursuit of human rights in foreign policy as part of their platform, although in differing degrees. The radical D66 party is very extensive in its support of human rights in foreign policy, while the more conservative Liberal Party supports human rights in foreign policy but cautions that the Netherlands must be careful, and that group or collective action is preferred to acting in

isolation.[85] Members of parliament also have historically been very active human rights supporters, although this may have decreased in recent years. These political parties reflect the values and opinions of the Dutch constituency and how the Dutch identity includes human rights as an integral part. The commitment to human rights was stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a policy memorandum issued in 1979 when it stated, "The Government regards the promotion of human rights as an essential element of its foreign policy."[86] If, in contrast to other nations, the Dutch identity so fully entails the pursuit of human rights in foreign policy, it is important to analyze from where this identity emerged.

Dating back to the seventeenth century, the Netherlands had a great interest in the rule of law, influenced by its geographic location, lack of resources, and need for international trade. International law was very much in the interest of this small state so as to protect its economic and security interests.[87] Therefore, the promotion of peace and stability was important to the Netherlands and, in modern times, continues in the form of promotion of international aid and human rights support. However, there are other factors beyond state interests that influenced this identity.

Some scholars argue that it was Protestant-influenced political cultures that ingrained within the citizens of the Netherlands (as well as other countries such as Denmark and Sweden) a need to do good for others and protect rights.[88] Others argue that there remains a sense of guilt from their colonial past and a sense of need to make up for the wrongs committed through colonialism; but even in their colonial experience, there was an element of moralism with much emphasis given to the Christian missionary programs.[89] Whatever the origins, the Netherlands has developed a keen sense of identity in domestic politics that entails a high regard for human rights. The identity is then reflected in the foreign policy of that state.

The Netherlands was willing to participate in collective action strategies against China, and even advanced these ideals at some cost. However, when it became apparent that actions would not be taken collectively, with the majority of European Union members backing away from critical policies towards China, the Netherlands eventually backed away as well. The defection of European states from collective action increased the costs to be shouldered by the remaining actors. The costs were difficult to bear. Moreover, with the lack of criticism from other countries, China had various avenues to pursue in its trade and international policies, and the leverage through pressure from small states diminished considerably. Therefore, the benefits of condemning China were outweighed by the costs of doing so, and the Dutch government, which encourages multilateral and collective action, decided against supporting the U.S.-sponsored resolution to condemn China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission convention in April of 2000. The identity was not strong enough to withstand the great opposition, coming even from within the European Union.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the government leaders of the United States, Japan, France, and the Netherlands were all subject to domestic pressures in their policies towards China following the Tiananmen Square massacre. The experiences of these leaders illustrates why collective action against China was unsuccessful. The failure of collective enforcement of human rights standards in China following the Tiananmen Square massacre can be explained largely by self-interested motivations on the part of governments leaders. These leaders chose policies that best served their perceived interests, which interests revolved around gaining or maintaining leadership. Interests may be based on a national self-image that must be maintained for purposes of legitimacy or may revolve around economic concerns.

[1] Donnelly 2000, 119.
[2] Talagi 1994, 100.
[3] Anderson 1995, 352.
[4] Snyder et al. 1962, 90.
[5] Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16–24.
[6] Forsythe 2000, Introduction, 2.
[7] Donnelly 2000, 311.
[8] Krasner 1993, 166.
[9] Morgenthau 1960, 4–12.
[10] Turner 1997, 506, 773–74, 952, 1428; Turner 1990, 493, 765, 907, 1414–15.
[11] Donnelly 1998, 120–21.
[12] Hardin 1982, 10.
[13] Ibid., 25.
[14] *St. Lewis Post-Dispatch*, 5 June 1989, 8A.
[15] U.S. Congress, Senate 1990, 14.
[16] Waller and Ide 1995, 133–34.
[17] Sutter 1998, 56.
[18] Folsom, qtd. in ibid.
[19] Ibid., 60–63.
[20] Ibid., 53–55.
[21] Lewis-Beck 1998, 125.
[22] Davis and Lynn-Jones 1987, 22.
[23] Forsythe 2000, Introduction, 3.
[24] Franklin D. Roosevelt, qtd. in ibid., 25.
[25] Madeline Albrigth, qtd. in Rubin 1998, 27.
[26] George Bush, qtd. in Sutter 1998, 41; James Baker, qtd. in Sutter 1998, 41.
[27] U.S. Congress, House 1993, 43.
[28] Neier 1997, 97.
[29] Bill Clinton, qtd. in Dunne and Wheeler 1999, 14–15.
[30] Forsythe 2000, 143.
[31] Keck and Sikkink 1998, 27.
[32] Ibid., 144.
[33] Richard Solomon, qtd. in U.S. Congress, Senate 1990, 15.
[34] Ibid., 18.
[35] Richard Solomon, qtd. in ibid.
[36] McCargo 2000, 170–71.
[37] Ibid., 79.
[38] Ibid., 93.
[39] Ibid., 104.
[40] Ibid., 95.
[41] Donnelly 1998, 120.
[42] Inoguchi 1991, 110.
[43] Arase 1993, 93.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., 938.
[46] Cowhey 1993, 321.
[47] Uno, qtd. in Arase 1993, 943.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Grant 1997, 117.
[50] Donnelly 1998, 121.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., 120.
[53] Binyan 1992, 31.
[54] Kaye 1994, 28.
[55] Rongxia 1994, 26.
[56] *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 May 1997.
[57] Hancock et. al. 1993, 108–16.
[58] Walsh 2000, 97–98.
[59] Ibid., 99.
[60] Lincoln 1994, 28.
[61] *New York Times*, 11 April 1996.
[62] Hewlet 1998, 78.
[63] Ibid., 99.
[64] Lewis-Beck 2000, 48.
[65] Ibid., 97.
[66] Jacques Chirac, qtd. in ibid., 53.
[67] *The Independent*, 16 April 1997.
[68] *Financial Times*, 21 May 1997, A6.
[69] Hewlet 1998, 56.
[70] *New York Times*, 8 April 1997, A7.
[71] *The Independent*, 16 April 1997, 15.
[72] Shen Guofang, qtd. in Lewis 1997, 7.
[73] *The Independent*, 20 April 1997.
[74] *Wall Street Journal*, 9 April 1997.
[75] Cramb 2000, 7.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Baehr 2000, 58.
[78] Cramb 1997, 7.
[79] Forsythe 2000, 149–50.
[80] Baehr 2000, 61.
[81] Ibid., 76.
[82] Flinterman and Klerk 1993, 283.
[83] Baehr 2000, 57.
[84] Baehr 1994, 148–49.
[85] Baehr 2000, 59–60.
[86] Baehr 1994, 145.
[87] Baehr 2000, 50.
[88] Ibid., 51.
[89] Ibid., 52.

WORKS CITED

Anderson, Christopher J. 1995. The dynamics of support for coalition governments. *Comparative Political Studies* 28, no. 3:350–83.

Arase, David. 1993. Japanese policy toward democracy and human rights in Asia. *Asian Survey* 33, no. 10:935–52.

Baehr, Peter R. 1994. *The role of human rights in foreign policy.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

_____. 2000. Trials and errors: The Netherlands and human rights. In *Human rights and comparative foreign policy,* ed. David P. Forsythe. New York: United Nations University Press.

Binyan, Liu. 1992. The Beijing-Tokyo axis against human rights. *New Perspectives Quarterly* (Winter): 31–33.

Cowhey, Peter F. Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments. *International Organization* 47 (Spring): 299–326.

Cramb, Gordon. 1997. Dutch fear loss of China trade. *Financial Times* (London). 16 April, 7.

Davis, Tami R., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones. 1987. City upon a hill. *Foreign Policy* 66 (Winter): 20–38.

Donnelly, Jack. 1998. *International human rights,* 2d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

_____. 2000. An Overview. In *Human rights and comparative foreign policy,* ed. David P. Forsythe. New York: United Nations University Press.

Dunne, Tim, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds. 1999. *Human rights in global politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Flinterman, Cees, and Yvonne S. Klerk. 1993. The Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Netherlands. *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 11, no. 3:283–92.

Forsythe, David P. 2000. Introduction. In *Human rights and comparative foreign policy,* ed. David P. Forsythe. New York: United Nations University Press.

Forsythe, David P. 2000. *Human rights in international relations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grant, Richard L. 1997. *The process of Japanese foreign policy: Focus on Asia.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Hancock, M. Donald, et al. 1993. *Politics in Western Europe.* Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers.

Hardin, Russell. 1982. *Collective Action.* Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hewlet, Nick. 1998. *Modern French politics.* Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.

Inoguchi, Takashi. 1991. *Japan's international relations.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Kaye, Lincoln. 1994. Humble pie. *Far Eastern Economic Review* 157, no. 16: 28.

Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink.1998. *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1993. Sovereignty, regimes and human rights. In *Regime theory and international relations,* ed. Volker Ritterberger. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lewis, Paul. 1997. China warns Denmark on resolution. *New York Times.* 8 April, A7

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. *Economics and elections: The major western democracies.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

_____. 2000. *How France votes.* New York: Chatham House Publishers.

McCargo, Duncan. 2000. *Contemporary Japan.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1960. *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace.* 3d ed. New York: Alfred Knopf.

Neier, Aryeh. 1997. The new double standard. *Foreign Policy* 105 (Winter): 91–101.

Rongxia, Li. 1994. Delegation courts business in France. *Beijing Review* 37, no. 30: 26.

Rubin, James. 1998. Popular diplomacy. *Harvard International Review* 20 (Summer): 26–27.

Snyder, Richard C., et al., eds. 1962. *Foreign policy decision-making: An approach to the study of international politics.* New York: Free Press.

Sutter, Robert G. 1998. *U.S. policy toward China: An introduction to the role of interest groups.* New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Takagi, Seii Chiro. 1994. Japan's policy towards China after Tiananmen. In *Human rights and international relations in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. James T. H. Tang. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Turner, Barry, ed. 1991. *Statesman's Yearbook 1991*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

_____. 1997. *Statesman's Yearbook 1997*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights. 1993. *Human rights policy under the new administration*. 103d Cong., 1st sess. 10 June.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 1990. *Sino-American relations: One year after the massacre at Tiananmen Square*. 101st Cong., 2d sess. 6 June.

Waller, Walter Pomeroy, and Marianne E. Ide. 1995. China and human rights. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59, no. 1: 133–43.

Walsh, James L. 2000. *European monetary integration and domestic politics: Britain, France, and Italy*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Xin, Ren. 2000. U.S. stands alone in anti-China proposals. *Beijing Review* 43, no. 18: 8–9.

Book Review

Maren Mangum

Red China Blues: My Long March from Mao to Now by Jan Wong
(New York: Anchor Books, 1996), 405pp.

Youth, they say, is wasted on the young. Youthful exuberance, determination, boundless energy, a conquering spirit—all are wrapped up in a fragile yet stubborn idealism that demands to be both proven and challenged. Practicality, realism, and even cynicism come, often painfully, with time. It is this rite of passage, both for herself and the Chinese nation, that journalist Jan Wong chronicles in *Red China Blues: My Long March from Mao to Now.*

Wong, a Canadian-born ethnic Chinese, traveled to China at the height of the Cultural Revolution. She arrived as a self-proclaimed "Montreal Maoist," an idealist who sincerely believed Chinese Communist propaganda and became a firsthand witness to the major events that rocked China from the 1970s to the 1990s. In the process she was transformed from an ardent disciple of Chinese Communism to an ardent critic of its failure. Wong successfully debunks many Western beliefs and theories about Communist China and even offers up some theories of her own, but in the final analysis, she fails fully to come to terms with China's past or future.

Initially a true believer in Maoism, Wong provides an important counterbalance to traditional Western thought, calling into question many long-held beliefs and assumptions. Perhaps the most important doubt she casts is on the long and tenaciously held assumption that capitalism is better than communism. The young, idealistic Wong certainly didn't think so. She had lived towards the top of a successful capitalistic society but was deeply dissatisfied with it. She saw Western society as "a hopeless mess of racism, exploitation and shopping malls" (12). China, with its proclaimed idealism of social equality and justice seemed instead to provide the example of what the world should be. As she begins to see the reality, however, the idea of China as a shining beacon of Communism begins to fade. Nonetheless, even as Chinese Communism begins another "long march" on the rocky road to pseudo-capitalism, Wong never is fully convinced of capitalism's success. Indeed, she continues to point out some of its more offensive evils—official corruption and the gap between the rich and the poor, for example—many of which were problems under Mao's Communism as well.

Wong also attacks the tendency to view the Chinese as the faceless, thoughtless masses. From

the moment stories of China began to find their way into the Western imagination, the East was shrouded in mystery. The West has never truly understood the people or traditions of China, but Wong turns the Chinese people into real live, thinking, breathing, feeling individuals. First, she documents quite clearly their dissatisfaction and unhappiness with Maoism during the Cultural Revolution. For example, she was repeatedly approached by people desperate to get themselves or their loved ones out of China. Moreover, she describes specific instances of unhappiness with the Communist rule, feelings which the cautious Chinese people share with her only after she has already begun to question Communism's success. Clearly, despite Western stereotypes and explanations of Chinese Communism, the Chinese people are not obedient and unquestioning sheep who lack the ability to think for themselves. Wong illustrates the independence and courage of the Chinese people as she describes the many dissidents she encountered. Most people, she explains, knew and privately acknowledged that the Cultural Revolution was a failure. These people are real. Their stories are real. As Wong describes them, the people of China are no longer faceless or thoughtless. The result is a much more personal connection with a country and a people generally regarded as mysterious and inexplicable. Instead, Wong brings out their universal humanness.

Much more explicitly, Wong questions the suggestion that the Chinese people simply are not yet capable of effectively establishing and implementing democracy. She recognizes that many in the West feel China is "too poor, too vast, too backward for anything but an iron dictatorship" (388). She flatly disagrees. A rural peasant, she contends, may not understand the correct terminology, but he knows which leaders he supports and which he doesn't. Wong also describes incidents of both open and covert rebellion, of private complaints against the regime, and of silent protests that demonstrate that the Chinese people can and do think for themselves. For this reason, Wong contends, democracy can flourish in China. However, Wong offers no response to the other impediments—size, tradition, poverty, etc.—which in Western eyes continue to make China a questionable candidate for democracy.

Wong goes beyond merely disagreeing with Western theories, however. She offers some of her own. China is not just capable of implementing democracy someday in the future—it's ready now. With such an assertion, she implicitly suggests that democracy is the best path for China's millions. Moreover, she continues, it will come from the rising middle class. They are "the strongest proponent of democracy in China today" (388). Wong thus proposes two theories: First, that China has a rising middle class and second, that the middle class is open to democracy. While she acknowledges that many Western experts on China would find such beliefs naïve, she briefly states the basis for her argument. The middle class, she says, are up and coming. She has seen firsthand the evidence of their growing existence and power. They were important supporters of the student protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Moreover, she argues, China has already changed a great deal over the last two decades. Those changes render China capable of implementing democracy and enjoying a bright pluralistic future. Wong's views seem valid, if perhaps optimistic, although it remains unclear how and in what form China should implement democracy.

At the same time, however, Wong fails to fully come to terms with China's past or future. First, she fails to acknowledge or explain why Chinese Communism failed. Was it China, the system, the people? For someone who so ardently and passionately supported Communism in China, Wong has very little to say about its lack of success. She implicitly recognizes that even when she first arrived and thought she saw success, it was merely well-concealed failure. The why and how of that failure is never broached. In her youth Wong found Western democracies ineffective and undesirable and Communism a shining beacon of equality. Wong's description of her discovery of Communism's failure is clear and moving, but she does not come to terms with why.

Just as Wong fails to fully come to terms with China's ineffective Communist past, she also fails to fully accept or explain its capitalist future. Though she initially rejected the capitalism of the Western democracies, she now implicitly hails those same democracies as the model for China's future development. If capitalism was an unprincipled failure in the 1970s, how could it suddenly be a success by the 1990s? A mere two decades later Wong supports the system she once traveled thousands of miles to escape. Indeed, the evils of capitalism do not seem to be much mitigated by the unique communism–capitalism mix in China. Instead it has brought a widening gap between rich and poor, disillusionment, obsession with money and material items, and loss of idealistic pursuits—all reasons why she so disliked capitalism in the first place. Wong simply never explains the apparent paradox. The reader is left wondering whether Wong and China changed or instead both were completely misled in their Communist faith. The future,

Wong hopes, looks bright, but the reasons for such optimism are shadowed. A social critic to the end, it seems unlikely that she accepts capitalism as the answer to all of China's or the world's problems, but the reader, like Wong during her early experiences in China, remains in the dark.

Undoubtedly, Wong provides valuable insights into China of the present and China of the past. As one of the few Western observers to many of modern China's most important events, her experiences provide helpful and important insights that question common Western beliefs and theories on China. Wong herself, however, seems unexpectedly ambivalent. She fully accepts neither communism nor capitalism. For a book that implicitly promises to resolve the idealistic mistakes of youth, *Red China Blues* is stuck somewhere between youthful idealism and adult realism. Neither China's Communist past nor its capitalist future fully fits into Wong's experiences or impressions, leaving the Western reader to wonder which holds the answer to China's problems.


Cambridge