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SLEEPING ON THE JOB: THE IRISH FAILURE TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF NICE

MATTHEW C. JENNEJOHN

The fundamental misperception among the central decision-making group prevented the Irish government from appropriately counteracting the Nice opposition campaign. Government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality are the key factors contributing to the administration’s misestimation of both the opposition and its own efficacy. The results not only explain a watershed event in EU development but also prescribe specific policy principles of EU enlargement to continue. Special emphasis is placed on the study’s ramifications for the intergovernmental model for EU policy-making. The writer wishes to thank Dr. Valerie Hudson and Dr. Wade Jacoby of Brigham Young University and Dr. Michael Young of Ohio State University for their contributions to this article.

SLEEPING THROUGH THE “CHOICE FOR EUROPE”

It was a very quiet day yesterday for the 14 people sitting behind polling tables in Neilstown National School, Co Dublin. By 5:20 p.m. just 5.4 per cent of the 4,350 voters had dropped by. Polling officers looked bored, having lost interest hours earlier in the books they brought, or the small talk their table-partner had to offer. Well-used word puzzle books lay around. And the electorate [was] just as bored. (Ni Cheallaigh, 2001)

Upon the close of the lackadaisical Irish polls on 7 June 2001, all of the late-night bickering among European Union (EU) members at Nice the previous December suddenly appeared in vain. With 54% of voters refusing to ratify the Treaty of Nice, the Irish electorate aborted the institutional reforms codified within the Treaty that are necessary for the European Union’s expansion into Central and Eastern Europe. The Treaty implements controversial and painful reforms in Union decision-making and budget policy in order to accommodate an expansion that adds twelve governments to the administrative structure, increases EU population by over 25%, and yet only augments EU GDP by 5%. The Treaty’s implementation is the last step in a decade-long process to fully integrate the former communist countries into a democratic Europe. However, by halting the requisite reforms, the Irish referendum jeopardized this historic EU expansion if not frustrated it all together (Kaminski 2001).

WHY?

Perplexity crept through the whole of Europe and, ironically, through the administration of Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern following the referendum. Why did the Irish,
having ratified the previous treaty on European enlargement (the Treaty of Amsterdam) in 1998, refuse the Treaty of Nice in 2001? This question is especially puzzling considering Ireland's historically supportive electorate and foreign policy behavior. While the role of the “No to Nice” opposition campaign is clear in the Treaty rejection, the source of its efficacy is not. How could an opposition campaign orchestrated by electoral starvelings wrest victory from the hands of the entire Irish political center? Why did the Nice supporters, most notably the government, run such an ineffective, half-hearted campaign for Nice ratification? Lastly, both participants and observers asked the most crucial of all: So what happens now?

In hopes of eventually approaching this last question, this case study begins by tackling the first: Why did the Irish, having ratified the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998, reverse their EU policy and refuse the Treaty of Nice in 2001? As we shall see, changes occurring between 1998 and 2001 among those parties opposing EU expansion account for the Irish policy reversal. However, although the opposition parties were galvanized by 2001, these changes still do not explain how a coalition of parties controlling no more than 5% to 7% of the electorate was able to undermine the will of Ireland’s major center parties. Thus, understanding the Nice “yes” campaign is this study’s central puzzle: if they were committed to the Treaty’s ratification and also had the ability to appropriately counteract the opposition, why did the Nice supporters run such an impotent campaign? Why were they caught sleeping?

Two Sedatives and a Treacherous Personality

I argue that a conflation of governmental, cultural, and personality factors caused the Ahern administration to misestimate both its opponents’ and its own efficacy. While the fundamental source of the administration’s misperception is found in Ahern’s own personality, government structure and cultural preferences provided the conditions (the “sedatives”) necessary for Ahern’s personality to be influential. Because of his misestimation, Ahern failed to muster a sufficient counterattack against the Nice referendum opposition, thus allowing the “no” campaign to seize victory.

This rather holistic argument takes issue with the conventional wisdom regarding the poorly executed “yes” campaign. Typical explanations of “yes” impotency claim that considerations for the upcoming 2002 elections prevented Nice supporters from spending sufficient campaign funds to win ratification: “Facing the prospect of an election in 2001/2002, the political parties were loath to use scarce financial resources on the Nice campaign as there is no state funding of political parties in Ireland” (Laffan 2001, 2). I find such explanations wanting in three respects.

First, the Nice opposition parties must also budget for the 2002 elections—why could they afford to break the bank over Nice while the flush center parties could not? Second, successfully campaigning for Nice arguably does not require much money: with 59% of the population supporting enlargement (Special 2001) and over 50% of the population attributing their decision not to vote simply to their inability to understand the Treaty’s intent and content (Peel 2001), successful ratification demands no more money than what is needed to translate clearly the purpose of the Treaty to the public. Since the “no” campaign communicated their translation of the Treaty primarily through posters and television/radio invites (to which the “yes” campaigners were invited also), it follows that successful campaigning was possible for a minimal price. Third, for no cost to the “yes” campaign, other EU members campaigned among the Irish voters to ratify the treaty (e.g., Germany’s Joschka Fischer gave rallies in Dublin urging ratification) (de Breadún and Staunton 2001). Yet, outside contributions still didn’t turn the tide of favor. “The ‘no’ campaign won the battle of language” (Laffan 2001, 3), not the battle of the war chest. Thus, the “yes” campaign suffered less for a lack of funds than for a lack of vision (Holland 2001 and Laffan 2001, 3).

So What?

This article makes three contributions to foreign policy-making and political analysis. First, this explanation might grant policy-makers
critical insight into gaining public support for pro-EU legislation in an increasingly technical and "democratically deficient" European Union. Second, this study provides an explanation for a watershed event in EU history—obviously, if we understand why the Irish rejected Nice, we might determine whether this obstacle to EU enlargement is surmountable or not. Third, this study introduces an important caveat to liberal intergovernmentalism's model of EU policymaking. The Irish case shows that understanding the impact of government structure, cultural preferences, and personality allows us to better apply the intergovernmentalist model to policy scenarios. Hence, the relevance of this study is founded upon both practical and theoretical applications. Considering the unprecedented crossroads at which the EU now stands—the common currency came into full effect at the beginning of the year, a common defense force will soon be a functioning reality, the Union is set to nearly double its size to 27 members within 10 years, and institutional reforms are, arguably, creating a more federalist future for Europe—these contributions to understanding current and future European political phenomena are valuable indeed.

After introducing Irish domestic politics and outlining how the Nice opposition managed to deny the EU of ratification, I will present the three major factors contributing to the Ahern administration's mistake. First, I will discuss the impact of government structure upon the administration's decision-making. Second, I will treat the role of Irish culture in the administration's decision-making. As will be shown, these two factors funnel decision-making power away from organizational and bureaucratic processes to the taoiseach (the Irish word for Prime Minister) himself. Thus, the third major factor contributing to the Irish government's misestimation of the Nice situation is the personality and perception of Bertie Ahern himself.

IRISH DOMESTIC POLITICS DURING NICE RATIFICATION: AHERN'S RUDE AWAKENING

Irish domestic politics and internal changes within the parties opposing the Nice Treaty produced a robust anti-enlargement campaign in 2001. The nature of the Irish political system provides the motivation and means for opposition movements, such as "No to Nice," to emerge. With the necessary systemic condition provided, changes in the opposition party fortunes between 1998 and 2001 allowed these parties to take advantage of the opportunity Nice offered.

Means and Motive. For the focus of this article, the ramifications of proportional representation and coalition government are the most important aspects of Irish politics to be considered. While a full description of the unique Irish proportional voting scheme will be provided later, it suffices now to simply point out that proportional representation (PR), unlike a majoritarian system, allows for small party existence. Additionally, coalition government provides small parties an access to power; a major party often needs only a small party to create a governing coalition. For instance, under Ahern, Fianna Fáil joined with the Progressive Democrats (a smaller party harvesting only 8% of the vote on average) to form the current coalition. PR and coalition government, thus, grant small parties both the means and the motives for "rocking the boat" in hopes of gaining an inroad to governance.

The Nice Treaty referendum provided such an inroad for two of Ireland's smallest, though increasingly potent, parties: Sinn Fein and the Green Party. Looking for an opportunity to legitimate their participation in the mainstream political debates (Financial Times 2001), these opposition parties found Nice an ideal sticking point. In the words of one Sinn Fein committee member, "It's given us new credibility. People are beginning to think that if there were more Sinn Fein TDs and they played a bigger role, then what would that role be? It is an excellent chance for us to explain" (ibid.). An exchange between Ahern and Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader, illustrates the same opportunism:

The Taoiseach, Mr. Ahern, met the Sinn Fein president, Mr. Adams, early in the campaign and asked him why the party was urging a "No" vote. Shrugging his shoulders on the staircase of Government
Buildings, Mr. Adams looked up and smiled: "Can you think of a better way of getting publicity?" (Ibid)

Thus, the Nice referendum offered these parties a cheap and effective means of getting a foot in the door before the next round of elections.

*Internal Galvanization.* Changes in the opposition parties' respective political situations also account for the Irish policy reversal between Amsterdam and Nice. Until the Good Friday Agreement of 1999, Sinn Fein was still enmeshed with an armed and mobilized IRA. Competing in the typical debates and machinations of a liberal democracy (e.g., arguing against Nice to boost electoral prospects) was out of question for a Sinn Fein that was still directly associated with terrorism. Once the Good Friday Agreement passed, however, Sinn Fein was freer to reconstruct a new image for itself. The other major opposition party, the Greens, didn't factor into the Amsterdam decision simply because they didn't exist in any significant numbers at the time (the Greens were first established in Ireland around 1996). After three years of consolidating support on campuses and organizing among the electorate, the Green Party finally had the political clout (and it was still little at that) to affect major national debates. Therefore, with both major opposition parties unable to mount an attack on EU enlargement in 1997-98, ratification of Amsterdam proved an easy measure. The parties' different political fortunes three years later made Nice ratification more uncertain.

Thus, the power of domestic politics is evident in the Irish case. By failing to appropriately manage the domestic game, to use Putnam's metaphor (1988), the Irish decision-makers allowed themselves to be acted upon. The opposition parties had their victory, Ahern had the proverbial foot in mouth, and the EU still didn't have a binding treaty. Why did Ahern fail to oppose "No to Nice"?

**GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE: SEDATIVE ONE**

Ireland employs a unique "proportional representation—single transferable vote" system (PR-STV or simply STV). This peculiar electoral scheme, along with the institutional character it gives the Irish government, provides the fundamental environment necessary for personality and perception, the most defining characteristics of Irish decision-making, to affect government foreign policy. The structure of the Irish government subtly yet powerfully impacts Irish foreign policy decision-making. Specifically, the PR-STV scheme, in cultivating personality politics, magnifies the depth of personality's effect on policy-making, while the method of cabinet formation and functioning, in allowing much leadership autonomy, compounds the breadth of personality's effect on policy-making.

The Effects of PR-STV. While the PR nature of the system creates the sufficient conditions for multiple parties and thus coalition government, the single transferable vote option, by allowing voters to put down their second and third preferences should their first option lose, fosters constituency politics. STV provides the Irish voter with the opportunity to compare competing candidates on individual rather than party criteria and forces the Irish politician to engage his/her constituency on a personal level; the high level of proportionality reinforces the importance of constituency politics in Ireland. The intimacy between candidate and voter in constituent politics, often founded upon a perception of friendship, establishes the primacy of personality considerations in electing officials.

In that "ranking a set of candidates according to one's preferences" (Sinnott 1995, 104-5) is the central logic of the STV vote scheme, a candidate's image compared to his/her competitors' assumes paramount importance. Were Ireland to use the list scheme like other PR regimes, where voters simply vote for a comprehensive party ticket rather than for individual candidates, party loyalties would trump individual candidates' characteristics. The party would overshadow and subsume the unique character, promises, plans, and ideologies of the individual candidates. However, by not using such a list system, the Irish Constitution provides for the separate consideration of each candidate.

While not using a list scheme provides for individual candidate relevance and introduces candidate comparison to Irish voting, STV further magnifies the importance of comparative...
differences. Unlike majority/plurality systems (e.g., the United Kingdom or the United States), where the crucial battles are fought among the "swing voters," the STV system forces politicians to campaign equally among all constituents. While swaying the fence-sitters is still important, it is also important for a politician to campaign among his/her opponents' core supporters since they may make him/her their second preference. To illustrate the relevance of second and third preferences, the results of the 1990 Irish Presidential election are provided below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>First Preferences</th>
<th>Transfer of Currie's Votes</th>
<th>Second Count Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Currie, Austin</td>
<td>267,902</td>
<td>-267,902</td>
<td>267,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenihan, Brian</td>
<td>694,484</td>
<td>+36,789</td>
<td>731,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson, Mary</td>
<td>612,265</td>
<td>+205,565</td>
<td>817,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-transferable papers</td>
<td>+25,548</td>
<td>25,548</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Valid votes: 1,574,651, Quota: 787,326

Figure 1. Results of the 1990 Irish Presidential election

Were it not for the second preference votes transferred from Austin Currie to Mary Robinson (votes are transferred when none of the candidates reach the election quota upon the first count), Brian Lenihan would have won the Presidency. The second preference votes were so crucial that, had she not campaigned among Currie's supporters, Robinson would have lost the Presidency. Thus, with a nonlist voting scheme and the need to campaign among all district voters, a broad relationship is forged between politicians and citizens.

The Irish constitution's limits on district size deepen the already broad politician-constituent relationship provided by STV. District size must be no larger than 30,000 constituents per parliament member and no smaller than 20,000 per member (Chubb 1992, 134). Historically, district size has hovered around 21,000 constituents ever since the advent of the republic in the early 1920s (ibid.). The expectations of the Irish voters further deepen this relationship. A poll conducted in 1989 measuring "the most important criterion determining [the Irish voters] vote" found "choosing a [parliament member] who will look after the local needs of the constituency" to be by far the most critical consideration for the Irish voter, with 40% of the participants placing it first (Chubb 1992, 144). "Choosing a taoiseach," "choosing ministers who will form a government," and "choosing a [parliament member] who will perform well on national issues in the [Parliament]" were placed as first considerations by only 14%, 9%, and 15% of the poll participants respectively (ibid.). Thus, small districts allow for close politician-constituent contact, while voter expectations demand it.

Proportionality/disproportionality is "measured by comparing parties' shares of the votes with their shares of the seats and noting the discrepancies" (Sinnott 1999, 113). "PR-STV in Ireland delivers a high degree of proportionality, virtually as high as that produced by electoral systems that have the achievement of proportionality as their sole aim" (Sinnott 1995, 115). As a practical matter for the Irish politician, high proportionality means that voters' preferences are efficiently translated in elections. Subsequently, the politician must actively maintain the broad, deep relationship created by PR-STV or else face negative results from a disenchanted electorate.

The primacy of personality, caused by the nature of STV, small districts, voter expectations, and high proportionality combine to make the personality and perception of the taoiseach the most important influences on Irish foreign policy decision-making. The relative power and autonomy of the office of taoiseach make this combination possible.

The Effects of Irish Cabinet Formation/Functioning. While coalition government often disperses decision-making power among many, it provides no such service in Ahern's administration. The insignificant number of Progressive Democrats serving in ministerial posts (only one Minister and two Deputy-Ministers) allows for Fianna Fáil domination in group deliberation. With the central decision-making group ideologically homogenous, the necessary conditions for "groupthink" exist within the Irish cabinet (Janis 1982, 174). Thus, Irish government structure provides the Prime Minister with a large amount of autonomy. Also, as will be discussed...
later, certain cultural preferences predispose the Irish to groupthink situations. With groupthink "pressures toward uniformity" (Janis 1982, 175) silencing possible detractors to the taoiseach's policy-preferences, the taoiseach's personality and perceptions enjoy a wide range of influence.

The Prime Minister's autonomy allows him/her to transcend the group in making decisions. "The taoiseach is usually considered to be one of the strongest of all heads of government" (Elgie 1999, 237). The norms of Irish cabinet interplay provide the taoiseach with most of this decision-making power: "The taoiseach determines the order in which items on the cabinet agenda are taken, the time given to consideration of each item, who is to speak, and when a decision should be reached—or postponed.... In practice, ministers do not challenge the taoiseach's control of the agenda" (Farrell 1971, 176). In addition to agenda control, the taoiseach enjoys pervasive influence in the entire decision-making process: "the Taoiseach is in a position to direct rather than simply manage the flow of governmental business and is thus able to follow the full course of policy making from inception through to approval at the cabinet level" (Elgie 1999, 239). Thus, institutional norms allow the taoiseach considerable autonomy in the decision-making process; if he/she desires to, the taoiseach may transcend the Cabinet and make unilateral decisions.

The taoiseach's previous experience in government grants him/her the ability to take advantage of these norms and transcend his cabinet as such. History bears out that prime ministers typically have extensive experience in previous governments. For instance, Bertie Ahern, previous to his tenure as Prime Minister, served as the Assistant Government Whip, Chief Government Whip, Minister for Labour, and Finance Minister. Therefore, Ahern, serving in several previous governments, has necessary acumen to forsake consulting his Cabinet on crucial decisions.

With institutionally granted autonomy and the ability or power to take advantage of that autonomy, the Prime Minister is the key, almost sole, decision-maker in Irish foreign policy. We may look at these two factors as the necessary conditions for taoiseach personality and perception to significantly influence foreign policy. If those are the necessary conditions, then the pervasiveness of personality politics, as described earlier, provides the sufficient condition. The primacy of personality created by the small districts' constituency politics does not dwindle with becoming Prime Minister: first, as mentioned before, no real structures exist to constrain elite personality; and second, the Prime Minister, as a continuing member of Parliament, is still beholden to his district constituency. Thus, we would expect that any irrational outcomes in Irish foreign policy decision-making could most probably be explained by the unique personality and perceptions of the Irish Prime Minister.

**Culture: Sedative Two**

Culture has a glacial influence on foreign policy decision-making; its effect on the political environment is deep and lasting. However, inasmuch as it carves out the canyons and moraines of the national psyche over a long period of time and over a broad horizon, culture's influence is difficult to pinpoint. As Vertzberger points out, "societal factors are less apparent to the observer" (Vertzberger 1991, 260). In the Irish case at least, culture does not explicitly cause, per se, any foreign policy outcomes. However, like Ireland's governmental structure, Ireland's culture contributes to isolating decision-making power in the hands of the taoiseach.

In identifying causality, following Hudson's prescription for examining cultural "value preferences" (Hudson 1997, 8-9), I will employ Vertzberger's theoretical framework for culture-decision interaction. Vertzberger outlines four ways that culture (or "societal attributes") affects leaders' decision-making:

First, [societal attributes] affect the weight attached to foreign policy issues compared to other issues on the decision-makers' agenda and hence affect the allocation of attention to and cognizance of foreign-policy-related information. Second, once information has been recognized and has gained attention,
societal factors may impinge on the assessment of the importance of a particular datum and its diagnostic value. Third, societal attributes may influence the open-mindedness of decision-makers to dissonant information and their preparedness to readjust existing definitions of the situation in the light of new information. Finally, their attributes affect the interpretation of available information and the choice among competing interpretations. (1991, 261)

In other words, culture can affect policy by influencing decision-makers' priorities, by favoring particular sets of data, by further closing or opening decision-makers' minds, and by biasing certain interpretations at the expense of others. I will discuss the special importance of culture affecting policy in Vertzberger's ways one and four. Culture affects the Irish decision on enlargement the most by influencing decision-maker priorities and by biasing decision-makers' interpretations.

Hofstede identifies four cultural preference continua influential to foreign policy decision-making: one, individualism v. collectivism; two, strong v. weak gender differentiation; three, small v. large power distances; and four, low v. high uncertainty avoidance. Like values, preferences also provide a framework for decision-making. The natural preferences of a culture predispose decision-makers to particular types of action. For example, as Hofstede notes, cultures that prefer individualism to collectivism value personal achievement more than group harmony. These preferences affect decision-making by prescribing certain action. For instance, the subordination of group harmony to individual achievement invites debate into decision-making, thus undermining one of the causes of groupthink (Janis 1982, 37-9). The particular preferences of Irish culture hampered the Administration's ability to counter "No to Nice" because they fostered groupthink.

Irish culture, generally speaking, lends decision-makers to prefer collectivism to individualism, weak gender differentiation, and small power distance. The Irish preference for collectivism is evidenced in the importance of relationships among Irish politicians (for instance, Ahern's chief Cabinet Members and political counselors are his boyhood friends), the resolution of conflict through bargaining (such as, leadership successions in the Fianna Fáil party involve negotiations between the party elite), and the familial relationships between superordinates and subordinates in Irish politics (e.g., Charles Haughey, former Prime Minister and Bertie Ahern's political mentor, aided Ahern throughout his career after meeting fourteen-year-old Ahern at a local canvassing board). Irish decision-makers also prefer a weak gender differentiation: for example, the two Presidents of the 1990s were women and recent legislation modernized Irish gender law (Finnegan and McCarron 2000, 183-8). Also, Irish culture prefers a small power distance of which the following organizational chart provides an example (notice the lack of extensive hierarchy—e.g., the Prime Minister's office is organized not above the other Ministries but as just another cog in the government's wheel):

The cultural preferences of Ireland identified using Hofstede's criteria contribute to the Administration's failure to meet the opposition's threat. The preferences for collectivism, weak gender differentiation, and small power distance, provide an ideal groupthink environment by lending the Irish decision-makers to seek consensus, resolve conflict while retaining group harmony, and maintain low levels of centralization. With group members prizing relationships over tasks and group harmony over dissention, the autonomous taoiseach enjoys almost total group loyalty in making a decision. Therefore, when Ahern made the decision to disregard the "No to Nice" campaign, other Cabinet Members felt comfortable with simply jumping on the bandwagon.
TREATY OF NICE

ET TÔ BERTIE? AHERN
AS HIS OWN WORST ENEMY

With government structure and culture funneling decision-making power almost entirely into the taoiseach, the unique personality and perceptions of Bertie Ahern determined the Administration's approach to the Nice opposition. As outlined above, the structure of the Irish Executive and the nature of Irish constituent politics allow for the individual leader's personality and perceptions to play a significant role. Cultural preferences incubated the central decision-making group in a groupthink environment—those that might have raised alternative policies deferred to the taoiseach. Both his personality trait of confidence and his perception of the opposition's strength factored heavily into Ahern's decision-making regarding the Nice "yes" campaign.19

I argue that Ahern was aware of the growth in opposition from Amsterdam to Nice but had an attitude that undercut an appropriate counter attack. That Ahern recognized the strength of the opposition is reflected in comments such as "[the previous referendums on the EU] all passed comfortably, even if the margin of success had been gradually declining" (Ahern 2000). Ahern was aware of the growing opposition to EU enlargement. Also, with the major parties outlining their stances on the Nice Treaty months before the referendum in June, it would have been nearly impossible for an astute politician to fail to recognize the existence of an opposition.

Ahern's attitude affected decision-making in two respects. First, Ahern's attitude led him to be overconfident in the situation and abilities of his administration. Second, Ahern's attitude led him to misperceive the abilities of his opposition. Thus, Ahern's attitude squandered any value brought by recognizing opposition growth after Amsterdam. In the words of Brigid Laffan, "The performance of the Government was particularly lacklustre as it appeared to take the outcome for granted" (Laffan 2001, 3).

A content analysis of speeches given by Ahern from the beginning of 1999 to July 2001 reveals Ahern's steadily swelling self-confidence. I followed a simple three-step process in measuring Ahern's confidence levels. First, I coded his speeches for confidence, following coding and content analysis methods developed by Margaret Hermann.20 Second, I coded the same speeches for a lack of confidence using the same principles. I operationalized a lack of confidence as use of the subjunctive verbal mood in non-conditional statements and use of plural first-person personal pronouns when the actor is discussing initiating action, his/her position of authority, and receiving positive feedback.21 The third and final step was dividing each speech's high confidence measure by its low confidence measure. This creates a ratio of high confidence to low confidence that captures the high/low relationship.

My analysis reveals high confidence markers increasing more than low confidence markers until the Nice referendum. Low confidence markers quickly outnumber high confidence markers shortly thereafter. While content analysis is not a perfect science, I am confident this measure is roughly accurate of Ahern's confidence during this period: the four speeches and one interview coded were each well over 1,000 words, thus providing sufficient material for an accurate coding.

As the graph below shows, confidence reached its peak during the months immediately preceding the Nice referendum debacle (and fell thereafter):

Figure 3. Measure of Ahern's confidence levels from early 1999 to mid-2001

Previous victories in subjects unrelated to the EU caused Ahern to overestimate his odds of success on the Nice referendum. In the early part
of 1999, Ahern was still weathering criticism and grappling with persistent opposition regarding the Good Friday Agreement—thus the relatively low confidence levels. Upon final resolution of this issue, a major victory for Ahern and his administration, Ahern’s confidence steadily grew. In the sense that Ahern’s growing confidence can be attributed to his watershed victory in the Northern Ireland peace process, and as such the result of a “judgmental-evaluative process” (Vertzberger 1990, 128), Ahern’s confidence can be categorized within Vertzberger’s definition of an attitude. The relationship between the attitude of confidence and the decision to not counteract the Nice opposition is causal: “[attitudes] create a disposition for a particular pattern of behavior toward specific objects or categories of objects and social situations or some combinations thereof” (Vertzberger 1990, 127–8). Thus, Ahern’s confident attitude prevented him from appropriately reacting to his opposition. He misperceived his own efficacy and, therefore, didn’t take the proper steps to shore up the support for Nice.

In Ahern’s case, the sword cut twice. Not only did Ahern overestimate his own position but he also underestimated the position of his opponents. Vertzberger describes the “insensitivity to situational implications” evident in Ahern’s disregard for the Nice opposition as “the tendency to prefer dispositional explanations of the other actors’ behavior” (e.g., inherent weakness) (Vertzberger 1990, 129). In other words, individuals choose to discount another actor on the perception of the other’s deficiency. As in Vertzberger’s example of Israel disregarding the obviously imminent attack from the “weaker” Arab states in the fall of 1973, Ahern and his administration underestimated the opposition because they considered their opponents as ideologically marginalized, intellectually inferior, immoral, and illegitimate.

Statements from administration officials indicate these four sources of “situational insensitivity.” Ahern’s Minister of Justice reveals the perception of the opposition as intellectually inferior and ideologically marginalized when referring to the Green Party with the following, “What can be said of this party whose policies and attitudes regularly make good theatre of the absurd?” (Irish Times 2001b) Perceived opposition immorality and illegitimacy is evidenced through another administration official who “described the No [to Nice] campaign as ‘wrong’” (Irish Times 2001b), and through the Minister of the Environment who said that the Sinn Fein “campaign was dishonest” (Irish Times 2001a). Ahern himself referred to “No to Nice” as “a sinister campaign of disinformation” and called supporters of the “No” campaign the “lunatic fringe” (de Bredun 2001). Thus, working within an attitude that perceived nonexistent deficiencies in the opposition, Ahern and his administration acted inappropriately to the reality they faced.

With Irish government structure and culture concentrating the responsibility for counter-acting the “No to Nice” campaign in his hands, Bertie Ahern had only himself to blame for the failure of Nice ratification. By overestimating the efficacy of his administration and underestimating the efficacy of his opposition, Ahern became his own worst enemy. In his own words:

I, of course, am deeply disappointed by the Referendum result. I am also disappointed that all of us on the ‘Yes’ side, the Government, the main political parties and the social partners were not able to persuade a higher number of voters to participate in making such an important decision. (Ahern 2001)

RECAPITULATION AND REFLECTION

The interplay of government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for decision-maker misperception in the Irish case. Irish government structure and culture concentrate decision-making authority in the taoiseach by creating a groupthink environment within the central decision-making body. Although there are short power-distances and little hierarchy in the Irish Cabinet, “pressures towards uniformity” and institutional norms grant the taoiseach sweeping autonomy. Irish government structure and culture also elevate the importance of personality in politics. Therefore, the taoiseach has a proclivity for injecting his/her
TREATY OF NICE

personality in politics, and his/her policy-making autonomy provides the opportunity to do so.

Such personality injection is the precise cause of the Administration's miscalculation regarding the Nice referendum. Ahern's overconfidence in his own abilities and inaccurate attitudes towards the Nice opposition led him to misperceive the situation. Without decision-making power dispersed to other actors, that they might challenge Ahern's interpretation and attendant policy-prescription, this personal miscalculation proved fatal to all on the "yes" side. Ahern had both the ability and interest to defeat the "No to Nice" campaign, but instead he inadvertently allowed his opponents' victory.

The lessons provided by the Irish Nice experience, especially when coupled with the Danish Maastricht experience, are this article's first intended contribution to the field. The Nice experience shows that EU leaders cannot expect to operate in a vacuum—if decision-makers neglect domestic interests, citizenries will impact EU progress. Perhaps Nice's most important lesson is that the "democratic deficit" murmured of for so long is a reality, or at least perceived to be among the electorate. EU policy-makers might learn from Ireland that EU progress is feasible not simply through direct, clear engagement with the citizenry but also engagement that communicates interests up the hierarchy and not just down. Vision, not just mud-slinging the opposition, must attend reform campaigns, especially when the reforms do not promise more money.

Actor misperception, magnified by structural and cultural factors, provides my Nice reversal explanation: my second intended contribution to the field of foreign policy analysis and international political study. With this explanation, it is possible to discern whether this obstacle to EU enlargement is surmountable. My explanation isn't a quick-fix like the "lack of funds" explanation: simply throwing money at this problem will not necessarily result in ratification. Yet, this explanation does allow for "yes" correction. The Irish hurdle to enlargement is surmountable, if the decision-making group, principally Bertie Ahern, is able to correct the previous misperception. Since failure is the primary impetus for change (Herman 1990, 10), it seems that this misperception, and thus Nice ratification, will be corrected in time.

Third, this study contributes to European political analysis, specifically to liberal intergovernmental theory. The politics of the Irish Nice referendum provide an ideal case for further understanding how states debate and configure "national preferences," (Moravcsik 1993, 482, and Moravcsik 1998, 24-7). National preference formation is the first step in the intergovernmental model of EU negotiation and policy-making. Thus, the Irish experience allows us to better understand and predict EU policy-making by providing insight into this fundamental process.

Arguing that "groups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them" (Moravcsik 1993, 483), liberal intergovernmentalism identifies the formation of national preferences as the launchpad for EU policy outcomes. National preferences are crucial because nation-state governments, not supranational bureaucrats, are the key decision-makers in EU policy-making. Andrew Moravcsik, the leading intergovernmental theorist, outlines the intergovernmental policy-making model as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Liberal Theories</th>
<th>Intergovernmental Theories</th>
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<tr>
<td>(International demand for outcomes)</td>
<td>(International supply of outcomes)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Underlying societal factors: pressure from domestic societal actors as represented in political institutions</td>
<td>Underlying political factors: intensity of national preferences; alternative coalitions; available issue linkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PREFERENCE FORMATION</td>
<td>INTERSTATE NEGOTIATION</td>
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<td>CONFIGURATION OF STATE PREFERENCES</td>
<td>OUTCOMES</td>
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The Irish Nice referendum experience falls within the "configuration of state preferences" step of the model, where domestic and elite preferences mix. Moravcsik argues that the principle-agent relationship between society and government bounds this preference configuration (Moravcsik 1993, 483). Since "the primary interest of governments is to maintain
themselves in office” and since “this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups, and bureaucracies” (Moravcsik 1993, 483), preference configuration is rational. Domestic actors directly or indirectly pressure the government for a certain foreign policy decision (e.g., refuse to ratify the Nice Treaty). The government must respond to domestic pressure in order to secure their office. “At times the principal-agent relationship between social pressures and state policies is tight; at times, ‘agency slack’ in the relationship permits rational governments to exercise greater policy discretion” (Moravcsik 1993, 484), depending upon the issues and actors involved.

The Irish Nice experience teaches us that decision-maker perception of this principal-agent relationship is crucial for determining the outcome of EU policy. In its Nice policy, the Administration perceived more slack in the relationship than actually existed. The government inaccurately aggregated the domestic interests and configured a national preference unacceptable to the domestic polity. Domestic actors took two routes to influence this unacceptable configuration: some directly protested, or exercised “voice,” and voted against the ratifying referendum, others indirectly influenced, exercising “exit,” and simply refused to participate. The policy-making process broke down because one of the players inadvertently failed to follow the rules.

The Nice referendum offers an obvious caveat to Moravcsik’s model: rational assumptions explain the configuration of state preferences only if state decision-makers do not seriously misperceive the principal-agent relationship. However, the Irish lesson goes further, and is therefore more meaningful, by offering the key variables explaining this misperception. By analyzing the impact of government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality in a given case, we can determine whether this misperception exists.

Understanding this preference configuration process allows policy-makers to manage more effectively and efficiently the changes EU enlargement requires. Such management is not only necessary in Ireland but also in all of the current transfer states. With the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries, Spain, Portugal, and Greece will lose the majority of their EU transfer funds along with Ireland (Economist 2001). While Irish economic growth has lessened the importance of the funds to the Irish, the rest of the “Poor Four” still rely heavily on transfers. Spain provides a striking example. Transfers to Spain in 1997 totaled 2,674.1 million Spanish pesetas (Scobie 1998, 37-8) or 35.94 million U.S. dollars. With the Spanish government’s 1998 expenditures budgeted at 18,139.6 million pesetas (Europa Publications 2000, 3616) or 243.81 million U.S. dollars, this transfer amounts to approximately 14.7% of the total Spanish budget. Eleven of Spain’s seventeen regions receive transfer funds from the EU (Economist 2001). With stakes so high, configuring the domestic preferences in Spain will be as important as it is difficult. Does the Spanish administration correctly perceive the principal-agent relationship on this issue? Is the perceived democratic deficit too large for the currently constituted leadership to overcome? Can it effectively manage this change? What role should the EU play, if any, in this debate? Such questions can be answered when intergovernmentalist theory is applied with an understanding of the specific government structure, cultural preferences, and personality dynamics influencing Spanish decision-making.

Thus, as they comprise one instrument in a greater theoretical tool-belt, government structure, culture, and leadership personality provide us with insight into both the Irish Nice refusal and future European policy struggles.

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NOTES
1. Only about 38% of the electorate turned out.
2. For a full description of the Nice Treaty, see European Union 2001.

4. For a brief treatment of Irish EU support and the causes behind it, see Butler and Castle 2001.

5. All of the five major parties in Ireland—Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour, the Democratic Left, and the Progressive Democrats (which when combined control about 93% of the electorate—Whelan and Masterson 1998, 153)—openly supported Nice Treaty ratification.

6. For instance, Sinn Fein and the Green Party, the only two parties opposing the Treaty of Nice with representatives in parliament, hold only three of the 166 seats in the Dáil (Laffan 2001, 2).

7. For description of the “yes” campaign's deficiencies, see Laffan 2001, 3–4.


9. Liberal intergovernmentalism, championed by Andrew Moravcsik, is “the most prominent and promising rationalist account of the major turning points in the history of European integration” (Schimmelfennig 2001, 47).

10. TD is the Irish equivalent of MP—Member of Parliament.

11. Also contributing to the change, although at less significant levels, were Ahern’s relatively lower confidence during the Amsterdam decision, the recent election, and the far less controversial nature of the Treaty of Amsterdam (all the thorny issues were procrastinated until Nice).

12. For an insightful comparison of PR-STV with other electoral systems, see Arend Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy (1999).


15. My research on whether Irish culture prefers high or low uncertainty avoidance has proven inconclusive.

16. The following evidence is found in Ahern’s personal history Bertie Ahern: Taoiseach and Peacemaker (Whelan and Masterson 1998).

17. Organizational chart compiled from information found on the official website of the Department of the Taoiseach (2002).

18. For a full treatment of the groupthink concept, see Janis 1982, 174–98.

19. For a thorough discussion of how misperception affects policy-making, see Jervis 1976.

20. For coding scheme design, see Herrmann 1983; for content analysis methodology, see “Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Study of 53 Heads of Government” (Herrmann 1984).

21. Coding the subjunctive in nonconditional statements is my own idea, as the subjunctive mood of verbs is most often used when one is hedging or being overly polite if it is not used in a conditional. Coding the plural first-person pronoun as low confidence is simply an adaptation of Margaret Herrmann’s coding scheme for confidence. She codes high confidence as the use of the first-person pronoun in the same situations (Herrmann 1984).

22. For a scholarly discussion of the EU democratic deficit and the debate surrounding it, see Lord 2001.

23. The neofunctional school of thought asserts that supranational actors, such as the European Commission, are the fundamental drivers behind EU policymaking. For a discussion of neofunctionalism, its assumptions, origins, and explanatory purchase, see George 1994 and Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991. For the intergovernmentalist critique of neofunctionalism, see Moravcsik 1993, 474–80.

24. This model can be found in Moravcsik 1993, 482.

25. Moravcsik asserts that direct and indirect pressure has the same effect on governments (1993, 484).

26. I use the terms vote and exit as found in Moravcsik 1993, 484; however, these terms were introduced by Hirschman (1970). The abysmally low voter turnout is a good example of the exit option used during the referendum.

27. The author’s calculation taken from figures found in Scobie 1998, 38.

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SYMBOLS AND SPOILS: FRAMING AND MOBILIZING STRUCTURES IN COLOMBIA’S ENDLESS CIVIL WAR

JOSH WHEATLEY

The civil war that has plagued Colombia over the past four decades is often explained in the context of class-based theory. This study will examine class-based theory as it relates to Colombian socioeconomic structure, showing that it does not completely explain many specific elements that have developed in the war. This paper will instead analyze the use of framing mechanisms used by each faction, as well as the mobilization structures in which the framing arrangements are manipulated. Finally, it will demonstrate how the leaders of the FARC and AUC use these groups to promote their own interests.

A civil war has plagued Colombia over the past four decades, causing over 35,000 deaths. The hostilities officially began in 1964 when leftist insurgents, responding to military aggression, formed guerilla armies seeking to overthrow the government and establish a regime based on leftist ideology. According to class-based theory, a civil war in Colombia is neither unusual nor unexpected. In an environment of such obvious inequality, with masses of impoverished peasants, the system’s mere structure should eventually lead to the uniting of the lower class in open rebellion against the upper class. However, class-based theory does not explain many specific elements of the Colombian Civil War and may in fact contradict them. While the conflict originally consisted of hostility between a movement claiming to represent the interests of the peasants and a military representing the interests of the oligarchy, it has evolved into a completely different kind of quarrel.

The war currently involves three principal factions: the Colombian military, the left-wing guerilla group Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), and the right-wing paramilitary group United Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC). Historically, the major conflict has been between the FARC and the military, but in recent years the AUC has emerged as a powerful force, fighting against the FARC on their own, independent of the military. In 1998, the Colombian military withdrew from many FARC-controlled areas as a gesture of peace, and since then the FARC and the AUC have emerged as the conflict’s principal actors and enemies.

The FARC and the AUC both claim to be representing the interests of the common Colombian while opposing the oppression perpetrated by the elites. Despite this, both groups are actively involved in violating the human rights of the citizens they profess to protect. This article will seek to explain why the Colombian
Civil War has become a conflict in which the principal actors are poor people fighting against poor people. The leaders of the two groups use culture-based collective action mechanisms to mobilize their followers and convince them that the cause they promote is in fact a noble venture with a purpose to protect the Colombian culture and way of life. Further, the leaders of these movements are in fact significantly concerned with advancing their own interests, using the mobilized masses as their tools. It is the presence of these features that challenges the assumptions of class-based theory.

To accomplish this, I will first examine class-based theory as it relates to the Colombian socioeconomic structure. I will then analyze the organization of the FARC and the AUC, focusing on both the framing mechanisms utilized by leaders of the two groups to rally their members to action and the mobilization structures in which these framing arrangements are manipulated. Finally, I will examine the organization and operations of the FARC and AUC to demonstrate how the leaders use these groups to promote their own interests. While the bulk of my evidence will come from studies presented in scholarly books and journals, I will also rely on documents produced by the FARC and the AUC that state their official viewpoints, actions, and goals. I will also use reports published by international NGOs providing data about the Colombian socioeconomic structure and statistics related to the conflict.

**HISTORICAL COLOMBIAN CLASS STRUCTURE**

Colombia has a history of socioeconomic class separation. In 1849, two political parties formed within the elite oligarchy. Those same two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, are still the predominant, if not exclusive, political actors in modern Colombian politics (Kline and Gray 2000). They are basically catch-all parties that cater to the interests of the upper and middle classes (Boudon 2000, 35). Economic disparity is rampant; the World Bank gives Colombia the fifth-highest rating of disparity in the world, with 61.5% of the wealth owned by 20% of the population. The disparity becomes even more evident when one realizes that, within that sector, 46.9% of Colombia’s wealth is controlled by only the top 10% of the nation’s citizens (Center for Balanced Development n.d.). Because of this tremendous inequality, the peasant class has little representation in the national political structure.

As a result of its exclusion from mainstream politics, the peasant class has historically had to make one of two choices. Most peasants chose to support one of the two elite parties. Those desiring to own land and survive through subsistence agriculture generally followed the Liberal party, whereas those who were content to survive under the employ of the elite landowners usually upheld the Conservative agenda. For decades following the establishment of democracy, party affiliation was an important element in nearly all Colombians’ concept of cultural and political identity (Chepesiu 1999).

The second option, which was practiced by a minority of the peasants, was to resort to unconventional tactics to promote their interests. As early as the 1920s, peasant groups attempted armed insurgency as a means to bring about social reform, but the military easily defeated all uprisings (Tickner 1998). In the late 1920s, Jorge Gaitan, an emerging leader of the Liberal party, actively promoted social and agrarian reforms to benefit the lower class. However, efforts led by radical conservatives and supported by moderates within both parties impeded implementation of any meaningful reform (Hoskin and Murillo 1999).

Following the 1946 election of Conservative Ospina Perez to the presidency, violence broke out among rural supporters of both political parties. The conflict escalated following the murder of Jorge Gaitan in 1948 and resulted in a civil war known as La Violencia, a ten-year period of extreme conflict. According to Kline and Gray (2000), the violence was instigated mainly by elite Conservatives, who sought to consolidate their power, and by elite Liberals, who sought to prevent such consolidation. During this time, radical leftist guerrillas also established a presence in the countryside, hoping to take advantage of the turbulent environment to trigger a communist revolution. In 1953, a
military government took power, but the fighting continued until 1958, when the Colombian National Congress and the citizens adopted a new institution called the National Front (Kline and Gray 2000).

The National Front established a system of power sharing between the two parties, which agreed to alternate control of the executive office until 1974 and share an equal number of elected and appointed offices (Kline and Gray 2000). While it established peace between these two elitist groups, the agreement failed to address underlying socioeconomic problems that continued to plague the population's lower class. Once again at peace with each other, the two parties supported a violent military campaign against the more radical leftist insurgents that maintained demands for extensive social reforms (Hoskin and Murillo 1999, 38–9).

Rather than promoting needed agrarian reform, the National Front established policies to allow increased private ownership of land in rural areas. Under the guise of battling leftist insurgency, the military violently displaced many peasants from these newly privatized areas, forcing them into more remote and inhospitable regions. The new peasant settlements often formed community defense forces, which laid the foundation for later formation of guerilla armies such as the FARC and the AUC (Vargas 1998, 23–4).

**CLASS-BASED THEORY**

Various theories seek to explain the behavior of individuals based on the socioeconomic environment in which they live. Two of these are structuralist and rational choice theory. Structuralist theory asserts that social systems consisting of extreme socioeconomic disparity inevitably lead to revolution, because the system's structure provides the lower classes no other way to remedy the situation. Skocpol (1979) argues this view in case studies of the Russian, Chinese, and French revolutions, all of which were the result of mobilized peasant classes overthrowing elite ruling classes.

The second class-based theory, rational choice, also allows for economically constrained behavior. This school of thought focuses on "rational and strategic individuals who make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends" (Levi 1997, 23). In other words, individuals determine their behavior based on the costs and benefits of their possible actions. Individuals living in a system of socioeconomic disparity may view armed insurgence against the upper class as providing great potential benefits for future prosperity, whereas failure to rebel could result in the continuance of poverty. In such a case, the rational behavior would clearly be violent rebellion against the elites. Armed conflict with other members of the lower class would not be rational, as it would bring about few, if any, economic gains.

Skidmore and Smith (2001) analyze Latin American politics from a structuralist, class-based perspective, focusing on such aspects as international division of labor and resource-based economies. While they do not include a case study of Colombia, they do analyze class-based social movements in such nations as Mexico and Peru. Their model would predict that the Colombian peasant class would have at some point in history united in collective protest against the elite upper class, with such action resulting in at least the creation of political parties to represent their interests and at the most a revolution to overthrow the oppressive regime.

Considering both the historical and current socioeconomic structure, the fact that civil war has raged for thirty-seven years should not be surprising, especially based upon the predictions of class-based theory. What is surprising is the fact that in recent years, when the violence has escalated to its highest levels, the nature of the conflict has changed considerably. As the FARC has increased its power, the AUC has matched the escalation. However, the lower echelon foot soldiers of both groups are made up almost entirely of peasants from the lower classes. Rather than a class-based struggle with peasants fighting against elites, this conflict has turned into a power struggle between different groups that are able to successfully mobilize the peasants to fight for them. In the following sections, I will examine how culture-based theory
may help explain this apparent contradiction of class-based theory.

**Framing Mechanisms**

One of the key elements for successful collective action is the use of proper framing mechanisms. According to collective action theory, framing includes the use of cultural symbols to mobilize the masses into group participation. Tarrow argues, “Inscribing grievances in overall frames that identify an injustice, attribute the responsibility for it to others, and propose solution to it is a central activity of social movements” (1998, 111). Tarrow further asserts that movement leaders “orient their movements’ frames toward action in particular contexts and fashion them at the intersection between a target population’s culture and their own values and goals” (1998, 110).

Both the FARC and AUC have been successful in applying these framing mechanisms to their own causes. Both groups have delegated the blame for social injustices suffered by Colombian peasants to external sources. Each of the groups also appeals to basic cultural beliefs and desires of the Colombian peasant class. Both the FARC and the AUC claim to be the true advocates of the Colombian people, defending the common man against oppression by the political and economic elites. In appealing to the concept of cultural identity as free Colombians, these leaders elevate their soldiers’ status from that of simple mercenaries to that of freedom fighters.

**Framing and the FARC**

In the early 1960s, leftist rebels officially founded the FARC with the ultimate goal of seizing control of the national government through armed insurgence, becoming the first rebel group to actively promote change through a mainly offensive rather than defensive campaign (Vargas 2000). Since its inception, the FARC has evolved from being a minor inconvenience for the government to its current existence as a military force of 15,000 members and a political power controlling a significant amount of territory (Pardo 2000, 69). FARC leaders have taken advantage of the continually changing situation within Colombia to increase their fundraising and recruiting efforts. However, their culture-based framing structures have remained constant over the years.

FARC propaganda disseminated over the internet helps the outside observer to understand the group’s domestic framing mechanisms. According to its official homepage, the FARC was established after a group of peasants withstood an armed attack perpetrated by the Colombian military and supported by the United States. In the wake of this attack, the FARC emerged as “a revolutionary program calling together all the citizens who dream of a Colombia for Colombians, with equality of opportunities and equitable distribution of wealth, and where among us all we can build peace with social equality and sovereignty” (FARC-EP n.d.). Throughout the years, the number of active guerrillas and the level of violence have increased, as the FARC claims its members remain “ready to give everything, including their lives, to realize the dreams of equality and justice that inspire our struggle” (FARC-EP n.d.).

FARC leaders have framed their armed insurgence as a struggle to protect the interests of the innocent Colombian citizen that has been and continues to be oppressed by an elitist, foreign-influenced government. As their webpage asserts, the FARC’s armed insurgence is “an option that has been imposed upon the Colombian people by the ruling class which follows the orientation of the government of the United States of America” (FARC-EP n.d.). The principal symbol used by the FARC is the outline of the Colombian nation inscribed upon the Colombian flag, a simple appeal to the Colombian identity. While labeled by the government as insurgents and criminals, FARC guerrillas can view themselves as freedom fighters possessing the honor to participate in Colombia’s liberation.

The FARC also appeals to the people through revisiting historical incidents of peasant-class collective action. The peasant uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s are heralded as the beginning of the people’s movement to free Colombia from socioeconomic oppression, and the leftist movements during the period of La Violencia
and the years that followed are considered a continuation of the same battle and a predecessor of the current guerilla insurgence (FARC-EP n.d.). FARC leaders have clearly taken advantage of historical events to strengthen their framing structure, even though most of the uprisings prior to 1948 were supported by a faction of the Liberal party and promoted moderate agrarian reform that was nowhere near the FARC's current stated goal to overthrow the government and replace it with a communist regime.

**Framing and the AUC**

On the other end of the conflict, the paramilitary groups of the AUC have emerged as well-armed, capable opponents of the FARC's guerillas. The AUC's groups trace their origins to 1965, when the government passed legislation authorizing the military to arm civilians in order to fight the guerillas. While this policy was later revoked, the tradition of private armies had by then become well established in the Colombian culture (Chernick 1998a, 28). In the 1980s, landowners such as drug lords and cattle ranchers began the widespread establishment of private armies to protect their holdings from the guerillas (Richani 2000, 41).

Carlos Castaño first became involved in the paramilitary movement in 1981 after FARC guerillas kidnapped and murdered his wealthy cattle-ranching father. Shortly thereafter, Castaño allied himself with Pablo Escobar, a powerful drug lord, in a vengeful organized fight against the guerillas. Over the years his group gained power with support from the military and greater revenue from the drug trade. In 1996, Castaño united various paramilitary groups to form an organization called the United Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC). The AUC has emerged as the most powerful and influential paramilitary group, with a well-trained and well-organized army of estimated strength as low as 4,000 active members (Richani 2000, 39) and as high as 11,000 (Wilson 2001).

Similar to the FARC, the AUC utilizes cultural framing mechanisms to justify its cause. According to the AUC webpage, paramilitary groups emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s to defend the Colombian people from the growing guerilla threat. The AUC propaganda allows that the guerilla movement began with noble intentions to bring about necessary social and political reforms but asserts that it had degenerated into a simple criminal operation heavily involved in drug trafficking and kidnapping that threatened the livelihood of the rural Colombian citizen (AUC n.d.). In the AUC's view, this threat is also demonstrated by the FARC's desire to take property away from wealthy landowners, upon whom peasants rely for land and employment.

The paramilitary group also argues that the government and the military give priority protection to the oligarchy and fail to provide proper protection for the lower class (AUC n.d.). In the wake of such threats to the Colombian way of life, it was necessary for the paramilitary groups to step in as the defenders. The AUC also uses the Colombian flag and map as its principal symbols, and its very name—the United 'Self Defense' Units of Colombia—appeals to protection of the Colombian identity.

Like the FARC, the AUC uses historical trends to promote cultural loyalty to its cause. AUC leaders appeal to the traditional differences between the peasants, such as the original concept of identity determined by party affiliation and the Conservative-supported peasant armies of the La Violencia Civil War. They also promote the economic model of the peasant class relying upon large landowners to provide them with land and employment. The AUC framing mechanism presents this system as the model that will provide peasants the greatest levels of prosperity and stability and identifies the agrarian redistribution agenda of the FARC as implausible and unstable because it will lead to chaos and poverty for the lower class (Suarez 1998).

**Mobilization Structures**

While framing is an important aspect of collective mobilization, an organized structure to manage collective action must also exist. As Tarrow states, "Social movements do not depend on framing alone; they must bring people together in the field, shape coalitions, confront
SYMBOLS AND SPOILS

opponents, and assure their own future after the exhilaration of the peak of mobilization has passed" (1998, 123). He further analyzes many aspects of mobilizing structures, but one concept particularly relevant to this case is his concept of external resources facilitating the establishment of these structures. While Tarrow focuses on such external resources as the media to reach and motivate extensive audiences, I seek to modify his approach. I argue that actions by the Colombian government have helped to improve the cultural image of the FARC and AUC movements, thus increasing the groups’ support among Colombian citizens and serving as external resources that have strengthened their mobilizing structures.

One of the principal external resources aiding the establishment of mobilizing structures for both the FARC and the AUC has been the general weakness of the Colombian government. Perceived and actual regime weaknesses have allowed the FARC and AUC to expand their objectives as well as prevent the government from intervening to stop the spread of these groups’ power and influence. FARC leaders have lost confidence in the government’s ability to protect them and respect their interests should they choose to lay down their arms, and AUC leaders have recognized that the government will not interfere with their violent counter-insurgency efforts.

The attitudes and perceptions of both groups can largely be attributed to the emergence of Colombia as a leading international supplier of illegal drugs, an event that has been a key factor in exposing the regime’s weakness and inability to maintain order within its own borders. For many years, Colombia has ceded to pressure from the United States to reduce the supply of illegal drugs flowing from within its borders. In recent years, the government instituted a U.S.-sponsored program to eradicate coca fields by spraying them with pesticides from aircraft flying above or by sending the military to burn them. Most of this eradication has occurred in the southern part of the nation controlled by the FARC, as the government has consistently attempted to correlate the guerilla movement with drug trafficking (Vargas 2000).

Rather than having its power and influence diminished by the eradication efforts, the FARC has flourished. Many peasants hold coca cultivation as their principal source of income and view the eradication efforts, which also damage other crops, as a direct attack on their livelihood (Molano 2000, 30–1). The government’s eradication program has clearly been an external force that has strengthened the FARC’s mobilizing structure while legitimizing its framing mechanisms. To the coca farmers, the FARC is their only protection against a tyrannical government seeking to destroy their livelihood for no apparent reason. As the FARC informs them that the government acts this way to please a foreign power while harming its own citizens, these farmers become culturally committed to supporting the movement that seeks to protect Colombia and allow them to live life according to their desires. Most of them are then very willing to pay taxes to the FARC, and the individuals more committed to that desire to join the noble movement protecting the Colombian way of life choose to become active members of the guerilla army (Vargas 2000).

While alienating its own citizens, the government’s eradication program has failed to stem the flow of coca production in southern Colombia, with most reports estimating that production has actually increased (Avilés 2001). Drug-related money constitutes an estimated 60% of the FARC’s yearly revenue, which has been projected to be as high as 600 million U.S. dollars a year (Pardo 2000, 70). With the FARC’s burgeoning money base and the increasing number of displaced peasants available and committed to join the organization, its membership has increased from a mere 500 in 1970 to current estimates of 15,000. The increased revenue has assisted the FARC in paying, training, and equipping its members, which has greatly increased its military capability (Vargas 2000).

Not only has the eradication program assisted in the FARC’s growth, but it has also served as an external resource to strengthen the AUC’s mobilizing structure. As the government and military consistently assert that the guerilla movement and drug trafficking are one and the same, they fail to address the issue of drug
production in areas controlled by the AUC. Various reports imply that the AUC is much more involved in the drug trade than the FARC, but the government refuses to acknowledge or address this claim (Montalvo 2000, 9–10). In attacking its principal enemy while leaving the AUC alone, the government has helped to legitimate the paramilitary movement. Supporters of the AUC may desire political reform, but they do not wish for the complete overthrow of the regime sought by the guerrillas. Seeing the government actively working toward the same goal as the AUC likely strengthens their cultural resolve that the paramilitaries really do seek the welfare of the Colombian nation.

Increasing drug-related revenue has allowed the AUC to become better equipped and better trained, resulting in more military successes. While individuals truly culturally committed to the AUC would sustain the group in times of success and failure, victories are always better than losses for fortifying support. A proud Colombian may see the realization of national success and prosperity as inevitable, and if the AUC is providing the mechanism through which that goal is obtained, it must be the true proponent of Colombian culture and identity.

Prior to the coca eradication project, other actions by the government had also bolstered the strength of the two groups. Throughout the civil war, various administrations had attempted to make peace with the FARC. In 1984, the FARC and the military declared a cease-fire, and many members of the FARC established a legitimate communist party known as the Patriotic Union (UP). While the government and the FARC seemed to desire peace, other interested parties did not. Over the next two years paramilitaries and drug traffickers murdered over 3,000 members of the UP, causing it to be virtually nonexistent. The deaths were rarely investigated and few if any of those responsible were prosecuted (Vargas 1998, 25). As a result of the government’s failure to protect its members attempting to assimilate into the political sphere, the FARC gained new resolve to continue its armed insurgency. Similarly, paramilitaries realized that the government either could not or would not stop them from murdering their enemies, which encouraged them to continue doing it. While this event preceded the AUC, it laid the foundation for the formation of future paramilitary groups.

Government failures continued to facilitate the strengthening of the rebel groups’ mobilization structures. In 1994, Ernesto Samper assumed the office of president, actively promoting peace negotiations with the FARC. However, shortly after his inauguration, reports surfaced that he had accepted campaign donations from various drug cartels, and he instantly lost nearly all credibility. The FARC immediately withdrew from peace negotiations, and during the next few years escalated its offensive campaign to the highest levels ever (Suarez 1998). The paramilitaries responded by also increasing their strength, which likely factored into the formation of the AUC (Richani 2000, 39). In this case, as Chernick asserts, the corruption of one political leader provided extensive external fortification of the groups’ mobilization structures:

With Samper reduced to practicing the politics of survival, the growing vacuum at the center of power has prompted many political sectors—Congress, the military, party leaders, gomones, business, paramilitaries, guerrillas—to push their own agendas and take advantage of the executive’s weakness. (1998b, 41)

**FARC AND AUC LEADERS: CULTURAL CRUSADERS OR RATIONAL ACTORS?**

Until now, I have focused on framing mechanisms and mobilization structures used by the FARC and AUC to legitimize their movements and recruit membership. However, leaders of these groups have utilized these mobilization devices not just to establish their organizations but also to promote their own interests. Though I feel that culture-based theory is a more viable explanation for Colombia’s apparent contradiction of class-based theory, rational choice theory also deserves consideration. Not only has this crusade promoted positive action for the group, but the actions of the FARC and AUC have also provided individual-level benefits to their leaders, providing them rational incentives to continue the fight.
SYMBOLS AND SPOILS

While there appears to be strong evidence that cultural framing plays an important role in mobilizing members of the FARC and the AUC, rational choice theorists could argue that membership in these organizations results simply from rational actors seeking to further their own economic interests. It is certain that members of these factions are mercenaries; they receive monthly income for their efforts, and both groups generally pay better than the military (Chepesiuk 1999, 8). They may also feel that failure to join one of the groups will bring about accusations by both factions that they support the other, which may threaten their future survival. An examination of each group's leadership may prove useful in evaluating the merit of rational choice theory in this context.

THE FARC LEADERSHIP

As he entered office in 1998, President Andres Pastrana showed his interest in negotiating peace with the FARC by ceding to its demand that the military withdraw from a 42,000 square kilometer area in southern Colombia. He was also willing to discuss offering clemency to FARC leaders and allowing them to participate in the government if they were willing to make peace. The Barco administration had made a similar offer to the M-19 terrorist group in 1991, which resulted in that organization's demilitarization and the assimilation of its members into the legitimate political sphere (Tickner 1998, 62).

FARC leaders gladly accepted control of the area, but rather than responding with their own peaceful overtures, they converted the region into a virtual sovereign state within Colombia and then escalated the hostility. The FARC now uses the demilitarized zone to recruit and train new soldiers, cultivate coca crops, hide hostages and kidnap victims, and execute prisoners (Pardo 2000). FARC leaders are also exerting increasing influence in the local politics of municipalities they control. In some cities, FARC operatives manage such simple tasks as issuing marriage licenses and building permits. Reports have surfaced claiming that since assuming total power over the region, the FARC leadership has become divided over issues such as local power struggles and corruption involving taxes and other public funds (Chernick 2000, 36–7).

The desire to control local politics and the subsequent spoils, the kidnapping of the citizens they are supposed to protect, and the escalation of the war effort in response to peaceful gestures by the government do not prove that FARC leaders are fully self-interested, but this evidence does raise the possibility that their agenda includes more than just achieving socioeconomic equality for the peasants. Pardo asserts that the FARC's estimated $600 million per year revenue makes it the wealthiest rebel group in the history of the earth (2000, 70), which raises the legitimate question of whether its leaders receive economic kickbacks to complement their political and military power.

THE AUC LEADERSHIP

Behind all the rhetoric of defending the Colombian citizen and the Colombian way of life, the AUC seems to be little more than a well-armed and well-organized crime syndicate. Various independent studies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report that since its inception the AUC has been responsible for 70% of war-related human rights abuses (Avilés 2001, 43–5; Human Rights Watch n.d.). AUC soldiers are routinely involved in massacres of peasants they accuse of cooperating with the guerrillas. After a well-planned paramilitary operation that resulted in the murder of thirty civilians in the town of Mapiripan, Carlos Castaño was quoted as saying, “These were not innocent peasants. They were guerrillas dressed as peasants” (Chernick 1998a, 31).

As stated previously, the AUC is likely to be heavily involved in drug trafficking. Exact data on the AUC's drug-related revenue is scarce, but there are other indicators that the self-defense force is also a business venture. Similar to the FARC, the AUC has begun to develop an extensive presence in the local politics of municipalities in its sphere of influence, including taxation of legitimate businesses to complement its taxation of coca production.
Perhaps a stronger indication is a recent report in the Colombian newspaper *El Nuevo Herald* citing evidence that a power struggle was occurring within the AUC leadership and that Castaño faced increasing difficulties in controlling the actions of lower-level leaders operating in the field (Rodriguez 2001). An organization that exists solely to promote the defense of Colombia will not likely have great internal dissention, but when power over local politics and the extreme potential wealth of the drug trade are factored in, such conflict becomes much more realistic.

The prevalence of former military officers in the AUC leadership also raises questions about the organization's true motives. To contradict negative press reporting that the military and the AUC have close ties, the government has demanded that the military punish its members who do in fact associate with and support the paramilitaries. Many officers have been censured, and some expelled, but a great number of them have simply taken high-paying positions in the AUC command structure (Chernick 1998a, 31–2). It is possible that these military officers identify with the AUC and support its ideology, but it is more likely that the group has sufficient money to lure such individuals into its ranks. The officers can provide the soldiers with invaluable training, which will increase the likelihood of military success and the expansion of the sphere of influence.

**Culture or Rational Choice?**

The extreme flexibility of rational choice theory makes it possible to successfully apply that approach to almost any situation, but I feel that in this case the cultural aspects cannot be ignored. As stated earlier, FARC membership does not likely exceed 15,000, with AUC membership likely fewer than 11,000. While these are considerable numbers for groups of such nature, they still constitute a small minority of Colombia's population of 40 million. Economic hardships have abounded in Colombia in recent years, but many destitute peasants have chosen to move to urban areas seeking work rather than hiring on with the FARC or the AUC. If enlisting in these armies was truly the best economic option available, and the people were completely self-interested, the membership of these groups would grow exponentially to mirror more closely the estimated 80% of the population who live in poverty.

Further, rational actors seeking to promote their own interests will not likely risk their lives on a daily basis, even if it comes with a paycheck. Death is a risk for many members of each group. Members of the FARC and the AUC must face the prospect of armed engagements with each other and with the Colombian military, the possibility of torture at the hands of their enemies should they be captured, and reprisal from their comrades should they choose to withdraw from active involvement (Richani 2000). Similarly, one might argue that the FARC and the AUC are havens for career criminals seeking unconventional employment; certainly a number of these individuals are found within the ranks, but for a truly rational criminal, employment with a private drug cartel would likely provide much better hope for survival and future economic prosperity.

No single social science theory can explain any situation completely. In the case of the Colombian Civil War, rational choices do play some role in the decisions of individuals to join the FARC or the AUC. However, culturally based factors also play a significant, if not major, role in explaining how movement leaders have mobilized masses of peasants to support their causes. Along with fighting for a paycheck, lower-echelon members of FARC and AUC are also battling for the protection of the Colombian way of life. This brings about the question of whether the leaders of these movements have the Colombian citizens' best interests in mind, or if their efforts to organize private armies in the name of Colombian preservation are complex fronts disguising their true desires to further their own material gains.

**Conclusion**

Despite claims made by the government and other factions that they desire peace, all indicators show that the level of violence in the Colombian Civil War is not subsiding and is
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more likely escalating. Recent U.S. foreign policy includes an aid package to provide the Colombian military with equipment and training to escalate the fight against drug supplies. The government continues to assert that the FARC is the nation's principal institution of drug trafficking and has stated its desire to use the new military strength to make a final push into the south, implying a desire to once again take the offensive to FARC-controlled areas (Johnson 2000). Such an event would have significant effects on the future of both the FARC and the AUC.

The FARC and AUC have successfully used culture-based collective action mechanisms to mobilize followers to their cause. If the increasing foreign influence on Colombian domestic politics has adverse affects on the peasant population, it is likely that the FARC's cultural framing mechanism as Colombia's national protector will continue to grow stronger, either leading to an increase in its political and military influence or an increase in casualties as the violence escalates. If the FARC is significantly weakened by a new military offensive, the AUC will likely grow stronger, and it will be interesting to see if the paramilitaries will continue to adapt their cultural framing approach to the changing situation. It also remains to be seen what approach AUC leaders will take to legitimize their cause should the anti-drug efforts begin to target them to the same degree as the FARC.

The leaders of these organizations take advantage of their armies to promote their own welfare. While the evidence I have presented does not prove that leaders of the FARC and AUC are simply self-interested individuals seeking to satisfy their own interests, I do maintain that enough evidence exists to raise questions about their motives. The extreme amount of money involved in the drug trade, the internal divisions within the leadership of the groups, the FARC's kidnapping of individuals it professes to protect, and the AUC's slaughter of peasants it claims to defend all cast doubt upon the motives presented by these groups to their own members as well as to the world. Despite the fact that the military has scaled back its counter-insurgency efforts and the government appears willing to negotiate peace, the FARC and the AUC continue to fortify themselves and escalate their offensive campaigns. Perhaps the best summation of the situation is provided by Guerrero Barón: each of the warring factions believes it can win, so they do not wish to negotiate (2001, 18). The years to come may determine the victor of the civil war and the emergent dominant Colombian culture, or the proponents of conflicting interests and ideologies may continue to do battle for an indefinite period of time.

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United States citizens have enjoyed a press that is free and unrestrained since the late eighteenth century. However, there is little agreement upon what the freedom of the press meant when it was drafted in the Bill of Rights as part of the First Amendment. The First Amendment itself offers little explanation of what liberties the press is entitled to. This study will examine state constitutions, debates, opinions, newspaper articles, essays, and court cases to present different interpretations of Freedom of the Press by 1800. Opposing viewpoints are presented and discussed to symbolize the general sentiments of American society during this time period.

Freedom of the Press has been and continues to be one of the most highly celebrated freedoms enjoyed by citizens of the United States. Americans have exercised this constitutional freedom for over two centuries, beginning with the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 (O’Connor and Sabato 2000, 43). The legacy of press freedom is indeed longlived, but its limits and interpretations have not been definitive or exact. It is this lack of definition that has spurred debates as old as the Constitution itself. The assumption can be made that the framers of the American government meant something by placing the term “Freedom of the Press” among other First Amendment rights, but its exact meaning remains unclear (Hay 1799, 38). This study will examine what freedom of the press meant in the United States between 1776 and 1800 by analyzing original evidence from state constitutions, material discussed in debates, printed public opinion, newspaper articles, essays, and court cases.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

Freedom of the press has been accustomed to examination and interpretation since its ideological inception. Historians have studied this “great bulwark of liberty” from nearly every possible perspective using a variety of methods. The focus of this study is to more clearly define what press freedoms the First Amendment was intended to protect. The research for this study, as well as its conclusions, are original. However, it is not the first work of its kind. The works of Leonard W. Levy, Jeffery A. Smith, and Margaret A. Blanchard closely resemble the focus of this study.

Leonard W. Levy described the conclusions of his research on freedom of the press in two books, *Legacy of Suppression* and *Emergence of a Free Press*. In his first book, *Legacy of Suppression* (1960), Levy concluded that the ideas and philosophies of a free press did not match
the legal practices in colonial America. He acknowledged the existence of wide spread ideas concerning what freedoms the press should enjoy but argued that legal restraints, state laws and practices against a free press were a better judgment of American sentiments about the press. Levy labeled this book as “revisionist history” because his conclusions led him to believe that the press in America was actually subject to suppression to a greater degree than it was free.

Levy’s second book, Emergence of a Free Press (1985), was written as a correction for Legacy of Suppression. In its preface, Levy stated that he had exaggerated his thesis in the first book and had come to different conclusions after an extended examination of newspaper sources. He said he had failed to examine the practices of the press itself in its criticism of government and public officials. Levy still felt that the press in colonial America was more suppressed than mainstream libertarian thought, but less so than he had originally stated.

Jeffery A. Smith concluded a much more libertarian approach in Printers and Press Freedom (1988). He stated that the American people believed that a free press was an integral part to democracy, serving as an effective check on the abuse of power. He also stated that early Americans recognized that false printed material could be a form of personal injury, but that they were willing to tolerate it in order to receive information from the press. Smith concluded that the framers used the strongest possible terms in the First Amendment to preserve the freedom of the press for themselves and future generations.

Margaret A. Blanchard, author of Revolutionary Sparks: Freedom of Expression in Modern America and History of the Mass Media in the United States: An Encyclopedia, defined what freedom of the press meant by 1804 using six criteria.1 These criteria imply that freedom of the press meant several things and cannot be captured in one general trend of thought (Blanchard 1999, 118).

The works cited here do not comprise a comprehensive list of studies done on original interpretations of freedom of the press in America. They are, however, some of the most authoritative and closest in resemblance to this study.

Methodology

The primary methodology used in this project was a critical analysis of documents about freedom of the press originating between 1730 and 1800. The antiquity and inaccessibility of these documents did not allow original copies to be examined, necessitating the use of reprints and microfilmed copies in lieu of the original materials. The works cited in this study are exclusively primary sources, taking exception only for the works of contemporary historians that were used for comparison and contrast of this study.

The foundation of this analysis was provided by an inspection of state constitutions that were put into place between the signing of the Declaration of Independence and the dawning of the nineteenth century. This was done in an attempt to gain a better understanding of what freedom of the press meant to Americans during this period. As a collective group, the state constitutions provide a much more narrow description of press liberties than the absolute wording of the First Amendment. The constitutions were analyzed for recurring themes or ideas about the press, as well as any unique philosophies in each state. It was also determined whether the states revised any clauses about press freedoms in their constitutions after the federal Constitution was ratified. Leonard W. Levy did a very similar examination of state constitutions in Legacy of Suppression but focused more on comparisons between common law and constitutional law (1960, 183–8).

To add to the foundation of constitutional law concerning press freedoms, written and spoken arguments of the framers, lawmakers, judges, printers, newspaper editors, and concerned citizens were examined. This provided some interpretation to the law and revealed opposing viewpoints. More weight was placed upon the statements of individuals directly involved in the government and creation of law. The remainder of the statements analyzed was weighted according to descending priorities marked by the list above. The material for this portion of the study was found in congressional debate records, essays, pamphlets, and newspapers of the era.
This study further focused on how the press was punished under libel laws. This was done to verify whether or not existing state libel laws were actually enforced and, if so, to what degree. The enforcement level of libel laws during this period is an indicator of how strongly Americans felt that a printer was responsible for what he/she printed. The only sources for libel cases used in this study were reports from period newspapers.

**CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS**

When the Declaration of Independence was signed on July 4, 1776, the thirteen British colonies in America claimed they were no longer subject to the government and laws of their mother country. This claim was founded upon a philosophy that allowed citizens of a nation “to alter or to abolish” any government that violated certain “unalienable rights” granted to men by their creator (O’Connor and Sabato 2000, 375). Independence was not gained through this document alone, but this bold statement paved the way for the establishment of a new and highly experimental government.

Although the colonies were free to establish a form of government after they had separated themselves from England, the permeation of the English law system within the colonies still provided a foundation for the establishment of the Articles of Confederation and, later, the American Constitution. Similarities between the American and English law systems are prevalent today. But despite similarities, the developing American government sought after freedoms that were not as well established in England at the time of the Constitution’s ratification. One such freedom, the freedom of the press, worked its way into the Constitution as one of the most valued freedoms.

The ideologies of providing freedoms for the press were not new to colonists at the time of the Declaration of Independence. Debates over this issue, more specifically licensing and restraining the press, were common in England and in the colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These debates provided the roots for press freedoms in the United States. However, for this study, interpretations of the original meaning of freedom of the press in America will be taken from constitutional laws and debates in the United States from 1770 to 1800.

In 1777, delegates representing the colonies formed the Articles of Confederation. This was the first format of national government for the declared independent colonies. It can be considered as a national governing body, but it is better represented as a “firm league of friendship” (Thorpe 1909, 1:10). Because the colonies, now called states, existed prior to the Articles of Confederation, this government allowed each state to retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence. The national government outlined in this document was very weak and had limited powers. No freedoms were protected by the Articles of Confederation, because those rights were to be protected within each state according to its own constitutions and laws.

The Articles of Confederation were considered to be inadequate by the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The delegates of this convention drafted a constitution that created a stronger national government, but the majority of rights remained under the jurisdiction of each state (O’Connor and Sabato 2000, 32-3). Some states ratified this constitution on condition that a bill of rights would be included to protect citizens of each state from the national government. Among the rights listed in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights is freedom of the press. The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (Thorpe 1909, 1:29).

Because the First Amendment contains all of what is written in the Constitution about the freedom of the press, it is critical to examine each of the state constitutions of the period to gain a general understanding of what freedom of the press meant to the developing nation. Prior to the ratification of the United States Constitution in 1789, eleven of the thirteen states had drafted and approved state constitutions after their separation from England. Out of these eleven states,
eight had statements concerning freedoms that the press should be allowed to exercise. Among the eight states were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia. Three prominent themes are outlined in the constitutions of this collective group. First, freedom of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state and is one of the great bulwarks of liberty. Second, the freedom of the press should be inviolably preserved. Third, no restrictions or restraints should be placed upon the press (Thorpe 1909, 2:785; 3:1690, 1892; 4:2456; 5:2788, 3083; 6:3257; 7:3814).

By 1792, just one year after the Bill of Rights was ratified, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Delaware had drafted new versions of their constitutions. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1792 made no changes in its freedom of the press statement (Thorpe 1909, 4:2474). Delaware, who had made no reference to the freedom of the press in their constitution of 1776, made specific references that the press should enjoy in their constitution of 1792. Section Five of Article One stated that the press was free to any citizen in the examination of the conduct of men acting in public capacity, that citizens could print on any subject with a responsibility for any abuses of that liberty, and that the truth could be given as a defense in indictments for libel in matters of publication proper for public information (Thorpe 1909, 1:569).

The language used in this statement is similar to that found in the 1792 Delaware Constitution. However, Pennsylvania adds that a communication of thoughts and opinions is an invaluable right of man.

Connecticut and Rhode Island were the only states that had not adopted official constitutions between 1776 and 1792. Connecticut adopted its first constitution in 1818 and Rhode Island followed in 1842. Both of these constitutions stated that citizens had the right to freely speak, write, and publish on any subject, but they were responsible for the abuses of that liberty. In addition, Rhode Island allowed the truth to be used as a defense in libel charges (Thorpe 1909, 1:537; 6:3224). Even though the constitutions of these two states were not ratified for many years after the time period being studied, it is important to note that they included some protections for the press.

**Constitutional Debate**

After the American Constitution was drafted in 1787, debates developed throughout the country on the proposed plan for government. Much of the opposition to the Constitution resulted from the lack of guaranteed rights for individuals. A compromise would later be reached with the addition of ten amendments that outlined specific freedoms that the national government could not infringe upon. It is evident
from historical records that those involved in the
government process were deeply concerned with
the freedom of the press. The Constitution, even
with the First Amendment, does not provide
much of an explanation as to what extent free­
doms of the press would be guaranteed. An
examination of the debates between public
officials and other men of high social standing
clarifies this very subject.

A common theme exists among those who
were opposed to the ratification of the Constitu­
tion. In general, these individuals were con­
cerned that the new government would trample
upon the rights of the people if those rights were
not specifically protected by constitutional law.
The dissenting minority of the Pennsylvania rati­
fying convention objected to the Constitution in
part because there were no statements in it pro­
tecting the freedom of the press (Pole 1987, 69).

George Mason, who was a member of the Con­
stitutional Convention in 1787, also stated his
concern that many freedoms were not specifi­
cally addressed in the Constitution. In a speech
to the Virginia ratifying convention, Mason
emphasized that the liberty of the press, trial by
jury, and the danger of standing armies in time
of peace were liberties that were of priority to
protect (Mason 1787).

The statements made by Mason and dis­
senting members of the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention are typical of the sentiments
expressed by those in opposition to the Constitu­
tion. Patrick Henry, one of the most nation­
ally prominent opponents of the Constitution,
was more detailed in his statements. Henry
addressed the Virginia ratifying convention in
1788, comparing the new government to the
separation from Great Britain. He claimed that
both movements were radical and founded
upon the rights that all men should enjoy. Henry
did not want to see the rights that he
and other Americans had fought for during the
Revolutionary War extinguished (Pole 1987,
117).

Those in favor of the Constitution were
more specific in their arguments about what
liberties the press should exercise. In Federalist
No. 84, Alexander Hamilton made a bold argu­
ment that the freedom of the press is not easily
defined, nor can it be better preserved through
constitutional protections. He argued:

For why declare that things shall not be done which
there is no power to do? Why for instance, should it
be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restric­
tion may be imposed?

On the subject of the liberty of the press, as
much has been said, I cannot forbear adding a
remark or two: In the first place, I observe that there
is not a syllable concerning it in the constitution of
this state, and in the next, I contend that whatever
has been said about in that of any other state,
amounts to nothing. What signifies a declaration
that "the liberty of the press shall be inviolably pre­
served?" What is the liberty of the press? Who can
give it any definition which would not leave the
utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracti­
cable: and from this, I infer, that its security, what­
ever fine declarations may be inserted in any
constitution respecting it, must altogether depend
on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the
people and of the government. And here, after all, as
intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for
the only solid basis of all our rights. (Hamilton
1788, 315–6)

Hamilton provides insight to the difficulty of
defining the freedom of the press. According
to the argument presented here, the spirit of
the people and public opinion should be the
defining voice of press freedoms.

PUBLIC OPINION

The arguments about freedom of the press
were not limited to those directly involved in
creating public policies and law. Citizens voiced
their opinions in private conversation, public
debate, and written works—including a flurry of
public opinion expressed through the medium
of newspapers and pamphlets. This resource will
be used to gauge the various opinions held by
citizens of the new nation.

In opinions expressed through newspapers
and pamphlets, the purpose of the press is
brought to the attention of the reader in nearly
every case. In an article from the Salem Chronicle
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and Essex Advertiser on 30 March 1786, the existence of the press was justified. It claimed that “a licensed press is worse than none,” and if a “notion be absurd, the opinion false, the system iniquitous, the press will sooner or later ridicule, refute, and expose them all.” The article further emphasized the need for a free press as an instrument to root out the evil from society.

Excerpts from newspapers and pamphlets also reveal sentiments concerning the role and rights of the press. The following quotations are examples of such excerpts. “Freedom of the press will contribute more to the freedoms and happiness of the people, than all of the combined strength of your National Militia.” “Let every man...have the freedoms of publishing his own sentiments on all subjects; but let every man be responsible to God, and to the laws which ought to be established for the sake of peace and tranquility” (Newport Herald, 17 December 1788).

Debates over the Bill of Rights as a necessity to the Constitution were also common in newspapers of the period. Two views were generally presented. An article published in the Gazette of the United States (15 April 1789) supported the establishment of the federal Constitution. It stated that Americans had derived permanent advantages from a free press and that, “having been inspired by sentiments of heroism and sound policy derived from this origin, to establish an independent empire, and adopt a glorious federal constitution; they are enthusiastic to preserve and perpetuate this inestimable jewel.” The article focused on how the press would be maintained through the Constitution with an addition of expressed rights.

An opposing viewpoint was expressed in the Pennsylvania Gazette (17 October 1787). It argued that an amendment outlining a free press “would have been merely nugatory to have introduced a formal declaration upon the subject—nay, that very declaration might have been construed to imply that some degree of power was given, since we undertook to define its extent.”

The relationship between constitutional law and the freedom of the press sparked yet another viewpoint. An essay written by an anonymous American citizen published in the New Haven Gazette on 29 November 1787 expresses the opinion this way:

Using these viewpoints as a sample of public sentiment that can be generalized to the American people, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the states had constitutions and laws that were sufficient to regulate the press and protect its necessary freedoms. Second, the federal government should not be allowed to regulate the press, regardless of whether the press was specifically protected by the federal Constitution or not.

RESPONSIBILITY OF PRINTERS

There was not a group more concerned by the various arguments presented about the freedom of the press during the last two decades of the eighteenth century than the printers and publishers. It is clear from state constitutional law that any individual had the right to think, speak or write whatever they wished, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. As citizens, printers were also given this right, but the nature of their commercial endeavors created a situation requiring a more concrete definition of laws and responsibilities for the printer. It is not surprising that most of the discussion on these issues was introduced by printers themselves; however, differing viewpoints were presented.

Benjamin Franklin, successful printer and innovator of many printing practices, published “An Apology for Printers” in 1731. Franklin wrote the pamphlet as a rebuttal to criticisms he had received for printing sundry articles during his career. A list of considerations was presented by Franklin to describe the printer’s role. A brief summary of this list follows to
1. The opinions of men are as various as their faces.
2. Printing has chiefly to do with the opinions of men and printing promotes some and opposes others.
3. Printing is prone to offending people, while other trades rarely offend anyone.
4. It is unreasonable for anyone to expect to be pleased with everything that is printed.
5. Printers should print opposing opinions, allowing the public to decide the truth of a dispute.
6. Indifference should be exhibited by any printer publishing opposing opinions.
7. It is unreasonable to imagine that printers approve of everything that they print. If this were the case, all that is printed would be the printer's opinion only.
8. If printers were determined not to print anything that might offend someone, very little would be printed.
9. If vicious or silly things are printed, often it is because the people are corruptly educated and do not encourage the printing of quality material.
10. Printers often discourage the printing of bad things, even at the expense of losing business.

The observations Franklin made were not derived from law, nor were they arguing for specific freedoms that printers should be permitted. However, they are an important factor in defining what the freedom of the press was in 1731. Although it was written many years before the period under study, its theoretical themes parallel those within the period and offer an expanded opinion on the responsibilities of printers. Franklin does not make reference to the legal responsibilities printers should be held accountable for, but he does suggest that printers should be ethical and socially responsible. The conclusion of "An Apology for Printers" emphasizes that the press should not be restricted just because men cannot agree upon its purpose and role in society (Franklin 1952, 21–4).

The publishers of newspapers were also active in declaring their role in society as well as defining what the press should be used for. Edward Powars, in an article in The American Herald and Worcester Recorder on 21 August 1788, had a different approach than Franklin about the influence of a printer's opinion. He said that a printer "conceives it as an incumbent duty, to explain his views, and to declare the principles by which his future conduct will be regulated." Powars also argued that only that which adds to the betterment of the society should be published and that a printer should be impartial to printing edifying works.

An essay originally printed in the Pennsylvania Gazette and reprinted in the Berkshire Chronicle on 5 June 1788, signed Philodemos, was directed to printers in the United States concerning their conduct. The main argument of the essay was that the press could threaten its own freedoms through improper conduct of printers. In order to prevent this from occurring, the author made suggestions for printers' conduct. First, a printer should remain independent and uninfluenced by others in his writing. Second, a printer should remain dignified and refrain from using the press to mistakenly censure others. Third, it is the responsibility of the printer to determine what is appropriate to print. This point made reference to the right of the people to print, but that they were also held accountable for their words. Fourth, the first duty of a printer is owed to society. This is explained as a willingness to publish all just censures no matter how bold they may be. Fifth, a printer should publish works that are innocent and chaste.

Thomas Greenleaf of the printing office of New York added another suggestion to printers in an article published originally in the New York Journal. He said that a printer should allow his press to be free for all parties and a vehicle for discussion. If this was not done, Greenleaf said lovers of a republic should begin to fear (reprinted in The American Herald and Worcester Recorder on 21 August 1788).

**Libel**

Constitutional laws, official debate, and opinions expressed by the public are necessary elements to produce a definition of freedom of the press. However, it is by action and not by theory through which society's true feelings are
manifested. The ideology that the press should be punished for publishing defamatory material was debated, but most often upheld by courts of law.

The actions taken against the freedom of the press were focused on punishments for the printers of libelous material. An examination of essays and the proceedings of state and federal courts will demonstrate that a printer was indeed held responsible for printing falsities against an individual.

In 1790, Edmond Freeman was placed on trial in Massachusetts for accusing John Gardner of murdering his wife. These accusations had been made without any evidence of Gardner’s guilt. Gardner spoke to the court of the importance of the justice system and the necessity of laws. He said, “Those laws have not left it in the hand of any printer to execute anyone of his fellow-citizens without evidence, trial, or conviction” (in Berkshire Chronicle and Massachusetts Intelligencer, 4 March 1790). Gardner expressed concern that the press had tried to take on the role of the justice system.

In the case against Freeman, Gardner read from Hawkins Pleas of the Crown to define libel. He read: “That a libel, in a strict sense, is taken for a malicious defamation expressed either in printing or writing, and tending to either blacken the memory of one who is dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule” (from same article as cited above). Gardner also quoted a statement that made no distinction in the defamation of private and public persons. The case Gardner presented was convincing enough to find Freeman guilty of the libel charge.

Alexander Addison, president of the county courts of Pennsylvania, made an address to a grand jury in 1799, printed in the Columbian Centinel, 1799. The address was focused on a printer’s responsibility. He defined the liberty of the press in this way:

The principles of liberty, therefore, the rights of Man, require that our right in communicating information, as to facts and opinions, be so restrained, as not to infringe the right of reputation. Unless it be so restrained, there is no liberty; for there is no just enjoyment of our rights. And if every man’s right of communication be unrestrained, every man’s right of reputation is unguarded; and there is, in this respect, universal licentiousness, and each man is at the mercy of every man: the most precarious and oppressive of all states.

It is evident that Addison was concerned about unrestrained press only a few short years after the foundation of the American government. He alluded to the necessity of restraining one’s rights to some degree to avoid the trampling of another.

After defining libel, Addison explained the differences between the right of Pennsylvania and the United States to prosecute for libel. He explained that Congress had recently passed the Sedition Bill, which would allow the prosecution of individuals opposing the government. Anything written or uttered against the government in a false, scandalous, or malicious way would be eligible for a fine and imprisonment. Addison then argued that if the United States Congress had the power to enact this law, Pennsylvania also had the right to enact libel laws. The rights guaranteed to the press were much less restrictive in Pennsylvania’s constitution than the federal Constitution.

George Hay argued in an essay to republican printers in the United States in 1799 that the federal government did not have the power to punish libel, thus invalidating the Sedition Bill. Speaking of the federal government, he said, “that so much of the Sedition Bill as relates to libels in the government, or the individuals belonging to it, is not within the words of meaning of the constitution. It will not be said that the power of punishing libels is expressly given. Several offenses are numerated which may be defined and punished by the general government; but libels are not included” (Hay 1799, 10). Hay questioned where the federal government received its power to punish libels when that power was not expressly given. He further explained that the question had not been and could not be answered.

There was at least one argument to explain the source of the federal governments power to punish libel. Supporters of this argument claimed that the common law of England was
in force in the United States. This meant that the government could punish libel by traditional laws inherited from the English law system. Hay offered a rebuttal to this claim, stating that the United States Constitution had not declared the common laws of England to be a part of the American law system (Hay 1799, 27). He said, "Law is a rule prescribed by the supreme power of the state. The supreme power of the United States has not declared the common law of England to be in force here" (Hay 1799, 28).

Hay did claim the states had the right to punish libels. He said, “The state governments have yet a right to prescribe a punishment for slander, which effects the reputation of individuals, whether the slander be by speech, writing, or printing. Before the federal government was formed they possessed this power, and must yet retain it, unless it has been surrendered” (Hay 1799, 20).

Hay also spoke of the need to “draw a line between the freedom and licentiousness of press” (1799, 35). He said the legal and political writers of England had attempted to draw this line but could never come to a conclusion as to where it should be placed. Hay contended that the United States, being a republican government, ought to inform its citizens of the exact and precise extent of every law (1799, 35–6).

**Conclusion**

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares that Congress shall make no law that abridges the freedom of the press. This statement, taken alone, forbids the creation of any law by Congress in regards to the liberties that the press should be entitled to. However, historical evidence leads one to believe that the framers did not intend the freedom of the press clause to be absolute. A clear-cut explanation of this freedom’s parameters has not yet been defined, but an examination of state constitutions, debates, essays, news articles, and court cases of the period provides some interpretation.

As a collective group, the constitutions of the original thirteen states suggested four elements of the freedom of the press. First, the liberty of the press is essential to the security and freedom of a state and a great bulwark of society. Second, freedom of the press ought to be inviolably preserved. Third, there shall be no restraints placed on the press. Fourth, the press ought to be held responsible for what they print. These four elements provide the foundation of American thought regarding the freedom of the press.

The foundation provided by constitutional law was added upon by legislative debates and opinions expressed in the period. It is unclear that the press was in need of protection by the federal government through its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. Some argued that the new constitution would trample on the press without a guarantee of rights, while others felt that press freedoms could not be infringed upon by a matter of principle.

The vague wording of the First Amendment led to another debate on whether the federal government had any power to regulate the press. While few arguments support federal power over the press, it was commonly accepted that the states held that power, as long as the press was not restrained. Without restraints, punishment for printed material was used to control the press. Individuals were tried and convicted of libel during this period, suggesting that punishment could be given for material that was printed. Some argue that the Alien and Sedition Act gave the federal government power to punish the press, but others claim that the First Amendment provided no such power.

Beyond the definition of the law, some printers expressed the necessity of holding themselves to a higher standard. These printers advocated ethics such as objectivity, refraining from attacking the character of an individual falsely, and selecting material that upholds high moral standards.

Because the evidence for this study is rooted in opinion, concrete conclusions are difficult to clearly identify. However, the results of this study provide insights to what Freedom of the Press meant by 1800. First, all individuals had the right to speak or write about any subject he or she wished. Second, individuals should be
held responsible for what he or she had said or written. Third, no prior restraints should be placed upon the press. Fourth, states had power to punish individuals for their written or spoken words. Fifth, it was generally believed that the federal government did not have power to punish individuals for their written and spoken words, but opinions justifying this power did exist.

These insights are in harmony with Margaret Blanchard's studies on the freedom of the press. Blanchard said Freedom of the Press by 1804 could be defined with six criteria, including the five points listed in the preceding paragraph (1999, 118). In addition to these five points, Blanchard argues that individuals were given more freedom when criticizing the government or government officials. This point cannot be concretely substantiated by this study. However, evidence found within state constitutions between 1776 and 1800 alludes to its validity. The findings of this study are similar enough to Blanchard's definition of Freedom of the Press by 1804 to support her findings.

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NOTES

1 Blanchard's studies suggest that by 1804, the freedom of the press in America meant (1) Individuals were free to use the press to print their thoughts. (2) Individuals were given greater freedom to discuss public officials. (3) Individuals were held responsible for the abuse of the press. (4) Federal authorities were forbidden to act against the press. (5) State legislators could enact laws to ensure responsible use of the press. (6) There was a general acceptance that restraints should not be placed on publications.

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THE VELVET DIVORCE: SLOVAKIA'S DIVORCEMENT OF HER ABUSIVE SPOUSE

STEVEN C. PAGE

Only three years after the Velvet Revolution and the peaceful fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, Czechs and Slovaks peacefully parted ways on 31 December 1992. Most research has attributed Czech and Slovak nationalistic, linguistic, historical, and political differences to be the impetus of this separation, known as the Velvet Divorce. This study, however, will argue that the Slovak perception of oppression by foreigners was the major stimulus of the Velvet Divorce, evidenced by other previous Slovak autonomy movements.

On 17 November 1989, actors from Prague theaters and political dissidents defiantly gathered and protested against the Czechoslovak communist regime. During the next ten days, in what later came to be known as the Velvet Revolution, these anti-regime protests quickly spread from Prague’s large Václavské náměstí to other smaller town squares throughout the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. As the protests spread, university students joined the movement. These protestors courageously, yet peacefully, rattled their keys, signifying their disapproval of the oppressive policies of the regime. Subsequently, at the end of November, Communism officially ended in Czechoslovakia with little or no conflict.

Following the Velvet Revolution and the peaceful fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, democratic elections were held. The Czechoslovak people elected Vaclav Havel as their new president: a playwright, political dissident, and key player in communism’s demise in Czechoslovakia. Slowly the new government instated democratic institutions and began to privatize state-run industries. After more than forty years of oppressive communist dictatorship, the Czechoslovak people had finally begun their arduous journey to democracy.

The early nineties were a new, dynamic, and exciting time for Czechoslovakia. The people sought political stability amid the Czechoslovak pursuit of democracy. Regrettably, political stability remained elusive, and instability, caused by differences in Czech and Slovak approaches to political and economic reform, prevailed. Eventually, on 31 December 1992, the Czechs and Slovaks peacefully parted ways. This separation, known as the Velvet Divorce, ended a relationship of over seventy years.

Few researchers have thoroughly examined the causation of the Velvet Divorce, and they have generally limited their analyses to the
political atmosphere of Czechoslovakia from the Velvet Revolution to the Velvet Divorce. They attributed Czech and Slovak nationalistic, linguistic, historical, and political differences to be the impetus of the Velvet Divorce. Existing research gives a partial and superficial explanation of the centrifugal force that dissolved the Czechoslovak Federal Republic. The Slovak perception of oppression by foreigners was a major stimulus of the Velvet Divorce; this perception is evidenced in other Slovak autonomy movements during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the First Czechoslovak Republic, the Second World War, the subsequent communist period, and the time following the Velvet Revolution.

**AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE AND MAGYAR OPPRESSION**

In the eleventh century A.D., the Hungarian Empire was rapidly expanding as it acquired new lands for the imperial crown. Hungarian King Steven conquered the Slovak people, and Slovakia was absorbed in the Hungarian Empire (Leff 1997, 7). The Slovaks became subservient to their oppressive Hungarian overlords. For over nine centuries the Slovak people could not overthrow Hungarian rule. In the 1848 revolution and later in 1861, the Slovaks pursued their program and insisted that they were to be given a semi-independent state within the framework of Hungary, i.e. Hungary was to be federalized on the basis of nationality... Naturally, the Slovak demands were absolutely incompatible with the aims of the Hungarian [rulers], which were to transform Hungary into a modern Magyar state... Therefore the Slovak demand for an autonomous territory....was rejected. (Rychlik 1995, 100)

Slovak autonomy remained elusive because they lacked the political clout within the Hungarian Empire and the support of other powerful nations.

In 1867 Slovakia's subservient role was validated by the Austrian Empire's formation of a dual monarchy with the Hungarian Empire. Concomitantly, Hungarian attempts to Magyarize the Slovak people reaffirmed their minor role in this great European empire. For example, Hungarian was the lingua franca within the Slovak realm of the Empire. The Hungarians prohibited the use of the Slovak language and the teaching of Slovak culture and history in schools. Slovaks who refused to assimilate could not pursue advanced education or the careers of their choice (Leff 1997, 7). The Slovak people had to assimilate and become Hungarian for a modern Magyar state to become a reality. Magyarization reaffirmed the Slovak perception of oppression. To be Slovak was anathema. The social and political conditions within the Austro-Hungarian Empire provided virtually no hope for Slovak autonomy.

**THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC: A “PRAGOCENTRIC” REPUBLIC**

World War I marked the end of great European empires and the birth of new states. Czechoslovakia arose from the fall of the impervious Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1918, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk became president of the fledgling Czechoslovak state, which consisted of three major regions: Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. This inexperienced state was by no means united. A lack of homogeneity in its constituent regions resulted directly from their separate histories. Bohemia and Moravia, comprising the Czech Republic, had maintained relations with Germanic peoples for nearly a millennium. In contrast, Slovakia unwillingly had closer ties with the Magyar. The ethnic composition of the lands provides evidence of the former ties of these regions. Researchers, studying the 1921 Czechoslovak census, have found that 22% of Slovakia's populace were Hungarian and 31% of the population of the Czech Lands were Sudeten Germans (Kučera and Pavlík 1995, 15). Indeed, Czechoslovakia was formed from "the debris of the Austro-Hungarian Empire" (Pehe 1992, 16). The new state was a giant conglomerate of ethnically diverse peoples: Bohemians, Moravians, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, and Ruthenians.

The separate histories of the Czechs and Slovaks did not provide for a firm foundation upon which to build a new nation. The most
The minor difference between the people was the mutually intelligible Czech and Slovak languages. However, larger differences existed. Slovaks enjoyed a more agrarian lifestyle, and Czechs were more urbanized. Slovaks were religiously active. In contrast, a trend toward atheism prevailed among the Czech people. Surprisingly, these two distinct nations chose to unite.

“The birth of Czechoslovakia...was of immense importance for the Czech and Slovak nations, especially for the Slovaks...though both nations welcomed the new state, each had a different concept of it” (Rychlik 1995, 102). The Slovaks envisioned a loosely united confederation of Czecho-Slovakia composed of two sovereign regions. They perceived unification to be beneficial; relative autonomy was foreseen under Masaryk's Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks sought to free themselves from oppression. However, the Czechs had a different vision. They envisioned a unitary state governed in Prague by Czechs. To Slovak dismay, the new state was a “Pragocentric” republic controlled by Czechs. In 1921, the Slovak newspaper Slovenský týždenník wrote:

Let us not speak about a Czechoslovak nation. We are either Czechs or Slovaks, but we cannot be Czechoslovaks. We are citizens of a Czechoslovak state, we have a common Czechoslovak state administration, but we are two nations. (Felak 1990, 145)

The Slovaks wanted independence. Their desire to separate themselves from the Czechs resulted from perceived oppression. Czech dominance in Czechoslovakia helped “to nurture the stereotype of Slovak inferiority” (Ule 1999, 333). The Slovaks quickly realized that a union with their Slavic relatives reaffirmed the “inferiority” they had previously experienced with the Magyar.

“During the two decades of the First Republic, it became apparent that nearly everyone was dissatisfied with a unitary state of two constituent nations and minorities—except the Czechs” (Leff 1997, 25). The Slovak dissatisfaction with Czechoslovakia caused many Slovak leaders, such as Monsignor Andrej Hlinka and Father Jozef Tiso, to seek the foundation of Slovakia as an autonomous Christian nationalist state. The Slovaks could not tolerate another era of oppression and “inferiority.” Czechoslovakia was not the state the Slovak nation had envisioned. Much of the Slovak intelligentsia felt that “the Czechs were bent on eventually assimilating the Slovak community” (Goldman 1999, 5). Just as the Hungarians had sought to Magyarize the Slovaks, now the Czechs sought to “Czechize” the Slovaks. Attempted cultural assimilation greatly fueled the fires of demand for autonomy.

Slovakia: A Nazi State—Nominal Autonomy

The occupation of the Czech Lands by Nazi Germany beginning 6 October 1938 finally provided Slovakia with nominal autonomy. However, it was not until 14 March 1939 that Slovakia, under Hitler's pressure, formally declared her independence (Mlynárik 1993, 28). Father Tiso became Slovakia's first president. Under Tiso's rule, Slovakia was only a Nazi puppet state run by oppression and other dictatorial means. To ensure control of Slovakia, Hitler stationed troops in the Vah Valley near Budapest and on the Austrian side of the Danube (Goldman 1999, 7). With Hitler watching and controlling her actions, Slovakia had not obtained the autonomy she had sought.

Under the rule of Tiso, Slovakia followed the mandates of Hitler. Slovakia participated in Nazi Germany's Drang nach Osten by assisting the Germans in their takeover of Poland. Slovak Storm Troopers, the Hlinka Guard, were known for stealing Jewish property (Ulč 1996, 333–4). Tiso's regime deported thousands of Jews to death camps (Mlynárik 1993, 29). Paradoxically, the Slovaks had hoped to gain autonomy, but they believed they must collude with the Germans to attain it. However, collaboration only caused continued foreign domination of the Slovak people. True independence was not found in fascism. Many Slovaks realized that the Nazi state was merely a continuation of foreign dominance furthering their perception of oppression. By 1943, anti-Tiso movements arose throughout Slovakia (Goldman 1999, 8). This was ultimately a third failed attempt at autonomy.

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In 1945 the Allies defeated Germany and reestablished the antebellum status quo in Czechoslovakia, namely a Pragocentric Czechoslovak state. To the Czechs, Czechoslovakia had never ceased to exist; conversely, to the Slovaks, a semi-autonomous Slovakia was their perception of reality. By 1948, the democratic Czechoslovak government was replaced by a communist regime. The Slovak people were generally opposed to the Czechoslovak communist regime; it allowed for Soviet rule and further Czech dominance.

By the early 1950s post-World War II Czechoslovakia had become a satellite of Moscow, with a Soviet-style monolithic dictatorship committed to the introduction of economic and social policies developed by Stalin in the Soviet Union. The communist leadership in Prague acted with the approval of the Kremlin. (Goldman 1999, 11-2)

Though Communism helped to alleviate many of the tensions between the Czech and Slovak peoples—forty years of oppressive communist leadership forced the Slovaks, Moravians, Czechs, and other ethnic groups of Czechoslovakia to coalesce into a fairly unified nation—the Slovaks still had not attained the autonomy they sought. Rather, control was switched from fascist Berlin to communist Moscow.

Once again, the Czechs dominated the Slovaks in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. From 1948–68 Slovaks accounted for 82 of 585 appointees to the Czechoslovak corps diplomatique. Additionally, in 1968 only 3.7% of government personnel were Slovak (Goldman 1999, 12–3). Slovak interests could not be justly addressed in such conditions of Czech dominance; the communist Czech government was content with the status quo. Czech dominance during Communism only perpetuated the Slovak perception of oppression.

The bloodless Velvet Revolution on 17 November 1989 inaugurated a new journey to democracy for the Czechoslovak state. Communism had ended, and the Czechoslovaks were free again. Initially the Czechs and Slovaks shared a common course; however, this course markedly changed as time passed. "After the non-Communist government took office, Czechs and Slovaks began to disagree over political and economic issues. The disagreements blocked the adoption of a new constitution and slowed economic reform" (Wolchik 2001, 1214).

To the West it seemed that Czechs and Slovaks only differed economically and politically; however, other differences existed. In fact, Slovakia’s history of oppression and disputes over differences in history, language, and culture led to a sudden resurgence in Slovak nationalism (Abercrombie 1993, 10–1; Pehe 1992, 16). Slovak nationalism had always existed, but democracy provided the means for the Slovaks to express their feelings, beliefs, and political agenda. Slovaks were no longer "inferior." In 1991, the Slovaks wrote in the Czechoslovak newspaper Lidové noviny: “We favor a looser cooperating confederation of two sovereign republics with confederative principles, with sufficient advantages and sliding extent of jurisdiction” (Ulč 1996, 341). A Pragocentric republic would no longer suffice. The Slovaks insisted that their voice be heard in the new Czechoslovak democracy. Many Czechs disagreed with the Slovak stance, and the government reached an impasse.

In 1990–91 Slovak politicians began discussions about dissolving the Czechoslovak state. A breakup appeared inevitable. Not all were pleased with the Slovak politicians’ choice to part ways, so they

Initiated a campaign to have the people rather than the politicians decide the fate of the country.... Within a month, petitions with over 2 million signatures, including 200,000 from Slovakia, were collected in support of a referendum.... Alas, as was to be expected, the parliament could not reach a consensus on the wording of the referendum. The public resulted to a novel, unique way of expressing its will in what became known as the “light-bulb referendum.” At 7:40 p.m. on November 24, 1991, those in favor of saving Czechoslovakia switched on two
100-watt bulbs. The sudden increase in energy consumption registered the following unscientific results: support for the federation in the Czech Republic was expressed by 2.7 million households (8.1 million population, 80 percent of the total), and in the Slovak Republic in 450,000 households (1.35 million population, 37 percent of the total). (UPE 1996, 344)

Though the "light-bulb referendum" was unoffi­cial and unscientific, the Slovak will was made known. The Czechs wanted unity; the Slovaks wanted svrchovanost' (sovereignty).

In July 1992, Slovak politicians declared Slovakia a sovereign state free of Czech rule. The Slovaks had finally attained svrchovanost'. Czech politicians realized that the two nations would never again be one. The formal dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Velvet Divorce, occurred at midnight on 31 December 1992. After nearly one thousand years, the Slovaks could rule themselves. Svrchovanost! To be Slovak was no longer anathema; rather, Slovak citizenship was a source of pride. The Slovaks were free from the Magyars, Germans, Soviets, and Czechs. Oppression had ended. The Slovak nation was subject to no one.

UNDERSTANDING THE VELVET DIVORCE

Westerners may feel inclined to question the causation of the Velvet Divorce. After all, the Czechs and Slovaks bear a great deal of resemblance and appear to be one people. Many Westerners may ask: Wasn't the fall of Communism the actual cause of the Velvet Divorce? The answer is clearly yes, but with the caveat that the Velvet Revolution cannot be viewed as anything more than the superficial stimulus of the Velvet Divorce.

The Velvet Revolution opened many unhealed wounds. Whereas some wounds resulted from Czech-Slovak interaction, other wounds resulted directly from Magyar-Slovak, German-Slovak, and Russian-Slovak interaction. The historical, linguistic, ethnic, and political differences led to a sudden rise in Slovak nationalism and awareness of the recurring role of oppression in Slovak history. The Slovaks adamantly declared that they were no longer subordinate to Czechs or any other people. The Slovaks wanted Czecho-Slovakia (that is, a state consisting of two equally autonomous republics), but the Czechs wanted Czechoslovakia (namely, a Pragocentric state). The Slovak awareness of oppression contributed to the Slovak desire to be independent. The Czech government attempted to hinder the breakup, but the relationship was irreparable.

In the late twentieth century the former Eastern bloc has exemplified the role of political change in defining a region. The proverbial fall of the Iron Curtain, which marked the dawn of a new era of autonomy and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, was the impetus of much modern European change. Despite the newly acquired democratic freedoms in Europe, few strong cohesive forces bound the region's peoples together. Rather, balkanization, a powerfully destructive centrifugal force, prevailed. The once powerful and ominous Soviet Union disintegrated into many new states: the Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, to name a few. Many once communist states have disappeared, forming over a dozen new democratic states: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and others. Furthermore, Communism's demise resulted in the end of oppressive eras. Indeed, the pursuit of actual freedom from oppression is evidenced in the esoteric breakup of Czecho­lovakia: the Velvet Divorce—Slovakia's divorcement of her oppressive and psychologically abusive spouse.

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THE VELVET DIVORCE


In 1988, General Pinochet, nearing the end of his eight-year presidential term, organized a new presidential election as a simple yes or no plebiscite. The surprising success of the "No" campaign in deposing General Pinochet has been explained mostly through traditional social movement theory, focusing on grievances and deprivation of the social movement participants. This study, however, will show that the success of the "No" campaign is instead best explained by the application of resource mobilization theory.

The surprising success of the "No" campaign in effectively deposing General Pinochet in the 1988 Chilean plebiscite presents an interesting anomaly for social movement scholars. The question of how an opposition movement that was absolutely unsuccessful in its efforts over an almost fifteen year period was finally able to end military rule seems at first very puzzling. Many researchers have attempted to explain the movement through the lens of traditional social movement theory. Such research has focused on grievances of the politically disenfranchised Left and Center and has identified those grievances as the underlying impetus for the success of the campaign. While it is clear that grievances and the deprivation of the social movement participants played some role in the "No" campaign, left by themselves these factors do not adequately explain why the Chilean public was able to oust General Pinochet from office after fifteen years of authoritarian rule. For, if grievances and relative deprivation alone were the dominant factors, why hadn't there been a decisive campaign prior to 1988? More to the point, why had prior social movements, especially those held during periods of economic crisis, failed to overturn the military regime? This article will argue that grievances and deprivation were not the most important factors in Chile’s return to democracy. Instead, it will be argued that the success of the "No" campaign is best explained by the application of resource mobilization theory. Indeed, the savvy leadership provided by a sophisticated elite, in the form of valuable research conducted and analyzed and intensive campaigning based on that research, was the most important factor in explaining the success of the Chilean opposition in their efforts to end military rule. In order to better understand how the social movement elite determined the outcome of the campaign, it is important to first understand the intricacies of the resource
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

When the resource mobilization approach was introduced to the scholarly dialogue on social movement theories in the early 1970s, it represented a radical departure from the accepted thinking of the day. While the relative deprivation theory, as developed and defended by such respected social scientists as Ted Robert Gurr, focuses heavily on the psychology of social movement participants, resource mobilization focuses on the resources available to a social movement and the management of such resources by an elite sector. The resource mobilization approach recognizes the importance of deprivation and grievances in mobilizing a collectivity to protest. However, it suggests that there are more important factors at play than simply the degree of frustration of a population. In fact, it goes so far as to suggest that there is always enough deprivation/frustration within a society to generate a social movement. Indeed, resource mobilization theorists assert that even if there is not a great degree of antipathy towards a potential object of protest, it can be generated by a sophisticated elite group.

In rejecting the traditional social movement explanations, resource mobilization theorists point to other factors in their attempts to identify the most significant elements of a successful social movement. This new approach recognizes that successful social movements require the consistent supply of resources. Time and financial support typically constitute the bulk of such resources. The organization and strategic efforts essential to a successful social movement demand the time and energy of a movement’s most politically sophisticated participants. Not only does the leadership of a movement typically require some type of financial support simply to provide for its physical sustenance, but the activities of the leadership also require some degree of financial expense. In other words, not only do the “employees” of a social movement need a salary to live on so that they can continue their efforts, but they also need money to purchase the paper their work is printed on, they need the technology to perform statistical analysis, they need money to pay their phone bill, etc.

Consequently, resource mobilization focuses heavily on the flow of resources to the elite of a social movement. This approach seeks to identify the external sources of support and weighs their importance according to their donations. In order to better understand some of the fundamental contributions of resource mobilization theory, it is useful to use a familiar example from recent American history. In attempting an explanation of the success of the American civil rights movement of the 1960s, proponents of traditional social movement theories would point to the degree of oppression suffered by American blacks of that period. The deprivation of that collectivity, relative to its white counterpart, would be used to explain the widespread protests that typified the political climate of the American South of that time. Other theorists would perhaps seek to explain the rise in participation in the social movement as the result of cost/benefit analysis performed by the participants. These researchers would assert that the decade of the 1960s was the first time in American history when protest against the white establishment would actually have been a rational act, given the estimated costs and benefits of such behavior. Resource mobilization theory, on the other hand, explains the success of the Civil Rights Movement as the result of the highly organized and well-funded efforts of an elite few that led activist organizations such as the SNCC, the NAACP, CORE, and the SCLC. Instead of focusing on the frustrated masses, resource mobilization theorists investigate the influence of conscience constituents. In the case of the Civil Rights Movement, the relatively few Northern white liberals who provided hefty financial support for the protests are seen as more necessary to the success of the movement than are the tens of thousands of disenfranchised, poor Southern blacks who participated in the marches and sit-ins. The rationale for such a bold assertion is the belief that there had always been a great deal of discontent within Southern black society, but it was not until there emerged a highly professionalized, educated, and securely
funded social movement sector that this society was mobilized to consistent and effective protests. A thorough discussion of the Chilean protest movement that culminated in the "No" would necessarily include an in-depth treatment of the role of foreign donations in supporting the movement. Given the limited scope of this article, this important factor will have to be omitted. Instead, this work will focus on the sophisticated leadership of the movement and the resources, other than financial, drawn upon.

As with any social science theory, the resource mobilization approach utilizes a somewhat specialized vocabulary. A thorough understanding of this theory and its application to the "No" campaign in Chile requires a review of the essential terms of resource mobilization theory and the unique meanings these terms have within this research paradigm. To begin with, a social movement is loosely defined as a collectivity unified by a common preference for some type of change within its society. For our purposes in discussing the "No" campaign we will define this movement as the shared preference to terminate the Pinochet presidency. Of course, the Chilean protest movement also encompassed many more preferences; some groups were pushing for a return to Socialist government, some groups were fighting for full accountability for human rights offenses, still other groups were fighting for democratization. But the only preference shared by all participants was that Pinochet should not continue to govern Chile.

A countermovement is a collectivity within the same society unified by a common opposition to the preferences of the social movement. In the case we are discussing, the countermovement would be the preference shared by all those who supported Pinochet's government.

A social movement organization is a formal organization that identifies its preferences with those of a given social movement and whose objective it is to achieve the goals of that social movement. The social movement organizations most influential in the success of the "No" campaign, and those that this paper will focus upon, were the social science research centers. A few of the most influential of the Chilean research institutes were the Center for the Study of Chilean Reality (CERC), the Center for Social Studies and Education (SUR), the Latin American Faculty of the Social Sciences (FLASCO), the Latin American Institute of Transnational Studies (ILET), the Center for Political Studies (CEP), and the Center for Development Studies (CED) (Puryear 1994, 131–41).

A social movement organization is made up of a variety of different actors, who can be classified into a few main types. An adherent is an individual or organization that philosophically supports the goals of a social movement organization. A constituent is an individual or organization who provides resources to a social movement organization and can expect to benefit if a social movement organization achieves its purposes. A potential beneficiary is any individual or organization that stands to benefit if a social movement organization accomplishes its designs. A conscience adherent is an individual or organization that philosophically supports a social movement but stands to gain nothing (other than perhaps a sense of satisfaction) from the attainment of a social movement organization's goals. A conscience constituent is an individual or group that contributes resources to a social movement organization but stands to gain nothing if the social movement organization is in fact successful. Among the most significant conscience constituents with respect to the "No" campaign were North American donor organizations. Some of these organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, actually channeled public funds towards democratic reform in Chile (Muravchik 1991, 209–10). Others, such as the Ford Foundation, drew upon their own resources to support the "No" (Sigmund 1993, 167). The role of conscience constituents, such as the aforementioned donor organizations, cannot be

It was not until there emerged a highly professionalized, educated, and securely funded social movement sector that society was mobilized to consistent and effective protests.
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

underestimated in explaining the success of the Chilean plebiscite campaign. Again, although these conscience constituents were an invaluable asset to the social movement organizations that led the plebiscite campaign, the details of their involvement are beyond the scope of this article.

Each of these groups—the adherents, the conscience constituents, the social movements organizations, and so forth—played an important role in the Chilean plebiscite. The social movement, as represented by numerous social organizations, relied upon adherents, constituents, conscience adherents and constituents, and potential beneficiaries in its efforts to garner sufficient votes to force Pinochet from office. The existence of sophisticated social movement organizations, unified under a common purpose, and supported by adherents and constituents, is what distinguishes the “No” campaign from earlier unsuccessful opposition movements in Chile. The prominent role played by the aforementioned actors justifies the conclusion that the resource mobilization approach is the most effective framework in which to study the unprecedented success of the demand for the “No.”

HISTORICAL BACKDROP

From the early 1930s until Pinochet’s military coup in 1973, Chile’s democratic tradition was among the strongest in all of Latin America. It was notable for its durability even amidst political and economic turmoil and for its implementation of an effective and truly representative multi-party system. The Left, Center, and Right were all given voice in a form similar to that of many European countries.

In 1970, Salvador Allende, the presidential candidate for the Popular Unity (the coalition then representing the Left), won the presidential election with only 36% of the vote (Drake 1991, 3). The multi-party, winner-take-all electoral rules enabled Allende to take office with a minuscule margin of victory and a support base representing barely more than a third of the population. Allende’s Leftist ideology, combined with his relatively small base and far-reaching agenda for social reform, created a recipe for turmoil.

In the midterm congressional elections of March 1973, an alliance of the Center and Right parties received 54% of the vote to the Popular Unity’s (UP) 44% (Roberts 1998, 88). This led to a standoff between the executive branch and the legislative branch. The opponents of the UP, aided by an economy buckling under the inflation brought on by the redistributive policies of Allende’s socialist experiment, plotted a military overthrow. On September 11, 1973, this opposition, led by General Augusto Pinochet, overthrew the Allende regime. Allende refused offers to be flown into exile and killed himself upon the invasion of the military into the presidential palace (Roberts 1998, 91-4).

The Pinochet regime—made up of a coalition of technocrats, business elites, and most importantly, military leadership—began an unprecedented violation of constitutional law and human rights in Chile. Soon after Pinochet gained power, Congress was shut down and the constitution abrogated (Sigmund 1993, 85, 93). In order for the regime to survive, all outspoken supporters of democracy had to be silenced. Pinochet undertook this task ruthlessly and relentlessly. Social organizations, long the bastions of democracy, were suppressed and disassembled. Those with ties to organized labor were entirely eliminated. The armed forces tortured, killed, and exiled thousands of Chileans. Even those, such as students and university professors, who were traditionally protected by cultural norms, were subject to the brutality of this purging. Roberts documents how within six months the military had arrested an estimated 80,000 persons, 160,000 had “suffered politically motivated job dismissals,” and another estimated 200,000 people went into exile (94).

After the popular sector had been effectively crippled, the regime turned its attentions towards implementing neo-liberal economic reforms. Just as the politics of Chile had undergone a transformation from democracy to authoritarianism, the economy went from state-oriented to market driven. Under the direction of a group of young, American-educated technocrats known as the “Chicago Boys,” the economy experienced dramatic growth (Drake 1991, 55). The period from 1977 to 1981 became known as the “Chilean
miracle” (Drake 1991, 253–4). However, the miracle was not wrought without severe social costs. Unemployment rates soared and the distribution of wealth became more disparate than ever. This created growing resentment among those left out of the successes of the regime, especially the already disgruntled urban working class. The use of brutality to quell the occasional protest continued to be a common practice throughout this period. The Latin American debt crisis of 1982 altered Pinochet’s course drastically. After riding on the success of the economic reforms, the regime was severely damaged by the recession; the GNP decreased by over 14% in 1982 alone (Sigmund 1993, 139). Pinochet’s policies of economic openness further increased the vulnerability of the domestic economy and intensified the effects of the recession. Thus, ironically, the economic globalization embraced by the regime created its first political crisis. The widespread effects on all classes within Chilean society created deepened disenchantment with the Pinochet regime, even among those who had previously supported it.

The period of 1983–86 was marked by the nationwide protest movement that attacked the regime’s human rights violations, its economic policies, and the legitimacy of the regime itself. Led mostly by former labor unionists and students, the movement’s most effective form of collective action were the national days of protest that mobilized tens of thousands, sometimes even hundreds of thousands, of Chileans into the public squares to defy the military regime. Other groups, such as the FPMR, were more given to direct, violent attacks on pre-designated targets. These leftist groups were also responsible for the kidnappings and murders of government officials and police officers.

Despite the relatively high-level of participation, this protest movement failed to achieve its ultimate objective—the forced exit of Pinochet from control of the Chilean government. The failure of these groups to achieve their desired ends is fairly easy to explain. The leadership of the movement was largely made up of uneducated workers, inexperienced students, and illogical radicals. The dramatically different political ideologies held by these participants and their failure to come together to form a cohesive force was the biggest factor in the movement’s failure. The strategies devised by groups to the Center were far too moderate and pacifist for those on the Left. And the terrorist actions of those on the Left frightened many moderates away from any form of protest whatsoever. The Leftist violence also undermined the moderate efforts of Centrists and gave the military regime the justification it needed to squash the movement as a whole. Both of these groups, due to their lack of social prestige and visibility, were easily oppressed and even eliminated when the regime deemed such action necessary. Their leadership, never a bastion of efficiency, was easily rendered useless by the tactics of the military government. Lack of organization, lack of access to resources, and lack of sophisticated strategy led to the eventual failure of the movement to accomplish its ultimate goal of removing Pinochet from office.

Ironically, however, despite the regime’s effectiveness in eventually quieting the protest movement, the movement’s exposure of the weaknesses of the government’s economic policies did lead to a period of liberalization. Consequently, the press was allowed more openness, and, in 1987, a law was passed allowing the re-introduction of political parties onto the national stage (Puryear 1994, 127–8). This contradictory environment of repression and concessions set the stage for the “No” campaign.

THE “No”

As part of the earlier passage of the revised constitution put forth by the military government, the presidential term had been extended to eight years, with no laws limiting the number of terms (Drake 1991, 52). The President (Pinochet) had been given the right to deem the election a simple yes or no plebiscite and was not expected to give more than two months notice regarding the specific date on which the plebiscite would occur, but one would have to take place in 1988, that being the end of an eight-year term. Those opposed to the Pinochet government faced significant obstacles in attempting to achieve a “no” vote. First of all, the
lack of options set forth by the regime presented the opposition with no opportunity to set forth their own candidates. Additionally, in a country with so many political parties and of such diverse political ideologies, the method of unseating Pinochet and the choice of a new leader could absolutely not be agreed upon. Unity among the opposition seemed an almost insurmountable task. A second obstacle was the unknown date of the plebiscite. Not being able to put a time frame on their planning made effective strategizing difficult. Another significant impediment to the opposition was the culture of fear created by fifteen years of oppressive military rule. Many potential beneficiaries were hesitant to become politically active for fear of punishment by an intolerant regime if the campaign were unsuccessful. These are but a few of the difficult problems the opposition faced in their efforts to unseat Pinochet. However, social movement organizations, in accordance with resource mobilization theory, were able to overcome these obstacles.

Political parties were banned under Pinochet until 1987. The many social science research centers in Chile took the place of the parties as the centers of political thought and activity in the years prior to the plebiscite. As the centers were privately funded, somewhat less conspicuous than the universities, and without the overtly political intentions held by the parties, the research centers never became the target of government censorship. These centers were essential to the survival of the opposition in that they simply provided employment for the many politically minded intellectuals who would usher in the democratic transition. The suffering economy and the censorship of university life would surely have encouraged these elites to seek employment in American or European universities. As many of these academicians had already received doctorate degrees from prestigious foreign universities, life as expatriates would have been the most sensible option, had it not been for the opportunities provided by the research centers.

Another function the research centers provided was that their work contributed, through innovative polling techniques, a fairly accurate assessment of the political life of the opposition in Chile. In the terminology of resource mobilization theory, the centers were able to deduce accurate estimates of the numbers of adherents, constituents, and potential beneficiaries there were within Chilean society. This was an invaluable tool in setting the groundwork for the plebiscite. Up until this time, the only real public opinion polls based on political sentiment were those carried out by the military government. The results of these were rarely made available to the public and were of questionable accuracy. With the governmental liberalization that followed the economic crisis of the early 1980s, private research centers were allowed more leeway in their efforts to gauge public opinion.

The conclusion drawn portrayed a Chilean public that opposed political violence, was not entirely committed to any single political stance or to the exit of General Pinochet, but that was almost uniformly supportive of democratic principles.

The Center for the Study of Contemporary Reality (CERC), a Santiago based research facility, was among the first and most important of the many centers that effectively became social movement organizations working towards democratic change in Chile. CERC researchers began holding workshops to discuss the prospects for carrying out public opinion studies in Chile in the mid-1980s. These workshops came to include international public opinion experts who had conducted influential survey research during democratic transitions of other nations, such as that of Spain in 1975. Following the lead of social research organization Diagnos, whose general, nonpolitical survey work had showed the public as responsive to polls of this nature, CERC began to conduct surveys. Unlike Diagnos, however, the purely academically motivated surveys were politically slanted. As the results increasingly suggested that Chileans would indeed respond to political surveys, the researchers became bolder in their efforts to understand the political climate of Chile under
In 1987, the CERC researchers conducted the first nationwide survey of political attitudes since the coup (Puryear 1994, 134–8).

Another research center whose work had invaluable implications to the opposition movement was the Latin American Faculty of the Social Sciences (FLACSO). Like CERC, FLACSO’s early surveys began as contract work for private entities. In one of these early surveys, prepared in Spain for the Spanish government in order to determine Chilean public opinion concerning that country, FLACSO researchers, apparently more out of curiosity than any real political designs, decided to throw in a few politically slanted questions. The test was to determine whether the Chilean public would respond to inquiries as to their political leanings. The regime had been so intolerant of political expression that many researchers operated under the assumption that Chileans would be reluctant to commit their positions to paper. When this proved not to be the case, FLACSO researchers, again out of academic interest, began to develop more direct surveys. In the years leading up to the 1988 plebiscite, FLACSO’s surveys helped to dispel many of the false notions previously held by the opposition elite, and the center emerged as one of the opposition’s most powerful social movement organizations (Puryear 1994, 134–8).

The work of CERC, FLACSO, and other research centers like them, constituted a turning point for the opposition movement. Throughout the years of military rule, would-be political leaders had made unfounded and conflicting claims concerning the “will of the people.” For the communists, the “will of the people” was, of course, communism, for the socialists, socialism, and so on. The availability of the hard empirical data provided by the surveys forced adherents of various ideologies to confront the indisputable facts. What they found was both surprising and encouraging.

One of the most enlightening findings was that the Chilean public generally held much more moderate views than had previously been supposed. The popular belief prior to the surveys, especially among the Left, was that the Chilean public espoused fairly radical political beliefs and was supportive of a violent overthrow of the military regime. The strategy of social mobilization that had characterized the opposition movement since the early days of the coup reflected this ideology of change by force. This belief was probably supported by the fact that the most visible, if not the only visible, political activists were involved in radical, violent political activities. Guerrilla groups such as the MIR and the FPMR had left a long legacy of political violence on the streets of Chile. Due to the intimidating oppression of the Pinochet regime, these groups were really the only actively engaged protesters for many of the years of military rule. It was therefore only natural for the elites to assume that the actions of the few represented the sentiment of the many. However, the surveys revealed that in fact very few Chileans supported a popular overthrow. While the surveys did prove that the majority favored a political transition, this support was contingent upon it being enacted peacefully. This new revelation forced a paradigmatic shift for many of the elites at the helm of the social movement (Puryear 1994, 137).

Another important discovery of these surveys was that Pinochet’s support among the Chilean public had been underestimated by the opposition’s elites. Whereas before, the opposition had subscribed to the belief that the vast majority of Chileans (excluding the wealthy capitalists) were strongly opposed to the military government, the opposition leadership was now forced to confront the finding that roughly one-third of the population were either constituents or adherents of the countermovement that the Pinochet government represented. The surveys also indicated that another one-third of the population were neither constituents nor adherents of either side. This helped the opposition leadership realize that a substantial recruiting effort would be required if these potential beneficiaries were to be converted to the movement to end Pinochet’s presidency. The sobering nature of these facts forced opposition leadership to come to terms with their unfounded hubris and to realize that a transition to democracy would not come as easily as they had previously believed. On the positive side, by knowing its limitations
and those of its enemy, the opposition was better prepared to confront the obstacles ahead (Puryear 1994, 137).

Perhaps the most encouraging discovery of the surveys was that the vast majority of the Chilean public greatly valued democratic principles. In spite of almost a decade and a half of authoritarian rule, political parties remained a much-desired commodity. Chileans still identified themselves with various democratically oriented ideals and were supportive of a return to thoroughly democratic governance. The conclusion drawn from these results portrayed a Chilean public that opposed political violence, was not entirely committed to any single political stance or to the exit of General Pinochet, but that was almost uniformly supportive of democratic principles (Puryear 1994, 137).

The research centers continued to be of great importance to the opposition elites as they began to reevaluate past approaches and to devise new strategies for democratization. When the CIS consortium was formed midway through 1987 by three academic research centers (CED, ILET, & SUR), it represented a more overtly and deliberately political approach to the research that had been performed by centers like FLASCO and CERC. The CIS consortium had as its mission the transformation of research findings into sophisticated political strategy and modern campaign techniques. With the donated assistance of the Sawyer/Miller group, an American political consulting firm, CIS was able to make insightful recommendations to the opposition political parties that had been recently organized or reorganized. Among the principal members of CIS were intellectuals who were also participating in a group known as the Technical Committee for Free Elections. The primary purpose of the committee was to offer strategic advice to the political parties pushing for free elections. After a comprehensive review of the important survey findings the committee realized the fundamental inapplicability of social mobilization to the Chilean situation. The realization that the public was opposed to tumultuous politics, cynical of new initiatives, weary of conventional forms of protests, and fearful of the uncertainty of the future convinced the committee to abandon the initiatives for free elections. It was concluded that the most successful effort would be an intense and comprehensive campaign to vote “no” in the upcoming plebiscite. This new approach would manage the cynicism and apathy prevalent among Chilean citizens by simplifying the campaign and by generating an optimistic, even fraternal, sense of unity among the various political factions. By just saying no the populace would not be overwhelmed by the complexities that had characterized the opposition programs up to that point. By unifying the cause the opposition would be playing upon a perceived need in Chilean society to finally come together in healing a country fragmented by years of political violence. Additionally, by abandoning the contentious demand for free elections, the opposition would be appeasing a public already frightened by political conflict of any kind (Puryear 1994, 138-42).

After having solidified their position, these academics began an intensive effort to convince the nonacademic political elites of the wisdom of their stance. This would not be an easy task. The position of these opposition political leaders, the bulk of which formed the leadership of the newly formed parties, had been that participation in the plebiscite was out of the question. Most felt that the plebiscite of 1980 had been corrupt and that the regime would again somehow ensure itself a victory. Leaders believed that participation in the plebiscite would undermine the position of the opposition movement—Pinochet was bound to win in any case, and their participation would allow him the leverage of claiming that he had been democratically elected. Instead, they believed that, through effective social mobilization, the opposition movement could demand free elections, with each political party presenting its candidate. Through a series of weekly meetings conducted by academics from CIS and from the Technical Committee, these once dogmatic leaders were subjected to facts that forced them to reevaluate their previously incontestable assumptions. These meetings, consisting of chat groups, dinner parties, and even campaign strategy classes, were focused on dispelling the popular notions regarding public opinion and in convincing the
social movement organization leadership that
given an apathetic and frightened Chilean pub­
ic, a bold campaign for free elections was an
unrealistic strategy (Puryear 1994, 145). The
Pinochet government would hold the plebiscite,
with or without the approval of the opposition.
The constituents, adherents, and potential benefi­
ciaries of the opposition movement would be
cought unprepared and without voter registra­
tion cards and Pinochet would win the
plebiscite, remaining in office for at least another
eight years. Given those odds, the regime would
not even need a rigged election to ensure victory.

After several months of this dialogue, the oppo­
sition elites were eventually won over to the
strategy of participation in the plebiscite and in
simply unifYing to vote Pinochet out of office.

The Technical Committee was asked by
the coalition, which eventually consisted of six­
ten parties, to conduct the plebiscite campaign.
Drawing from the survey findings, the commit­
tee built a campaign characterized by its appeal
to previously uncommitted Chileans and by its
optimistic, forward-looking approach. Having
discovered that the percentage of Pinochet sup­
porters who were registered voters was signifi­
cantly higher than all other segments of the
population, the committee undertook a compre­
hensive effort to register all social movement
constituents, adherents, and potential beneficiar­
ies. The groups identified as being especially dis­
egaged from the electoral system, such as urban
youth, were the targets of registration efforts that
had been tailored to appeal to such groups. The
result of these efforts was a drastic increase in
voter registration rates among those opposed to
the Pinochet government.

The way in which the social movement
elites framed the message of the campaign also
had substantial effects on the outcome of the
plebiscite. As a majority of the Chilean popula­
tion was shown to have been cynical of all things
political, the campaign was designed as a prom­
ise of good feelings upon Pinochet’s exit from
government. The campaign slogan became “La
Alegria Ya Viene.” The fifteen-minute infomer­
cials aired each night consisted of themes of
unity, peace, order, and happiness. Subsequent
surveys demonstrated a marked preference for
the media campaigns of the opposition over that
of the regime (Sigmund 1993, 172–4).

The sophisticated strategy of the social
movement elites, as embodied by the research
center academics and newly converted political
party leaders, led to a victory in the plebiscite
held on October 5, 1988. The opposition won
with almost 55% of the vote, forcing Pinochet
from office and reintroducing democracy to
Chile (Sigmund 1993, 175–6). Three months
later Patricio Aylwin, leader of the Christian
Democratic Party, was chosen as president
in a free and fair election (Sigmund 1993,
183–7).

While it is clear that the deprivation and
grievances of the Chilean public played a sig­
nificant role in the success of the plebiscite, as
manifested by voter turnouts and simply by a
victorious outcome, their efforts in achieving
that success was marginal when compared with
the role of the social movement organizations
and the elites that were leading them. The func­
tion of the research institutions was especially
crucial. The research centers provided a home
base, so to speak, to the sophisticated elites
whose informed strategy provided the thrust
of the plebiscite campaign. The significance of
these research institutions in producing a dia­
logue among the different factions within the
movement and in creating a single approach
is especially evident when compared with the
earlier failures of the Chilean social movements.
The work that was done in conducting infor­
mative surveys, developing the basic strategy
of the campaign, registering previously uncom­
mitted voters, and winning over potential bene­
ficiaries was the indispensable element in
achieving a return to democratic governance
in Chile.

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work in Washington, D.C., before attending
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1 John McCarthy and Mayer Zald's work in defining the basic premises of the theory is drawn upon heavily in the subsequent section.

WORKS CITED


BOOK REVIEW: JIHAD VS. MCWORLD AND DEMOCRACY

FRED DONALDSON

JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: HOW GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD.

The cover of the book *Jihad vs. McWorld*, by Benjamin Barber, shows a veiled Muslim woman holding a can of Pepsi. This photograph illustrates the stark contrast between two simultaneous and very active global forces: Jihad, or tribalism, and McWorld, or economic globalization. Barber successfully shows the occurrence of McWorld and Jihad through the use of examples, statistics, and observations. Barber explains that Jihad is a backlash against McWorld and explores, in the pages of this book, the interactions between these two global processes.

Barber uses automobile manufacturing and anecdotal statistics to describe McWorld, which represents economic globalization. He notes that in the new global economy it has become difficult to trace automobile genealogy. For example, labels required by a 1994 U.S. law reveal that Chrysler Corporation’s Dodge Stealth is manufactured in Nagoya, Japan, while the Mitsubishi Eclipse is produced in Normal, Illinois (25). Through the process of economic globalization, “American” cars can be built in Japan, while “Japanese” cars are built in America. Anecdotal statistics, cited by Barber, bolster his evidence regarding the occurrence of McWorld. McDonald’s restaurants serve 20 million customers around the world every day, which is more than the people in Greece, Ireland, and Switzerland combined. Furthermore, the $2.4 billion’s worth of pizzas sold in 1991 by Domino’s alone was enough to fund the collective government expenditures of Senegal, Uganda, Bolivia, and Iceland (24). These figures show the power and size of some of today’s multinational corporations.

According to Barber, McWorld undermines democracy because it advocates business interests that conflict with state goals, increases interdependency, and disconnects citizens from public matters. Barber posits that McWorld does not recognize full employment as a public good. Business efficiency leads to capital-intensive
production, resulting in labor-minimizing job policies. For example, technological innovations and developments of new farm machinery have changed the nature of American agriculture. Though still a dominant world producer, America now employs just 2% of the workforce to grow crops, compared to 80% previously (27). Barber also believes that at the same time that McWorld increases global interdependency, it threatens democracy by moving nations away from self-sufficiency. Barber shows the existence of global interdependency by analyzing U.S. reliance on foreign oil and arguing that most countries import a large amount of the mineral, agricultural, and other resources they use (35).

McWorld damages democracy by causing citizens to lose interest in public affairs. Uncomfortable with what they see in a self-absorbed private sector and an unsympathetic government, consumption-weary people find themselves politically alienated (280). This problem is rooted in the way McWorld views people: citizens are nothing more than consumers. The economy, rather than democratic participation, controls policy. Without citizens, democracy is impossible. McWorld, rather than pursuing equality and justice, entertains a “bloodless economics of profit” (8). Citing Robert Putman, Barber states, “when people start bowling alone instead of together in leagues this [is a sign of] trouble for democracy” (275). The resulting lack of citizenship weakens the community institutions on which a civil society must rest.

The second section of the book discusses Jihad. Barber states that even while McWorld is bringing the world closer together through economic connections, Jihad is fragmenting it through tribalism. Jihad manifests itself in many forms: from provincialism, parochialism, and religious struggle to bloody wars on behalf of partisan identity and resistance to modernity. Barber uses the term Jihad to suggest extreme dogmatic devotion applied to any group, whether religious, political, or ethnic. Jihad identifies the self by contrasting it with an alien “other” and makes politics an exercise in exclusion and resentment.

A diluted version of Jihad can be seen in a tendency to resist modernity in Western Europe. “Provincialism, which sets the periphery against the center, and parochialism, which disdains the cosmopolitan... are hostile to the capital city and all it stands for.” Small-town citizens are less threatened by decentralized power; they embrace the concept of town or ward government. By this reasoning, residents of Barcelona or Lyon feel freer than those of Madrid or Paris and so on. Parochialism objects to cosmopolitanism and commercialism, forces that corrupt human association. Shying away from modernity, supporters of Jihad bunker-up in local communities, seeking a return to tradition and ways of the past (169–70).

Barber believes that Jihad is at war with McWorld. An example of this war can be seen in the criticism offered by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Islamic group known as the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna criticized Westerners for “importing their half-naked women into these regions, together with their liquors, their theaters, their dance halls, their amusement, their stories, their newspapers, their novels, their whims, their silly games, and their vices.” Barber notes that al-Banna believed that the culture of the West was “more dangerous than political and military campaigns” (210). This quote and other examples are used as evidence that Jihad is a backlash against McWorld.

In Barber’s opinion, the Christian Right’s campaign for a return to family values is an American example of Jihad. The American Jihad exists in the Protestants who rebel against the culture generated by McWorld in their midst. In this McWorld, despised “liberal” politicians undermine their belief systems with textbooks that preach evolution and schools that bar prayer (212).

Barber states that although Jihad and McWorld are opposing forces, they can be observed in the same country at the same instant. “Iranian zealots keep one ear tuned to the mullahs urging holy war and the other cocked to Rupert Murdoch’s Star television beaming in Dynasty, Donahue, and The Simpsons from hovering satellites” (4–5). Other examples include fundamentalists in the United
States plotting virtual conspiracies over the Internet and the Russian Orthodox Church teaming up with California businessmen to bottle and sell natural waters blessed by Patriarch Aleksy II. Barber argues that Jihad is detrimental to democracy within the country where it manifests itself because it destroys the mind-set that allows democracy to function. Jihad's demand for extreme devotion also limits its access to real power in a centralized independent world. Although tribes and religious clans have democratic possibilities, Jihad does not lead to the democratic values and institutions of the nation-states they fragment (233). His assertions are confirmed by historical facts, such as the military coup that ousted the formerly democratic government in Pakistan.

While Barber shows that Jihad is detrimental to democracy, his conclusions about the negative impact of globalization on democracy are debatable. Barber himself admits that economic freedom eventually leads to democracy. In a regrettable choice of examples, he uses the former Soviet Union to show that economic freedom leads to democracy in a very slow and unpredictable way. But Perestroika, an economic reform policy, was only enacted in the mid-1980s, and it quickly became the catalyst for the dismantling of the totalitarian state in the early 1990s. Other countries that have successfully transitioned to democracy from totalitarianism through economic programs include South Korea, Chile, and Hungary.

Barber's claim that McWorld harms democracy by decreasing citizen participation in public affairs is also questionable. Economic globalization has unintended positive effects on democracy. In some respects, the Internet and other innovations resulting from economic globalization actually facilitate civic participation, thus bolstering democracy. The amount of information available at the touch of a button for individual consumption and analysis is staggering. Economic globalization often increases civic participation by creating a more-involved and better-informed citizenry. This in turn results in greater government accountability and improved democratic processes.

In the last chapter of the book, Barber offers a radical solution to the problem of eroding global democracy caused by Jihad and McWorld: the establishment of a global confederation with a single civil society. This organization would resemble the loose unit set up by the original American colonies in the Articles of Confederation. Such a confederation would allow current nation-states to "create, bottom-up, a global association" (289). According to Barber, this new organization would offer a starting place to defend against the depredations of both Jihad and McWorld.

Barber's failure to consider economic prosperity, a result of globalization, more desirable than a strong civil society and his advocacy of an idealistic world confederacy show the reader his political paradigm. Barber advocates increased democracy on a global scale as opposed to increased localized democracy. For Barber, it is global democracy alone that can bring together a planet torn apart by the opposing forces of Jihad and McWorld.

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