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A Letter From the Editor

People continue to ask me, "What is *Sigma*?" I then try to explain the journal's rich history and to list the BYU alumni who wrote articles in the distant past. I usually end the discussion with a plug for how working on the journal is a great resume booster that will help improve a student's writing. Looking back, I see that I have never explained what *Sigma is*; I have only described what it *was* and how it can help students further their personal goals. I would like to set the record straight and explain what *Sigma* is to me.

Sigma, beyond the typed words and glossy paper, is a repository for student ideas concerning topics in the fields of political and international studies. Those ideas are the result of intense academic work, sleepless nights, and deep devotion to understanding and improving our world. Every issue of *Sigma* is a collaborative effort that involves over a dozen students trying to create a publication that can make a difference.

For many undergraduate students, college life is all about the hustle to and fro from classes to work, to family, to volunteer, and so on; the idea of making a difference seems ephemeral, a shadow that we merely chase through college and do not actually capture until we finally start our careers. I choose not to believe this. BYU students can change the world *today*, and one way they can do it is by sharing their unique ideas to the world. *Sigma* helps students do just that—it gives students a voice and a platform to give their perspectives on what is happening throughout their country and their world.

Because these students' ideas matter, the *Sigma* staff seeks not only to publish students' papers but also to help improve students' writing. Our main goal is not just to create a good journal; our mission is to give students the tools necessary to share their ideas broadly for the rest of their lives. To me, this is what *Sigma is*. We help students gain a powerful voice through their academic writing that can change the world.

Sincerely,

Alan Hickey Editor-in-Chief

Review of The Dispensable Nation

by Alan Hickey, Shanna Dungan, and Corey Cherrington

Not long ago, Vali Nasr released a revealing account of his time with the U.S. Department of State as an advisor to Richard Holbrooke, the U.S.'s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In his book the *Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat*, we learn that the Obama administration did not live up to its potential in the realm of foreign policy. In fact, Nasr goes so far as to contend that the current leadership of the United States has hindered the U.S.'s ability to enact effective policy decisions abroad and has weakened our nation's world leadership role.

While Nasr's book is descriptive about the situation surrounding U.S. relationships with countries in the Middle East, Nasr does not bring forth any new conclusions about international decision-making today. He does manage to give a unique view on the issues with U.S. policies abroad by offering specific examples of what he has experienced. Indeed, Nasr provides readers supporting evidence for the widespread claim that the U.S. presidency has failed to make informed decisions concerning foreign politics. He accomplishes this by discussing Holbrooke's impeded actions in the State Department, along with drawing attention to the executive branch's blindness to long-term outcomes for U.S. foreign policy. Although Nasr adds relevant points to the current conversation on the efficacy of the State Department, he clouds his arguments with meticulous attention to political detail and a sudden focus switch from U.S. failures in the Middle East to worries about China. Despite these weaknesses, Nasr still accomplishes the mission he sets out on in his book—to call attention to actions (or rather inactions) by the U.S. government that are rendering an "indispensable nation" a "dispensable" one.

One of the greatest strengths of Nasr's book lies in the portrayal of Holbrooke's legacy of diplomacy throughout the Middle East. According to Nasr, Holbrooke worked

tirelessly to create opportunities for diplomatic solutions to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than resorting first to military options. A great success of Holbrooke's diplomacy resulted in the signing of an economic treaty between Afghanistan and Pakistan, allowing Afghanis to travel across Pakistan to sell their goods in Indian markets. To accomplish this, Holbrooke and other diplomatic officers coordinated gathering the representatives from Afghanistan and Pakistan in the same room and not letting them leave until the deal was signed. Nasr quotes Holbrooke who said, "Don't let them out before they are done; don't go in, but stay right outside in case they need technical help." The pressure Holbrooke put on Afghanistan and Pakistan to cooperate on an economic deal paid off; the two countries signed the first treaty between them in decades.

Another strength of the book comes from Nasr's critique of the executive branch's failure to enact foreign policy based on long-term planning. Nasr lambasts President Obama's changing stance in handling the conflicts in the Middle East. He lashes out against the directions that America's foreign policy has taken, from supporting military solutions to troop withdrawals in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Nasr points out how the Obama administration was crippled because of its focus on maintaining public opinion in preparation for the 2012 elections rather than focusing on actual, long-term solutions that might have mitigated conflict in the region. Many of Holbrooke's policy suggestions fell upon the deaf ears of the executive branch, and the opportunities to diplomatically bring peace to the region slipped through U.S. hands like sand. By examining the failures of the executive branch to implement diplomatic solutions in the Middle East, Nasr reminds readers of the need for politicians and policy makers to have a "diplomacy-first" attitude rather than resorting to military action or not acting at all.

One of the most apparent weaknesses in Nasr's book is the incredibly overconsidered minutia of foreign policy strategy, giving it the air of a strategic playbook. Nasr may have been afraid that his foreign policy criticisms would be taken too lightly or lost in the detailed initiatives and considerations of the State Department. As a result, he packs his work with cumbersome information and drawn out guides to possible foreign actions and potential U.S. responses. Nasr focuses on several countries in the Middle East and attempts to create a comprehensive political and cultural guide for each region—an admirable task but one that is far too ambitious and lengthy for a single book. Each of his chapters could easily be broken apart into separate volumes, each with the purpose of advising the State Department on feasible and appropriate actions in the various countries.

A second weakness lies in Nasr's less comprehensive but alarmist views of China. Almost the entirety of his book focuses on the woes of the Middle East and only occasionally references China waiting patiently to the east. At the very end of his work, he suddenly brings China on stage, pronounces it the villain with great pomp, and then drags it off stage leaving the reader concerned but entirely unsure as to why. When he discusses China in the last moments of his work, he references China's economic rise as "not... as disruptive as that of Japan or Germany" but then almost immediately describes China's rise as militaristic, with the growing potential for conflict. He continues to describe his concerns regarding China as the U.S.'s main competition in the Middle East, but this does not match his earlier analysis of economic conditions in these regions. Nasr's economic understanding throughout the book appears limited and does not capture the full picture of the economic issues he so briefly discusses.

In weighing the strengths and weaknesses of Nasr's book, we find that Nasr's core message of the importance of seeking long-term, diplomatic solutions to the ills that plague the Middle East shines through. Nasr's elegy for Holbrooke captures the vision of how diplomatic solutions are worth the effort to nail them down. Further, his critique of the attitudes in the Obama administration illustrates how politics and elections can dismember foreign policy initiatives that focus on long-term solutions when staying in office is the main concern. Though readers may get a little lost in Nasr's discourse on U.S. foreign policy strategies and feel unsure about the economic situation between China and the Middle East, the essence of Nasr's narrative gives readers a good foundation for understanding what matters most in U.S. foreign relations: diplomacy.

Review of "Political Theory in the Square: Protest, Representation, and Subjectification"

by Lisa McGhie and Alan Hickey

As globalization takes hold, political movements and protests across the world become more relevant to us as Americans. In their paper, "Political Theory in the Square: Protest, Representation, and Subjectification,"¹ Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen² analyze what such protests can teach us. The article, published in *Contemporary Political Theory*, is timely in our globalized situation where protests have become something common. The article uses the movement *Toma la Plaza* in Spain and the movement *aganaktismenoi* in Greece to show what the "occupy" movements are trying to accomplish and how, in the end, these activities will not completely change the hierarchal political structure that dominates our society today. The authors submit that, though these movements fight for an egalitarian political structure, they can only disrupt the political status quo, because vertical political structures are inevitable. Although the article does not give any normative pronouncement of whether horizontal or vertical government structures are better for democracy, the article does give great insight into the practical difficulties that protest movements face when trying to supplant vertical government structures.

The article makes it clear that the "occupy" protests are designed to protest against the existing form of government, as they propose a different, more just form of government. Protestors in these cases demand an equal voice in government, rather than the distorted representative voice they currently have. Prentoulis and Thomassen explain that the movements seek governmental reform toward liberal democracy in which the government's power lies solely with the people. To the protestors, representative governments are merely a shadow of true democracy and limit the people's voice. This idea can be attributed to the fact that representatives act as trustees rather than delegates who are subordinate completely to the people, thus distorting or even silencing the people's voice entirely. Therefore, in the eyes of the people, the interests of the representatives trump those of the general population.

Understanding the mission of the movements, one question remains: Should governments have a horizontal and egalitarian structure or a vertical and hegemonic structure? Throughout their article, the authors never give a conclusive answer to this normative question. Rather, they explain that, even within protest movements there exists some form of vertical structure—someone has to be a spokesperson. No matter how hard movements try to form horizontal structures in their organizations to provide for equality, they can never escape some form of vertical structure that helps organize the movement to make it cohesive.

Though the authors never definitively answer the question about whether governments should have a horizontal or a vertical structure, they do make it clear that the people's ideals fall prey to reality. There is a big difference between the ideal philosophical world and the ideal structure in the real world. The authors explain well how electing someone as a representative distorts the people's voice. This problem would not exist if representatives followed the voice of the people in every decision. But, as Prentoulis and Thomassen clearly note, this is impossible since representatives have their own ideas and preferences, and because there is an epistemological problem of knowing exactly what the masses want.

Even if a representative wants to act as a true delegate and do exactly as the people would want, there is no way for him or her to be sure of what every person wants. This same problem exists within the movements themselves, because in order to form a cohesive, ideologically coherent body, movements must have leaders who represent the voice of protestors. Therefore, the voice of the movement's leaders may not capture the full voice of the protestors they represent, leaving protest movements subject to the flaws of vertical structures.

The Spanish and Greek protest movements offer interesting case studies, which explain that the broad mission of these movements is to challenge hegemony and vertical governmental structures. Though the authors never give an absolute answer to the question about whether horizontal or vertical structures are better for governments, they do make it clear that the ideal of strict, horizontal governmental structures is impossible to attain. Overall, the article gives a practical explanation about the difficulties protest movements face that seek to increase the "demo" portion of democracy in governmental structures.

NOTES

- Prentoulis, Marina and Lasse Thomassen. "Political Theory in the Square: Protest, Representation and Subjectification." Contemporary Political Theory 12.3 (2013): 166–84. ProQuest. Web. 11 Mar. 2015.
- 2. Dr. Malina Prentoulis0 PhD, University of East Anglia; Dr. Lasse Thomassen, PhD, Queen Mary University of London.

The Iconography of the Turkish Lira

by David Covey

Turkey seems to forever be at a balancing point—between East and West, secular and Muslim, autocratic and liberal, ancient and modern. As a rising economic power in a region plagued by turmoil, it has enormous strategic importance as both a center of power and a model for others. Pulled in multiple directions by its diverse population, few outcomes seem implausible for Turkey. In the coming decades, it could become a model for Western integration as a full EU member, an Islamist state seeking to regain Ottoman glory, and just about anything in between. With such high stakes, the political battle to determine Turkey's future direction is intense.

At the center of that political system for the last fifteen years has been the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Once Europe's darling and *Time*'s "Person of the Year" for his push toward liberalization and EU membership, Erdogan has lately been lumped with Vladimir Putin for the heavy-handed nature by which he has consolidated power. Under Erdogan's leadership, Turkey's direction has swung from one extreme to the other.

Understanding Erdogan and the AKP is at the heart of understanding Turkey today. How has it sought to position itself in the eyes of Turkey's voters? What has it tried to signal to political players within and without its borders? This paper seeks to shed some light on these questions through a careful examination of the decisions the AKP made around the iconography of the Turkish lira in the 2009 emission.

Such decisions are easily overlooked, but they reveal important insights into AKP's strategy. As Erdogan said, "Money symbolizes power, prestige and independence, just like the flag or anthem" (Hurriyet 2010). Through its design, money can subtly communicate powerful messages about national identity. Its value and

ubiquity mean that those messages are widely felt. A political party could co-opt this symbol to advance themes consistent with its own political positioning.

The 2009 currency was not the first time design had been used as a political tool in Turkey. As part of his transformation of Turkish society, founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk issued a new currency between 1937 and 1939 that would represent the values of the state. A significant stylistic change was made: The currency would no longer be covered in Arabic script but would use the Latin alphabet. As the Turkish people used the currency in their day-to-day lives, this change would reinforce the need to learn the Latin alphabet to accurately make financial transactions. Since this first emission, the design of the lira has undergone many changes that give us insight into the issuing government of the time.

In addition to providing us insight into the AKP, this paper also seeks to answer two questions from the literature on currency iconography. First, does the history of the Turkish lira's iconography fit the predicted trend of a shift from state actors and materialism toward non-state actors and postmaterialism? Second, do the changes really represent the achievement of state goals or are they simply the result of diffused norms? In the latter case, they would lack much explanatory power about the AKP's mindset.

Through a detailed categorization and analysis of the lira's iconography, I find that Turkey does indeed fit the trend toward individual actors and postmaterialism. This supports Hymans' theory of norm diffusion in the pan-European area (2010). However, unlike the Eastern European states he studies, the design change occurs quite suddenly for Turkey rather than through a gradual progression.

This suggests a different mechanism may have been behind the design change. Interestingly, the change in the lira's iconography was closely correlated with the rise of AKP, which was voted into power in 2002, just before the Turkish currency reform movement started in 2003, and stayed in power through the final reform phase of 2009. I argue that AKP sought to use the iconography of the lira as a tool to signal the party's progressive intentions for both an international and domestic audience.

This conclusion partially supports Hymans' world society theory (2010), finding that AKP's desire to be accepted as part of the international community and especially the EU was a contributing factor in causing the iconographic change. However, the world society theory does not prove to be a sufficient explanation. Turkey had been trying to join the EU since 1959, yet the lira's iconography remained stubbornly state/materialist themed until 2009. In addition, AKP was arguably more concerned with the domestic political payoffs of pursuing EU membership than achieving international respect. Due to these factors, I conclude the state goals model is a more useful framework for understanding currency iconography, at least for Turkey. Turkey appears to be in Europe's cultural orbit, but, like the post-Soviet states in Cooper's analysis (2014), is not fully riding the iconographic tide of Western Europe.

Iconographic Trends in the History of the Lira

Norm Diffusion or State Goals?

As mentioned briefly above, there are two main contrasting perspectives about the process of changes in currency iconography. The first argument is advocated by Hymans, who argues that the currency iconography of Western European states has converged around certain norms (2004) and that Japan (2005) and Eastern European states (2010) have also followed these norms. The chief cause of this norm diffusion is the "states' desire for legitimacy and recognition as normal members of the society of states" (Hyman 2010: 98). This desire to participate in the popular trends of the day leads the state to mimic the iconographic choices of its neighbors. Hawkins likewise finds evidence of European norms influencing currency design choices in Tunisia, due to the strong French influence (2010).

The second perspective focuses on how currency iconography is used to further the goals of the state. Helleiner shows that the rise of national currencies was correlated with the rise of the nation-state, and outlines several different ways in which currencies can serve as a tool for building a national identity (2003). These include cultivating a collective memory, creating a shared economic language and community, and creating a sense of trust in the state when managed properly. Unwin and Hewitt find support for this perspective in their analysis of East European currency, in which they see states using depictions of past events and individuals to create a sense of shared experience in their people (2001). Cooper confirms the importance of state goals in currency design in his study of the newly formed post-Soviet states and finds an emphasis on historical figures and state symbols rather than Hyman's predicted post-materialism (2014).

Which Images?

A common factor between the analysis of Cooper and Unwin and Hewitt is that the main subject of analysis is the primary image on the front of the banknote (Cooper 2014: 6; Unwin and Hewitt 2001: 1013). In some cases, Cooper also considers other significant images on the front of the note. The images on the back are not examined, as they are assumed to support the theme of the primary front image and would not provide additional insight (Unwin and Hewitt 2001: 1013). While this choice provides consistency of analysis between a wide sample of banknotes as well as an easier creation of a banknote database, it seems limiting when looking at the Turkish lira over time.

Hymans expands upon this perspective to additionally consider other human images on the back of the note (2004: 11). This is the model I will be using for my analysis of the lira. Except for three notes in the first series of 1927, every lira note since has depicted either the country's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, or the second head of state, Ismet Inönü, as the primary image on the front. If this were the only image on the lira to consider, it would force the conclusion that essentially nothing has changed in Turkish banknote design in the last century—a conclusion I would

consider wildly inaccurate. In addition, despite the unchanging theme on the front of the lira, the iconography on the back varies significantly, casting into doubt the aforementioned assumption by Unwin and Hewitt that these images consistently align with the same theme of the primary front image.

I find much richer results by expanding my analysis to the images on the back of the note. In the case of currencies with a similar structure to the lira (e.g., having the same individual on the front side of nearly every note) it may be useful to consider this expanded analysis for future research. This design choice is used in many currencies, including those of Brazil, China, and Thailand.

While I find variation between the themes on the front and the back of the lira, I did not find such variation within images on the same side. The location and size of these images change between emission series, making it difficult to compare notes across time. For my analysis, I will consider the primary image on the back to represent the theme of that side.

Typology

Drawing on the previously mentioned literature, I consider several methods for categorizing the images on the lira in order to gain diverse perspectives on its iconography.

Hymans focuses his analysis on human figures, categorizing them into two spectrums: the locus of actorhood and the nature of goals (2004: 12). He breaks down locus of actorhood into three categories: state, society/classes, and individuals. "State" represents human figures with historical or mythological ties to the country; "society/classes" represents the general masses, classes therein, or regional groups of human actors; and "individuals" represents identifiable non-state actors, or diverse persons. Nature of goals is broken down into three levels: traditionalist, materialist, and postmaterialist. "Traditional" represents classical or antique imagery; "Materialist" represents economic or social endeavors; and "Postmaterialist" signifies cultural pursuits Finally, Hymans looks at how the use of these categories changes over time. I have used his chosen time periods from his most recent publication on the topic to allow for consistency in comparison with the trends in Europe. These time periods are bookended by major global turning points: the first from 1919–45 between the end of WWI and the end of WWII, the second until the global explosion of 1968, the third until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the fourth until the present day (Hymans 2010: 101).

While the prevalence of human images in the currencies that Hymans analyzes allows for a focus on said images, this pattern does not hold useful for all currencies. Cooper expands upon Hymans' typology to consider other categories of images beyond human figures, including manmade objects, events, natural, and a catchall "other" category (6–7). In addition, he looks at the dimensions of gender and historical time periods (6, 8–9). In the case of the Turkish lira, I find that this typology adds additional understanding, as the majority of the images on the back of the lira do not depict human figures. For my analysis, I will look at the same categories.

	Traditional	Materialist	Postmaterialist
State	State symbols in classi- cal/antique garb, clas- sical gods (e.g., Athena, 'Columbia') or purely ornamental figures.	Historical heads of state, generals, other statesman (e.g., George Washington, Douglas MacArthur).	Representatives of 'official culture' (e.g., Francis Scott Key, Edward Teller).
Society/ Classes	Classical/antique imag- ery of mass, class, sector or region representative (e.g., allegorical figures 'Industry', 'commerce.'	Imagery of real world mass, class, sector or region representatives at work (e.g., farmers in the fields).	Imagery of real-world mass, class, sector or region representatives (e.g., kids playing baseball).
Individual	Historical non-state actors from classi- cal/antique era or representations of individual-level vir- tues (e.g., Aristotle, St Paul, 'Faith').	Historical non-state actors who made significant social or economic contributions (e.g., Margaret Sanger, Henry Ford).	Historical non-state actors who made sig- nificant contributions to the sciences or the arts and letters (e.g., Albert Einstein, Charles Ives, Herman Melville).

Table 1: Iconographic Choices*

*From Table 1 in Hymans 2010

Where a currency was reissued with the same denomination and basic design, I do not count the currency twice in my database. All information on dates and images has been taken from the database of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (2014).

Hymans' Methodology: Human Images, Front and Back

On the front of the lira, I find an overwhelming state/materialist theme throughout the history of the lira. As mentioned, either Atatürk or Inönü is depicted on the front of nearly every note. Looking at the back of the currency gives variety to the dataset. While the sample size is small due to the majority of images being non-human, we can still draw some interesting conclusions. There has been a shift from society/ materialist images, to state/traditional images, and to non-state individuals/postmaterialist images on the back of the currency.

Hymans' Methodology: Adjusted (2009 highlighted)

However, a problem with the above analysis is that Hymans has chosen cutoffs for time periods that do not give an accurate understanding of the lira. When the 1990–2009 period is combined, as in the previous table, it appears that there has been a gradual shift toward depicting non-state individuals and postmaterialist goals, with state/materialist themes still characterized in the dominant images.

Epoch of Currency Issue	State	Society	Individual	Total N
1919–45	15	2	0	17
	(88%)	(12%)	(0%)	(100%)
1946–68	19	4	0	23
	(83%)	(17%)	(0%)	(100%)
1969–89	12	0	2	14
	(86%)	(0%)	(14%)	(100%)
1990-present	21	0	6	27
	(78%)	(0%)	(22%)	(100%)
Total N	67	6	8	81
	(83%)	(7%)	(10%)	(100%)

Table 2: Actors (Hymans)

Table 3: Goals (Hymans)

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Epoch of Currency Issue	Traditional	Materialist	Postmaterialist	Total N
1919–45	0	17	0	17
	(0%)	(100%)	(0%)	(100%)
1946–68	0	22	1	23
	(0%)	(96%)	(4%)	(100%)
1969–89	3	10	1	14
	(21%)	(71%)	(8%)	(100%)
1990-present	0	20	7	27
	(0%)	(74%)	(26%)	(100%)
Total N	3	69	9	81
	(4%)	(85%)	(11%)	(100%)

However, this has not been the case and such a conclusion would be inaccurate. In the period from 1990–2008 there was a shift back toward state and materialist goals from the traditionalism of the previous period, and then in 2009 there was a dramatic shift toward individual and post-materialist themes, which shared the currency.

Comparison to European Trends

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With the aforementioned adjustments to Hymans' methodology, I find evidence that Turkey has made a recent switch to the pattern Hymans predicted. In comparison to Eastern and Western Europe, Turkey's iconography is very close to representing the standard percentages of notes that promote individual/postmaterialist themes.

It is interesting to note that the manner in which Turkey changed its currency iconography was not the gradual transition over decades that occurred throughout

Epoch of Currency Issue	State	Society	Individual	Total N
1919–45	15	2	0	17
	(88%)	(12%)	(0%)	(100%)
1946–68	19	4	0	23
	(83%)	(17%)	(0%)	(100%)
1969–89	12	0	2	14
	(86%)	(0%)	(14%)	(100%)
1990–2008	15	0	0	15
	(100%)	(0%)	(0%)	(100%)
2009–present	6	0	6	12
	(50%)	(0%)	(50%)	(50%)
Total N	67	6	8	81
	(83%)	(7%)	(10%)	(100%)

Table 4: Actors (Hymans Adjusted)

Table 5: Goals (Hymans Adjusted)

Epoch of Currency Issue	Traditional	Materialist	Postmaterial- ist	Total N
1919–45	0	17	0	17
	(0%)	(100%)	(0%)	(100%)
1946 68	0	22	1	23
1940-08	(0%)	(96%)	(4%)	(100%)
1060 80	3	10	1	14
1969-89	(21%)	(71%)	(8%)	(100%)
1000 2008	0	14	1	27
1990–2008	(0%)	(93%)	(7%)	(100%)
2000	0	6	6	12
2009–present	(0%)	(50%)	(50%)	(100%)

the rest of Europe. Instead, Turkey appeared to return toward materialist/state motifs in the 1990s until a dramatic shift was made in 1999. While the end result is in line with Hymans' theory of European norm diffusion, the process of how they got there is less obvious.

From my perspective, it seems that a norm diffusion process would happen gradually, with years of soft cultural influence changing perspectives among the populace and the state. From the data, I find little evidence of such a process occurring in Turkey, suggesting that another force, namely state goals, may have been more influential over the redesign process.



Figure 1: Depictions of Non-State Individuals

Adjusted Cooper Methodology-Front and Back

Cooper's methodology for categorization offers an additional perspective on the imagery of the lira banknotes. I made an adjustment to his methodology in considering both sides of the note. While human figures are obviously the dominant category for the front side of the lira, man-made objects are the most common category for the back side and deserve a closer examination.

In Table 7, I have further divided the types of man-made objects identified by Cooper into the two categories already examined with Hymans' methodology in order to gain more insight into the previous analysis: society and state. I find that state-associated iconography proves to be the most common in the history of the lira. However, after the first period, society-associated iconography is depicted nearly as often. It makes up 50%, 33%, and 60% of the images over the next three periods respectively. These results reflect a move away from state iconography in the lira after 1945, but not necessarily toward individual actors or postmaterialist goals.

^{*}First EU 15 and Next EU 15 data was originally provided in Hymans 2010 for the years 1990–2009. This data has been assumed to remain constant between the two time periods for the sake of this analysis.

	L	able 0. Figure	Types (Coope	1)	
	Human Figures	Man-Made Objects	Events	Natural	Other
Front	64	0	0	2	0
	(97%)	(0%)	(0%)	(3%)	(0%)
Back	17	36	0	11	2
	(26%)	(55%)	(0%)	(17%)	(3%)
Combined	81	36	0	13	2
	(61%)	(27%)	(0%)	(10%)	(2%)

Table 6: Figure Types (Cooper)

Table 7: Figure Themes (Cooper)

	Society			Sta	ite			
	Relig.	Cultural	Industry	Agri.	Transp.	Military	Gov.	Total N
1919–45	0	0	0	0	2	4	4	10
	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(20%)	(40%)	(40%)	(100%)
1946–68	0.5	4	1	0	1	4.5	2	13
	(4%)	(31%)	(8%)	(0%)	(8%)	(35%)	(15%)	(100%)
1969–89	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
	(0%)	(33%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(66%)	(100%)
1990–	0	3	3	0	0	1.5	2.5	10
2009	(0%)	(30%)	(30%)	(0%)	(0%)	(15%)	(25%)	(100%)
Total N	0.5	8	4	0	3	10	12.5	36
	(1%)	(22%)	(11%)	(0%)	(8%)	(28%)	(35%)	(100%)

Nonhuman objects can be more difficult to conclusively categorize on a traditional, materialist and postmaterialist spectrum. Devising a methodology that would allow for consistent coding of these types of images in a way that could be compared with Hymans' results would be an area for further research.

The State-Driven Redesign Process

As seen in the above analysis, Turkey's 2009 currency redesign fits well into the postmaterialist trend predicted by Hymans. But the question remains: What was the mechanism by which this shift occurred? Was it through a process of norm diffusion from Western Europe as Hymans has suggested, or was it related to state goals as Helleiner, Cooper, and Unwin-Hewitt would counter? As mentioned previously, the sudden shift toward postmaterialism in 2009 casts doubt on the diffusion theory and Hyman's predictions. In this section, I will seek to further show that the postmaterialist redesign was driven more by the state's goals than diffusion.

I find parallels between the 2009 lira redesign in Turkey and Mwangi's analysis of African currency in the early nineteenth century. Mwangi shows the images chosen for the Kenyan banknotes were primarily a reflection of the "social self-imagination of dominant classes" (2002: 58). In Kenya, banknote imagery changed with transformations in the philosophy of the ruling party. With rising nationalist discontent among the African population, the romanticized landscapes of Africa and depictions of the "noble savage" were not politically helpful (52). These images were changed to instead depict cash crops, such as cotton and tea, that emphasized the economic success derived from cooperation between the British and native Africans (55).

Mwangi mentions that norms around colonialism were changing on a global level, which certainly may have played a role in influencing the shift away from paternalistic imagery. However, from his analysis it seems clear that the change was primarily an attempt by the state to repair its disintegrating legitimacy and to bolster its chances for political survival rather than to align itself with international trends. In examining the circumstances around the 2009 lira redesign, I believe that the decisions around the iconography were made for similar reasons.

Penrose cautions against automatically assuming that the state is in complete control of currency design (2011: 431–32), so I will seek to make the causal link as clear as possible with the information available.

The currency redesign process in Turkey was part of the larger initiative of planning and managing the transition from the pre-2000s hyper-inflated Turkish lira to the new Turkish lira. Beyond the detrimental effects of high inflation, the high-denomination itself was causing a multitude of problems. The abundance of zeros made it easy for people to make mistakes in calculating prices, discouraging economic transactions denominated in the lira. Accounting with the lira became an especially large burden, with some software unable to process the large numbers (Bayir 2010: 7).

As for the nation-building power of the currency, the Turkish Central Bank specifically points out that "large denominations ruined Turkish Lira's credibility by weakening people's attitude towards national currency" (Bayir 2010: 5). If no one wants to use the money, they will not pay attention to what themes it depicts; in fact, the low credibility of the currency might negatively affect the perception of the images thereon. Portrayed on a weak, poorly esteemed currency, Atatürk and his



Figure 3: Turkey's Inflation Rate (Annual Change on CPI)

first phase would remove six zeros and rename the currency the "New Turkish Lira" and be completed 1 January 2005. The second phase would drop the prefix "new" on 1 January 2009.

To manage the process, a steering committee was formed with representatives from the Turkish Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Trade, State Institute of Statistics, Treasury, Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency, and Capital Markets Board (Bayir 2010: 12). The leadership of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry and Trade are appointed directly by the prime minister and the president (Grand National Assembly 2010: 53). The State Institute of Statistics is governed under the prime minister, the Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency is under the president, and the Capital Markets Board is under the Ministry of Finance. The Central Bank is nominally independent from the government, but its true independence is considered questionable as its governors are all appointed by the parliament (Gökbudak 1996). By controlling the presidency and parliament from 2002 onward, AKP leadership had the ability to influence every member of the steering committee in decision making regarding the new currency.

The 2005 transition was a relatively smooth one, and the populace quickly adjusted to the New Turkish Lira (Bayir 2010). To maintain a sense of continuity between the currencies and provide for easier recognition of the banknotes, denominations with the same purchasing power were produced in the same colors and designs, except with six zeros removed from the denomination. However, the steering committee ultimately wanted to make a clean break with the images associated with past hyperinflation and prepared a redesign of the banknotes and coins as part of the second phase.

The process behind the redesign suggests that creating new postmaterialist images was not considered as the main goal of the project; the redesign was part of a much larger process to continue to control inflation and redenominate the currency. The primary purpose behind the project seems to have been restoring trust in the currency itself, rather than restoring trust in the government or promoting AKP's perspective to the populace.

That said, AKP could have chosen any number of images for the currency. The easiest solution would have been to stick with the same images and themes that people recognized. However, when the opportunity presented itself, AKP moved to use new iconography that would bolster its legitimacy, just as the Kenyan government had done in Mwangi's case study. The fact that it chose to make a break from the dominant state/materialist imagery of the past eighty years in favor of individual/postmaterialist themes merits further investigation into AKP's interests.

AKP's Political Calculus

To understand AKP's interest in redesigning the currency, it is first necessary to understand the party's history. AKP was founded in 2002 from the remnants of the main conservative Islamist party. That party had been outlawed by the judiciary for violating Turkey's constitutional commitment to secular rule. This disbanding of Islamist parties was not a unique occurrence in Turkey; it was the fourth time some form of AKP had been forced to dissolve and reincarnate itself as a new party. Earlier Islamist parties had been banned in 1971, overthrown by a coup in 1980, overthrown by another coup in 1998, and then banned again in 2001 (Taspinar 2012). The strategy of the leaders of the disbanded party would be to form a new party with essentially the same Islamist goals, which would then be outlawed a few years later, restarting the cycle.

However, new AKP leadership decided to pursue a more pragmatic route. Rather than readopt the conservative Islamist stances of the past, AKP leadership made a conscious choice to present themselves as something different. AKP leadership carefully espoused secularism as their governing rule, arguing that "Islam is not an institution of the state but rather a social compass for society" (Tol 2011). Erdogan has said, "We are not an Islamic party and we also refuse labels such as Muslim-democrat" (Taspinar 2012). While the party leadership has deep roots in its Islamist predecessors (Erdogan once spent time in prison for publicly reading a poem promoting Islam), it strategically positioned itself as a Turkish version of Germany's Christian Democrats (Rahigh-Aghsan 2011).

Nevertheless, the secularist elements of the state, known as the Kemalists, were deeply suspicious of AKPs true intentions. With power bases in the judiciary and the military, they represented an ever-present threat to the party's political survival through the possible instigation of an investigation or a coup. For AKP to remain in power, it would have to appease the Kemalists by appearing sincere in its new liberal leanings. As a result, AKP decided to adopt a liberal, pro-Western platform that primarily focused on economic growth (Saatçioglu 2010). The party chose a light bulb as its symbol, signifying a commitment to scientific progress and modernization.

Perfectly aligned with this strategy was a new willingness by the European Union to consider Turkey as a potential member (Akçapar 2007). At first glance, membership in the EU would seem to be the goal of the Kemalists, AKP's political opponents. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the spiritual leader of that movement, worked to turn the remnants of the decaying Ottoman Empire into a modernized Western state (BBC 2014). He carefully studied Western European governments and used them as his model for what Turkey was to become. He instituted secular reforms, such as allowing the use of alcohol, banning headscarves in public, switching from an Islamic calendar and writing system to a more Western calendar and script, and abolishing the caliph. Membership in the EU would represent the fulfillment of Atatürk's ultimate goal of transforming Turkey into a recognized European state and seem to be the goal of the opposing Kemalists, not AKP.

Yet despite how counterintuitive it seemed at first glance, a pro-EU stance by AKP actually benefited the party in several ways. First, it established their credibility as supporters of liberal, secular policy (Içener and Çagliyan 2011). This credibility delegitimized the accusations of the opposition by demonstrating that AKP really was pursuing pro-Western policy. Second, EU reforms presented the possibility of weakening

the power of the military and judiciary, AKP's enemies in the Turkish state (Taspinar 2012). AKP could push for EU reforms without appearing to directly undercut them. Finally, EU membership gave hope for religious freedom reforms that were important to orthodox Muslims, such as the right for women to wear headscarves in public (Saa-tçioglu 2010).

AKP latched on to the opportunity and made pursuing EU membership the central pillar of its platform. To the public, AKP leaders were effusive in their enthusiasm for the project. Erdogan declared that EU membership was the greatest project ever after the founding of the republic (Içener and Çagliyan 2011). Reforms began in earnest and Turkey made significant progress toward future accession (Siitonen 2008). It was in this environment that the first phase of the currency redesign began. AKP had a clear interest in signaling its progressive intentions to both its domestic audience—for its political survival—and its international audience—for the purpose of successfully gaining EU membership. New currency iconography that imitated European individual and postmaterialist norms could help accomplish that goal in the eyes of both audiences.

The dramatically different redesign allowed AKP to disassociate itself from previous Islamist governments. A clean break from past eras was symbolized by the iconographic break from eighty years of state actors and materialist themes. The redesign also served as an attempt to subtly manipulate the Turkish people's perception of the party and its values. If AKP's public image were European, its political enemies would have a higher credibility barrier to overcome in making a public case for another ban of the party. In the past, it was not difficult to argue that a party that defined itself as Islamist should be banned for violating secularist principles as, by its nature, Islamist rule conflicted with secularism. But in its newest iteration as a party, AKP was crafting a different image altogether. The currency redesign was additional evidence of a progressive agenda that the public would remember when hearing secularist arguments in favor of a ban or coup.

The domestic audience proved even more important midway through the redesign process. Enthusiasm for EU membership died down in the second half of the decade for the Turkish populace as a whole (Pew 2008), as roadblocks were put in the way of Turkey's accession by several EU states (Captagay 2013). While loudly protesting such injustice, AKP executives officially continued to push for progress in the accession process (Akçapar 2007). However, membership looked increasingly unlikely and this stance likely represented another attempt to signal progressiveness rather than a legitimate hope for progress.

The likelihood of a military coup was greatly diminished in the aftermath of the Ergenekon trials, which controversially jailed key military officials on accusations of terrorism and treason (Saatçioglu 2010). The marginalization of this threat could have reduced AKPs need to signal a progressive platform. However, the danger of a judicial ban on anti-secular grounds was still present. In 2008, AKP was put on trial by the judi-

ciary to determine whether the party had violated secularist principles, and narrowly escaped a ban by a single vote (Tait 2008a). Despite a consolidation of power, as late as 2008 AKP still needed to prove its progressive credentials. The following section will examine how they used iconography to do so.

The 2009 Redesign Examined

Front Side

A high regard for Atatürk has always been reflected on the Turkish banknotes, upon which he has nearly always been the most prominent feature since the beginning of the republic. Even on the few notes where there is no portrait, a gray wolf the symbolic representation of the revered founder (Armstrong 1935)—is depicted instead. Upon Atatürk's death in 1938, the next Turkish president, Ismet Inönü, gradually replaced the founding father's image with his own over several issuances. During the first printing, the Inönü notes were half Inönü and half Atatürk; later printings replaced him completely. This was not necessarily a power play as the change was stipulated in the Turkish constitution—every new Turkish president was to have his face printed on the banknotes. But the gradual manner of the replacement is telling, almost as if the Turkish government could not quite let Atatürk go.

After Inönü's government lost power in 1950, the next prime minister, Adnan Menderes, changed the image back to that of Atatürk. This was a way for Menderes to borrow from the popularity of Atatürk in order to strengthen the legitimacy of his own government. There has been no change of the policy since then. The mere thought of it would seem borderline blasphemous.

In the 2009 redesign, Atatürk remains on the notes as the champion of the Turkish state. It seems that the Turkish banknote designers have continuously struggled to choose which portraits of Atatürk they like best—young, middle-aged, or elderly. Up until 2009, he had been variously depicted at all three ages. Indeed, the 2009 edition designers decided to eliminate the difficult choice between Atatürks by including a portrait of Atatürk at all three ages. On the 5 and 10 lira notes, we see Atatürk as a young revolutionary; on the 20 and 50 lira notes we see him in his middle years as president and reformer; and on the 100 and 200 lira notes, he is the elder statesman. In comparison to the rather stern expressions he wore in the past, the 2009 version of Atatürk seems more accommodating than fierce.

Back Side

It was not until 1981 that another recognizable historical figure besides Inönü or Atatürk was depicted on the lira. In that emission, the figures depicted included the writer of the Turkish national anthem and three Ottoman national heroes from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While the use of images of human figures was unique for the lira, the message of nationalism was nothing new. The notes were commissioned after an unpopular military coup and may have been an attempt to



Figure 4: 2009 Emission: Front, all denominations

recall the Turkish glory days and bolster the state's legitimacy. However, after the emission of these notes, the lira returned to depicting nonhuman figures for the next twenty-five years.

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The 2009 redesign brought human figures back onto the lira. However, the people chosen communicate a different theme than the nationalist heroes of the 1980s notes. There is still the sense of Turkish nationalism, but now the feeling is much more modern, artistic, and progressive.

From the 5 lira to 200 lira notes, the occupations of the individuals depicted are as follows: scientist, mathematician, architect, novelist, musician, and poet (Bayir 2010). Symbols of their work are portrayed around their heads: DNA structures, computer code, architectural blueprints, books, and music notes. Besides Atatürk, there are now no longer any political or military figures on the lira—human or nonhuman.

Tellingly, the depicted individuals were pioneers in their field who advanced science or the arts but still retained their Islamic identity. Fatma Aliye was the

first female novelist in the Islamic world. The luxuriously mustachioed Ahmet Kemaleddin was the first architect to combine European Art Nouveau and Ottoman styles to create the architecture of the new republic. Aydin Sayili was one of the first prominent Islamic scientists in a culture that had often been unfriendly to the discipline.

The message communicated by the choices of these images is clear: Turkey was looking toward a future in which its people are at the forefront of scientific discovery and artistic style. The images feel very European and even Renaissance-like in their veneration of these goals. The union of Islamic values with progressive pursuits that these individuals represent is the exact identity that the light bulb-branded AKP wanted for itself.



The images were generally well-received by the Turkish public, though Kemalists protested some of the choices. The individuals chosen were considered by some to be obscure, with one politician claiming that 90 percent of the people in the street would not recognize the figures (Tait 2008b). Another Kemalist said, "I don't trust the motives. . . . They will infiltrate through the currency names or images that at first look harmless but the next step will be to introduce gradually more conservative figures until you get people who negate the values of the republic" (Tait 2008b). The choice of Aliye was especially criticized, as more prominent feminist figures in Turkish history had been passed over. This was probably not accidental. The most famous Turkish feminists were closely associated with secularism, while the lesser-known Aliye supported traditional family roles (Tait 2008). While the occupations of the individuals chosen by AKP were progressive, the party carefully picked people who had also been faithful Muslims. If this meant choosing less recognizable figures, so be it.

Conclusion

In this analysis, I find that Turkey has converged toward Western European iconography in its depiction of non-state individuals and postmaterialist themes. Because the government was seeking to gain approval of the international community for EU membership at the time, I do find some evidence for the influence of the "world society" on the iconographic choices (Hymans 2010). However, a closer look at the motivations of the ruling AKP party more strongly confirms the conclusion made by Helleiner, Cooper, and Unwin and Hewitt: The state is the ultimate determinants of iconography and makes changes in order to achieve its goals. AKP sought to signal its progressive intentions in its currency redesign. Adopting this strategy was necessary in the first years of the redesign process in order to ensure the party's political survival, an outcome that was fundamentally more important to AKP than how it was perceived by the EU. It also allowed AKP to advance its vision for the Turkish nation and manipulate public opinion in its direction.

Currency iconography may be an insightful window through which we can understand the positioning of the government in power. Design changes can indicate how governments in other countries would like to be seen, how they define national identity and whom they hold as role models.

Some countries may have those questions largely settled. Turkey is not one of them. The battle to determine the answers is pivotal, as the direction that Turkey chooses will have significant consequences throughout the region. What AKP has done is stamp its vision of Turkish society onto something that is used by most of its citizens every day, and that stamp will remain in the foreseeable future. Changing currency design is a costly and lengthy process; without a crisis, it may be difficult for future governments to justify it. In a sense, AKP bought itself at least a decade's worth of highly visible advertisements to promote its vision of what Turkey should be. That is a valuable win in a high stakes ideological battle.

Ironically, Erdogan may now be pushing the country in a different direction than the progressive Turkey the lira was redesigned to portray. Looking back, he may regret missing a golden opportunity to replace Atatürk's face on the lira with his own.

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Trust and Scandal: A Tale of Two Theories

by James Martherus

"I am not a crook." Those five words are burned into the nation's memory. President Nixon was under investigation after five men were arrested trying to break into the Watergate office complex, where the Democratic National Committee was headquartered. Evidence was found that the burglary was funded using money from Nixon's re-election campaign. This led to cover-ups at high levels within the FBI, CIA, and the White House. Nixon was implicated in these cover-ups and was eventually charged with obstruction of justice, abuse of authority, and defiance of committee subpoenas. It was then that Nixon uttered the infamous phrase, "I am not a crook."

He was not the first public official to be involved in a major scandal, and he would not be the last. Just over twenty years later, President Clinton was involved in at least one affair, with intern Monica Lewinsky. Again, the nation was rocked as Clinton was impeached on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice.

The State of Utah has recently experienced its own scandal. Attorney General John Swallow took office in January 2013 and almost immediately came under investigation by the FBI (Gehrke 2013a). The FBI investigated whether Swallow had conspired to help an indicted businessman, Jeremy Johnson, avoid a lawsuit by the FTC (Carlton 2013). The investigation did not lead to any charges against Swallow, but it did provoke further inquiry by the lieutenant governor's office and the Utah House (Gehrke 2013b; HR9001) about various alleged misconducts including violation of campaign laws.

Swallow resigned as Utah's attorney general in November of that year (Roche and Romboy 2013) and was arrested on various state charges (Crofts 2014). Swallow maintains his innocence, but whether the accusations are true or not, Utah has been rocked by the news. These events provide a unique opportunity to study the effects

of political scandal on public opinion. Specifically, I present two findings. First, political scandals negatively affect trust in politicians but not in government institutions. Second, demographics like religion and party identification affect perception of the guilt of the parties involved, because individuals are less likely to believe someone like them could be involved in a scandal.

Theory

In the 1960s and early 70s, the public trusted the government at levels that seem laughable today. Pew Research found in 1964 that 77 percent of respondents felt they could trust the government "always" or "most of the time." Since 1964, trust in government has experienced a steady decline, reaching a low of 20 percent in 2014 (Pew 2014). This decline in trust is not unique to the U.S., but a phenomenon observed in virtually all Western democracies (Dalton 2004; Putnam et al. 2000).

Political scientists have recently tried to explain this phenomenon. The literature proposes many theories, most of which focus on the perceptions that government wastes too much, is inefficient, or chooses to spend on the wrong things (Nye et al. 1997; Chanley et al. 2000; Keele 2007; Miller and Borrelli 1991). A smaller group of researchers have studied the effects of political "scandals" on public trust in government. Two theories have emerged as a result of this research: one theory suggests that scandals can negatively affect public confidence in government institutions (i.e., Congress, the Supreme Court, etc.), while the other suggests that scandals have a large effect on confidence in the individuals involved in them but not on the institutions themselves.

Shaun Bowler and Jeffrey Karp support the first theory, suggesting that scandals have an effect on the public's attitudes toward institutions and the political process (2004). They are not alone; many other studies have suggested that corruption can have negative repercussions, not only for public confidence and trust but also for the outcome of elections (see e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Banducci and Karp 1994; Clausen et al. 2011).

Other academics have questioned whether scandal really affects the perception of institutions and find that scandals only affect the individual politicians involved (Clarke et al. 1998; Lanoue and Headrick 1994). For example, Jürgen Maier found that political scandals contribute to a decline of political support for candidates but not a loss of confidence in government institutions (2011). Diminished trust in individual politicians has been observed after Watergate (Yaffee 1999), Iran-Contra (Krosnick and Kinder 1990), and other major scandals, with the notable exception of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal (Zaller 1998). The idea that scandals do not really affect trust in the democratic process and government institutions has grown more and more popular in recent years. One of the most recent studies in this area attempts to explain this by making a counterintuitive claim: Scandals may have had a larger impact on public trust in institutions at one point, but the growing frequency of political scandals has caused us to be less affected by them (Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012). Some research suggests that even for the individuals involved, scandals do not have a huge effect. For example, Stephen Bennet found that during the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, approval ratings for President Clinton suffered an initial drop but then stayed relatively high. Further, most individuals did not believe the scandal was serious enough to warrant his removal from office (2002; see also Zaller 1998).

I am interested in further explaining the effect of scandal on public trust in government officials and institutions. Specifically, I am interested in studying which of the two above theories are more correct. The current literature fails to account for important variables like religion. Utah is unique in that most of its inhabitants are members of one church: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Recently, Utah's Attorney General John Swallow was involved in a political scandal, where he was accused of accepting bribes, tampering with evidence, and misusing public funds. Swallow also held a leadership position in the Church, providing a unique opportunity to study how religion affects public confidence in government when a scandal has occurred. I asked whether participants have heard of the John Swallow scandal and then measure the levels of public confidence among those who have followed the scandal and those who have not. I also controlled for participants' religion and activity in that religion to see if religion has an effect on public perception of scandals involving those of their own faith. As a secondary research goal, I plan to study how different demographic factors affect how we view government scandals.

Many people tend to trust religious individuals more than nonreligious individuals (Tan 2008). Furthermore, people tend to feel more warmly about people who share their religion than about people from other religions (Putnam 2010). When we trust someone more deeply, a breach of that trust is more devastating. Therefore, those who share John Swallow's religion will be more likely to lose trust in politicians/government in general after hearing that John Swallow, a prominent member of their church, may have participated in corrupt activities than would an individual who does not share a religion with John Swallow.

Further, we tend to trust those who are more like us politically (Lambert et al. 1986), and we find it hard to believe that "our team" would do something unethical. Therefore, those who identify as Republican will be less likely to believe that John Swallow is guilty than those who identify as Democrats.

Considering the above, I have two hypotheses of interest. First, I expect to find that a government scandal will cause individuals to lose trust in individual politicians but not in government institutions. Second, I expect to find that those who are similar to John Swallow (religion, ideology, race, etc.) are less likely to believe that he is guilty of corruption.

Methods

The data used in this analysis were gathered during the Utah Colleges Exit Poll (hereafter UCEP). The UCEP is conducted biannually on Election Day. About six hundred undergraduate students volunteer as pollsters and are sent to over one hundred polling locations throughout the state of Utah. The sample for the poll is drawn by statistics majors and uses a stratified, multimode design. The sample contains four strata, one for each congressional district. Within each stratum, we clustered on voting districts and polling places. In addition to the pollsters located at polling locations, we also collected data from mail-in and early voters through online and telephone surveys. The poll accurately predicted Utah's major races. For example, in the fourth congressional district, Mia Love garnered 50.0% of the vote, while Doug Owens received 46.8% of the vote. The UCEP called the race for Mia Love with 50.6% to Doug Owens' 47.0%.

All of the survey questions used in this paper are replicated from either a reputable survey research firm (i.e., Pew research) or the Utah Voter Poll. The Utah Voter Poll has a long history of accurate survey results in Utah. The Appendix includes the full text of all questions used in this paper.

Using the data from the UCEP, I ran various statistical tests. I first used T-tests and crosstabs to conduct preliminary analysis and then ran simple linear regressions. All regressions were run using robust standard errors to account for possible heteroske-dasticity and using proper weighting techniques. I dropped observations that had been marked invalid or missing as well as the "don't know" responses, which were analyzed separately. My models included various control variables such as age, gender, race, party identification, and ideology. Some models also included a knowledge index. The knowledge index was constructed by asking four political knowledge questions and adding up the number of questions the respondent answered correctly. The purpose of the knowledge index was to gauge a respondent's general political interest. Presumably, individuals who follow politics more closely would be more likely to be affected by a government scandal.

Analysis/Results

The first thing to note about our results is John Swallow's favorability rating. Respondents were asked to rate various politicians on a scale from 1 to 5. Consistent with what we would expect given the literature (see e.g., McAllister 2000; Hetherington 1999), John Swallow's favorability rating was incredibly low, with over 54 percent rating him at only 1 out of 5 and an average score of about 1.5. Compare this with the way Utah voters feel about President Barack Obama, who is hardly a popular figure in Utah. The president received an average score of 2.3, meaning these voters hold even more negative views about Swallow than they do about the president.

This low approval rating is likely related to the fact that almost all voters had heard something about Swallow's scandal. More than 90 percent of Utah voters claim to have heard, read, or seen something about a scandal involving the former attorney general. Unfortunately, the high level of awareness on this issue made it difficult to prove my hypotheses, because there were not enough respondents who had not heard about the scandal to produce a satisfactory level of variance. I now discuss each of my hypotheses in detail. My first hypothesis was that government scandals would cause a loss of trust in the politicians involved, but not in government institutions. My analysis largely supports this hypothesis. To measure the loss of trust in Swallow, I used his favorability rating. Those who had not heard of the scandal gave him an average of 2.6 on the favorability scale, while those who had heard about the scandal gave him an average rating of 1.6. Regression analysis produces this same finding, even controlling for religion, race, party identification, and ideology. Table one shows the results of this regression.

This regression clearly shows that having knowledge of a government scandal negatively impacts how the public views the individuals involved. Although not part

1	, ,
Regressor	
Heard about scandal	94** (.129)
Religion Index	04* (.018)
White	28** (.094)
Republican	.16** (.040)
Liberal	07** (.026)
Female	.02 (.042)
Income	02 (.011)
Married	02 (.054)
Education Level	03 (.024)
Intercept	2.82** (.254)
Regression summary statistics	
\overline{R}^2	.12
R^2	.12
SER	.90
n	2927

 Table 1: Effect of scandal on John Swallow's favorability

 Dependent variable: Favorability rating from 1 to 5

Notes: Dependent variable is the respondents rating of John Swallow on a scale from 1 to 5 (see appendix for full question wording). Religion index refers to an index plotting religious preference and activity in that religion. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the *5%, **1% significance level.

of my research, it is also interesting to note which of the demographic factors affected Swallow's favorability. Some factors, like party identification and ideology, we would expect. Others, like race and religion, are more interesting.

The other part of my first hypothesis was that scandals would not significantly affect levels of trust in government institutions. The data I collected mostly supports this part of the hypothesis. We asked respondents two questions. The first asked how much they trusted the federal, state, and local government to do the right thing. The second asked them to rate their level of confidence in various Utah government offices, including the office of the attorney general. My hypothesis would suggest that knowledge of the Swallow scandal should not significantly affect levels of trust or confidence in these two questions. Tables two and three show the results of these two questions.

This first set of regressions is inconclusive as far as my hypothesis is concerned. Surprisingly, knowledge of the scandal had no significant effect on levels of confidence in the attorney general's office but did have quite a large effect on levels

Regressor	Office of the Utah Attorney General	Office of the Utah Gover- nor
Heard about scandal	08 (.070)	.20** (.068)
Religion Index	06** (.018)	08** (.014)
Female	0005 (.037)	04 (.032)
Republican	.13** (.033)	.29** (.033)
Liberal	07** (.026)	06** (.022)
Intercept	2.64** (.162)	3.15** (.160)
Regression summary statistics		
\overline{R}^2	.09	.24
<i>R</i> ²	.09	.28
SER	.81	.73
n	3277	3346

 Table 2: Effect of scandal on confidence in government offices

 Dependent variable: Confidence in government offices

Notes: Dependent variable is confidence in various government offices (name of office at top of each column) on a five-point scale. Religion index refers to an index plotting religious preference and activity in that religion. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the *5%, **1% significance level.

of confidence in the Utah governor's office. Those who had followed the scandal actually rated the governor's office higher than those who had not. Possibly, those who had followed the scandal approved of the way the governor's office had dealt with the scandal by launching an extensive investigation. Other factors that affected confidence levels included religion, party identification, and ideology. This is unsurprising; Latter-day Saints (LDS) conservative Republicans control Utah, so LDS conservative Republicans are more likely to have confidence in Utah's government.

This second set of regressions gives substantial evidence against the theory that government scandals cause a loss of trust in government institutions. For all

Table 3: Effect of religion (and other demographics) on trust in diffe	rent levels
of government	

Regressor	Federal	State	Local
	Government	Government	Government
Heard about scandal	06	.01	05
	(.040)	(.046)	(.051)
Religion Index	.01	04**	05**
	(.0093)	(.012)	(.013)
Female	06**	12**	13**
	(.022)	(.028)	(.030)
Republican	15**	.09**	.04
	(.022)	(.025)	(.026)
Liberal	.12**	04**	02
	(.015)	(.017)	(.019)
White	12*	.02	03
	(.042)	(.051	(.062)
Knowledge Index	08	16*	03
	(.053)	(.067)	(.081)
Intercept	1.59**	2.15**	2.12**
	(.115)	(.134)	(.158)
Regression summary statistics			
\overline{R}^2	.25	.08	.04
R ²	.25	.09	.04
SER	.49	.58	.63
n	3332	2586	3347

0
Dependent variable: How often do you think you can you trust the
2 openaent vanaent in onten ao you anny ou can you autor an
following organizations to do what is right?
following organizations to do what is fight:

Notes: Dependent variable is how often you think you can trust the given organizations. Full question text given in the appendix. Religion index refers to an index plotting religious preference and activity in that religion. Knowledge Index refers to an index of four political knowledge questions where knowledge index is equal to the percentage of questions they answered correctly. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the *5%, **1% significance level.
three levels of government, knowledge of the Swallow scandal had no statistically significant effect on levels of trust. Interestingly, the factors that do affect levels of trust vary across the levels of government. For example, religion affected levels of trust in the state government but not the federal government. Local government seems to be a unique case. Surprisingly, neither party identification nor ideology had an effect on an individual's trust in local government. This can probably be attributed to the fact that local governments tend to enjoy high levels of trust and satisfaction or the fact that many respondents probably know some of the people in their local government personally. Overall, my analysis of the data supports the hypothesis that government scandals negatively affect the politicians involved in them but not the government in general.

Table 4: Effect of religion (and other demographics) on whether or not an individualbelieves John Swallow has done something illegal or unethical

Regressor	
Religion Index	06* (.028)
Female	.18** (.065)
Age	002 (.002)
Republican	.17** (.062)
Liberal	12** (.044)
White	28* (.139)
Education Level	03 (.035)
Married	.11 (.088)
Income Level	05** (.016)
Regression summary statistics	
Pseudo R ²	.06
Wald's Chi ²	116.30
n	2685

Dependent variable: John Swallow has done something illegal, unethical, or neither

Notes: Dependent variable is whether the respondent thought John Swallow had done something illegal, unethical, or neither (see appendix for full question wording). Religion index refers to an index plotting religious preference and activity in that religion. Standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the *5%, **1% significance level. My second hypothesis was that those who are more similar to Swallow demographically would be more likely to believe that he is innocent of the charges brought against him. The analysis partially supports this hypothesis. Data analysis reveals that some demographics matter and some do not. Gender and religion, for example, seem to make a significant difference. Age, education level, and marital status, however, had no significant effect. Table four displays the results of this analysis.

There are a few things that should be noted about these results. As the Pseudo R2 measure indicates, this model is not very predictive. This is unsurprising given that there are myriad other considerations one may have when deciding whether they think John Swallow is guilty. In order to make a more predictive model, we would need to collect additional information from these respondents.

Another point of interest is religion. Active LDS tend to be more likely to believe Swallow is innocent. Perhaps this is because Swallow was an active LDS and served as a bishop for a time.

In conclusion, my second hypothesis was partially correct. There is some evidence to support the idea that we tend to trust those who are similar to us more than those who are different. However, some similarities like education level or marital status seem to have no effect. Further exploration of this phenomenon is necessary, but I propose one theory as to why this might be the case. Some demographics tend to measure similarities that are based on identity. We identify as a democrat or republican and feel a sort of kinship with those who identify as we do. The same phenomenon occurs within religion, perhaps even more so. However, we tend to not feel a strong bond with someone just because they happen to be married or to have the same level of education as us. Therefore, these types of identifiers understandably have little effect on how much we trust someone.

Limitations

While the Utah Colleges Exit Poll was a considerably accurate poll, there are still some limitations to its use as a representative sample of Utah voters. It is well known, for example, that midterm election voters are significantly different from general election voters. Midterm election voters tend to be older, whiter, more educated, and more partisan (Wattenberg and Brians 2002). Our results are weighted more heavily toward those groups.

Another limitation to using this data is the low number of respondents who responded that they had not heard about accusations involving Swallow. We had planned on doing much of our analysis between those who had heard of the scandal and those who had not; however, over 90 percent of voters claimed to have heard of the scandal. One possible explanation for this extremely high percentage is that voters in midterm elections tend to be more politically active than those in general elections. There may be an even stronger bias toward informed voters in Utah, as voter turnout was a mere 30 percent. This would suggest that only the most dedicated and careful voters actually voted. Another possible explanation is that respondents did

not want to acknowledge ignorance. Essentially, because so few respondents claimed to have not heard about the Swallow scandal, we could not effectively compare the two groups.

The Utah Colleges Exit Poll also suffers from some nonresponse error. Student pollsters are instructed to gather as much data as possible from nonrespondents (i.e., race, approximate age, gender) in order to check for nonresponse error. We have weighted the results to reflect any error, but some small error is inevitable.

There is some evidence to suggest that asking someone if they have heard about the Swallow scandal is not a perfect substitute for getting a respondent's opinion before and after a scandal has occurred. It is possible that people who said they had heard about the scandal really had not and vice versa. For example, I conducted a t-test to see if the mean confidence level in the Utah attorney general's office was lower than the mean confidence level in Utah's Child Protective Services (CPS). In theory, CPS may be used as a control since they have not been involved in any major scandals recently and they are relatively unknown like the attorney general's office. The t-test found a statistically significant difference between the two means, with the attorney general's office scoring lower than CPS. However, the difference was only a tenth of a point, and I do not believe this difference alone constitutes enough evidence to disprove the hypothesis that scandals affect the trust in the individual rather than the office itself.

Finally, while the question wording we used was a replication of questions used in Gallup and Pew research studies, further study suggests there are better methods for asking about trust in government. Specifically, Timothy Cooke and Paul Gronke have developed a measure they claim is much more accurate than those used in most studies. They suggest using a scale from zero to ten where zero is very strong distrust of government to do the right thing, ten is very strong trust in government to do the right thing, and five is neither trust nor distrust in the government (2005). In future research, I will use these measures to more accurately describe trust in government among respondents.

Conclusion

Political scandals have been around for a long time and show no signs of ceasing. In fact, as the world advances technologically, our ability to uncover these scandals may increase, exposing us to scandals and corruption with even greater frequency. In light of this possibility, perhaps it is comforting to know that scandals do not substantially affect the government's ability to function or the people's general trust in that ability. When we uncover scandals, we can throw those involved out of office and try again. On the other hand, could a higher volume of government scandals begin to erode the public trust? This paper has studied the effects of a single scandal but may not be applicable to locations that experience scandals fairly regularly. Further research should be done to determine the effects of multiple scandals.

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APPENDIX

Full Text of Survey Questions

Have you heard, read, or seen anything about accusations involving former Attorney General John Swallow?

Yes No

How much of the time do you think you can trust the following organizations to do what is right? (Only some of the time, most of the time, just about always, don't know)

Deseret News The Salt Lake Tribune Federal Government State Government Local Government

How much confidence do you have in each of the following government offices? (Not at all, Not very much, Some, A great deal, Don't know) Office of the Utah Attorney General Office of the Utah Governor Child Protective Services As you may know, the media have reported several accusations about the activities of former Attorney General John Swallow. Based on what you have heard or read, which of the following statements best described your view of what John Swallow might have done? John Swallow has done something illegal. John Swallow has done nothing illegal, but has done something unethical. John Swallow has done nothing unethical. Don't know

On a scale of one to five, one being negative and five being positive, please rank your feelings on the following individuals: (1–5, Don't know) John Swallow Barack Obama Etc.

Note: The following four questions were used to create the political knowledge index.

What percentage vote of the U.S. House and Senate is needed to override a Presidential veto? A majority Two-thirds Three-fourths Unanimous

For how many years is a United States Senator elected—that is how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator?

2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years

Which of the following groups claimed responsibility for recent beheadings in Iraq? ISIS UNICEF Al Qaeda Don't know

Please indicate which office Joe Biden currently holds:

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Vice President of the U.S. Speaker of the U.S. House U.S. Senate Majority Leader

Research Project: Children in Agriculture

by Rachel Milliron

Introduction

The concept of the "American dream" lures many immigrants to the U.S. each year. Patterns of immigration to the U.S. throughout history may be categorized into waves, including major waves from Asia, Europe, and Latin America (Nelli 1987: 200-01). American industries have welcomed and capitalized from the influx of cheap labor in the workforce. The agricultural industry employs many immigrants, and, more specifically, child immigrants or children of immigrants (Human Rights Watch 2014a). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 exempts minors in agricultural jobs from the maximum-hour and the minimum-age requirements that apply to other working minors (Human Rights Watch 2014a: 642-54). This means children work upwards of ten hours a day in dangerous conditions on farms. These dangers include the risk of exposure to pesticide, heat illness, injuries, life-long disabilities, nicotine poisoning (in the case of children working on tobacco farms), and death. These dangers apply not only to immigrants but also to citizen minors. Human Rights Watch reports that 75 percent of the deaths from work-related injuries of children under the age of sixteen occurred in the agricultural industry in 2012 (2014a). In the time leading up to the passing of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the debate centered on the manufacturing and mining industries, though President Franklin D. Roosevelt and other advocates often mentioned the "ancient atrocity" that was child labor (Roosevelt 1938, 2: 275).

These factors pose the question of why the agricultural industry has not undergone as extensive a child labor reform as other areas of industry that have reformed and offer a wider variety of protections to minors. Also, some states have more robust protections for agricultural workers than other states despite being in the same country. I argue that the lack of rhetoric on and the exclusion of agriculture in the child labor debate was a result of the traditional norm that agriculture represented in American culture in the first half of the twentieth century. I further argue that the current lack of reform in this sector is due to the continued need for unskilled labor in the agricultural sector and the partisan divide in ideological views surrounding farming.

The paper will begin with a literature view, analyzing existing theories on the topic, and then will discuss the current significance and need of child labor reform in agriculture. The paper will then examine the evidence relating to my argument. First, I will examine the historical factors that surrounded the passing of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and identify why agriculture was largely excluded from reform. Second, I will discuss the differences between family and corporate farms. Third, I will compare current child labor laws and analyze why some states observe heavier restrictions on agricultural labor than others. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the limitations of my argument and suggestions for further research.

Current Significance and Literature Review

Current Significance

The labor that children perform in the agricultural sector is hazardous. In 2013, Human Rights Watch published a report on children working on tobacco fields in the United States. They interviewed 141 child workers, ranging in age from seven to seventeen (Human Rights Watch 2014b). They reported that nearly three-quarters of the children told HRW about serious symptoms they experience while working. The symptoms included vomiting, nausea, headaches, dizziness, loss of appetite, difficulty breathing, skin rashes, and eye and mouth irritation. One thirteen-year-old girl said, "I would barely eat anything because I wouldn't get hungry.... Sometimes I felt like I need to throw up.... I felt like I was going to faint. I would stop and just hold myself up with the tobacco plant" (Human Rights Watch 2014b, 3). The United States Department of Agriculture reported that in 2009 youth under the age of ten incurred 4,111 injuries, while youth ages 10-15 incurred 6,912 injuries (Child Labor in Agriculture: 2–3). Agriculture has an average of 21.3 deaths per 100,000 full-time youth workers in the U.S., meaning it is the industry with the second highest fatality rate for youth workers (3). All industries combined have an average of 3.6 deaths per 100,000 youth workers.

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health reports that machineryrelated injuries, motor-vehicle injuries, and job-related homicides are the leading cause of adolescent job deaths (Blosser 2000). Between 1998 and 2007, 178 transportationrelated deaths among workers ages 15–17 occurred, as well as 34 fall-related deaths, 45 assault-related deaths, and 70 equipment-related deaths (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2010). Along with agriculture, mining and construction reported the highest deaths per 100,000 full-time employees for young workers (36.5 and 10.9, respectively). PBS reported on a statistic from the Association of Farmworker Opportunity Programs concerning youth farmworkers. Half of the youth that regularly engage in farm work do not graduate from high school (PBS 2004). These numbers highlight some of the issues related not only to child labor in agriculture but child labor in generally hazardous industries.

The lack of protection to children performing dangerous agricultural jobs is an important and significant topic to explore. It is a question for which human-rights activists are currently demanding answers. The implications of the problem represent social and physical consequences. Understanding the answer to this question will help to properly address possible failures in federal and state law to protect children in the agricultural industry. Specifically, understanding the contributing factors to this difference of restrictions between industries may hold many policy implications. Legislators will better understand how to provide policy reforms on children's role in agriculture if they understand the variables that influence the different industries.

Literature Review

Carolyn M. Moehling (1999) examines the effect of state restrictions and the withdrawal of children from the labor market. She uses data from three federal censuses of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century to perform a test of the effect of minimum-age limits in the manufacturing industry on children's occupational choices (72). Overall, she finds that the imposition of age restrictions had little statistical effect on the decline of child labor in the first half of the twentieth century, and state labor laws regarding children were a consequence of social change rather than an initiator. Her tests exclude agricultural households because she identifies agriculture as an untargeted area of the child labor movement in the early 1900s (84). The lack of incorporation of children from agricultural households and similar variables means her conclusions cannot be inferred onto the agricultural labor sector. However, her results are fascinating when considering the direction of the causal relationships between variables in the analysis of my hypotheses.

A 1989 health-screening project of over 90 percent of children in a Californian farming town revealed that more than two-thirds of children needed a medical referral (Villarejo 2003: 186). This was found to be positively associated with the level of poverty in the town. Villarejo discusses the age distribution of hired farm workers and finds most of them are between the ages of eighteen and forty-four. He used this to explain the larger number of children and women in farming communities (177). From his finding, we discover a basis for the idea that children are a viable source of labor in agriculture due to their sheer number. Similarly, we find that the amount of illness in children who are farm workers is a serious cause of concern that deserves attention.

Daniel T. Lichter and David L. Brown (2011) found that interdependence between rural and urban areas helps rural areas move ahead and advance in a way similar to their urban counterparts. They also noted studies that found that there is a declining share of all rural employment in the agricultural sector. Lichter and Brown examined the notion that rural America is regarded as "backwater" society. This backwater view is a misconstrued attempt to explain the cultural conservatism that may be found more commonly in rural communities. However, this view declines as the level of interdependence between rural and urban areas increases. It is this type of explanation that gives credence to the idea of a partisan divide in agricultural policy. Lichter and Brown find the legitimacy of such explanations decreases with interdependence, which may mean a decrease in the possible partisan divide regarding agricultural policy. With the acknowledgement that rural areas, at least in a cultural perceptive, are usually associated with right-wing, conservative attitudes, the partisan argument will be explored later on in this paper.

Anne B.W. Effland (2005) wrote about how traditional ideals concerning agriculture affected child-labor reform. She identifies the root of the American agrarian ideal as resting in the beliefs of Thomas Jefferson (285). Jefferson believed agriculture was the best basis for democratic citizenship, because men who worked their own land had independence and virtue. Effland argues that this historic ideology is what drove public perception of agriculture and agricultural workers in the early half of the twentieth century. Effland identifies three ideas that stem from this ideological system that are still prevalent in the American public conception of agriculture today: economic, political, and social fundamentalism.

Economic fundamentalism asserts that agricultural production is the basis of all wealth, making its wellbeing critical to the wellbeing of the entire economy. Social fundamentalism asserts that farming is an occupation that naturally fosters a moral life, making the protection of a viable farm economy important to the moral state of the nation. Political fundamentalism asserts that farming produces self-sufficient, therefore independent, citizens capable of participating in true democratic government, making the preservation of a family farm system important to the maintenance of American democracy. (85)

These three ideas will be important when considering the current state of agricultural reform in the U.S. in regards to child labor in agriculture. They are important when considering the exclusion of agriculture from labor reform, because they imply there was no perceived necessity of such labor reform for agricultural child workers at the time of the development and passing of the FLSA.

Theoretical Arguments

I hypothesize that the traditional values associated with rural communities and the continued need for unskilled human labor in agriculture are the main causal effects of why the agricultural industry does not have stricter labor laws regarding children. Rural communities that rely on agriculture will more naturally accept child labor, especially in communities where family-owned farms are still prominent and/ or numerous. Children will be viewed as contributing to the community effort of producing agricultural goods and, therefore, will be required to work harder in comparison to children living in suburban or urban communities. This will be done to help their family make ends meet and to help produce their community's livelihood. The demand on financially stable farms increases as imports from foreign farms increase, putting weaker American farms out of business and putting the strain of demand on still-existing farms. However, with the advancement of society and the growth of the population in the U.S., farmers are using more pesticides and working longer hours in order to produce enough products to meet the demand. This adversely affects children farmworkers, because it exposes them to pesticides and longer working hours, both of which negatively affect their health and well-being.

American society has seen much technological advancement that has revolutionized industries. Jobs that required cheap labor in the past and that were ideal for children are now run by machines or facilitated by an assembly line and machine combination. The agricultural industry did not benefit from these technological advancements in the same way and still depends heavily on human labor. Much of the labor on farms does not require particular skill, making children good candidates for the job; and as immigration to the U.S. continues, especially from Latin American countries, immigrants and their children prove to be a commodity in the form of cheap labor.

Evidence

This part of the paper will focus on historical process tracing, examining evidence relating to the exclusion of child agricultural labor from the regulations imposed by the FLSA. Overall, I find evidence supporting the three pervasive ideas of fundamentalism identified by Effland as contributing to the lack of rhetoric and consideration of labor reform in agriculture. The large amount of children working drew national attention. The National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) conducted field investigations and studied legal statutes related to child labor and published their findings. This raised public consciousness, especially among religious organizations, college groups, and women's organizations (Stadum 1995: 34). Public awareness led to pressure on the government, which was blocked in its reform attempts by the Supreme Court, who declared restrictions on child labor "unconstitutional" (Grossman 1978). Eventually, President Roosevelt managed to bypass Congress and the Supreme Court when he signed the FLSA. Largely exempt from the FLSA were children working in agriculture, because agriculture was seen as a necessary way of life.

The Fair Labor Standards Act

The Progressive Movement at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century served as a catalyst to the events leading to the FLSA (United States Department of Labor). Rapid industrialization in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century introduced many social and economic problems to the U.S. (The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project). The Progressive Movement began as a social movement but later developed into a political movement. Adherents to the movement were generally educated, lived in cities, and shared a belief that the government could be used as a tool for change. During this time period, there was a massive influx of immigrants who flooded the industrial market and the school system (United States Department of Labor). Officials desired to instill upon these immigrant children traditional American values and beliefs to avoid foreign radical ideas prominent in Europe (Bodnar 1985: 190). However, this was met with opposition by the immigrant parents, because they depended on their children's wages to make ends meet. This led to a war of ideologies and ultimately led to legislation mandating schooling. Children, when possible, chose work outside of school or left school when they could, because they understood their greater duty to contribute to their family structure (193).

The 1900 census showed that two million children worked in mines, mills, fields, stores, factories, and on city streets (The National Archives and Records Administration). It was this statistic that ultimately sparked the American child-labor reform movement. In 1904, a group of men and women concerned with the state of child labor formed the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) in New York (The National Child Labor Committee). In 1907, an Act of Congress chartered the group, making it possible to push ahead with advocacy. The NCLC hired Lewis Hine in 1908 to travel and photograph working children. The photographs were used to "awaken the consciousness of the nation."

The record of the sixth annual conference of the NCLC shows the dialogue of the committee focused on education as the only harmed aspect of the lives of child farm workers. In discussing the situation of child migrant workers in Baltimore, Miss Anna Herkner, assistant chief of the Maryland Bureau of Statistics and Information, stated that the children of Polish immigrants "work in canneries and on farms.... The child labor law in Maryland permits them to work... until the middle of October. It is usually November . . . [when] they begin going south. . . . We have now children—many cases I know—who have never been to school" (Johnson 1910: 236). The chairman of the Committee on Child Labor in Home Industries and Street Trades, Edward N. Clopper, said in his committee's discussion (while describing the ineffectiveness of Kentucky's mandatory education law), "The rural schools are open for six months, and as most roads are in very bad condition in the spring, the session begins in July and ends some time in January." He continued, "Farmers who raise tobacco and other crops need the children, who are consequently deprived of schooling. . . . We are going to try at this session of the legislature to improve the compulsory education law with respect to rural districts" (Johnson 1910: 236–37).

The focus on the lack of education among child laborers over health concerns was due to the fact that the American public and the advocates for child-labor reform did not believe farm work was detrimental to a child's health but was to the child's education. In fact, later on at the conference, while discussing children laboring in tobacco fields, it was stated that children laboring in tobacco fields did not experience labor that was "detrimental to their health, but the great wrong is that during the period of childhood, they are practically deprived of an opportunity for education" (Johnson 1910: 237).

Photo 1. Photograph of Bibb Mill No. 1, Macon, GA, by Lewis Hine for the National Child Labor Committee, 19 January 1909



Source: www.ourdocuments.gov. Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916 (1916). Accessed 15 December 2014. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=59

These discussions at the sixth conference highlight the three ideological fundamentalisms discussed by Effland. Clopper's comment about how farmers needed child labor shows the idea that child labor was necessary for economic survival for farms and agricultural. The focus on education and the lack of belief that farm work is detrimental to children's health highlights the political and social ideological aspects of society at the time. It was only due to the possibility of the child not being educated that agricultural labor was even called into question. As previously discussed, education was viewed as necessary to producing contributing American citizens.

The conference proceedings and discussions provide ample evidence in favor of John Bodnar's assertion that the distilment of American values and beliefs was public officials and advocates' primary focus (1985: 190). Many of the child laborers are described by nationality, especially with regard to families' tendencies to pull their children from school. When discussing the Kentucky tobacco example, the unidentified moderator states, "A great many children do not go to school at all. These children in Kentucky are pure American stock; they are not foreigners . . . and these little boys and girls are growing up in ignorance" (Johnson 1910: 237). With this mindset— the Americanization of foreign immigrant children and the salvation from ignorance of American and foreign children alike—the NCLC pushed forward with its agenda, and in 1912, the Children's Bureau was established. The bureau "investigated and reported on matters related to the health and welfare of children" (United States Department of Labor Chapter 1). With the Children's Bureau now in play, the NCLC pushed for child labor reform and compulsory education 1910–20 (The National Child Labor Committee).

The 1918 Supreme Court Ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart proved to be a large legal blow to reformists when the court ruled that any federal restrictions banning child labor were unconstitutional (The National Child Labor Committee). The case was the result of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act (Kelly 1968: 320). This act was passed in 1916 after a long effort from the NCLC and banned articles from being sold in interstate commerce that were made by child labor (The National Archives and Records Administration). More specifically, the law banned selling products from any shop, cannery, or factory that had child employees under the age of fourteen, "from any mine that employed children under the age of 16," and from any sort of facility where children under the age of sixteen worked for over eight hours a day or overnight. The legal basis for the law was the ability of the federal government to govern interstate commerce with the purpose of regulating child labor. The court held the law unconstitutional on the grounds that it overstepped the government's power. The ruling was a close vote with four of the nine justices voting the law constitutional (Oyez Scholars, ITT Chicago-Kent College of Law 2014a).

The court's opposition to regulating child labor marked the beginning of a twodecade struggle to pass restrictions on child labor. In the aftermath of Hammer v. Dagenhart, Congress proposed a constitutional amendment to allow it the power to restrict and regulate child labor (NARA). This amendment carried the name of "The Child Labor Amendment." Opponents of the amendment used multiple lines of reasoning to oppose its passage. Opponents' charges ranged from traditional states' rights arguments against increases in the power of the federal government to accusations that the amendment was a communist-inspired plot to subvert the Constitution (NARA). However, Hammer v. Dagenhart had to do with the manufacturing industry, as the defendant was the owner of mill, trying to defend his perceived right to employ his fourteen-year-old son despite the restriction laid down by the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act (Oyez Scholars, ITT Chicago-Kent College of Law 2014a). The case makes no reference to agricultural laborers; in fact, the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act also does not make reference to agricultural child laborers. The wording in the bill prohibiting child laborers under the age of sixteen is: "any mill, cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, situated in the United States" (NARA). Here we see that agricultural work was largely left out of the reform debate (other than terms of education) and left out of landmark legislation to the child-labor reform movement.

The dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Hammer v. Dagenhart bears some consideration. In it, he states that the question is not really whether or not Congress has, or should have, the power to regulate commerce. He states that child labor is "evil." He also states:

But I had thought that the propriety of the exercise of a power admitted to exist in some cases was for the consideration of Congress alone, and that this Court always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of policy or morals. It is not for this Court to pronounce when prohibition is necessary to regulation—if it ever may be necessary—to say that it is permissible as against strong drink, but not as against the product of ruined lives. (Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School)

The rhetoric surrounding child labor changed somewhere between the sixth conference of the NCLC in 1910 and the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in 1918. The descriptions of child labor had tended toward the side of describing the practice as evil. They use the word "evil" in the minutes of the sixth conference of the NCLC, but by 1918, the wording had gone from a group of activists promoting their cause to entering the very dialogue of the Supreme Court. Despite the influence of activists in labor reform, there was still a lack of perceived need for reform in agriculture beyond mandatory school attendance laws.

Despite the setback of the loss of Hammer v. Dagenhart, labor reform advocates pushed forward. A decade after, the U.S. economy fell and the Great Depression hit. In 1933, President Roosevelt came into office and with him the promise of the New Deal. President Roosevelt developed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which united businesses in an effort to create stability (Grossman 1978). Part of the agreement was that businesses would not hire youth under the age of sixteen, with some exceptions. It was expected that "patriotic Americans" would only buy from participating businesses. President Roosevelt, in his notes to a speech given before Congress, wrote that if child labor could be eliminated, then more Americans could have employment (Roosevelt 1938: vol. 2, p. 205). Again, agricultural child laborers were left out of the dialogue.

The public papers of President Roosevelt reflect the ongoing battle regarding child labor in the beginning of his presidency. In agreement with the public perception of child labor, on 9 July 1933, Roosevelt hailed the abolishment of child labor in the cotton industry, saying, "This ancient atrocity went out in a day" (Roosevelt 1938: vol. 2, p. 275). In a nod to the educational concerns of labor reform activists, the president addressed Vassar College in August 1933 and told the students about the children he had met who were just "little bits and things," and how they had told him that employment kept them out of school (Roosevelt 1938: vol. 2, p. 341).

President Roosevelt's stance on child labor remained consistent throughout his presidency despite the Supreme Court's decision to repeal the NIRA in 1935 (Grossman 1978). Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States challenged the provision in the NIRA that the president could approve "fair codes of competition" for industries; the court ruled in favor of Schechter Poultry Corp., 9-0 (Oyez Scholars, ITT Chicago-Kent College of Law 2014b). In addition to this ruling, the state invalidated federal and state labor laws (Grossman 1978).

Change occurred in 1937 when Justice Owen Roberts voted with the four man liberal minority of the court in favor of Elsie Parrish in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish (Grossman 1978). She was suing for back wages as the hotel had paid her less than the state of Washington's minimum wage. This ruling helped to stem the tide of change that President Roosevelt threatened on the court for its uncooperativeness in Depression-era reform. Grossman identifies this switch as a turning point in American legal history and American social history because "it marked a new legal attitude toward labor standards." This decision encouraged labor reform advocates to develop something that the Supreme Court would not throw out.

President Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins began developing such a bill in 1933 upon her apportionment (Grossman 1978). When the Supreme Court shot down the NIRA in 1935, Secretary Perkins had Department of Labor lawyers write two wage-hour and child-labor bills that had a chance of withstanding Supreme Court review. One of the bills was a general fair-labor standards act. The bill took nearly four years to complete. The bill got lost for a while in Congress by opponents to labor reform, but President Roosevelt grew angry. Child labor, he said, "has a serious effect on buying power" (Grossman 1978). The bill, after revisions, went before Congress again in 1938 and, with a significant struggle, passed through and on to the president to be signed.

The FLSA prohibited child labor in manufacturing and mining industries for children under the age of sixteen (United States Department of Labor, Chapter 2, p. 4). Children aged fourteen and fifteen were allowed employment in occupations in industries other than manufacturing or mining if the Secretary of Labor deemed that the employment did not interfere with schooling. If the child was working on the family farm, then there was no age restriction set. "Children working on farms owned or operated by a parent are completely exempt from Federal agricultural child labor provisions" (4).

Agriculture was almost entirely excluded from the debate on child labor reform. As previously discussed, the educational concerns of American and immigrant children drove restrictions to ensure the children received schooling. However, the restrictions set in the FLSA with regard to child labor in agriculture are the same restrictions that apply at the federal level (with later amendments).

Contemporary Child Labor Reform

The United States Department of Labor web site states that farms are a commonly accepted ideal setting to raise children: "Growing up on the family farm, learning the value of hard work in the fresh air, is still viewed by many as the perfect childhood. Federal and State child labor laws . . . reflect this benefit" (United States Department of Labor). This statement provides the justification for why minors who work in agriculture are exempt from restrictions that apply to minors working in other industries: romanticized American agriculture.

Despite this traditional justification for agricultural exemptions, only 10 percent of migrant farm workers graduate high school (National Farm Worker Ministry). The United States Department of Labor reports similarly alarming statistics. Of minor teens who work in agriculture, "fewer than half [47 percent] were attending school at a grade level corresponding to their age, 15 percent were in school but behind in grade [levels], and 37 percent were drop-outs who did not have a high school diploma" (United States Department of Labor, Chapter 5, p. 54).

In 2011, the Department of Labor proposed changes to the agricultural labor laws that would restrict minors under that age of sixteen and eighteen; these changes were withdrawn in 2012, a move widely criticized as an attempt to gain favor and votes for the Obama administration from farmers and Republicans during the 2012 reelection (American Horse Council 2012). The American Horse Council, an agricultural interest group in Washington, opposed the change, citing the prevention of "young people from becoming involved in agriculture, and would negatively impact family farms and ranches." Perhaps the biggest voice against the change came in the form of the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), which is a large lobbyist group dedicated to preserving the rights of large, corporate farms down to small, family farms (Shearn 2012). The AFBF opposed the Department of Labor's proposed changes, stating that the decision to withdraw the proposed changes was a "positive step" and any changes going forward must "not infringe on the traditional rights of family farms and not unnecessarily restrict the ability of young people to work in agriculture. As DOL's proposed rule stands currently, that is not the case" (American Farm Bureau Federation 2012). The voices against child labor reform in agriculture on Capitol Hill often have large resources to push their agenda (Fang 2012), as seen with the withdrawal of the proposed changes in 2012.

Any attempts at reform always exempt family farms from the legal restrictions proposed. In the 1930s, when the FLSA was passed, the number of farms in the U.S.



Source: Plumer, Brad. 2012. After a seventy-year drop, small farms make a (small) comeback. Washington Post, October 2. Accessed 16 December 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/10/02/after-a-70-year-drop-farming-makes-a-small-comeback/.

had experienced a small growth, moving from the lower half of 7 million total farms to nearly 8 million farms (Plumer 2012).

The 1930s increase in farms, combined with traditional American ideology, may well have contributed to the exclusion of stricter laws regarding minors working in agriculture in the FLSA. As families during the Great Depression worked hard to make ends meet, children may have been seen as a necessary part contributing to their family's livelihood.

This line of reasoning leads to the question of whether or not the rise of corporations and commercial farming in the agricultural sector has grown significantly enough in prevalence to warrant a massive reform of child-labor laws. To answer this question, I will turn to numbers provided by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The Economic Research Service for the USDA reports that in 2011, family farms represented 97.6 percent of all U.S. farms (MacDonald 2014). These family farms output 85 percent of all U.S. farm production.

Family-owned farms make up the majority of farming in the U.S., but the question remains of how many are working under corporations, and how many employ minors that are not related to them. "Another 11.5 percent of U.S. farms, with 38.4 percent of production, are owned and operated by a family, but rely extensively on labor provided by hired workers, contract workers, and other operators and their families" (MacDonald 2014). The USDA's web site identifies that nonfamily farms represent 2.4 percent of the total number of farms in the U.S., making a number of fifty-three thousand.

Though all of these statistics suggest that the number of children adversely affected by the lack of stricter restrictions in child labor in the agricultural sector is minimal, lack of reform may come down to the partisan divide in American politics and the continued need for unskilled labor in farming. The USDA's web site states:

Agricultural production also usually requires localized knowledge, flexibility, and the ability to quickly adapt to changes in the production environment . . . families have been able to adjust their labor to the seasonality of farm production and to reallocate their labor to other tasks on and off the farm to accommodate unexpected variability in agricultural production needs. (MacDonald 2014)

The localized knowledge mentioned and the flexibility and adaptability all indicate the need for human labor. This is why family-owned farms are so prevalent in agriculture. The USDA also acknowledged nonfamily farm corporations and businesses are often formed on a model that closely resembles the family-farm model.

This information could imply the reason child labor reform in agriculture has not been achieved is because the issue is not a prevalent one, as most farms are family operated. The National Center for Farmworker Health, Inc. cites that there is no official data compiled that documents the number of children under the age of twelve working on farms. Overall, the lack of statistics regarding children in agriculture is frustrating at best. Human Rights Watch reports, "No one knows exactly how many children under the age of 18 are working in US agriculture" (Human Rights Watch 2010: 16). Of the numbers available, the United States Department of Labor does provide the following statistics, recreated in Table 1. The table details the percentage of children of farmworkers and the percentage of those children who also participate in farm work.



Table 1: Children of Farmworkers

Source: United States Department of Labor. 2000b. Chapter 5. Youth Employment in Agriculture. 2000. United States Department of Labor. Accessed 14 November 2014. http://www.bls. gov/opub/rylf/pdf/chapter5.pdf.

A source of information more readily available is that of state child-labor laws. Using the Department of Labor's web site, I compiled a map (See Table 2) detailing which states had laws higher than federal restrictions regarding the minimum age for employment during school hours. These states are filled in as blue on the map. The federal age during school hours is sixteen. The states with laws lower than the federal restriction for employment during school hours are filled in as yellow on the map. Of the blue states, New Mexico is the only state that has not imposed a maximum on the number of days a minor may work in agriculture in a week (United States Department of Labor 2013).

I compared this map to the Electoral College results of the 2012 presidential election. Interestingly, the states that have imposed restriction higher than the federal levels were all Democratic-majorities or undecided. The states that have standards lower than the federal voted republican or were undecided. The notable exceptions here are Illinois (President Obama's home state) and Massachusetts. Massachusetts allows fourteen-year-olds to complete farm work with small hand tools and small tractors if they have completed a required vocational training and can provide certification. Nevada and North Dakota require no such vocational training for fourteen-year-olds (United States Department of Labor 2013).



Table 2: Child Labor Laws in Agriculture

Source: United States Department of Labor. 2013. Wage and Hour Division (WHD). December. Accessed 14 November 2014. http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/agriemp2.htm#. Map created at http://diymaps.net/

This result provides a little basis for the partisan argument. Turning to the language used by republicans versus democrats in congressional debates sheds further light on the issue. Two notable examples are Representative Tom Lantos (a democrat from California) and Senator John Thune (a republican from South Dakota). In 1999, Lantos argued against child fieldwork and raised the issue of reform in connection to his bill the Young American Workers' Bill of Rights Act. Some notable extracts from his remarks are:

Children who work in agriculture often do so at the expense of their education . . . children working in agriculture receive less protection than children working in other industries because of many outdated and outmoded exceptions included in our laws . . . As many as 800,000 children work in agriculture in this country, picking the fruits and vegetables that end up in our grocery stores, either as fresh or processed fruits and vegetables. (Cong. Rec. 1999: p. 145, pt. 20: 29066)

Here, the same sorts of concerns that were raised during the Progressive Movement are brought to light again, namely education, the sheer number of workers, and the hazard of the labor.

In contrast, Thune uses different language to illustrate his point. Some notable extracts from his remarks are follows:

There seems to be a parallel universe to think that all of these various regulations and restrictions they would impose on young people working in agriculture wouldn't undermine the very fabric, the very nature, the very foundation of American agriculture . . . Farming and ranching is inherently a family enterprise. Young people have contributed for generations in helping that family farm or ranch operation survive and prosper . . . It is amazing to me, and incomprehensible, to think that bureaucrats in Washington, DC, could tell family farmers and ranchers how to run their operations with the kind of detail and the incredible prescription of these regulations and the very activities they would curtail for young people. (Cong. Rec. 2012: p. 158, pt. 27: S895-S898)

The language used by Thune is reminiscent of the language that opponents to "The Child Labor Amendment" used when they argued that the amendment promoted big government and even communist ideology. Though he does not make any reference to communism or Marxist ideals, Thune does imply that imposing further restrictions on child labor in agriculture would be overstepping the bounds of the government, as well as undermining American traditional values.

Strengths and Limitations

Defendants of continued child labor in the agrarian sector cite traditional childhood values as their main defense. Despite officials naming this argument, it may not be true in terms of majority public opinion today. Instead, it may just serve as a political argument federal politicians perpetuate on to the public. One further area of exploration with regard to this topic should be a public opinion survey of a random sample that attempts to measure the public view of child labor in the agricultural sector. Another further area of study should be whether the model that family-owned farms use and perpetuate in commercial and corporate farming is the main reason for poor treatment of child wage laborers who come from outside the owner's family.

One of the benefits of a qualitative analysis is the ability to examine substantive details. However, in this case, a quantitative analysis would be beneficial to measure the effect of the factors identified through qualitative analysis and their significance on labor policy. In order to test these hypotheses, I originally planned to perform a cross-county analysis of two farming communities within the United States. However, I found the numbers needed to measure the dependent variable (the number of children working in agriculture) do not exist. There are estimates but no definitive numbers of how many children are employed on farms. Instead, I turned to a qualitative analysis of the historical factors affecting the child labor reform in other industries and in federal law.

The evidence for the exclusion of agriculture at the time of the FLSA is stronger than the evidence regarding the continued lack of reform in contemporary society. This is due in part to the need of more in-depth research of congressional debates surrounding proposed changes. This, combined with a cross-analysis of the speaker's ties to agricultural interests in their home state, would provide a better picture of whether there are partisan ties or whether there is more support for reform from states with smaller agricultural outputs. An alternative explanation not explored in this paper is the idea that the issue is "out of sight" and, therefore, "out of mind." Farming occurs on private property and receives relatively little press. The public does not see the conditions youth workers face, and other topics take the spotlight of media attention. For example, a perceived influx in unaccompanied minors crossing the U.S.–Mexico border is a much more discussed issue in Washington than a small number of youth worker deaths, even though those deaths could be those of such minors. Because the problem occurs in remote areas, it may be considered more of an abstract issue in a system with more pressing problems.

Conclusion

This research helps us to understand why agriculture has not experienced the extensive labor reform that other industries experienced earlier in the twentieth century. Human Rights Watch interviewed over a hundred minors working on tobacco farms (Human Rights Watch, Tobacco's Hidden Children, 2014). These interviews serve as evidence that the children in agriculture are exposed to working conditions that possibly violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN General Assembly 1989). However, the U.S. has not ratified this treaty, meaning there is no clear venue to internationally pressure the conditions under which children work in agriculture in the United States. Understanding the variables that have affected the lack of restriction of children in agriculture will provide a better pathway to understanding how to reform legislation. Though there are numerous limitations to my analysis, including weak evidence for both of my arguments, the evidence provided in this paper serves as a building block toward a better understanding of the important elements and aspects of child labor reform in the United States.

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United States—Chile Bilateral Free Trade Act

by Jake Berlin

Introduction

Since the formation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947, world trade has increased exponentially, leading to unprecedented economic growth and prosperity throughout the world. The elimination of nontariff barriers (NTB's) and the reduction of tariffs throughout the world have allowed world trade and wealth to flow effectively from one country to another guided by the "invisible hand" of economic liberalism. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which led to the creation of a formal World Trade Organization (WTO), was seen by many as evidence pointing to continued progress toward trade liberalization throughout the world. In contrast to previous decades, recent developments have stalled further rounds of negotiation at the WTO, casting doubt on the ability of the WTO to effectively continue the reduction of trade barriers.

Lack of progress on a global scale has prompted many countries, such as the U.S., to turn to bilateral free-trade agreements to achieve their goals of trade liberalization. Indeed, the last several decades have seen a proliferation of bilateral free-trade agreements. Data from the WTO database lists 221 bilateral free-trade agreements that are currently in force, the vast majority of which have been signed within the last fifteen years (WTO.org). Scholarly opinions are mixed about the implications of such deals on the overall growth of world trade. Some scholars emphasize that bilateral and regional deals are a viable second-best option to multilateral negotiations and that such deals often promote successful negotiations at the WTO (Griswold 2003). Other scholars argue that bilateral/regional deals divert trade, distract from multilateral deals, and often involve countries with asymmetrical bargaining power, thereby allowing the more powerful industrialized states to manipulate such deals to their advantage (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2003).

Overview of the U.S.-Chile FTA

One of the first bilateral agreements that involved the U.S. was the 2003 U.S.– Chile Free Trade Agreement, which was signed on 6 June 2003 (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative). The agreement included provisions on a wide variety of topics dealing with trade in goods and services. The key element of the agreement was the elimination of all tariffs on goods traded between the U.S. and Chile. Eighty-five percent of the tariffs on industrial and manufactured goods were eliminated immediately, and the rest were phased out within a period of four years (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2003). The agreement also covered agricultural products such as fresh fruit and wine. Seventy-five percent of U.S. farm exports to Chile became tariff free within four years after the agreement was signed, and the rest were to become duty-free within twelve years of the signing. Ninety-five percent of Chilean exports to the U.S. also received tariff-free status with the signing of the agreement, with the remaining 5 percent of goods scheduled to become tariff free within a period of twelve years (Hornbeck 2003: 2).

Other important, and some of the most controversial, aspects of the agreement are provisions concerning environmental and labor-standards issues. The agreement encourages increased cooperation between the U.S. and Chile on these matters, including several joint environmental projects on topics ranging from wildlife protection to finding safer alternatives for environmentally hazardous chemicals (Office of the U.S. trade representative 2002). The agreement also calls for upholding the existing regulations in each country and for abiding by ILO (International Labor Organization) standards. Despite these provisions, labor rights advocates from the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC) and other labor-rights groups criticized the agreement for not having sufficient enforcement powers and for being a "big step backwards" from the labor rights provisions in the U.S.–Jordan Free Trade Agreement that was signed in 2000 (Bolle 2003: 3).

The negotiation of the U.S.–Chile FTA was an extensive process lasting over two years.¹ On 29 November 2000, President George W. Bush notified Congress about his desires to negotiate an FTA with Chile, and negotiations began on 6 December 2000 (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Fact Sheet 2002). There were fourteen negotiating rounds that culminated in June 2003, when the agreement was signed in Miami, Florida, by Robert Zoellick, U.S. trade representative, and Chilean Foreign Minister Soledad Alvear (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2003). The agreement was signed by President Bush on 3 September 2003, after passing the House on 24 July 2003 and the Senate on 31 July 2003 (Govtrack.us). The bill entered into effect on 1 January 2004 (Hornbeck 2003). Voting in both the House and the Senate reflected a partisan divide. In the House, the bill passed with a vote of 270-156 and, of those who opposed the bill, 128 were Democrats (Govtrack.us). In the Senate, the bill passed 65-32 (with three senators who abstained from voting), and once again twenty-four of the opposing votes came from Democratic senators (Govtrack.us).²

In 2002, Congress passed the Bi-Partisan Trade Promotion Authority Act effectively granting fast-track authority to President Bush, which allowed him (or his representatives) to directly negotiate trade deals with foreign countries whenever he felt that a tariff "had a negative effect on the U.S. economy" (Congress 2002). The passing of the 2002 Trade Act was vital to the completion of the U.S.–Chile FTA because it consolidated negotiating power within the executive branch. Without fast-track authority, it is likely that the U.S.–Chile FTA never would have come to fruition. The 2002 Trade Act also marked an important compromise between Democrats and Republicans on the inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in trade agreements, which set the stage for many of the political battles involved in the U.S.–Chile FTA.

Why a U.S.-Chile FTA?

Economics and politics have always been intricately related, and this statement is true with regard to the complex global economy that has developed in the twentyfirst century. Although the U.S.–Chile FTA certainly has significant economic implications, the overall economic benefit to the U.S. is merely another drop of water in the vast ocean of the economy of the United States. The estimated economic benefit of the FTA is \$4.2 billion dollars—an impressive figure when measured in absolute terms, but one which equates to only about .04 percent of U.S. economic output (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Fact Sheet 2002: 10). Pure economics fail to explain why the U.S. would invest such a considerable amount of time and effort into an FTA with Chile, especially in the face of opposition from labor, environmental, and anti-globalization groups, and the occurrence of other important political developments such as the War on Terror and the Doha round of negotiations at the WTO. There were other countries far more important to the U.S. in terms of overall trade,³ and in order to fully understand the motivations behind the agreement, one must examine the political side of the issue.

In Richard Feinberg's article "The Political Economy of United States' Free Trade Arrangements," Feinberg highlights four political motivations for the U.S. to pursue FTAs: 1) to open markets for U.S. traders and investors ("asymmetric reciprocity"), 2) to serve as a precedent or catalyst for wider trade agreements, 3) to reward and support countries for Democratic and market-oriented reform, and 4) to strengthen strategic partnerships (2003: 1020). The rationale behind the U.S.–Chile FTA is best understood by examining these political motivations rather than focusing on the economic benefits offered by a bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Chile.⁴

The political reasoning for the U.S.–Chile FTA coincides neatly with the first three motivations listed by Feinberg. The second motivation, to use FTAs as a template and catalyst for wider trade agreements, is especially applicable in this case. The U.S.–Chile FTA went hand in hand with the Bush administration's focus on increasing trade liberalization and forming a hemisphere-wide FTA. The lucrative dream of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) was one of Bush's primary economic and foreign policy goals, and many viewed the U.S.–Chile FTA as a possible pre-

cursor to a much larger regional agreement (Becker 2002). In addition, the deal was struck at the beginning of the Doha round of WTO negotiations, sending a message to other countries that the U.S. was willing to pursue free trade through bilateral deals if foreign countries were unwilling to cooperate at a global level.

At the start of Bush's presidency in 2001, the only U.S. FTA in force (apart from the NAFTA agreement) was with the economically unimportant but politically salient Israel. At the end of the year, an FTA with Jordan was signed. Once again, the economic benefits of the treaty were marginal, but the potential national security benefits were substantial due to Jordan's strategic location in the Middle East. The U.S.–Chile FTA follows the pattern of other bilateral trade deals signed by the U.S. by virtue of the fact that it was signed as much for political reasons as economic ones.

In summary, several factors help explain the rationale behind the FTA with Chile, namely: President Bush's desire to establish an FTAA in the Western Hemisphere while simultaneously applying pressure to advance the Doha round of negotiations at the WTO, U.S. desire to support liberal democracy and market reform in Latin America, and, to a lesser extent, U.S. exporters' interest in gaining access to a growing Chilean market and consumers' desires for cheaper Chilean imports. These factors generated a sufficiently strong consensus in favor of the agreement allowing for its passage in spite of opposition from interest groups. This paper will attempt to examine each of these factors in greater detail in order to explain the political struggles and decision-making processes that culminated in the U.S.–Chile FTA.

Political Support for the U.S.-Chile FTA

The roots of the U.S.–Chile bilateral free-trade act run deep. As early as 1991, U.S. and Chilean officials initiated a discussion concerning a free-trade agreement between the two countries (Blustein 2002). In 1995, there was a congressional hearing on whether to include Chile in the landmark NAFTA agreement signed between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico (House Ways and Means Committee). The NAFTA proposition never really gained steam, and for several years there was little progress toward a bilateral deal involving the U.S. and Chile. In order to understand the delay in reaching a free-trade agreement with Chile, one must examine the domestic political struggles between Congress and the executive branch and the importance of presidential trade promotion authority. Important changes in the international economic environment also increased support for the passage of the U.S. Chile Free Trade Act.

President Bush was not unique or original in his desires to promote trade between the U.S. and Latin America. It was President Clinton who first had aspirations of forming a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (Bhagwati 1997), but those aspirations were shattered when Congress refused to grant him fast-track negotiating authority. Charlene Barshefsky, the U.S. trade representative under Clinton, remarked that he was "empty-handed" in Latin American trade negotiations without fast-track authority (Bhagwati 1997). Interestingly, it was congressional Democrats who failed to support Clinton in his desire for fast-track authority due to their concerns that Clinton's proposed trade deals would not provide, "adequate protection for workers and the environment" (Broder 1998). His efforts were also limited by partisan opposition exacerbated by the fact that Republicans had taken control of both the House and the Senate in the "Republican Revolution" of 1994. Ultimately, Congress' refusal to grant President Clinton trade-promotion authority stymied his efforts to conclude a free trade agreement with Chile (Feinberg 2003: 21).

The Republican electoral victory in 2000 and the ascension of George W. Bush to the presidency reopened the door for continued progress toward an FTA with Chile. Bush was elected on a platform that included the goal of expanding free trade multilaterally as well as regionally, and many of Bush's first important foreign policy initiatives were aimed at expanding free trade and American political influence. Writer Paul Blustein highlights the importance of a U.S.–Chile FTA for the Bush administration's foreign-policy objectives, explaining that despite the small economic benefits offered by bilateral deals, "the administration is aggressively pursuing them nonetheless as a device for cementing ties with certain nations and as part of an overall strategy aimed at lowering trade barriers worldwide" (2002).

This strategy was known as "competitive liberalization." The basic logic behind the strategy was that by signing bilateral or regional agreements, the U.S. would put pressure on other countries to engage in trade negotiations and the reduction of trade barriers if they wanted to remain competitive with exports to the lucrative U.S. market (Feinberg 2003). This strategy became especially important as negotiations at the Doha round of WTO talks bogged down over concerns about intellectual property rights and agricultural products. U.S. leaders hoped to increase their bargaining advantage at the WTO by establishing more limited regional and bilateral agreements, and the U.S.–Chile FTA was seen as an important stepping-stone in this process.

The overall success of the NAFTA agreement prompted U.S. leaders like Bush and Zoellick to push toward their dream of forging a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) that would encompass virtually all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere (with the obvious exception of Cuba). The economic gains from such an agreement would be staggering and would provide the U.S. with even closer political ties (and possibly increased control through economic leverage) with its Latin American neighbors. Similar to Clinton's aspirations, the creation of an FTAA constituted one of Bush's foremost economic goals. In remarks he gave to the Organization of American States prior to a summit meeting in Quebec, Bush declared:

We must affirm our commitment to complete negotiations on the free trade area of the Americas by January, 2005. Nothing we do [at the trade meeting] in Quebec will be more important or have a greater long-term impact. It will make our hemisphere the largest free trade area in the world, encompassing 34 countries and 800 million people. (Gpo.gov 2001)

To accomplish this important foreign policy objective, Bush appointed Zoellick as the U.S. Trade representative. Zoellick had been involved in previous trade negotiations

with Chile during the first Bush administration, and this experience made him an ideal candidate to work on reaching a trade agreement with Chile (Blustein 2002). After his appointment, Zoellick immediately began working to hammer out free trade deals with several countries (including Chile) in hopes that these deals would pave the way toward an FTAA.

In his first State of the Union address, President Bush declared, "Give me the strong hand of presidential trade promotion authority . . . and do so quickly" (Sek 2003: 5). On 6 August 2002, his wish was granted by the Trade Act of 2002 after a narrow 215-212 vote in the House and a 64-34 vote in the Senate that took place on 26 July (Sek 2003). Prior votes on provisions to the language of the bill concerning labor and environmental standards were hotly contested in the House with strong partisan divisions. Democrats wanted to ensure that labor and environmental concerns would not be ignored in trade negotiations, and the necessary number of votes could not be obtained until Republicans agreed to enshrine these provisions in the bill granting presidential trade-promotion authority. After receiving trade-promotion authority, negotiations proceeded at an accelerated pace and were concluded on 11 December 2002 (Hornbeck 2003).

The shocking events of 9/11 and the ensuing wars with Iraq and Afghanistan caused U.S. foreign policy priorities to shift dramatically. In general, there was little Latin American support for the wars, and progress toward an FTAA stalled. The U.S. hinted at delaying the passing of the U.S.–Chile FTA in order to prod Chilean officials into supporting the War on Terror (Blustein 2003). Bush and Zoellick were determined not to lose their chance at forming an American free-trade area. And, "in an attempt to re-insert itself in regional trade circles, the administration consented to sign the agreement" (Angrisani 2003: 83). The U.S.–Chile FTA may be viewed as a preliminary stepping stone toward the greater goal of creating an FTAA, and there was hope that the agreement would serve as a template for future trade deals and as a catalyst to spur progress in the Doha round trade talks.

From an economic perspective, the rationale for the agreement comes from the fact that Chile had (and continues to have) one of the fastest-growing and most highly developed economies in all of Latin America, and the agreement allowed U.S. exporters greater access to this market. It also provided U.S. consumers with lower prices on key Chilean exports such as copper, wine, and agricultural products (Hornbeck 2003: 8). Furthermore, there was concern that if an FTA with Chile was not established, U.S. firms would fail to compete effectively in the Chilean market with firms from Canada, Mexico, or other Latin American countries—all of whom already had free-trade agreements in place with Chile (Hornbeck 2003: 2). Although, as I have mentioned previously, the economic benefits of the U.S.–Chile FTA were only of secondary importance.

From an ideological perspective, the U.S.–Chile FTA may also be viewed as a statement by the U.S. in support of democracy and economic liberalism. Since the dark days of the dictator Augusto Pinochet, Chile had made great strides in establishing a generally fair and representative Democratic government and in opening herself to world markets. The Chilean government pursued policies to promote export-led growth and to protect the property rights and civil liberties of Chilean citizens. Chile also had demonstrated sound macroeconomic management, and many U.S. officials viewed Chile as "a model for Latin America" and other developing countries throughout the world (Mares and Aravena 2001: xv preface).⁵ At a time when the U.S. was actively promoting and defending the ideals of political and economic liberty, the agreement may be understood as a message to the world that the U.S. was willing to reward developing countries that made social and economic progress by following the guiding principles of American political and economic ideology.

FTAs with larger countries such as Argentina or Brazil would have allowed the U.S. to reap larger economic benefits, but, once again, political motives trumped economic ones. The conservative nature of the Chilean government from both a political and economic standpoint made it an appealing candidate for a free-trade agreement especially when contrasted with other Latin American countries such as Argentina, which had suffered disastrous inflation throughout much of the 1990s. The Chilean government was also more willing to engage the U.S. in trade talks than other leftleaning governments.⁶

In his remarks during the signing ceremony of the U.S.–Chile FTA, President Bush elaborated on the supposed connection between free trade and the spread of democracy, saying, "The growth of economic freedom and ownership in developing countries creates the habits of liberty and creates the pressure for democracy and political reform" (Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov 2003). He also stated repeatedly that the economic benefits associated with free trade, including job creation, cheaper imports, and increased living standards for citizens of all the nations involved. While scholars and policy makers may debate whether bilateral FTAs really bring about such benefits, it is important to note that the Bush administration believed in the benefits of free trade and pursued policies in accordance with that belief.

Political Opposition to the Agreement

The opposition to the U.S.–Chile FTA was championed by various environmentaland labor-rights groups who felt that the agreement failed to impose sufficient environmental and labor standards. One of the most prominent of these groups, and one that characterizes the sentiments shared by various other individuals and groups in opposition to the U.S.–Chile FTA, was Citizens Trade Campaign, a group originally founded in opposition to the NAFTA agreement that seeks to establish "social and environmental justice in trade policy" (citizenstrade.org). In general, organizations like Citizens Trade Campaign oppose FTAs due to their belief that such agreements lead to resource depletion, competitive deregulation, increased inequality, and the unfair exploitation of labor.

Environmentalists raised fears that the agreement would force Chile to rely even more on the exportation of nonrenewable natural resources such as copper and other minerals in order to generate wealth. Exports such as copper, fish, and lumber constitute a very large percentage of Chilean GDP, and those opposed to the agreement argued that it would exacerbate Chile's dependence on such products, leading to the eventual depletion of precious natural resources. Labor standards were also a point of contention, and labor-rights groups voiced concerns that the U.S.–Chile FTA would increase the already substantial income gap between the richest Chileans and the average Chilean citizen. Labor unions (primarily the AFL-CIO) also argued that the agreement should contain stricter provisions regarding labor standards that would eliminate the possibility of either the U.S. or Chile lowering their standards in order to gain comparative advantage (Hornbeck 2003: 13).

In reality, concerns about the labor standards provisions of the U.S.–Chile FTA lacked a strong foundation due to the fact that Chile had a strong record of compliance with International Labor Organization (ILO) standards and had made great strides in increasing protection and benefits for workers. Many of those opposed to the agreement recognized this, but their greatest concern was that while the looser terms of the agreement may have been sufficient for Chile, the agreement would not work as a template for future deals with other Latin American countries that had a much shakier track record of upholding adequate labor standards (Hornbeck 2003: 17).

Interest groups and labor unions generally had little influence over the actual negotiating process. The Trade Act of 2002 had consolidated negotiating power within the executive branch and specifically within the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Positions within the trade office are given by appointment rather than by direct election, thus insulating the members of the trade office from the influence of interest groups. Furthermore, the typical difficulties presented by collective action logic were mitigated by the 2002 Trade Act. Bush and Zoellick had little reason to worry about a negative response from several relatively small groups throughout the country given the fact that they represented the interests of a much broader constituency. Plus, in Bush's opinion, the potential economic gains of an FTAA dwarfed environmental or labor rights concerns, and the U.S.-Chile FTA was a key step in achieving his longterm trade policy goals. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. public attention was fixed firmly on the Middle East and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The negotiation of the U.S.-Chile FTA was merely a side note to the upheavals of the time, which frustrated any attempts at arousing widespread public opposition to the agreement. Lack of public concern and most importantly the central negotiating power of the executive branch allowed negotiations to proceed fairly smoothly and without much interference from the interest groups opposed to the agreement.

After the agreement was signed, pro-environmental and pro-labor groups turned their efforts toward Congress, yet once again their success was only marginal. Congressional Republicans overwhelmingly supported Bush and the FTA, as can be seen by the voting records in both the House and the Senate (Govtrack.us). And by granting Bush fast-track negotiating authority, many Democrats had already voiced their support of free trade expansion in general, and the fiercest political battles had already been fought. Politicians from both parties were backed on this issue by the multitude of American Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and export-oriented firms which formed a key part of the constituencies of most congressman. Fears about environmental degradation and labor exploitation were assuaged by Chile's strong record of progress in both areas and by their commitment to abide by international standards. All of these factors combined led to a relatively easy passage of the U.S.– Chile FTA.

The opposition's greatest success came from their ability to force the U.S. Trade Office to recognize that the specific provisions of the agreement could not serve as a framework for future FTA's with other Latin American countries. Various members of Congress voiced this opinion arguing that the loose terms of the agreement were likely sufficient for Chile but would be unacceptable for many other developing countries (Congressional Record 2003). Advocates of the agreement were compelled to compromise on this issue in order to receive the necessary votes for the agreement to pass the House and the Senate.

Evaluating the Effects of the U.S.-Chile FTA

It has now been more than a decade since the U.S.-Chile FTA entered into force, and by next year, the full effects of all tariff reductions should be felt according to a study performed by the United States International Trade Commission (Hornberg 2003). An in-depth analysis of the effects of the agreement lies beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief examination of some of the political and economic repercussions of the agreement is warranted. From 2003 to 2012, U.S. exports to Chile increased by a staggering 600 percent, and Chile went from being the thirty-fifth largest export market for the U.S. to being the nineteenth largest export market (White House Press Secretary 2013). Chilean exports to the U.S. have also increased by nearly 150 percent over the same time period. The unemployment rate in Chile was slightly below 8.5 percent in January 2004 and is currently hovering around 6 percent (National Institute of Statistics, Chile). The unemployment rate in the U.S. was 5.7 percent in January 2004 and was at 5.7 percent in January 2015 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). Considering that trade with Chile constitutes a very small portion of the total U.S. economic output, it is unsurprising that the U.S.-Chile FTA has had little impact on U.S. employment rates. Judging by the large increases in total trade between the two countries and the reduction of unemployment in Chile, it appears the agreement has delivered many of the expected economic benefits without damaging job prospects for Chilean workers.

The Chilean mining industry, which provides the bulk of Chilean export revenues, has enjoyed continued strong growth, leading to possibilities for the expansion of mines in some areas. But expansion creates a risk of additional of environmental degradation. Concerns have been raised over water depletion in northern Chile, which is home to some of the world's largest copper reserves as well as the world's driest desert—the Atacama (Jarroud 2013). It is difficult to draw a direct causal link between the U.S.–Chile FTA and environmental problems in Chile considering all of Chile's environmental concerns existed before the agreement was signed. Furthermore, Chile has signed FTAs with a number of countries, including Canada and the EU, so any environmental problems due to trade-based economic expansion can only be partially due to the U.S.–Chile FTA.

A study published in 2011 compared Chilean labor laws with those in the U.S. and found that "Chile currently imposes more labor regulations in some areas (e.g., termination and severance pay, minimum wages and overtime), while other aspects of labor law (i.e., unemployment compensation) seem to be similar to that of the U.S." (Pattison and Mogab 2011). Chile has also worked to ensure that its fruit export industry complies with GLOBALG.A.P. certification standards to ensure fair treatment of labor, but some concerns over the rights of seasonal workers persist (Bain 2010). Based on these findings, concerns over the potential exploitation of workers in Chile due to economic pressures appear vastly overexaggerated and insignificant. Overall, evidence suggests that the U.S.–Chile FTA has had marginal economic effects in the U.S. and produced substantial economic benefits in Chile. Activists' concerns about the environment and labor standards also appear to have been largely avoided.

Conclusion

The U.S.–Chile Bilateral FTA came about primarily due to the Bush administration's hope that it would serve as a precursor to an FTAA, which would increase the economic welfare of the country and provide the U.S. enhanced leverage to bargain at the WTO. In addition, the agreement can be viewed as a move by the U.S. to promote and reward the spread of democracy and liberal economic principles throughout the world. The trade promotion authority granted by the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 allowed officials in the U.S. Trade Office to negotiate much more effectively and severely restricted the effectiveness of interest groups opposed to the agreement. The dramatic events of 9/11 relegated the U.S.–Chile FTA to the background of U.S. public consciousness, which further limited interest groups' ability to mobilize widespread public opposition to the agreement and enhanced the centralized negotiating power of President Bush and U.S. Trade Office representatives. Congressional Republicans strongly supported the agreement due to the potential economic gains it provided, and many Democrats pledged their support as well after their concerns over labor and environmental standards were assuaged.

The passing of the U.S.–Chile FTA clearly shows how domestic political developments influence international trade flows and the global economy in general. Many realist and neoliberal theories of Intellectual Property Enforcement (IPE) treat states as unitary actors that act out of their own self-interest. While these theories may be helpful for understanding the overall structure of the world economy, they neglect the influence of domestic political factors on specific policy decisions. Scholars of international political economy should always take into account these domestic factors and how they shape the complex global economy as they analyze international economic developments.

NOTES

- 1. Previous talks about a bilateral FTA with Chile or even including Chile in the NAFTA agreement took place during the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration.
- 2. Due to Congress's granting of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to Bush in 2002, the U.S.– Chile was treated as a Congressional Executive Agreement (CEA) rather than as a formal treaty. CEAs are subject to a straight up and down vote in the Senate rather than a two-third majority. For more information, see page 78 of the Congressional Research Service report on treaties and international agreements cited in the references list.
- 3. At the time the agreement was being negotiated, Chile was the U.S.'s thirty-fourth largest export destination and thirty-sixth largest import contributor (Hornbeck 2003: 8).
- 4. Some would argue that preferential FTAs actually have negative economic consequences. For a further discussion of this topic, see Bhagwati, Jagdish. Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade. Oxford University Press, 2008.
- For a more detailed analysis of Chile's economic reforms see pages 3–8 of John Hornbeck's CRS report for Congress cited in the works cited list.
- 6. In all honesty, Chile probably did more to initiate trade negotiations than either the Clinton or the Bush administrations, but this paper focuses on the FTA from the U.S. perspective. See Feinberg 2003: 1025.

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An Analysis of the Predictive Ability of Political Psychological Theory: A Case Study of President Clinton's Behavior in Bosnia

by Madeline Ary

Introduction

Why does the U.S. sometimes choose to intervene in international conflicts? Can the political decisions of a leader be profiled? In order to address these questions, this study analyzes the case study of the Bosnian civil war and the decisions President Bill Clinton made to escalate intervention measures in the region until the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. To accomplish this analysis, the psychological theory of international relations, specifically operational code theory, will be applied. Overall, this analysis concludes that the psychological and instrumental beliefs held by President Clinton had an impact on U.S. foreign policy pertaining to Bosnia.

Psychological theorists Brian Ripley and R.C. Snyder theorize that we cannot assume states have "well-defined interests" as presupposed in realist theory. Rather, we must look to the "beliefs, values, and goals of decision-making elites, who act as the state in foreign policy" (Ripley 1993: 466). They believe understanding this ethical "psychological theory" is crucial to comprehending U.S. foreign policy. Political psychology theory is driven by Kenneth Waltz's "first level of analysis," meaning the individual person. This level of analysis does not take into account national and international factors, with the exception of assessing how broader factors might have an effect directly on the psychology of the individual (Waltz 1959: 19).

Waltz's political psychology theory encompasses a number of smaller theories, which include cognitive process, decision making, and political cognition theory. In the middle of the twentieth century, many academics focused primarily on discovering particular personality traits of political leaders in order to predict their foreign policy decisions. Later, the focus of studies shifted to "perception, cognition, and information processing" (Shapiro 1973: 124). Similarly, this analysis will follow the guidelines of

process, tracing President Clinton's decisions concerning U.S. interference in Bosnia using a synthesis of political psychology theories.

The operational code analysis theory is an outgrowth of perception, cognition, and information processing from contemporary psychological theory (Schafer and Walker 2006). This theory will be emphasized to explain foreign policy choices by analyzing the "operational code" of the president. An operational code is an approach to studying political leaders' sets of political beliefs embedded in their personalities that then shape their notions for correct strategy and tactics (George 1980: 486; Post 2003: 216). Alexander George, a renowned scholar, developed an operational code for political psychology in 1969. This code is composed of a set of ten research questions divided into two categories: instrumental belief and philosophical belief (Walker 1990: 409). The philosophical beliefs refer to "those [beliefs] that provide information about the subject's beliefs regarding the nature of politics and other actors in the political universe" (Schafer, Walker, and Young 2003: 33). Instrumental beliefs are those beliefs that describe how the leader believes one should act to achieve political goals (Schafer, Walker, and Young 2003: 4). President Clinton's decisions regarding Bosnia will be analyzed using these questions, which is similar to the format employed by Walker, Schafer, and Young in their book Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis.

George's operational code includes the following research questions:

Philosophical Beliefs

- 1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or of conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
- 2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score and in what respects to the one and / or the other?
- 3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
- 4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?
- 5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Beliefs

- 1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
- 2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
- 3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
- 4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?
- 5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Schafer, Walker, and Young's operational code analysis used data derived from sixteen speeches given by Clinton during his presidency (quoted in Post 2003: 324). However, because these authors used the president's speeches to derive the operational

code, they could not necessarily control for rhetorical devices like exaggeration, intentionally obscure language, etc. More importantly, it is almost impossible for anyone to accurately ascertain what motivates someone else, as they cannot literally read minds. However, even with these limitations, their operational code is thorough, and it draws some conclusions that seem to fit with this analysis of the data on the Bosnian crisis.

According to this theory, it should be possible to draw a straight line, or correlation, between the operational code of President Clinton and U.S. foreign policy during the Bosnian conflict and the consequent Dayton Peace Accords. In other words, the personal beliefs of the president should have a direct effect on the choices the administration makes and the ultimate outcome. Assuming this is the case, these hypotheses should be true:

Hypothesis 1: U.S. foreign policy undertaken during this period reflect Clinton's philosophical beliefs.

Hypothesis 2: Clinton's instrumental beliefs are demonstrated by the way the administration enacted these policies.

If enough evidence in favor of these hypotheses can be determined, such that we fail to reject these hypotheses, then it can be concluded that President Clinton's operational code did in fact predict much of the outcomes of his foreign policy.

The objective of this analysis is to explain the U.S. reaction to the Bosnian civil war through the lens of operational code analysis theory. If the answers to George's research questions are reflective to the reality seen in the Bosnian crisis, then we can conclude that Clinton's administration behaved according to the predictions of psychological theory in spite of pressures from the domestic and international levels of analysis.

To analyze Clinton's operational code, his code must be defined. Clinton demonstrates a positive perspective about policy-making and its environment, a sense of optimism about achieving political goals, and a desire to work cooperatively in accomplishing goals and problem solving. He also has a tendency to emphasize rewards rather than punishment, and he has a general reluctance to engage in risky behavior (Hook 2012: 92). This operational code of conduct will now be addressed in the scope of the two previously stated hypotheses. In the first, Clinton's philosophical beliefs—as demarcated by Walker, Schafer, and Young—will be analyzed to determine whether these beliefs fit with the political psychology theory in reference to the action taken with U.S. foreign policy in Bosnia. In the second, Clinton's instrumental beliefs will be analyzed in a similar manner.

Hypothesis 1: U.S. foreign policy measures undertaken during the Bosnian crisis reflect Clinton's philosophical beliefs until the Dayton Peace Accords.

Clinton's philosophical beliefs include the following ideas: the nature of the political universe is exceptionally friendly, there are extremely optimistic prospects for realization of political values, and the ability of the U.S. to predict the political future is very low. Additionally, Clinton's own ability to control historical development is high, others' abilities to control historical development is very low, and chance has an average role in the determination of future events (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003: 325). Each of the listed philosophical beliefs need to be analyzed individually to determine whether the events leading up to the Dayton Accords reflect Clinton's philosophical beliefs.

Philosophical Belief 1: The nature of the political universe is extremely friendly.

If the political universe is extremely friendly, we should expect to see the Clinton administration often engaged with, relied on, and trusted the international community to help accomplish its political goals. This was the case during the Bosnian crisis. The administration's first moves regarding Bosnia were conducted through the United Nations ("The War in Bosnia"). As the UN attempted to broker peace, it did so through coalition intervention and international agreements. U.S. actions reflected a real sense of optimism in spite of the carnage found within the region. In 1995, the war in former Yugoslavia, which had been raging for more than two years, had escalated from infighting to genocide. There did not seem to be an imminent end to the violence Clinton openly recognized as "ethnic genocide" (Clinton 2004: 424). The administration never acted unilaterally in Bosnia; rather, the administration always ensured that when it took action, it did so with the help of the other nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In 1995, when the administration first succeeded in enacting Clinton's professed desire to "oppose the ethnic cleansing more vigorously" (Clinton 2004: 424), it composed the "Endgame Strategy," which was designed to find a way to permanently end the war in Yugoslavia. This strategy included pushing for a "realistic diplomatic settlement this year" (Berger 1995). It was accomplished through combining diplomatic efforts with a sustained NATO-controlled airstrike on Serbia. The Clinton administration chose to trust NATO with this venture, despite the fact that the alliance had not been tested before in a war scenario. NATO's ability to predominate was by no means certain. NATO's ability to conduct such an attack was called into question by its supreme military commander, despite its obvious technological and numerical superiority. General Wesley Clark's account of the war in Serbia and Kosovo suggests that NATO's success was not due to effective strategy or superior fire power but luck (Betts 2001). The administration demonstrated considerable trust in the ability of international efforts when it chose to act with the other NATO states (predominantly the UK and France) rather than acting unilaterally. It did this regardless of the clear debacle of international peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, which is most vividly illustrated by the failure of the Dutch peacekeeping troops in Srebrenica to protect the local population against incoming Serbian troops (Daalder 1998). Clinton described his decision to act in a coalition as a strategy to avoid repeating the mistakes in Vietnam (Baer 1995).

Although the U.S. consistently took a leadership position in these efforts (particularly in regards to the creation and implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords), the U.S. used international coalitions such as the International Implementation Force (IFOR) when troops were needed to maintain peace in Bosnia. Americans made up only one quarter of the troops in IFOR (Chollet 2005: 180–81). These examples of international collaborations demonstrate that the Clinton administration relied heavily on international efforts.

Philosophical Belief 2: The opportunity for Clinton's political values to be realized in the world is extremely optimistic.

If the Clinton administration enacted foreign policy during the Bosnian crisis which reflected this belief, we should see that the administration undertook major efforts to promote western values like democracy, self-determination, and international peace. When we take into account the enormous effort the administration eventually put into ensuring peace in Bosnia and the rest of former Yugoslavia, this seems to be the case. However, the U.S. took three years to take any significant action. This suggests that optimism for the ability of the U.S. to realize its political values was actually not that high.

In 1992, Clinton campaigned on the platform that he would take more action in Bosnia than the Bush administration had ("The War in Bosnia"). However, as soon as Clinton took office, the administration moved at a "glacial pace" to do anything to stop the fighting (Schulzinger 1959: 330). The first U.S. action attempted to engage the United Nations in doing more. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright ultimately failed to secure the Security Council's approval of making certain cities in former Yugoslavia "safe zones." When the Clinton administration failed to initially secure NATO's support for Clinton's "Lift and Strike" policy-a policy that called for the end of the weapons sanction against the Yugoslav states and the deployment of an air strike—efforts stalled for two years. The administration was clearly unwilling to act unilaterally. This delay demonstrates a sense of U.S.-wide negativity in regard to Bosnia, which does not reflect Clinton's philosophical belief about the ability to realize political values. After the world witnessed the horrors of the massacre at Srebrenica-an atrocity where over four thousand men and boys were shot and thousands of women and girls were brutally raped and some killed—the Clinton administration finally secured approval from congress and NATO to act in Bosnia. It was this fateful action that eventually brought Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to the table at the Dayton Peace Accords (Clark 2001: 67–68). In this case, it seems evident that Clinton's philosophical belief was not the primary driving force for U.S. foreign policy.

Philosophical Belief 3: The ability of the U.S. to predict the political future is very low.

If U.S. foreign policy from this period reflects this belief, we should see the U.S. emphasizing tactics that protect it from the repercussions of backfire from its intervention efforts. This is only sometimes the case. The consistent U.S. attempts to engage the international communities in its efforts in Bosnia can be seen as a form of self-protection. For instance, with the U.S. backed by a variety of nations, blame for

failed policies would be defused among these states rather than shouldered by the U.S. alone.

It makes considerable sense that the Clinton administration first chose to involve the UN rather than take immediate unilateral action. Beyond simply believing that multilateral engagement was a better choice than unilateral engagement, Clinton also demonstrated a streak of true pragmatism. The decision to wait for international approval before action demonstrates that the administration was more gun-shy of potential failure than it was gung-ho about its professed desire to stop the genocide. President Clinton began to fear that "ethnic hatreds between Serbs and Muslims ran so deep that outside intervention would not solve the problem" (Schulzinger 1959: 330). This fear contributed to what was ultimately termed the "muddle through" approach, meaning the series of indecisive and "half-hearted" actions undertaken by the U.S. prior to Srebrenica (Daalder).

In this case, psychology was not the only determinant of what the U.S. ultimately did. Domestic politics played a major role. The administration had a contrarian congress and a reluctant Department of Defense to deal with (Schultz 2003). The Department of Defense was concerned about "protracted occupation or guerrilla warfare." These two factors, combined with popular sentiment against intervention, made the administration reluctant to act decisively ("The War in Bosnia").

When the Srebrenica massacre occurred, U.S. policy regarding Bosnia changed almost overnight. Professed beliefs of the U.S. and international community about the intolerability of genocide seemed to overpower the fear of protracted conflict. Within a few days of the massacre, NATO met and concluded that it would ramp up its "dual key" policy where the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and NATO shared responsibility to conduct airstrikes against key Serbian military points. It was this effort in combination with a joint Croatian–Bosnian ground operation and the diplomatic endeavors of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke that eventually brought about a ceasefire and the realization of Clinton's dream—the Dayton Peace Accords ("The War in Bosnia"). Through this timeline, we see Clinton's belief that the U.S. cannot predict future events predominated in the behavior of the U.S. regarding foreign policy until other circumstances compelled this cautionary tendency to be subsumed.

Philosophical Belief 4: Clinton's own ability to control the path of history (historical development) is very high while the ability of others to do so is very low.

Clinton perceived his ability to affect change in the world considerably larger than the ability of other people in power. If this belief is reflected in U.S. foreign policy during the Bosnia civil war, then we should see the U.S. being more willing to act as a leader or to act unilaterally. We should expect to see this, because the U.S. would believe that it could succeed where others failed. While we certainly saw the U.S. taking a leadership role, we rarely saw it acting in any unilateral sense during the crises. Therefore, the results of this philosophical belief's bearing on U.S. foreign policy are mixed. The U.S. consistently acted as the leader of foreign efforts during the Bosnian crisis. For example, Clinton was the first to propose the "Lift and Strike" policy to NATO (Schulzinger 1959: 330). The U.S. also composed the "Endgame Strategy," which was enacted to great effect after the Srebrenica massacre (Berger). In particular, the U.S. led the creation of a "contact group," which outlined the parameters for the future of Bosnia and eventually served as a foundation for the negotiations undertaken at the Dayton Accords ("The War in Bosnia"). Of course, the peace accords themselves are the best example of U.S. leadership in the conflict, but even the accords had international backing; the UN circulated the final document in the General Assembly and the Security Council (Bosnia and Herzegovina—UNMIBH).

U.S. actions were not undertaken unilaterally. Even when the U.S. acted more decisively, it did so only with the approval of NATO. Therefore, though Clinton believed in the ability of the U.S. to accomplish more change than other states, the administration still insisted on working as a leader in the international community rather than as an independent actor.

Philosophical Belief 5: Chance has an average role in the determination of future events.

If the administration acted according to this particular philosophical belief of President Clinton, then it would have taken a middle-road approach. It would not refrain from international affairs, such as a rational actor would, if it believed there was a chance for absolute control. Neither would it commit all possible efforts, such as a rational actor would, if it believed chance had no role in determining future events. As previously demonstrated, the U.S. did in fact take this middle path for the first three years of the Clinton administration.

This path proved largely ineffective and contributed to some intensely bitter feelings from those left in the wake of violence. One embittered reporter wrote, "Western attempts to end the war have gone around in circles, drifting from threats to new peace proposals as the killing has continued," (Chollet 2005: 60). Another biting criticism leveled at the U.S. during this period came from the newly elected French President Jacques Chirac, who said decisive U.S. military intervention was the only way Western credibility could be restored in Bosnia (Whitney). It seems likely that for the first half of U.S. policy regarding Bosnia (the pre-Srebrenica period), the U.S. was acting as though chance had an average role in determining future events. The U.S. did take decisive action, but it is difficult to tell whether this meant the position on chance changed or simply that the stakes were high enough now that the risk was worth it.

Hypothesis 2: Clinton's instrumental beliefs are demonstrated by the way the administration enacted its policies.

Clinton's instrumental beliefs, as identified by Walker, Schafer, and Young, include the following: goals should be determined through cooperation with other powerful entities and goals should be pursued cooperatively. Also, because Clinton faced an average amount of risk in the world, actions should almost always be pursued cooperatively rather than confrontationally. Clinton's propensity to shift between action and rhetoric is at an average level, and he is much more likely to employ rewards, make promises, and appeal for help than resist helping, threatening, or punishing. The following is a step-by-step analysis of how well U.S. foreign policy during the Bosnian crisis reflects these instrumental beliefs. Instrumental beliefs are implicitly expressed in the above descriptions of U.S. actions during the Bosnian period and will have a briefer analysis in the following section to avoid redundancy.

Instrumental Belief 1: Goals should be determined through cooperation with other powerful entities.

If U.S. foreign policy during this period operated under this instrumental belief, then we would expect to see the U.S. addressing other powerful international and domestic entities whenever a decision was to be made. The U.S. could also be observed adjusting its position on what actions should be taken to reflect the opinion of the group rather than just its own perspective. Evidence indicates this was both true and not true for the Clinton administration's actions regarding Bosnia.

This belief was true in the sense that the U.S. did not engage in anything more than the few interventions, which NATO and the UN both approved prior to engagement. These included sanctions, a strategy to protect UN safe zones, and the deployment of peacekeeping troops ("The War in Bosnia"). However, it was not true because the official rhetoric of the Clinton administration continued to push for more intervention than the international community was initially willing to give. For example, Albright often spoke in the UN about the need to use more force against the Serbs (Schulzinger 1959: 330). However, she had "little influence on the overall administration policy" ("The War in Bosnia"). From all of these ideas, it seems likely that the decisions the administration made were shaped largely by forces outside of the instrumental beliefs of Bill Clinton.

Instrumental Belief 2: Goals should be pursued cooperatively.

If this instrumental belief is pertinent, then we would expect to see the U.S. take actions with the cooperation of international and domestic entities and shun unilateral behavior. This is definitely the case, as demonstrated in detail from the previous analysis of philosophical beliefs. As discussed earlier, the U.S. had international approval and help from international forces for all significant actions taken in the region.

Instrumental Belief 3: The role of risk in the outcomes of world politics is at average levels.

Average levels of risk means that Clinton thought risk did not play a major role in the outcomes of his policies. Instead, he believed the world was risky but only to the degree reported by the average person. He was neither flippant nor paranoid about risk. If the U.S. acted according to the assumption that risk is at average levels, then we should expect to see the U.S. take a middle-of-the-road policy toward risk minimization—it would not be so risk averse that it would refuse to take action, neither would it be so risk prone as to jump into full-scale involvement without taking time to consider all options and conduct precautionary measures. This is, in fact, the case. The U.S. did not sit entirely out of the proceedings by reverting to the isolationism that characterized the Great Depression, nor did it jump in full force. The muddle-through policy is the best example of the U.S. position of not taking enormous risks. When President Clinton spoke in front of the UN General Assembly in 1994 during the heat of the conflict yet before full NATO engagement, his words were cautionary. He said, "If the parties of that conflict take the hard steps needed to make a real peace, the international community including the United States must be ready to help in its effective implementation." Here, he is willing to take action but only if certain conditions are met. This corroborates the cautionary nature of U.S. policy regarding Bosnia before and after Srebrenica (the U.S. still did not commit more than twenty thousand troops, requiring that the others were supplied by the member nations of NATO).

Instrumental Belief 4: Clinton's propensity to shift between action and rhetoric is at average levels.

President Clinton was willing to use rhetoric as a tool of affecting change to the same degree as he was willing to act to affect change. If this instrumental belief had overall bearing on U.S. foreign policy, we should expect to see action taken to stop the fighting during the Bosnian crisis. Speeches given frequently in a variety of venues around the world also catalyze change. Evidence supports this belief that Clinton's rhetoric and action shifted at average levels. A variety of U.S. actions undertaken during the crisis are well catalogued throughout this paper. Additionally, President Clinton and Madeleine Albright both gave a number of speeches and wrote several documents with references to what should happen in Bosnia. Albright's efforts were of particular note and were previously mentioned. While Clinton's rhetoric tended to breeze over Bosnia, Albright emphasized it ("The War in Bosnia"). Thus, there existed a fair mix between action and rhetoric, just as our prediction suggests there should be if this instrumental belief were reflected in the actions of the administration.

Instrumental Belief 5: Clinton highly prefers rewards, promises and appeals to resisting appeals, threats, and punishment.

If this is the case, then we should see the U.S. tried a variety of "pulling" measures before reverting to coercion. However, the Clinton administration did resort to a good deal of coercive measures regarding the situation in Bosnia. This may have resulted because by the time Clinton took office, a policy of coercive measures (sanctions in this case) was already in place; or, it may simply be because this particular instrumental belief did not translate into U.S. foreign policy. All of the major U.S. actions taken up until the Dayton Accords were fairly coercive. First, the U.S. imposed weapons sanctions. Then, the U.S. began to undermine Milosevic's efforts to starve whatever Bosnians could not be reached by other forms of attack by enacting a night airdrop policy. Soon the UN proclaimed a no-fly zone over Serbia and Bosnia, enforced by the U.S. Air Force in Operation Deny Flight. When the U.S. efforts to enact the "Lift and Strike" policy initially failed, the UN and NATO initiated the "dual key" strategy to protect UN proclaimed safe zones. Finally, with the formation of Contact Group (a UN endeavor headed by the U.S.), plans were drafted for peace and airstrikes were increased. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic said, "It was your [NATO's] bombs and your missiles, your high technology that defeated us. . . . We Serbs never had a chance against you" (Clark 2001: 67–68). All of these actions were ultimately designed to be coercive.

It was only with the organization of the Dayton Accords that the promises/reward aspect of Clinton's instrumental belief came into play. With the successful completion of the Dayton Accords, the U.S. promised to supply troops, to secure the region, and to ensure a definitive end to the fighting. The conclusion can be reached that in the case of the Bosnian civil war, Clinton employed measures based more on punishment and coercion than reward and promises.

Operational Code Assessment

The operational code analysis predicts that Clinton's operational code will largely correspond with U.S. foreign policy during the Bosnian crisis. Table 1 illustrates a dichotomous decision based on this analysis of how well the philosophical and instrumental beliefs predicted Clinton's actions and U.S. foreign policy decisions leading up to the Dayton Peace Accords. The operational code is divided by the specified beliefs that have been analyzed with a total tally at the end of the table. In accordance with the previous analysis, "Yes" means this portion of the operation code accurately predicted U.S. foreign policy behavior in Bosnia. "Mixed" means it predicted some aspects but not others. "No" means it did not predict any of the outcomes.

According to the table, the operational code theory accurately predicted the majority of U.S. foreign policy decisions made during this period. However, it was imperfect. In two cases, it failed to predict what occurred, and in two other cases it only predicted a portion of the outcomes.

Operational Code	Yes	Mixed	No
Philosophical Belief 1	Х		
Philosophical Belief 2			Х
Philosophical Belief 3	Х		
Philosophical Belief 4		Х	
Philosophical Belief 5	Х		
Instrumental Belief 1		Х	
Instrumental Belief 2	Х		
Instrumental Belief 3	Х		
Instrumental Belief 4	Х		
Instrumental Belief 5			Х
Operational Code Match	6	2	2

Table 1

It is crucial to remember that this is only one model of operational code analysis. Other schools of thought contend that operational codes are comprised more of principled and causal beliefs rather than philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Instrumental and casual beliefs are arguably the same. They are both beliefs about what is the best method for an individual to achieve a particular political end (Hook 2012: 93; Schafer, Walker, and Young 2003: 4). However, principled and philosophical beliefs are not the same. Principled beliefs are beliefs about "the virtues and limitations of human nature, the proper roles of governments, and the national and global problems that are of greatest concern" (Hook 2012: 93). They are normative beliefs about the way the world should be. Philosophical beliefs are about the way the world is, not the way it should be (Schafer, Walker, and Young 2003: 33). Therefore, Schafer, Walker, and Young's model has the disadvantage of not clarifying the political goals of the leader in the way the model that uses principled (normative) beliefs does. Under this first model, all we know about the leader is what that leader believes the world is like and how the leader tries to achieve political ends. Schafer, Walker, and Young's model despite its disadvantages synthesizes the operation code theory with political psychology theory and is best applied to this particular case study, although other methods could have been used.

Conclusion

The discrepancy between theory and reality is likely due to a number of factors. Here we have only looked at the individual level of analysis. This almost entirely ignores the impact of national and international pressures on decision making, the second and third levels of analysis, respectively. Yet, because psychological theory failed to explain everything, a deeper analysis including variability in the level of analyses may provide a more extensive and complete explanation.

Domestic pressures were mentioned on several occasions as having a direct impact on policy making. For example, at times, Congress was opposed to military interventions and the Department of Defense was reluctant to engage in Bosnia because they feared entering into another protracted conflict like Vietnam. Opinion polls also indicated that U.S. citizens were not keen on the idea of intervening in Bosnia ("The War in Bosnia").

International factors also played a major role in the outcomes. NATO initially refused to act in the way Clinton had hoped, causing a two-year delay in implementing his "Lift and Strike" policy (Schlesinger 1959: 330). Although compromise measures were eventually reached, they ultimately did little to mitigate the rising conflict. Perhaps if the president had taken totalitarian control over the country and full reign in the international realm, the operational code could have predicted every decision he made, but that would be impractical and overly idealistic. As it is, however, these pressures prevent that from being the case. Waltz reminds us that a "single factor" cannot account for the outcome when multiple factors are always at play (Waltz 1959).

Despite the limitations of this qualitative analysis, the operational code analysis used explains a large portion of Clinton's behavior during the Bosnian crisis. This indicates that the president's upbringing, life experiences, and other factors—used to formulate the operational code—can have an enormous impact on U.S. foreign policy (Post 2003: 216).

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Conflicting Thoughts: The Effect of Information on Support for an Increase in the Federal Minimum Wage Level

by Joshua Cooper and Alejandra Gimenez

In March 2014, President Obama urged Congress to approve a minimum wage hike from \$7.25 to \$10.10. As expected, a debate sparked from both sides of the aisle about whether it should be increased at all and if the proposed jump was too large. Following this debate, a flurry of public opinion polls entered the field to measure how Americans felt on this issue. Research firms from the Washington Post to Pew fielded basic surveys asking how Americans felt about the potential wage hike. However, none of them looked at how the levels of information about the minimum wage increase affected survey responses. We fill this hole by conducting a field experiment through the Utah Colleges Exit Poll that varies the information given to the respondent. We presented respondents with either positive information, negative information, or both categories of information. In our study, we found respondents are significantly affected by "negative" and "combined" sets of information.

Discussion of the Literature

The Strength of "Bad"

When presented with positive and negative information, people are affected much more by the negative than the positive (Baumeister et al.). Further, negative or "bad" information is processed more thoroughly and deeply than positive or "good" information. The authors also look at the effects of good and bad events. Unsurprisingly, they find that bad events wear off slower than good events (326). When put into a financial context, they find that losing money caused greater distress than winning the same amount of money. Put differently, people are "more upset about losing \$50 than [they] are happy about gaining \$50" (326). Likewise, we expect similar results, given that we are testing our theories on a monetary topic.

Information as a Game Changer

In this experiment, we isolate the effects of information on respondent opinion. James N. Druckman (2004) employed a similar technique using positive and negative information to study the shifting response rates when positive versus negative information is presented. In his work, he tests both equivalency-framing effects and issue-framing effects; equivalency framing presents the same information in different lights, such as job loss versus job gain for the same event, while issue framing offers two contrasting ideas, such as free speech versus public safety. Our experiment will employ equivalency-framing effects by using positive and negative information that are logically equivalent.

Martin Gilens (2001) conducted further research on the effects of different kinds of information on political opinions. He finds that policy-based facts have an important effect on political judgments, particularly in individuals with the highest levels of general political knowledge. Gilens shows that citizens with low levels of general political knowledge are less affected by policy-specific, relevant facts. He theorizes that more political knowledge allows a voter to take new political facts and evaluate them in context. Gilens also suggests that his research does not contradict research about cues that allow voters to vote according to those preferences, but he says it shows that, at least for more politically knowledgeable members of the public, the effect of raw facts is substantial. The minimum wage policy we are testing is far more relevant to the average person than the policies Gilens used (such as foreign aid), and we hypothesize that our information will affect voters more since the threshold of political knowledge about minimum wage is likely to be lower.

Matthew S. Levendusky (2011) argues that information has a relatively low but real effect on differences in voters' opinions and behavior. He uses matching algorithms in an attempt to control for other variables and to make his study as if the level of information were randomly assigned. He then uses panel data to eliminate other variables, which may lead to omitted variable bias. Levendusky contends that his methods show that most research on the effect of information and politics has grossly overestimated the effect of political information when controlling for other factors in the correct way. Our research relates to his, because we assigned information (although a small amount) randomly among voters and noted its implications. While we recognized providing information may not have drastic effects, we believed we would still see some sort of outcome when respondents receive information.

The Expected Effect of Partisan Leanings

Beyond information itself, partisanship also plays a large role in respondent selection. As may be expected, conservatives and liberals react differently to social and economic policies. In the literature, scholars find that conservative voters support policies and leaders who create legislation that reduces tax rates (Swank and Swank 1993). In a different light, voters also reward conservative leaders when tax rates are cut, regardless of the party of the person responsible (Lowry et al. 1998). James (2011) uses field and laboratory experiments to assess the effects of cues about good and bad performance for local government officials. He finds the cues raise or lower a citizen's perception of performance and satisfaction with government officials in the expected manner based on whether it is a good cue or a bad cue. Likewise, here we are giving the voter a good cue, a bad cue, or both cues, and we expect to see positive, negative, and mixed shifts because of these cues.

Many respondents will face a moral dilemma of sorts when we give them both positive and negative information about raising the minimum wage. Brishen Rogers ascertains that minimum-wage laws create a level of social equality, an idea internally accepted by most people (2014). Respondents may strongly oppose raising the minimum wage on principle, but they do not want to seem unfair and opposed to social justice by opposing a raise in the minimum-wage level. This research suggests a person's moral compass may override their personal political beliefs in order to benefit society. From this, we gather that people will respond differently in such a way that they try to help society in whatever way that may be for each set treatment.

The Setting of the Experiment: The Utah Colleges Exit Poll

To test our ideas, we conducted a survey experiment on the 2014 Utah Colleges Exit Poll. The poll is a survey given to randomly selected voters as they leave their voting station on Election Day. The questionnaire asked about their vote choice and demographics, along with some issue-position questions. The sample is a stratified random sample based on Utah's four congressional districts. In 2014, early voting was expected to be higher than ever, pronounced by the fact that both Cache and Davis counties were using all or almost-all vote-by-mail systems. In order to create an accurate sample that surveyed early voters who would not be at the polls on Election Day, the Exit Poll sent postcards to a random subset of early voters and invited them to take an online version of the poll. The Exit Poll also operated a phone bank the week before the election to get responses from randomly selected early voters who had not yet completed the online version of the survey. In total, 22,118 people responded to the Exit Poll in some form.

In order to fit as many questions as possible into the medium of the Exit Poll survey, the questionnaire was broken down further. There were three colored forms (blue, green, and yellow), each with a different set of questions. Respondents were randomly given one of the three colors, so any variation among respondents is arbitrary. Our experiment was fielded on the yellow form, with each treatment swapped out evenly and randomly among the yellow forms.

We used a 2x2 experimental design in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. As the base of each question stem, all respondents were told what the current minimum wage was. The information that followed then varied according to each condition. For the complete text of the questions, see

Appendix A. We had 4,178 respondents, which gave us about one thousand respondents in each condition.

- *Control:* Did not provide any additional information. The control simply asked the respondent whether or not they support a raise in the minimum wage level.
- *Positive Treatment (T1):* Indicated that the minimum wage raise would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans.
- *Negative Treatment (T2):* Indicated that the minimum wage raise would eliminate 500,000 jobs.
- *Combined Treatment (T3):* Included both the positive and negative information.

We expected that, relative to the control, respondents given the positive treatment would be more likely to support the increase in minimum wage, and respondents given the negative treatment would be more likely oppose the increased minimum wage. For those given the combined treatment with both the positive and negative information, we expected the majority to still support the wage raise, because the respondents were told it would help people and inherently be for the greater good (Rogers 2014). We also expected more respondents would select the "do not know" option, since they were being asked to choose between what is considered a "good" and "bad" thing.

In each of these situations, we expected social desirability to play a large role. While the respondents' answers to the questionnaires and the respondents themselves are never connected to each other, the respondents still feel as though they should or should not put a certain answer simply because that is what is expected of them (Rogers 2014). In the positive treatment, people would feel inclined to favor the measure, because they would not want to appear as if they do not want people to earn more money. In the negative treatment, we expected people to be swayed by the "bad" aspects of taking away jobs and show less support (Baumeister et al.). In combined treatment, we expected respondents to be caught between both of these competing theories. At this point, they would opt for the "do not know" option at a higher rate than the previous two treatments, so they would not have to make a choice either way.

Modeling the Effect of the Information on Support for the Wage Increase

In order to analyze the results of our experiment, we used both a simple linear model and a multinomial probit model. We used the linear model for the initial results discussion, and the multinomial probit for latter results and predictions.

To begin our analysis, we ran a basic OLS regression to look at the simple effects of each treatment (see Figure 1). We did not include controls due to the experimental nature of the study, since the randomization should control for variation among the treatment groups. We found that the negative treatment had the strongest effect in relation to the control; on average, the negative treatment is expected to decrease support by 16 percent. The combined treatment also strongly decreased support, though not as strongly at 12 percent. Overall, the effect of our treatments on voters was not the same as what we expected in our hypothesis. While we expected the positive treatment to significantly increase the rate at which people would likely support the wage raise, it did not have a statistically significant difference from the control. We attribute this to the fact that the majority of our respondents are Republicans. Republicans tend to be fiscally conservative, and we would not expect them to be persuaded to increase the minimum wage as easily as Democrats. Even though there may be a shift among the non-Republicans, it may not be enough to be a significant factor in the positive treatment.

As the linear model shows, the negative and combined treatments both had significant effects. This model only accounts for whether or not someone supported or





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opposed the wage raise. To solve this hole in our analysis, we turned to a multinomial probit. The multinomial probit accounts for respondents that indicated "support," "oppose," and "do not know." As previously mentioned, we expected that the amount of respondents who cho ose "do not know" would vary based on the treatment. We also expected that respondents who select "do not know" would be systematically different than those who express either support or opposition. As such, we used a multinomial probit to analyze the effects of the "do not know" option (see Figure 2).

The negative treatment shows a complete shift in preference when compared to the control. Support for an increase in the minimum wage was 18 percentage points lower than the control group. The effect was in line with our hypothesis. This is evidence of the weight of negative information and, particularly, of the type of information we had given. It appears that job loss is an unacceptable thing for many voters. This also follows with the findings of Roy F. Baumeister et al. Although the number of those who answered "do not know" rose between the negative treatment and the control, it is not enough to account for all voters, suggesting that many voters who would have voted to support the minimum-wage raise opposed it specifically because of the new information we presented.

We expected the combined treatment to trigger more responses of "do not know"; however, we see results rather comparable to those of the negative treatment. It appears the effect of losing 500,000 jobs is greater than increasing 16.5 million Americans' income. Negative information seemed to substantially outweigh the positive information, despite the fact that the positive condition affected more people, because 16.5 million people would have a higher income compared to the 500,000 people who would be out of a job. This finding is consistent with those of Baumeister et al. in that the "bad" outweighs the "good."

Additionally, the unweighted results and the predicted probabilities, both with and without controls, are strikingly similar. The predicted probabilities from our multinomial regressions are almost an exact mirror of the percentages in the actual data. The fact that the unweighted results mirror the controlled results demonstrates the accuracy of randomizing treatments and encourages us to be confident in the validity of our models and their implications.

Party ID was the most significant factor in our models when included. More than any other variable, party affiliation predicts the largest percentage of change for support among respondents. In both the linear and multinomial probit models, party affiliation was heavily significant, often at the 0.01 level (see Appendix B for full results).

What we can see in the data is that party follows roughly the same patterns we might expect; democrats favor wage increase the most, followed by Independents, and then Republicans. On the other hand, in the negative treatment, the model fails to accurately predict what happened when Republicans received that treatment

Unweighted Results	Control	Positive	Negative	Both
Favor	53%	50%	36%	40%
Oppose	38%	41%	50%	48%
Do not know	9%	10%	14%	11%
Predicted Probabilities without Controls	Control	Positive	Negative	Both
Favor	53%	50%	36%	40%
Oppose	38%	41%	50%	48%
Do not know	9%	10%	14%	11%
Predicted Probabilities with Controls	Control	Positive	Negative	Both
Favor	54%	50%	36%	41%
Oppose	38%	40%	50%	48%
Do not know	8%	10%	14%	11%

 Table 1: Unweighted results compared to predicted probabilities

 The Effect of Party Identification

(see Appendix C for comparison to unweighted results). This failure is because the multinomial probit has the limitation of not allowing interactive control variables. Fortunately, this does not affect the overall validity of the model in conveying how the treatments affect respondents as we saw in our analysis of the initial results. Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine the fact that the negative treatment only caused a minor drop in Democrats' support in the unweighted data, whereas it caused a major drop in support among Independents and Republicans. It seems that when given information about the positive and negative effects of a raise in the minimum wage, Republicans and Independents do not find the trade-off to be acceptable and respond with even more opposition than the control group, whereas Democrats seem to find the trade-off acceptable.

The Effect of Age

Our predictions show age is a substantial factor in support for minimum wage, with a U-shaped effect following age. People younger than twenty years old are likely to support a minimum wage increase, but those who are between twenty and fiftynine are less likely to support it by around 4 percent. People who are over sixty are even more likely to support minimum wage than those who are under twenty. This suggests that those who are retired have a different view on wages than those who are in the workforce, as this is most likely to account for these differences. We believe this increase in wages is because those who are retired are most likely receiving benefits from government programs (such as social security) and are more likely to favor social welfare programs, even if those programs do not benefit them directly (one would not expect minimum wage increases to benefit those over sixty). Also, since older people are most likely retired, they probably pay fewer taxes and are not as concerned with the possible increase in taxes that might come because of a minimum-wage increase.



Figure 3: Predicted Minimum Wage Increase Support by Party ID

Note: It is important to note that in our main predictive model we have used a seven point scale for party ID, but for simplicity in the graphs we have a used a three point model here to examine the data and generate the predictions. Independent leaners were categorized according to their partisan leaning. To see the full breakdown, refer to Appendix C.



Figure 4: Predicted Minimum Wage Increase Suppory by Age

Note: In the model, age is a continuous variable, but we collapsed the age categories as shown above to make for a simpler presentation.

The Effect of Income

The trend for income is as expected, with higher-income voters opposing minimum-wage increases and lower-income voters supporting the minimum-wage increase (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013). Generally, we observe that the effect of each treatment is the same for the different groups. A sharp drop still occurs for the negative treatment, because the effect of negative information is substantial, and it continues in the combined treatment, although the drop is not as great, which is attributed to their receiving positive information.



Figure 5: Predicted Minimum Wage Support by Income

The Effect of Gender

As with many other political studies, the gender of the respondent influenced the results. Females are much more likely to support the increase, regardless of treatment. In fact, an average of a five-point difference tends to separate males and females in each condition. The negative treatment flips the female-support effect, with neither a male nor female plurality expected to support it. Instead, we see females are also likely to oppose the wage increase, though at a lower level than males. Females oppose this measure 44% to 38%, a 6% point gap, while males oppose the measure 55% to 34%, an 11% gap. This gap is because 6% more females than males chose the "do not know" option.

The importance of the "do not know" option is especially prominent when the responses are broken down by gender. Females select "do not know" nearly twice as often as males. This finding is congruent with the literature, most of which states that when respondents are unsure of an answer, males are more likely to mask their uncertainty and randomly pick an option, while females are more likely to show their uncertainty and pick the "do not know" option. Especially given that economics and finances are considered more of a "man's game" in politics, it is not surprising that more females opted for "do not know" (Lawless 2004; Meeks 2010; Dolan 2014). In the negative treatment, part of the reason we see closer "favor" and "oppose" rates among females than males is because a larger proportion of the female respondents selected "do not know." Because of this, a smaller group of women remain to choose favor or oppose, resulting in the closer gap.

Interestingly, both men and women are affected almost equally by the negative treatment and the combined treatment regarding the "do not knows," and the per-



Figure 6: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Employment Status

centage of respondents choosing neither "favor" nor "oppose" increases in both men and women. From this, we can gather that the negative treatment places an inquisitive burden on both genders at about the same rates and that the higher "do not know" rate among females in response to the negative treatment is more of a function of female uncertainty consistent with the literature rather than a specific burden from the question itself.

The Effect of Religious Activity

In addition to other demographics, we decided to see how religious activity affects support for increasing the federal minimum wage. In the state of Utah, where the survey was fielded, approximately 65 percent of voters in 2014 identified with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS)-otherwise known as the Mormon Church. Given the prominence of the Church in Utah, we generated a religion index for members of the LDS faith. This index combines peoples' religious identification and their religious activity. The scale spans from "Active LDS" to "Non-LDS" (see the graph below for the full scale breakdown).

As it turns out, there is a strong correlation between activity in the Church and support for the minimum-wage laws. A possible reason for this could be that when one becomes more active in the LDS religion, one becomes much more likely to oppose new laws. The opposite is true as well, in that less active and non-members of the LDS Church in Utah usually support creating new laws. One of the most striking findings is that the level of support in relation to the other points on the religious index does not change. Rather, support is either suppressed or increased among all groups per each treatment, while the slope from "Active LDS" to "Non-LDS" remains virtually the same. Overall, support for the wage increase was significantly hampered with the negative treatment, including among Non-LDS respondents, whose support and opposition we expected to be about the same regardless of treatment.

While in other demographic categories "do not know" responses are important in the analysis, they do not play such an important role in religion. For the most



Figure 7: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Religion Index

part, "Active LDS" and "Non-LDS" alike selected "do not know" at similar rates. As with the overall treatment effects, the respondents who selected "do not know" increase with the negative treatment and go back down slightly on the combined treatment, though the effects are not statistically significant. Because a large majority of LDS members are conservative and identify with the Republican Party, active LDS members and conservatives often mirror each other's response rate, since they tend to be the same group. When we look at the effect of party identification, we see that, excluding Independents, Democrats and Republicans selected "do not know" in a pattern similar to the patterns of the religious index. "Do not know" increases on the negative treatment and drops slightly on the combined treatment. While their "do not know" percentages are fairly similar, they differ slightly. Non-LDS respondents tend to report "do not know" at a slightly lower rate, and such is the case with Democrats. As such, we can draw a parallel between party identification and the religion index.

The Effect of Employment Status

In our research, we found that employment status does not affect support for an increase in the federal minimum wage. Though not significant, we chose to explore this variable, since its lack of results ignites some interesting thought. The Utah Colleges Exit Poll asks respondents what their employment status is, and respondents are asked to choose from a list of seven options, including selfemployed, employed, unemployed, homemaker, and retired. For the purposes of analyzing this data, we have chosen to collapse self-employed and employed into the "employed" category and to collapse unemployed, retired, and homemaker¹ into the "unemployed" category.

When we compared the response rate for both the employed and unemployed, we found there is no significant difference in their response choice per condition; they actually respond with virtually the same choices through all conditions. We see that the negative treatment has the largest effect and significantly lowers support.



Firgure 8: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Employment Status

While in the control and first treatment the majorities of both the employed and unemployed supported the increase, support drops by more than 10 percent among those same groups in the negative and combined treatments, with the largest effect occurring in the negative treatment. The "do not know" rates are also very similar, further showing that employment status does not matter. Regardless of employment status, these numbers once again show the strong effect of the negative treatment and slightly less strong effect of the combined treatment.

Conclusion

Overall, the negative treatment places a significant toll on all respondents, regardless of gender, income, or other demographic variables. The combined treatment also lowers support rates more than the control and first treatment. As demonstrated in the significant drop in favor in the negative treatment, maintaining jobs is important to many Utahans. Although people are told that others will have a greater income, they are still influenced by the job loss that would take place, even though the percent affected by the job loss is fractional compared to those for whom income would increase.

One large limitation is our question presentation. In the combined treatment, we could not randomize the order of the treatment information. Due to logistical limitations, the positive treatment was always listed before the negative treatment. While both pieces of information were included, we recognize the possibility that we are seeing the effects of recency bias (Ornstein 2013). In other words, the respondent's mind sticks with the last piece of information they were given, which in this case is the negative information. We thought we might see more support on the combined treatment because of the inclusion of the positive information, but we see in the combined treatment a plurality still opposes the wage raise. However, we do not see a significant effect in the positive treatment, indicating the positive treatment itself was not strong enough. This leads us to believe this limitation does not inhibit our results.

The control question mirrors a question from a CNN/ORC poll conducted from

late May into June 2014. In the data, we see a noticeable difference between their reported responses and our reported responses. In the CNN poll, we see 18 percent more support for increasing the federal minimum wage. There is only a 9 percent difference between levels of opposition, though. We attribute this difference to the drastically different "do not know" responses: 1 percent in the CNN/ORC poll, but 9 percent in the UCEP poll. While these differences may seem alarming, we must remember that Utah is a highly conservative state, and the CNN poll was a national sample that has many more Democrats and Independents than Utah.²



Note: Percentages for UCEP 2014 represent the weighted survey data, not predicted values, in order to create a fairer comparison to the poll. CNN / ORC Poll: n=1,003; UCEP 2014: n=1,066.

The base of the information for the treatments comes from a Bloomberg National Poll run in March 2014.³ The trend of decreased favor and increased opposition continues in the Bloomberg poll, just as it does in ours, suggesting that the weight of losing 500,000 jobs is greater than the weight of raising the incomes of 16.5 million Americans. The Bloomberg poll asks whether the tradeoff is acceptable or unacceptable, and the response options are "acceptable," "unacceptable," and "unsure." While not an exact comparison, it provides a general idea of Utah compared to the rest of the nation. We would hypothesize that the wording of the question as acceptable or unacceptable increases the amount of opposition further than our question does, as a person could say it is unacceptable but still support a raise in the minimum wage.

The importance of maintaining jobs is an important theme across the nation, not just in Utah. As such, we expect these results would be similar if this experiment were run in other states. Since Utah is a very conservative state, we believe the starting support level would be lower than that of a more liberal state. However, we feel the effect of the negative information in the negative and combined treatments would be just as strong in other states. As such, we would get the same statistical effect per treatment but with different numbers. Baumeister et al., show that bad impressions "are quicker to form and more resistant" to change than good impressions, and we expect the bad information of job loss would be just as relevant and have as much impact in other states.



Figure 10: Combined Treatment Effects: Bloomberg vs. UCEP

Note: Percentages for UCEP 2014 represent the weighted survey date, not predicted values, in order to create a more fair comparison to the poll. Bloomberg National Poll: n=1,001; UCEP 2014. n=1,066.

The Baumeister et al., piece adds a plea at the end for researchers to find places in which the bad does not outweigh the good. Unfortunately, we would have to report to Baumeister and his fellow researchers that we have also found that the bad outweighs the good. Our results show that preventing job loss is important to Utahans. Without knowing the trade-offs of the minimum wage increase, the public is willing to support it; as soon as jobs are on the line, however, support is dramatically cut.

NOTES

- 1. We tested collapsing the employment variable with homemakers being considered both employed and unemployed. There was no significant difference whether the homemakers were considered employed or unemployed.
- In the 2014 Utah Colleges Exit Poll, the partisan breakdown was as follows: 28% Democrat, 62% Republican, and 10% Independent. In the CNN poll, the partisan breakdown was as follows: 30% Democrat, 23% Republican, and 47% Independents.
- 3. Bloomberg poll question stem: "A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to \$10.10 over the next three years would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans while eliminating 500,000 jobs. Does that tradeoff seem acceptable or unacceptable to you?" Response options: acceptable, unacceptable, and unsure.

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APPENDIX A: Original Question Text

Control:

As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at \$7.25 an hour. Knowing this, do you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?

Treatment 1 (positive):

As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at \$7.25 an hour. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to \$10.10 over the next three years would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans. Knowing this, do you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?

Treatment 2 (negative):

As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at \$7.25 an hour. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to \$10.10 over the next three years would eliminate five hundred thousand jobs. Knowing this, do you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?

Treatment 3 (positive and negative):

As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at \$7.25 an hour. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to \$10.10 over the next three years would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans, and eliminate five hundred thousand jobs. Knowing this, do you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?

Response Options

- a. Favor
- b. Oppose
- c. Unsure

APPENDIX B: Statistical Models

Table 1: Linear Regression

Dependent Variable: Support for Minimum Wage (1=favor, 0=oppose)

	(1)	(2)
VARIABLES		
Treatment 1	-0.0303	-0.0329
	(0.0226)	(0.0219)
Treatment 2	-0.163***	-0.156***
	(0.0230)	(0.0215)
Treatment 3	-0.127***	-0.118***
	(0.0229)	(0.0219)
Gender		-0.0821***
		(0.0159)
Age		0.00135***
		(0.000507)
Not-so-strong Democrat		-0.0865**
		(0.0389)
Independent leaning Democrat		-0.0193
		(0.0190)
Independent		-0.320***
		(0.0336)
Independent leaning Republican		-0.569***
		(0.0269)
Not-so-strong Republican		-0.487***
		(0.0326)
Strong Republican		-0.584***
		(0.0251)
Other		-0.559***
		(0.0373)
Do not know		-0.346***
		(0.0830)
High school graduate		0.186*
		(0.105)
Some college		0.108
		(0.102)
College graduate		0.0815
		(0.102)

Post-graduate		0.108
		(0.103)
Somewhat active LDS		0.0668*
		(0.0374)
Less active LDS		0.0744*
		(0.0392)
Non-LDS		0.117***
		(0.0209)
Employed		-0.0141
		(0.0178)
Income		-0.00981**
		(0.00384)
Constant	0.581***	0.839***
	(0.0159)	(0.108)
Observations	3,717	2,918
R-squared	0.018	0.339
Adjusted R-squared	0.016	0.334

Note: Dependent variable is Support for a Raise in Minimum Wage where 1 is support and 0 is oppose. Heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. A * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level. A ** indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. A *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.

Table 2: Multinomial Probit

Dependent Variable: Support for Minimum Wage (1=favor, 0=oppose, 2= Do not know)

	(0) Oppose	(1) Favor	(2) Do not know
Treatment 1		-0.137	0.0460
		(0.102)	(0.128)
Treatment 2		-0.770***	0.0345
		(0.104)	(0.123)
Treatment 3		-0.573***	-0.0302
		(0.102)	(0.125)
Gender		-0.411***	-0.598***
		(0.0759)	(0.0900)
Age		0.00568**	-0.00122
		(0.00243)	(0.00281)
Not-so-strong Democrat		-0.896***	-0.441
		(0.264)	(0.320)
Independent leaning Democrat		-0.413**	-0.0343
		(0.204)	(0.252)

Independent		-1.883***	-0.718***
		(0.198)	(0.244)
Independent leaning Repub- lican		-2.794***	-1.424***
		(0.189)	(0.232)
Not-so-strong Republican		-2.461***	-1.116***
		(0.197)	(0.242)
Strong Republican		-2.866***	-1.375***
		(0.186)	(0.227)
Other		-2.789***	-1.635***
		(0.216)	(0.279)
Do not know		-2.054***	-0.480
		(0.343)	(0.409)
High school graduate		0.788*	-0.533
		(0.471)	(0.454)
Some college		0.422	-0.549
		(0.459)	(0.433)
College graduate		0.301	-0.700
		(0.458)	(0.433)
Post-graduate		0.425	-0.801*
		(0.463)	(0.441)
Somewhat active LDS		0.230	0.00421
		(0.154)	(0.183)
Less active LDS		0.333*	0.223
		(0.184)	(0.218)
Non-LDS		0.548***	0.187*
		(0.0912)	(0.111)
Employed		-0.0814	-0.0815
		(0.0843)	(0.0955)
Income		-0.0459**	-0.0326
		(0.0180)	(0.0215)
Constant		2.054***	1.188**
		(0.516)	(0.508)
Observations	3,268	3,268	3,268

Note: Dependent variable is Support for a Raise in Minimum Wage where 0 is oppose, 1 is support and 2 is do not know. Column 1 is used as the base case and all coefficients are generated using column one as the base. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. A * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level. A ** indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. A *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.



APPENDIX C: Party Identification Graphs



Effects of Scandals on Voter Turnout in Canada

by Terrance Kutney

Although there has been much research done regarding the effects of political scandals on the voting share won by a political party, little research has been done on the effect of political scandals on voter turnout. This is especially true in the context of Canadian politics. This work analyzes the effect of the Canadian sponsorship scandal on voter turnout, primarily using the 2004 and 2006 iterations of the Canadian Election Study. It finds a positive relationship between anger about the sponsorship scandal and the probability of voting. Closer analysis of the 2004 election shows that voters who were angry about the sponsorship scandal increased their political activity leading up to the election and were thus more likely to vote.

Introduction

On 19 May 2013, Nigel Wright resigned his position as chief of staff to the Canadian Prime Minister, having been implicated in what is now known as the Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal. The year before, the auditor general of Canada found that Conservative Party Senator Mike Duffy had violated Senate expense claim rules, and the prime minister's office had intervened in an attempt to limit fallout. This entailed cutting a deal with Senator Duffy, who was required to reimburse \$90,000 in claimed expenses. Further inflaming the public, news sources later revealed that Chief of Staff Nigel Wright had cut Duffy a \$90,000 check to cover expenses on the deal that Wright helped to arrange. Critics alleged that Wright violated criminal law and was guilty of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Certainly, the Wright-Duffy affair served to compound negative public perceptions of governmental corruption and further damage trust in Parliament.

The Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal is only one of a string of scandals affecting Canadian politics. In Toronto, Mayor Rob Ford was captured on video smoking crack cocaine and stands accused of being an alcoholic who has driven while under the influence. In 2004, in an episode known as the Sponsorship Scandal, broad corruption was uncovered in a federal government program in Quebec, which involved millions of dollars that were awarded without a proper bidding process and sometimes without any work required. The sponsorship scandal is widely thought to have resulted in the historic defeat of the Liberal Party of Canada in 2006, which was replaced by a Conservative government for the first time since 1993. This election also marked a reversal in an eighteen-year downward trend in election turnout. This information suggests that scandals, rather than marking the demise of democracy, might actually invigorate democratic participation in Western countries, such as Canada, by increasing election turnout.

This work examines the effect of political scandals on election turnout within a Canadian context. To test this effect, this study presents a possible explanation for election turnout and applies the proposed explanation to data from two Canadian elections. Specifically, it considers the theory that a political scandal galvanizes the voter base and leads to greater turnout as voters attempt to replace wayward politicians. Thus, it is hypothesized that the sponsorship scandal in 2004 increased voter turnout in subsequent Canadian elections by angering voters into political activity. This theory may seem counterintuitive, as there is a strong tendency to believe that political scandals will lead to a disappointed electorate that sees little point in voting. This article shows, however, that the anger-response theory, as applied to Canada, provides a reasonable explanation for increased election turnout. The elections examined here have been largely ignored by academic studies and provide convincing support for this theory.

To examine the hypothesis that political scandal leads to greater election turnout, this work will analyze relevant literature, examine the theoretical basis of the hypothesis presented, review the historical context of the Sponsorship Scandal, and then discuss the methodology of the statistical tests performed. Through analyzing relevant literature, it is apparent that experts on election turnout have not definitively determined the causes of election turnout nor the effect of political scandals on election turnout. This section also provides a foundational understanding of the causal relationship that exists between the sponsorship scandal and increased voter turnout in subsequent elections. The section that outlines the historical background of the sponsorship scandal provides a brief overview of the scandal and establishes valuable context for the statistical tests performed. The methodology section explains three ways in which the effects of the sponsorship scandal on election turnout are examined.

This work highlights general trends in Canadian election turnout, uses statistical tests to determine individual voting behavior in two Canadian elections, and demonstrates through data analysis the causal relationship described in the hypothesis. It concludes that the general trends in Canadian election turnout partially support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal increased election turnout. This finding is further substantiated by a test of individual voting behavior using election surveys from the 2004 and 2006 elections. A test of the causal relationship further supports the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters and increased voter turnout.

Literature Review

Prominent academics have long puzzled over why people choose to vote. According to a rational choice model, the vast majority of people should decide not to vote. This model suggests that a person should only vote when the expected benefit of voting, which is a function of the probability that the vote cast will be decisive, is greater than the cost of voting (generally viewed as the opportunity cost of spending time and effort to become informed and then physically voting). Since the probability of casting a decisive ballot is extremely low, the cost of voting will almost always be greater than the expected benefit. However, people do vote and in large numbers (Blais 2000: 2). In the 2012 U.S. election, less than 55 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots, but this still meant that over 129 million people voted (Woolley and Peters 2013). To resolve this discrepancy, some academics have suggested the rational choice model cannot fully explain voting behavior.

Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen offer an alternative theory based on the concept of mobilization (1993). Central to this concept is the idea of social networks—groups of friends, colleagues, politicians, and interest groups—that exert pressure on individuals to vote. These social networks work through social pressure. People want to be valued, and social networks fulfill that need. Politicians have an incentive to use social networks to mobilize voters in "get out the vote" campaigns (Blais 2000: 13). Various studies and field experiments have found that social pressure, including communication that encourages voting, can have a significant, positive impact on voter turnout (Mann 2010: 388; Amaro de Matos and Barros 2004: 239). Interestingly, too much social pressure can also be a bad thing. Research suggests that politicians who overuse social pressure experience backlash (Matland and Murray 2013). According to one study, a politician who uses social pressure may inadvertently increase voter anger and hostility toward him/herself. Such resentment then increases the probability that people will vote against the candidate (Matland and Murray 2013). This concept of mobilization offers a key insight into the possible causal relationship, tying political scandals to increased election turnout.

Daniel Stockerner and Patricia Calca support this relationship by finding that political scandals cause higher election turnout (2013: 535). Stockerner and Calca argue that a political scandal operates as a mobilizing agent. That is, political scandals anger the public and cause people to vote who would not usually engage in politics. This theory posits that people vote because they hope to "throw out the bums." This causal logic seems reasonable when applied to a country like Canada, which does not suffer from highly visible endemic corruption. Politicians in Canada are not expected to be corrupt, so political scandals may be unexpected and shocking, thus angering the public.
Other explanations for election turnout include theories that focus on the phenomenon of voter fatigue. Margit Tavits argues that election turnout depends on institutions. Tavits finds that having a direct election for a president has the effect of fatiguing voters, which lowers voter turnout. In fact, she finds that having a direct presidential election lowers voter turnout by 7 percent (2009: 42). In line with Tavits' work, Richard Boyd suggests that increasing the frequency of elections also reduces turnout. According to Boyd, countries with more frequent elections will experience lower voter turnout, as frequent elections fatigue voters (1989: 730). Further expanding on the concept of voter fatigue, Christopher R. Berry and Jacob Gersen argue that the timing of the election plays a crucial role. The authors found that municipal elections that coincided with federal elections had substantially larger voter turnout. Essentially, the authors explain low municipal election turnout using a variation of voter fatigue; they argue that only the most fervent and dedicated voters will vote in municipal elections not held in tandem with federal elections (Berry and Gersen 2010: 37).

Furthermore, Maciej A. Gorecki finds that more competitive elections have greater voter turnout. Studying the multiple rounds of voting that take place during Polish elections for city president, Gorecki found that the political elite increased the intensity of their campaigning during competitive elections, which persuaded the public to vote (2009: 291). Although many academics have focused on voter fatigue, some have also explained voter turnout by drawing on more atypical causal relationships.

Many alternative explanations of voter turnout focus on less conventional causes. Brad Gomez, Thomas Hansford, and George Krause argue that the small things are what count. Through a study of U.S. presidential elections, the authors found that rainy weather decreases election turnout by almost 1 percent per inch of rain. The authors also found that snow can depress election turnout, although only by about 0.5 percent per inch of snowfall (Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 2007: 649). This finding is substantiated by Steve Knack, who also found that inclement weather depressed election turnout (1994: 187). Additionally, Joseph Robbins, Lance Hunter, and Gregg R. Murray look at the effect of terrorism on election turnout, finding that terrorism is positively correlated with election turnout (2013: 495). Robins, Hunter, and Murray acknowledge that their findings run counter to conventional wisdom. Their analysis is substantiated, however, by the work of Valentina Bali, who found that the Madrid train bombing effectively mobilized segments of Spanish society that were otherwise less likely to participate in elections (2007: 669). Clearly, there are many unconventional explanations of election turnout.

Little work has been done specifically examining the causes of election turnout in Canada. Descriptions tend to center on the competitiveness of Canadian elections but some address other factors as well. Howard A. Scarrow offers a few explanations, suggesting that inclement weather and competitiveness both play a role (1961: 351). James Endersby, Steven Galatas, and Chapman Rackaway also attribute Canadian election turnout to competitiveness, finding that the closeness of elections explained turnout in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections (2002). Furthermore, Donley Studlar presents a pattern of Canadian voter turnout in which provincial elections have greater turnout than federal elections. Studlar finds that region, population density, and the amount of time elapsed since the last provincial or federal election have the greatest effects on voter turnout (2001: 299). Michael Martinez and Jeff Gill highlight a particularly troubling trend in Canadian elections: the decline in election turnout. They show that between 1979 and 1998 there was a systemic decline in election turnout but fail to offer specific explanations for this trend (Martinez and Gill 2006). In contrast to the lack of academic studies regarding election turnout in Canada, there has been notable work dealing with the general effects of political corruption on election turnout.

Some research argues that political corruption will increase election turnout by either galvanizing voters to "throw out the bums" or, inversely, to claim benefits from rent-seeking politicians. Stockerner and Calca find that in Portugal, political corruption is positively correlated with election turnout. The authors find that municipalities with high levels of corruption have election turnout several percentage points higher than municipalities with low levels of corruption. The authors suggest that political corruption is a mobilizing agent, because news about corruption angers the public enough to incite them to vote (Stockerner and Calca 2013: 535). Gokhan Karahan, Morris Coats, and William Shughart also find that political corruption increases election turnout, although their explanation of the causal relationship is much more cynical. Karahan, Coats, and Shughart suggest that corrupt politicians are willing to distribute the gains of holding office to voters in return for votes. Therefore, as corrupt politicians gain greater power, they are willing and able to buy more votes. The authors substantiate these claims with a finding in Mississippi's 1987 county supervisor elections (which took place after an FBI investigation resulted in the conviction of 55 of 410 county supervisors). They determined that Mississippians voted more in corrupt than non-corrupt counties (Karahan, Coats, and Shughart 2006: 87).

Conversely, some academics also argue that political corruption will decrease voter turnout. Using a broad sample of democratic countries, Daniel Stockerner, Bernadette LaMontagne, and Lyle Scruggs find that political corruption is inversely correlated with election turnout (2012: 74). In a study of Mexican voting, James McCann and Jorge Dominguez found that widespread suspicions of fraud and corruption made it less likely that opposition supporters voted, thus depressing election turnout (1998: 483). It is clear that political corruption is related to voter participation, though the nature of this relationship remains controversial.

Sponsorship Scandal

Following the 1995 Referendum on Quebec sovereignty, the governing Liberal Party established a fund to raise Canada's profile in Quebec. Revelations of corrup-

tion involving this fund later became known as the "federal sponsorship scandal." The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reports that the sponsorship scandal all started with "rumours and whispers about the fund" (CBC 2006). Although the fund was distributing federal money in Quebec, there were no application forms, and it was unclear how the money was being used. In 2000, initial indications of government corruption came to light as Public Works Minister Alfonso Gagliano faced public criticism for awarding contracts to a company which hired his son as an executive. Two years later, newly appointed Public Works Minister Don Boudria came under fire for failing to find a report on cultural and sporting activities for which the government had paid \$550,000. In time, the report was found. However, the Globe and Mail asserted that this report was nearly identical to another report produced by a firm which received \$575,000 in government payment. Eventually, public pressure forced Prime Minister Chretien to ask the auditor general of Canada to investigate.

Auditor General Sheila Fraser released reports in 2002 and 2004 that were highly critical of the government, and the government responded by forming a Commission of Inquiry in the lead up to the 2004 election. In 2002, Fraser released a preliminary report accusing the government of breaking "just about every rule in the book." Fraser then proceeded to ask the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to investigate Groupaction, a firm that had been heavily involved with the sponsorship fund. The RCMP raided Groupaction and began to investigate the Public Works Department. In 2004, Fraser released her second report on the sponsorship fund. This report implicated several senior government officials; Fraser discovered that government officials had shown blatant disregard for rules and had mismanaged millions of dollars in advertising and sponsorship money. The report detailed how the government had paid hundreds of thousands of dollars, through contracts that were never officially assigned, to firms that were not required to do any work. According to the report, the corruption was "such a blatant misuse of funds that it is shocking" (CBC 2004).

Under public pressure, and having already contemplated it, Prime Minister Jean Chretien retired from public office. Chretien's successor, Paul Martin, promptly fired the former public works minister, Gagliano, from his ambassadorship post. Martin also suspended the heads of three Crown corporations and vowed to resign if any evidence surfaced which linked him personally to the scandal. Perhaps the most significant action Martin took was to ask Justice John Gomery to head an official Commission of Inquiry into the sponsorship program (CBC 2006). The Gomery Commission, as it came to be known, did not begin hearing testimony until after a scheduled federal election in June 2004, which the Liberal Party only narrowly survived (CBC 2008).

The Liberal Party retained a minority government in 2004, although the Gomery Commission's report triggered another election in 2006. Prior to the sponsorship scandal, the Liberal Party was heavily favored, with many expecting the Liberal Party would retain its majority. But the Liberal Party dropped heavily in the polls in the lead-up to the election. On Election Day 28 June 2004, the Liberal Party managed to win only enough seats to form a minority government, the first in twenty-five years (CBC 2008). The Liberal Party respite was short-lived; in February 2005, the Gomery Commission issued hundreds of subpoenas and heard testimony throughout the year (CBC 2008). On 1 November 2005, the commission released its first report, absolving Jean Chretien and Paul Martin of personal wrongdoing. However, the report stated that the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) did bear some responsibility, because the PMO was responsible for running the sponsorship program. Regardless, the opposition parties demanded that the government resign and call a new election (CBC 2006). Initially, Martin refused to resign, but after the Liberal Party lost the support of the NDP (New Democratic Party of Canada), the opposition parties joined together in a vote of non-confidence in late November 2005. This triggered the election held in 2006 (CBC 2008).

The 2006 federal election, held on 23 January, was a disaster for the Liberal Party. The Liberals managed to win only 103 seats in Parliament while the Conservatives won 124 seats. For the first time in twelve years, the Liberals were unable to win enough seats to form the government, and the Conservatives formed a minority government. This election was followed by the release of the second part of the Gomery Commission's report. The report included a series of recommendations for reforms to increase transparency and accountability in government (O'Neal and Smith 2006).

Methodology

To test the hypothesis that political scandals increase voter turnout, the effect of the sponsorship scandal on voter turnout in the 2004 and 2006 Canadian federal elections is studied. Although a quantitative test on the effect of the sponsorship scandal in subsequent Canadian elections would be preferable, a quantitative test that examined elections generally would have too few observations to have statistical significance. Therefore, this article first looks at general trends in voter turnout in Canada across a series of elections from 1984 to 2011. This information is then complemented by a quantitative analysis of voter turnout, using survey data from the 2004 and 2006 iterations of the Canadian Election Study (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011). Using this dataset, the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior in both the 2004 and 2006 election is tested, followed by a test of key components in the causal relationship between the variables.

Variables

To determine general trends in voter turnout, data from Elections Canada is used. This source is run by the Canadian federal government and includes official turnout for every election since 1867. This analysis focuses on the most recent trends, so only elections from 1984 to 2011 are examined. It should be noted that the 1992 election was the referendum on Quebec sovereignty. Results from Quebec are not included for that year, as Quebec held its own referendum. Furthermore, election turnout from the 1993 and 2000 elections were adjusted after the election following maintenance on the National Register of Electors that removed duplicates (caused by electors moving) and electors who were deceased (Elections Canada 2013). These updated numbers are used, as they are the numbers officially used by the Canadian government.

To determine the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior during the 2004 and 2006 federal elections, data is taken from the Canadian Election Study that was run during both years. These two Canadian election surveys are cross-sectional surveys, meaning new respondents were selected for both years. However, about half of the 2006 survey sample also participated in the 2004 Canadian Election Survey. Respondents to the survey were interviewed exclusively by phone. The respondents were selected randomly from a directory of phone numbers generated by the Canadian Election Survey to represent all possible phone numbers in Canada. Once a household was identified, the interviewer asked for the number of adults in the household. If there was more than one adult in the household, the adult with the closest birthday was selected. As the Canadian Election Survey is intended to represent all eligible Canadian voters, only Canadian citizens eighteen years of age or older were eligible to participate in the survey. Furthermore, the sample was weighted by household size and province to ensure the results were representative of the population of Canada (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011).

The Canadian Election Study had three components: a Campaign-Period Survey (CPS), a Post-Election Survey (PES), and a Mail-Back Survey (MBS). The 2004 election survey consisted of all three of these portions; however, the 2006 Canadian Election Study consisted of only the first two components, meaning that the MBS portion of the survey was excluded. The CPS was conducted during the official campaign period of the election. In the 2004 election, the campaign period lasted the thirty-six days leading up to 28 June 2004. In the 2006 election, the campaign period was 30 November 2005, until the election on 22 January 2006 (a period of fifty-four days). The PES survey started a week after the 2004 election and a day after the 2006 election. The MBS survey commenced one week after the PES survey had started, and responses were accepted until the end of November of that year. Responses to each of the portions of the survey vary, with the CPS portion of the survey receiving the highest response rate. Below is a summary of the number of completed interviews for each portion of the survey:

	CPS	PES	MBS
2004	4,323	3,138	1,674
2006	4,058	1,684	

From the Canadian Election Study Documentation

To determine individual voting behavior during the 2004 and 2006 federal elections, questions from the CPS portion of the Canadian Election Survey are the primary source, but some responses are drawn from the PES and MBS portions of the Canadian Election Survey. In the following sections, the dependent, independent, and control variables are described. These are the variables used to test the general hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters during the 2004 and 2006 election. Following this section, the method for testing the causal relationship (as described in the hypothesis) is also outlined.

Dependent Variable

For both the 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Survey, respondents were asked in English or French the question, "Did YOU vote in the election?" Respondents were given the option of answering "yes," "no," or "do not know" (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011). Out of all of the respondents to the PES surveys for both years, only five people refused to answer. It is possible that some respondents lied about voting in the election or forgot if they had voted or not.

Independent Variables

Data is taken from the 2004 and 2006 iterations of the Canadian Election Survey to measure attitudes toward the sponsorship scandal. During the campaign period (in the CPS portion of the survey), the Canadian Election Survey asked respondents the question "Does [the sponsorship scandal] make you very angry, somewhat angry, not very angry, or not angry at all?" These responses were recoded in ascending order so that "not angry at all" was coded as a 0, and "very angry" was coded as a 3. The interviewer also coded for respondents that did not know anything about the scandal or did not know how they felt about the scandal. Those respondents were omitted in this analysis (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011). Ideally, respondents that did not know about the scandal would be coded as being "not angry at all." However, since those respondents could not be separated from people that responded by saying they did not know how they felt about the scandal, it was necessary to omit them. Across both surveys, a total of 458 respondents were omitted.

Control Variables

Attempts are made to control for other factors that could explain variation in voting behavior. Control variables for demographics include age, gender, and education. The Canadian Election Study data includes the year of birth. This allows the age of each of the respondents at the time of the 2004 and 2006 federal elections to be easily calculated. The Canadian Election Study data also included the gender of the respondent. Education was controlled for using the question "What is the highest level of education that you have completed?" This question was asked during the CPS survey, so all of the respondents to both the 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Study survey were asked. There were eleven possible answers to this question. No schooling through completed elementary school was coded as 1–3, some secondary/high school through completed high school was coded as 4–5, some technical education, community college, CEGEP, or college classique through a professional or doctoral degree was coded as 6–11 (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011). All respondents who refused to respond to this question or who answered "do not know" were omitted.

Region and partisanship were also controlled, using data from the Canadian Election Study. Respondents were coded for region depending on the Canadian province in which they resided. Respondents were also asked how they felt about each of the major political parties in Canada. This question was asked during the CPS survey. Interviewers were instructed to emphasize that the question was about the respective federal parties as opposed to the provincial or local version of the party. The question used in this analysis was about the federal Liberal Party and looked like this: "How do you feel about the FEDERAL Liberal party." Interviewers were then instructed to ask the respondents to rate the federal Liberal Party on a 100 point scale, with a 0 being coded as "really dislike" and a 100 being coded as "really like." Respondents that refused to answer or answered that they did not know any of the parties were coded as 50.

To test the causal relationship between the sponsorship scandal and voter turnout, data was taken from the MBS portion of the Canadian Election Study. Unfortunately, the MBS survey was not conducted during the 2006 election. As such, the causal relationship described in the hypothesis can be tested only for the 2004 election. It is hypothesized that that the sponsorship scandal angered voters who then became increasingly politically active. These galvanized voters then voted in greater numbers in an effort to "throw out the bums." To test this hypothesis, the relationship between the sponsorship scandal and political activity and the relationship between political activity and voting are both examined. Political activity is operationalized by using the question, "During the most recent election how often did you talk to other people to persuade them to vote for a particular party or candidate?" Respondents were given four possible answers: "Frequently," "Occasionally," "Rarely," and "Never." These responses were recoded in ascending order with "Never" coded as a "0" and "Frequently" coded as a "3." This question was also used to test the relationship between political activity and voting, with voting being measured as previously discussed (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011).

Test Results

Canadian election turnout from 1984 to 2011 was used to look at general trends in election turnout surrounding the 2004 and 2006 federal elections. Then a series of statistical tests were run to determine the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior during those respective elections.

The general trends in election turnout suggest that the sponsorship scandal played a role in increasing election turnout. Graph 1a demonstrates that from 1984 to 2004, election turnout was steadily declining. Martinez and Gill also noticed this decline in election turnout, although they failed to offer an explanation for this decline (2006). Interestingly, the 2006 election saw a major spike in election turnout. This is especially significant given that the increase in election turnout was counter to an eighteen-year trend of declining election turnout. This spike in election turnout may be attributable to the sponsorship scandal, as the 2006 election was triggered by the opposition, using the sponsorship scandal as justification. Graph 2a illustrates this spike in election turnout. Perhaps election turnout in 2004 was not as heavily influenced by the sponsorship scandal as the official Gomery Commission report had not yet been published. In fact, voters waiting for the official inquiry into the sponsorship scandal to conclude before drawing conclusions would not have been ready to punish politicians at the polls until the 2006 election, as the official investigation concluded between the two elections in 2005.

The analysis of individual voting behavior suggests the sponsorship scandal caused election turnout to increase in the 2004 election. During the 2004 general election, voters' attitudes about the sponsorship scandal had a statistically significant effect on election turnout, as illustrated in Table 1a. A one-unit increase in how angry voters felt about the sponsorship scandal (for example, going from "not angry at all"to "not very angry" or from "somewhat angry" to "very angry") increased the







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	(1)	(2)
Regressor:		
Sponsorship Scandal	-0.0239*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.005)
Gender(Male)	_	0.005 (0.013)
Age	_	0.003*** (0.000)
Education	_	0.017*** (0.003)
British Columbia	_	_
Alberta	_	0.015 (0.027)
Saskatchewan	—	0.017 (0.032)
Manitoba	_	-0.016 (0.033)
Ontario	—	0.018 (0.021)
Quebec	—	-0.019 (0.022)
New Brunswick	_	0.001 (0.041)
Nova Scotia	_	0.033 (0.044)
PEI	_	-0.024 (0.040)
Newfoundland	—	-0.088** 0.038
Political Affiliation	—	0.000 (0.000)
Regression summary statistics:		
N	3004	1904
Pseudo	0.033	0.114

Table 1a: 2004 Canadian Election Survey

Note: The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded with a 0 for "did not vote" and a 1 for "voted." The results are reported at the 90 percent*, 95 percent** and 99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.

probability of voting by 1.5 percent. Although this effect is small in absolute numbers, compared to other statistically significant factors that affect voting, the sponsorship

	(1)	(2)
Regressor:		
Sponsorship Scandal	0.022*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)
Gender(Male)	_	0.015 (0.012)
Age	_	0.002*** (0.000)
Education	_	0.000 (0.000)
British Columbia	-	
Alberta	-	-0.020 (0.027)
Saskatchewan	_	-0.005 (0.035)
Manitoba	_	-0.062** (0.030)
Ontario	_	-0.018 (0.021)
Quebec	-	-0.029 (0.022)
New Brunswick	_	0.031 (0.050)
Nova Scotia	-	-0.043 (0.035)
PEI	—	-0.042 (0.038)
Newfoundland	_	-0.080** 0.036
Political Affiliation	_	0.000 (0.000)
Regression summary statistics:		
N	1673	1639
Pseudo	0.017	0.095

Table 1b: 2006 Canadian Election Survey

Note: The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded with a 0 for "did not vote" and a 1 for "voted." The results are reported at the 90 percent*, 95 percent** and 99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.

scandal has reasonably strong substantive significance. An increase in education, for instance, only increases the probability of voting by 1.7 percent. Likewise, a decade

in age only increases the probability of voting by 3 percent. Accordingly, it seems that attitudes toward the sponsorship scandal were positively correlated with voting probability. These results support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilizes voters.

The analysis of individual voting behavior during the 2006 federal election also suggests that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters, leading to greater election turnout. During the 2006 election, a one-unit increase in how angry voters felt about the election increased the probability of voting by 1.6 percent. In comparison, a one decade difference in age only increased the probability of voting by 2 percent. Interestingly, in 2006, education did not have a statistically significant effect on voting. As shown in Table 1b, these results suggest that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters.

The test of the causal relationship suggests the sponsorship scandal did in fact mobilize voters during the 2004 federal election in Canada. Table 2a contains the results of a test of the relationship between attitudes about the sponsorship scandal and political activity. The first test returned a statistically significant result that indicates a positive relationship between the sponsorship scandal and political activity, meaning that the more angry voters were, the more politically active they became. When run without control variables, the test indicated that a one-unit increase in anger

	(1)	(2)
Regressor:		
Sponsorship Scandal	1.175*** (0.026)	0.076** (0.034)
Gender(Male)	_	0.163*** (0.051)
Age	_	0.005*** (0.001)
Education	_	0.063*** (0.012)
Province	_	0.003** (0.001)
Political Affiliation	_	0.003 (0.001)
Regression summary statistics:		
N	1583	1583
	0.000	0.032
Robust Standard Errors	Yes	Yes

Table 2a: 2004 Canadian Election Survey

Notes: Regression. The dependent variable is political activity coded in ascending order from "never" politically active to "frequently" politically active. The results are reported at the 90 percent,* 95 percent, ** and 99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.

about the sponsorship scandal is associated with a corresponding increase in political activity. Adding control variables does not drop the result out of statistical significance, but does lower the substantive significance of the result—a one-unit increase in anger is now associated with only a small increase in political activity. Regardless, the results support the causal relationship hypothesis, indicating a positive relationship between anger about the sponsorship scandal and political activity.

The relationship between political activity and voting behavior was tested next. The results of this test are reported in Table 2b. These results indicate a statistically significant positive relationship between political activity and voting. In fact, as political activity increases by one unit, the probability of voting increases by about 4.5 percent. A person that is very politically active is thus 18 percent more likely to vote than someone who is not at all politically active. As both parts of the test of the causal relationship gave statistically significant positive results, it is concluded that the tests of the causal relationship support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters during the 2004 Canadian federal election.

Conclusion

Results of the statistical analysis indicate the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters, since anger about the sponsorship scandal is positively correlated with increased voter turnout. The results confirm that political scandals in Canada have an overall

	5	
	(1)	(2)
Regressor:		
Political Activity	0.050*** (0.007)	0.045*** (0.007)
Gender(Male)	_	-0.013 (0.013)
Age	_	0.002*** (0.000)
Education	_	0.014*** (0.003)
Province	_	0.000 (0.000)
Political Affiliation	_	0.000*** (0.000)
Regression summary statistics:		
Ν	1583	1583
Pseudo	0.055	0.122

Table 2b: 200	4 Canadian	Election	Survey
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Notes: Probit. The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded with a 0 for "did not vote" and a 1 for "voted." The results are reported at the 90 percent,* 95 percent, ** and 99 percent*** significance levels. This is a probit model.

positive effect on voter turnout. Common sense may dictate that political scandals have a detrimental effect on democracy. Many Eastern European countries have experienced endemic corruption and political scandals, which have lowered citizens' expectations for democracy. Recently in Egypt, the inefficiencies and imperfections of politicians led to the reinstallation of a military dictatorship, a dictatorship tolerated and even supported by Egyptian liberals. However, in a country such as Canada, with a long history of democracy, scandals may have an overall positive effect. According to the tests performed in this analysis, anger over the sponsorship scandal contributed to the reversal of a decade-long trend of decreasing voter turnout. In effect, the sponsorship scandal served to reinvigorate the electorate. It may be that a succession of serious political scandals could weaken and erode democracy. But in a rich, Western country such as Canada, the occasional political scandal—such as the ongoing Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal—may infuse much needed energy into the system. Indeed, the Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal may be just what the doctor ordered.

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Gender, Corruption, and Culture: Evidence from the American States

by Luke Bell

Introduction

In recent years, several influential studies have reported that high levels of female representation in national legislatures seem to correspond with low levels of countrywide corruption. Scholars have expressed excitement at the prospect that simply adding women to government will "diminish the need for a painful, expensive, and politically difficult process of rooting out corruption via oversight and prosecution" (Esarey and Chirillo 2013: 364). Some governments have launched initiatives to increase the number of women in positions of public responsibility as a means of combating corrupt behavior. Peru, for example, recently created an all-women police division in an attempt to curb instances of extortion in traffic ticketing, and Mexico took similar action several years later (Karim 2011; Keating 2013). Does the mere presence of female public officials truly ward off corruption, or are other factors at work?

This paper focuses on whether female representation in American state legislatures is negatively correlated with levels of state corruption, controlling for institutions and other state characteristics. I begin by reviewing existing explanations for the association between female participation and corruption, after which I lay out my theory and hypotheses. Next, I describe the variables, data sources, and quantitative models I used to test my hypotheses and present empirical results. Overall, I find that the proportion of women in state legislatures is significantly and negatively correlated with corruption in cross-sectional models. I argue that state corruption is better explained by broader political cultural factors that vary between states, such as female opportunity in general, education, and other within-state dynamics.

Literature Review

The debate over whether women bring a purifying presence to the public sphere is not new. Orestes Brownson, a prominent anti-suffragist, summarizes a common suffragette argument, stating "We have heard it argued that, if women were to take part in our elections . . . her presence would do more than a whole army of police officials to maintain order, to banish all fighting, drinking, ... venality, and corruption" (Brownson 1869). Recent research by World Bank scholars has rekindled the debate about whether women really are the "fairer sex." In a 2001 study, David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti find a persistent negative correlation between the proportion of women in national legislatures and perceived corruption. These findings, replicated with three distinct corruption measures on a cross-sectional sample of over one hundred countries, retain significance in the presence of controls for civil liberties, population, GDP, region, and ethnic fractionalization (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001). A contemporaneous study using several cross-national corruption measures, micro-level surveys of Georgian businesses, and attitudinal data from the World Values Survey also produces evidence of a link between gender and corruption (Swamy et al. 2001). The authors find that "greater participation by women in the market and government is associated with lower levels of corruption" and that women are less likely than men to condone hypothetical scenarios of corrupt behavior (Swamy et al. 2001: 27).

Scholarly studies on female political representation and corruption offer several explanations for the correlations observed in the studies mentioned above. In general, academic explanations for the apparent association between gender and levels of corruption can be grouped into four categories: gender gap in corrupt behavior, democratic institutions, institutional deterrence, and political culture. I discuss each of these schools of thought in turn, drawing on literature from various behavioral disciplines.

Gender Gap

Those who subscribe to the "gender gap" argument, broadly speaking, tend to claim that female participation in government is negatively correlated with corruption, because women infuse honesty into the public sphere. These explanations draw on attitudinal studies, which, on the whole, suggest that women are more ethical than men. One such study finds that female U.S. Coast Guard employees score significantly higher than their male counterparts on "Defining Issues Tests," questionnaires that confront respondents with various moral dilemmas (White Jr. 1999: 467). Similarly, a meta-analysis of fifty-six tests of this type finds that women are substantially more likely to volunteer ethical responses than men at all age and education levels (Thoma 1986). Business ethics studies also assert that women hold to higher ethical standards in inter-personal situations (Dawson 1997) and express greater intolerance for unethical practices (Franke, Crown, and Spake 1997; Glover et al. 1997).

Regarding corruption specifically, Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti use gender gap logic to explain their results, tracing the relationship between female representation and

corruption to the female propensity to exhibit "higher standards of ethical behavior and be more concerned with the common good" (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001: 427). Using this same line of reasoning, Swamy et al. conclude "there is indeed a gender differential in tolerance for corruption" (Swamy et al. 2001: 51). Citing original experimental evidence, Rivas, too, claims women are less corrupt than men and "increasing participation by women in . . . politics would be expected to help in fighting corruption" (Rivas 2008: 32).

Democratic Institutions

Rejecting the gender gap explanation for the correlation between female representation and corruption, other scholars argue that the connection can be explained by variation in political institutions between countries. Hung-en Sung, for instance, argues that "both female participation in government and lower levels of corruption are dependent on a liberal democratic polity" (Sung 2003: 703). That is, he asserts, the relationship between female political involvement and low levels of corruption is spurious in that both variables are caused not by gendered differences in behavior, but macro-level features of liberal democracy such as a free press, independent judiciary, and the rule of law (Sung 2003). In a separate panel study, Sung reveals further evidence that liberal democracy mediates the link between female participation and corruption, concluding that the strength of democracy is a significant predictor of both corruption and women in government (Sung 2012: 213).

Institutional Deterrence

A third thread of research modifies individual-level gender gap explanations of corruption to account for institutional deterrence. Experimental studies suggest that women's willingness to engage in corruption may depend on perceptions of monitoring and risk (Schulze and Frank 2003: 16; Armantier and Boly 2011). An experiment in Burkina Faso, for instance, examines how participants instructed to grade papers react when offered a bribe in exchange for a passing grade. The researchers find that female graders are less likely to accept bribes than their male counterparts but only when the risk of detection is high. Women are more likely to accept the bribe in the absence of risk (Armantier and Boly 2011). Likewise, Justin Esarey and Gina Chirillo argue that because they are held to higher ethical standards and are more likely to be punished than men, women in corruption-averse societies respond to systemic discriminatory incentives to avoid corrupt behavior (Esarey and Chirillo 2013). Similarly, Anne Marie Goetz argues that women in liberal democracies do not have the same opportunities for corrupt behavior as men; given the opportunity to abuse power, she argues, women "will not passively conform to the idealized notions of their finer moral nature" (Goetz 2007: 102). In brief, these arguments find that individual-level female characteristic interact with systematic incentives such as monitoring and enforcement, and that this interaction effectively explains the gendercorruption connection.

Political Culture

In contrast to the gender gap, democratic institutional, and institutional deterrence explanations described above, I argue that the relationship between high female representation and low corruption is driven by the existence of political cultures characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness, as evidenced by high levels of overall female opportunity. International studies have found that countries with an "egalitarian culture" are significantly more likely to have large proportions of women represented in parliament (Kenworthy and Malami 1999: 24; Matland 1998: 121). Moreover, countries where public support for gender egalitarianism is high are substantially more likely to exhibit lower levels of corruption overall (Seleim and Bontis 2009). Corroborating the importance of political culture, a survey measuring corruption-related attitudes of public officials in Ghana suggests that an infusion of female officials does little to curb corruption when opportunities, networks, and social expectations for corruption remain in place (Alhassan-Aloho 2007: 236). Taken on the whole, the political cultural hypothesis suggests that simply adding women to government may not alleviate corruption unless the increase in female representation corresponds with more fundamental cultural changes.

Of course, the demarcation between institutions and political culture is vague, if not completely fluid. Institutions are, in many ways, a reflection of the cultures that adopt them, and cultural values can be influenced by institutional forces. That said, both democratic and deterrence institutional arguments focus on how the presence of institutions themselves affects the gender-corruption relationship, whereas my research attempts to examine gender, culture, and corruption, holding institutions constant. Consequently, while political culture is connected to the institutions present in a given society, I treat the two as separate concepts in my analysis.

Case Selection

With these potential explanations—gender, democratic institutions, institutional deterrence, and political culture—in mind, I attempt to add to the debate on whether the presence of women in politics has an independent negative effect on corruption. To do so, I analyze overall state corruption and female participation in the legislatures of the fifty U.S. states. The setting of the U.S. offers several advantages. For one, government structure is relatively standard across the country, and each state has an independent judiciary and well-established respect for principles such as the rule of law and freedom of the press. State electoral systems are also quite similar. The vast majority of states have bi-cameral legislatures and independent executive branches (though there is some interstate variation in branch power).

Additionally, as part of the U.S., the states share a liberal democratic heritage that encourages citizens and elites to frown on abuses of public power. Since my entire universe of cases resides within a democratic context, my research will evaluate whether an increased female presence in government tends to reduce corruption, absent of significant variation in levels of liberal democracy. My results will also yield insight into whether the number of women in government affects corruption within a country where, on the whole, corruption is highly stigmatized. In short, this paper contributes to existing literature by examining the link between gender and corruption within the purely democratic context of the American states.

Theory and Hypotheses

Because observational and experimental studies yield mixed evidence about the link between female representation and corruption, my research has two principal objectives:

1. Determine whether the negative correlation between female political representation and corruption holds within the liberal democratic context of the American states.

 Determine whether the correlation can be attributed primarily to a gender gap in corrupt behavior, state institutions, institutional deterrence, or political culture.
With regard to the first objective, I postulate that the correlation between gender and

corruption will persist among the American states. Stated formally:

H1: There is a negative cross-sectional correlation between female representation and state corruption.

Given that both this and cross-national studies evaluate the relationship between individual legislator characteristics and overall corruption among public officials (rather than corruption in the legislature alone), the relationship cannot simply be traced to a feminine Midas touch for reducing unethical behavior. Even if women are significantly less corrupt than men at the individual-level, using individual legislator characteristics to make inferences about an aggregate-level phenomenon is logically inappropriate. As Sung notes, this type of reasoning causes researchers to "risk aggregative error associated with the individualist fallacy" (Sung 2003: 705). This is especially true because the gender makeup of the legislature may not reflect the gender composition of the vast pool of other public officials. Consequently, evaluating the proportion of women in the legislature does not lend itself to individual-level inferences about overall corruption among public officials. Given that individual legislator traits and the overall number of corruption convictions are not on the same logical plane, the gender gap explanation does not seem to hold water.

While it is possible that differences in political institutions are important determinants of cross-national variation in corruption, I do not believe that aspects of liberal democracy are the missing nexus between gender and corruption in the United States. For one, the American political arena, unlike the international political atmosphere, features government institutions that are extremely similar across states. Minute institutional fluctuations such as campaign finance initiative, referendum, and recall laws are also unlikely to have discernible effects on corruption rates (Meier and Holbrook 1992: 145). What is more, differences in institutions fail to account for meaningful interstate variation in female representation (Hill 1981: 159). Hence, I argue that the presence of democratic institutions does not adequately explain the relationship between female representation and corruption, leading to my second hypothesis:

H2: The relationship between female representation and corruption remains statistically significant in the presence of institutional controls.

If neither gender gap nor democratic institutional theories adequately explain the relationship between female political involvement and corruption, does institutional deterrence? On one hand, experimental studies provide evidence that women may behave more or less ethically than men depending on levels of risk. And the American corruption literature shows that deterrence is a strong predictor of state corruption (Alt and Lassen 2011; Goel and Nelson 1998). While institutions that discourage corruption may alter individual female behavior, deterrence likely does not explain the macro-level relationship between corruption and female representation for the same reasons that gender gap theories are unconvincing: individual-level reactions to institutional incentives do not logically aggregate to statewide reductions in corruption. Although deterrence is associated with lower overall corruption rates in the U.S., I argue that the relationship between female representation and corruption will remain largely the same when deterrence is taken into consideration. Thus:

H3: The relationship between female representation and corruption remains statistically significant in the presence of controls for institutional deterrence.

The Importance of Political Culture

Departing from the gender gap, democratic institutional, and institutional deterrence explanations, I argue that the correlation between corruption and female representation is best explained in terms of the political culture (of which female representation is a part) in which corruption and gender interact. This assertion raises the question: what is political culture? Admittedly, political culture is a somewhat amorphous concept that has been broadly construed to encompass a host of different variables, particularly in relation to corruption. David C. Nice, for example, traces much of the interstate variation in corruption convictions to political culture, which he defines as levels of education and urbanization (Nice 1983). In the international context, Seymour Lipset and Gabriel Lenz discuss political culture in terms of country characteristics like income inequality, education, social diversity, and ethnic fractionalization (Lipset and Lenz 2000).

Political culture has also been used to describe a country's religious environment. Treisman, argues that the moral individualism stressed by protestant denominations may be partially responsible for the formation of "legal cultures" that discourage corrupt behavior (Treisman 2000). Others use a more attitudinal approach; studies of female participation in state legislatures discuss political culture in terms of public attitudes toward female involvement in government and sex roles more generally (Hill 1981). American public-opinion research, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of ideology and partisanship as indicators of "unique political cultures of individual states" (Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987L: 798).

I again note that the distinction drawn between political culture and institutions may be overly fine. Political institutions reflect the underlying values of the society that adopts them, and cultural attitudes may change or be reinforced by institutional incentives. This is particularly true of deterrence. A strong societal emphasis on exposing illicit behavior is an element of political culture, but usually manifests itself in institutions that deter corruption. That said, because this paper attempts to parse out whether the relationship between female representation and corruption is an explicit function of institutional incentives or is somehow reflective of state political values, I sacrifice a certain degree of complexity for the sake of theoretical clarity.

Elements of State Political Culture

In any event, the examples articulated above illustrate that, to some extent, the definition of political culture is contingent upon the context in which it is used. In my research, I do not presume to offer an exhaustive definition of political culture. Truly, any attempt to do so would extend well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I emphasize specific elements of political culture conceivably related to corruption in the American states, namely, opportunities for women, education, legislative professionalism, citizen and elite ideology, political competition, and deterrence. In the paragraphs that follow, I justify my use of these variables in relation to their potential bearing on state corruption.

The opportunities available to women in both public and private spheres, a central concern of this paper, are an essential part of political culture as it relates to corruption. Female opportunity may be a reflection of the values and social norms of a given state and, therefore, may be linked to ideas about fairness, egalitarianism, and the individual in relation to society and government. Put differently, high proportions of women in public office may be associated with a political culture that stresses inclusion and equal opportunity, which are in turn associated with low tolerance for violations of public trust. Several studies mentioned previously find that egalitarian cultures tend to have strong female political representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999: 24; Matland 1998: 121) and that countries that support gender egalitarianism experience low levels of corruption (Seleim and Bontis 2009).

Popular conceptions of state government and society may also relate to attitudes about corruption as well as gender. Drawing on the categories of political culture pioneered by Daniel Elazar (Elazar 1972), John G. Peters and Susan Welch find that legislators in states with a "moralistic culture" that emphasizes the common good over personal interests tend to be less tolerant of corruption than those in more individualistic or traditional cultures (Peters and Welch 1978). Likewise, Diamond argues that moralistic cultures offer more female opportunity, since states with such cultures are more "receptive to the values and style that have been associated with women concern with the public welfare rather than private enrichment" (Diamond 1977: 165). Because political cultures in which the public good is placed at a premium are likely to simultaneously encourage female inclusion and frown on corruption—an obvious threat to collective welfare—I assert that states with a political culture that fosters greater female opportunity will exhibit lower levels of corruption. That said, I note that while the proportion of female legislators is a useful proxy for female opportunity and progressive political culture more generally, a more broadly applicable measure for female opportunity will provide a better estimation of state political values. Accordingly, I present my third and fourth hypotheses:

H4: A state's overall levels of overall female opportunity will have a more meaningful effect on corruption than does the proportion of women in the state legislature.

H5: In the long term, female legislative representation will not be significantly correlated with corruption, though overall female opportunity will remain significant over time.

While measures of female opportunity may prove to be useful gauges of state attitudes, political culture clearly encompasses more than attitudes about gender and equality alone. Though not directly related to my hypotheses per se, levels of citizen education and legislative professionalism are also relevant aspects of political culture. Scholars find that high levels of public education correspond to both increased female legislative representation (Camboreco and Barnelo 2003) and decreased levels of corruption (Nice 1983). Similarly, legislative professionalism, measured in terms of a state legislature's session length, salary, and staff, often result in lower levels of female representation (Squire 1992). Professionalized legislatures could provide more opportunities for corruption, since legislators who are drawn to a professional political career may be more motivated by self-interest than are those in citizen legislatures. At the same time, the direction of the effect of professionalism on corruption is not clear, since legislators with higher salaries, prestige, and resources may have more incentives to avoid removal from office than citizen legislators, who might be tempted to supplement their meager state salaries with proceeds from illicit political favors.

Though not obviously related to female legislative representation, I also consider citizen and elite ideology and political competition to control for factors commonly understood to have a significance on a state's political dynamic. State political environments marked by stiff political competition may discourage corruption, since the risk of exposure and consequent removal from office is higher when elections are close and rival candidates are actively seeking campaign material. Ideology, which varies in distinct patterns between states, also has important ramifications for public attitudes and could relate to tolerance for unethical behavior in government (Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987).

Data

Measuring Corruption: Dependent Variable

For the purposes of my research, I define corruption as the "misuse of public power for private gain" (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91). In the American corruption literature, scholars traditionally utilize one of two operational strategies to measure corruption. The first relies on the number of convictions of public officeholders, as reported the Public Integrity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice (Department of Justice 2014). The corruption conviction count for a given state reflects all indictments of public officials, elected or appointed.

The second strategy attempts to replicate the expert surveys used to measure perceptions of corruption in the cross-national context. The only such survey for the American states is a questionnaire distributed to reporters covering the House of Representatives in each state during legislative sessions in 1999. The survey data is limited to the forty-five states where reporters responded and is only available for one year (Boylan and Long 2003). In contrast, corruption conviction data are publicly available for every state in each year dating back to 1976. I use the number of U.S. Department of Justice corruption indictments within a given state, normalized by state population as the primary dependent variable in my analysis. By doing so, I significantly increase the number of cases in the sample and allow for panel analysis. Moreover, the conviction-based corruption measure facilitates comparison with a large body of state corruption literature, since the majority of relevant studies use normalized convictions as a dependent variable (Nice 1983; Meier and Holbrook 1992; Goel and Nelson 1998; Maxwell and Winters 2005; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Alt and Lassen 2008; Alt and Lassen 2011). In any case, the convictions variable correlates positively with the Boylan and Long measure, consistent with comparable research (Alt and Lassen 2008: 40). Even so, I test the robustness of my results using the survey data, as reported in the New York Times (Boylan and Long 2003; Marsh 2008).

Like any proxy for actual corruption, the conviction-based measure has limitations, foremost among which is that it only accounts for overt abuses of power detected and found to be illegal. Since the conviction count variable is inherently limited to illegal activities, it fails to capture behavior that is unethical, but not illegal. Consequently, the scope of my analysis will inevitably leave out some "politically interesting activities" that many Americans would likely perceive as corrupt (Meier and Holbrook 1993; Peters and Welch 1978). That said, the conviction-based measure tends to produce results that match common perceptions about which states are most corrupt (Maxwell and Winters 2005). Moreover, the list of most and least corrupt states produced by this measure matches reasonably well with rankings produced by other studies in the state corruption literature (Glaeser and Saks 2006). Conviction counts also provide a relatively objective measure of corruption, unlike the surveybased measures that capture only perceptions of graft. This objectivity helps prevent misspecification due to survey non-response error, measurement error, inconsistent responses, and variation between samples (Glaeser and Saks 2006: 1058). Furthermore, because indictments are made by the U.S. Department of Justice, a centralized federal agency insulated from state influence, enforcement is likely to be consistent across the fifty states (Nice 198: 508).

As stated above, I normalize the number of corruption convictions by state population. While deflating convictions by the number of state public officials might be a more appropriate specification (Maxwell and Winters 2005), the U.S. Census Bureau discontinued the report providing this data as of 1992 (U.S. Census Bureau 1995). Consequently, the normalized variable would be outdated for cross-sectional studies of corruption in 2010 and distorted in years after 1992 due to lack of variation in the variable denominator. Given that other studies of American state corruption normalize by population (Alt and Lassen 2011; Glaeser and Saks 2006) and that related data is available on a yearly basis (U.S. Census Bureau 2014), I use conviction counts divided by the state's annual population in my analysis.

Independent Variables: Political Culture

For my primary independent variable, I use the proportion of women serving in the state legislature. This proportion reflects the share of women in both chambers of the state's legislature (with the exception of Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature) and is available on an annual basis through the Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics (Center for American Women and Politics 2014). Another important variable, the percentage of women with a college education, is available through the U.S. Census Bureau, while female participation in the labor force can be located in the U.S. Statistical Abstract (U.S. Census Bureau 2014; U.S. Statistical Abstract 2012). Overall education, defined here as the percentage of the state population with a college degree, is also obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). To measure legislative professionalism, I employ the widely used "Squire Index," a composite variable that accounts for session length, legislator salary, and staff resources (Squire 2007) and is available through State Politics and Policy Quarterly (State Politics and Political Quarterly 2014).

For other aspects of political culture, I turn to several indices commonly used in state electoral studies. To quantify political competition, I employ the Ranney index, which accounts for each party's share of legislative seats and the gubernatorial vote, as well as the occurrence of divided government. The index ranges from zero to one (with zero signifying complete Republican control and one complete Democratic control) and is available as a rolling average through Indiana State political scientist Carl Klarner (Klarner 2013). Measures for citizen and elite ideology rely on the Berry ideology index, which synthesizes ideological positions of congressional candidates and district-level election results into statewide measures of citizen and elite ideology (Berry et al. 1998: 331). These data are made available by Richard Fording (Fording 2014).

Control Variables: Institutions and Deterrence

To account for interstate variation in political institutions, I use variables for term limits, direct initiatives, open primaries, recall laws, and transparency laws. I retrieve data on term limits, open primaries, and recall laws from the website of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), a nonpartisan organization that provides interstate research on various policy initiatives for state legislators and staff. The term limits variable is a binary field that indicates whether or not a law limiting legislative terms has taken effect in a given state, recognizing only those states where the term limits law has restricted a legislator's ability to run for office (NCSL 2014a).¹ I operationalize direct initiatives as the presence of a law that allows state citizens to directly propose either a statute or Constitutional amendment (NCSL 2014b). The variable for open primaries is also dichotomous and specifies whether a state's primary nomination system is open to voters of all parties, while the binary variable for recall laws indicates whether a state has legislation that allows voters to remove state legislators from office (NCSL 2014b). I account for state transparency policies using the 2008 Better Government transparency index, which rates states based on freedom of information, open-meetings, whistleblower protection, and conflict of interest laws (Better Government Association 2008).

To measure the effect of institutional deterrence on corruption, I use the ratio of average state-worker to average private-worker salary and state police expenditures. The ratio of public to private salary is an institutional practice that deters corruption because public workers may be discouraged from corrupt behavior when they have more salary to lose (Goel and Rich 198: 274). I calculate this ratio by dividing the average public worker salary by the average private worker salary for each state. The average public employee salary is the total amount paid in state government salaries divided by the total number of state employees, while the average private worker salary is the total salaries paid to private sector employees divided by the total number of private sector workers. I obtain all data for these calculations from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2014). State police expenditures may also deter corruption (Goel and Nelson 1998) and are measured using annual census estimates (U.S. Census Bureau 2014).

Finally, in order to ensure that my models do not suffer from omitted variable bias, I include controls for a series of additional state economic and demographic variables, including income inequality, GSP per capita, household income, unemployment, urbanization, and government revenue. I measure income inequality using state-level Gini coefficients calculated by Mark Frank (Frank 2008). Information for Gross State Product per capita and household income per capita are taken from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2014), while variables for annual unemployment percentages, percent population living in urban areas, and government revenue (a proxy for government size) are again informed by U.S. Census Bureau data.²

Quantitative Framework and Results

As mentioned previously, this paper proposes to test the relationship between corruption and female legislative representation in the American states, as well as the underlying institutional and political cultural factors that could be responsible for this correlation. Accordingly, my quantitative analysis proceeds in the following stages:

 Replication of models from cross-national studies of female representation and corruption using cross-sectional data from the United States.

- Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female legislative representation on corruption in the presence of institutional and demographic controls.
- 3. Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female representation on corruption, controlling for institutional deterrence.
- 4. Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female representation on corruption, controlling for elements of political culture not directly related to female representation.
- Cross-sectional models that substitute a measure for overall female opportunity for the female representation variable.
- 6. Fixed-effect models to account for latent determinants of corruption that vary between states.

Unless otherwise specified, the dependent variable in each of the models is the five-year lagged average of corruption convictions as of 2010, normalized by state population. Lagged variables are advantageous because the averages reduce the possibility that a single year with abnormally high (or low) corruption convictions will bias the regression estimates. This insulation from yearly fluctuation is particularly beneficial because the American setting yields a relatively small cross-sectional sample of only fifty cases. Second, the use of averages allows for maximum comparability with the Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) study, as well as studies in the American corruption literature, which also use variables averaged across years (Meier and Holbrook 1992; Maxwell and Winters 2005; Glaeser and Saks 2006). Because conviction counts are heavily right skewed, I take the log transformation of indictment counts after applying a simple shift parameter (n+1) to the variable. The resulting dependent variable is normally distributed and produces corruption rankings similar to those produced by measures in comparable studies (Glaeser and Saks 2006).

Replication of International Models

In order to determine whether the same correlations observed in international corruption studies occur among the American states, I use five ordinary least squares regression models that include the state equivalents of the variables employed in the specifications put forward by Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001). Models 1, 2, and 4 in Table 1 illustrate that the proportion of women in state legislatures has a negative impact on public official corruption conviction that is statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level. Substantively speaking, the exponentiated coefficient for women in the legislature indicates that a 1 percent increase in female legislators corresponds with a 4.7 percent decrease in corruption. This relationship holds in the presence of controls for education, gross state product, and region, in both 2010 and 1999.

While the inclusion of controls for region reduces the significance of female representation as a predictor of corruption in 2010 (see model 3), female representation retains high levels of statistical significance in 1999, suggesting that the relationship may vary over time. As a robustness check, I test the basic model again using Richard

Variables	(1) 2010	(2) 2010	(3) 2010	(4) 1999	(5) 1999
	Log of Normalized Cor- ruption Convictions (Five- Year Lagged Average)	Expert Survey			
Women in Legislature	0368***	0457***	0275*	0400***	0517**
	(.0132)	(.0168)	(.0154)	(.0124)	(.0218)
Ln (GSP)		-2.131	-2.644**	-5.173***	7.345***
		(1.422)	(1.307)	(1.366)	(2.157)
Ln(GSP)2		.0817	.102*	.219***	280***
		(.0583)	(.0530)	(.0594)	(.0999)
Midwest			0808	.0276	-1.540**
			(.222)	(.184)	(.652)
South			.126	0581	-1.060
			(.240)	(.197)	(.701)
West			296	158	595
			(.228)	(.210)	(.626)
% College		.0186			0633
		(.0210)			(.0583)
Ln (Population)					546
					(1.281)
Constant	2.065***	15.51*	18.83**	32.22***	-32.31*
	(.336)	(8.681)	(7.942)	(7.750)	(16.81)
Observations	50	50	50	49	46
R-squared	.17	.26	.30	.44	.35

Table 1: Corruption and Female Legislators in the U.S.

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

T. Boylan and Cheryl X. Long's survey-based corruption measure and find that the number of women in the legislature continues to have a significant, negative effect on corruption rates. Thus, the results from my replication of the Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti models suggest that despite the universal existence of liberal democracy in the U.S., there is a non-trivial negative relationship between female participation in government and instances of state corruption.

Institutions, Economics, and Demographics

With the existence of a negative correlation between females in the legislature and corruption in the American states relatively established, I proceed to examine whether the relationship holds in models that control for state economic, demographic, and institutional variables. The first model in Table 2 features controls for state characteristics such as urbanization, real gross state product (GSP) per capita, the log transformation of government revenue, and education. Consistent with other studies, the sign and significance of the real GSP per capita variable suggest that more affluent states tend to observe more corruption convictions (Alt and Lassen 2003). Notably, the proportion of women in state legislatures continues to have a significant, negative effect on corruption rates in the presence of demographic and economic controls, providing further evidence for a cross-sectional link between female representation and corruption. Other models (not shown) that control for state income inequality and unemployment support the same conclusion.³

Table 2 also indicates that the female representation variable retains statistical and substantive significance when I consider variation in political institutions across states. The first model, which features institutional factors alone, achieves a relatively poor fit, explaining only about 20 percent of the variance in corruption convictions. When other state economic and demographic characteristics are also included in the regression specification, the fit of the model improves substantially, achieving a higher R-squared than the models that include either demographic or institutional variables alone. Model 4 in Table 2 indicates that the presence of term limits seems to correspond with higher rates of state corruption. Although this finding seems counterintuitive, it may be that those states that adopt term limits do so in response to already high levels of government corruption. The presence of direct initiatives, on the other hand, has a negative effect on corruption that achieves modest levels of statistical significance. Likewise, high transparency scores are negatively related to the number of corruption convictions in a state, though the variable achieves only borderline levels of statistical significance. Taken on the whole, the results from the four models in Table 2 suggest that the number of women in the legislature maintains significance in the presence of institutional controls, purely institutional models fail to achieve good fit, and institutional variables such as direct initiatives and transparency laws are associated with modest reductions in corruption.

Institutional Deterrence

The first two models in Table 3 attempt to gauge the effect of state practices that deter corruption by including variables for the ratio of public to private sector worker salaries and state police expenditures. Neither variable comes close to conventional levels of statistical significance, nor do interaction terms that multiply each deterrence variable on the percentage of female legislators (not shown). In this model, state police expenditures and public official salary are not significantly related to corruption. That said, the salary ratio and police expenditure variables do not seem to fully capture the concept of deterrence. Despite this limitation, my analysis can still comment on the validity of institutional deterrence theories because

	Domo o orrenda i en	Trantitudiana		
	Demographics	Institutions		
Variables	(1) 2010	(2) 2010	(3) 2010	(4) 2010
	Log of Normalized	Corruption Cor	victions (Five-Ye	ear Lagged Average)
Women in Legislature	0405**	0330**		0388***
	(.0168)	(.0155)		(.0135)
% Urban	0123*	00820		00264
	(.00652)	(.00790)		(.00701)
Real GSP Per Capita	.0288*	.0296**		.0235*
	(.0146)	(.0144)		(.0135)
Per Capita Income	.0296	.0344		.0156
	(.0339)	(.0343)		(.0370)
Ln (Revenue)	0444	101		
	(.0904)	(.0866)		
% College Graduates	.00416			
	(.0233)			
Open Primaries			.0580	
			(.187)	
Recall Law			144	
			(.216)	
Term Limits			.590**	.573**
			(.259)	(.217)
Direct Initiative			488*	365
			(.272)	(.229)
Transparency			0204**	0124
			(.00930)	(.00907)
Ln (Population)				0847
				(.0793)
Constant	1.493	1.594	2.278***	2.852*
	(1.305)	(1.266)	(.475)	(1.653)
Controls for Region	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	50	50	50	50
R-squared	.32	.34	.24	.42

Table 2: Corruption: Gender, Demographics, and Institutions

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

enforcement is overseen by the Department of Justice, a federal agency independent from state governments, making the threat of enforcement relatively consistent across states.⁴ In other words, because female representation is still a significant predictor of corruption when monitoring and enforcement are held constant, it appears that institutional deterrence arguments fail to explain the link between gender and corruption in the United States.

	(1) 2010	(2) 2005	(3) 2010	(4) 2005
Variables	Log of Norr Average)	nalized Corrup	tion Conviction	ns (Five-Year Lagged
Women in Legislature	0485***	0491***	0481***	0495***
	(.0178)	(.0111)	(.0173)	(.0110)
Political Competition	.233	.258	.229	.254
	(.607)	(.748)	(.604)	(.735)
Citizen Ideology	.00417	.00153	.00546	.00163
	(.00725)	(.00682)	(.00734)	(.00675)
% Urban	0110	.00240	0112	.00235
	(.00676)	(.00532)	(.00671)	(.00522)
Real GSP Per Capita	.0280**	.0115	.0263**	.0119
	(.0131)	(.00980)	(.0130)	(.00957)
Per Capita Income	.0228	0277	.0193	0281
	(.0373)	(.0285)	(.0360)	(.0284)
Ln (Revenue)	0480	351**	0688	330***
	(.0968)	(.138)	(.0907)	(.117)
Legislative Professionalism		1.305		1.382*
		(.788)		(.744)
Ratio of public/private salary	.687			
	(.837)			
Police expenditures		1.30e-07		
		(3.45e-07)		
Constant	.924	5.262***	1.922	5.084***
	(1.777)	(1.494)	(1.320)	(1.322)
Observations	49	47	49	47
R-squared	.35	.42	.34	.42

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Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Political Culture

Now that I have analyzed the relationship between female representation and corruption in the context of state demographics and political institutions, I examine the effect of other political cultural factors on corruption convictions. Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 show the effect of cultural variables such as citizen ideology, political competition, and legislative professionalism on corruption. Because neither citizen ideology nor political competition have significant effects on indictment rates in either 2005 or 2010, it seems that differences in ideology and party heterogeneity between states do not contribute meaningfully to the corruption equation.

As in previous models, the percentage of college-educated citizens does not reach statistical significance in any model of corruption and political culture and is not reported in Table 3. However, because overall levels of education correlate highly with the percentage of women in the legislature, I revisit the importance of education in the fixed-effects analysis described below. The addition of legislative professionalism to the 2005 specification alters the fit of the model and dramatically influences the size and significance of the coefficient for government revenue (since professionalism and government size are closely related), though it achieves only marginal significance in model 2. The positive coefficient suggests that a more professionalized legislature corresponds with higher state indictment rates.⁵ Additional models (not shown) that control for elite ideology, the percentage of Democrats in the state House of Representatives, and a binary field for divided government produce similar results. Overall, models 3 and 4 indicate that ideology and political competition do not significantly affect corruption, professionalized legislatures are modestly associated with higher rates of indictment, and the percentage of female legislators continues to coincide with statistically and substantively significant decreases in these rates.

Having assessed the relationship between gender and corruption in light of state demographic and economic characteristics, institutions, and political culture, I present models that simultaneously consider cultural and institutional factors. By including both types of variables in a single model, I can make inferences about which variables seem to have the strongest effect on corruption rates. To facilitate comparison with subsequent models, I rescale the percentage of women in the legislature variable to run from zero to one. As has been the case in all of the models previously displayed, models 1 and 2 indicate that female representation has a significantly negative effect on corruption, with a 1 percent increase in female representation corresponding to a 5.3 percent decrease in conviction indictments in 2010 (when the coefficient is exponentiated).⁶ The term limits coefficient remains positive and significant but seems to have a weaker effect on corruption relative to female representation.

To better understand whether female representation or political cultural factors in general are more strongly correlated with corruption rates, I introduce a measure that accounts for a wide range of societal opportunities for women. This variable combines the percentage of female legislators with the percentage of the female population participating in the labor force and the percentage of women with a college degree. The resulting standardized index achieves an alpha coefficient of .84, and exploratory factor analysis indicates the three variables load highly on a single factor. For ease of interpretation, I rescale the variable to run between zero and one. From a theoretical perspective, I feel that by including variables that account for female participation in the workforce, higher education, and political office, I produce a measure that encompasses three highly relevant categories of civic life, even if the measure is not exhaustive.

Models 3 and 4 indicate that the coefficient for the female opportunity index has a significantly larger substantive impact than every other variable in the model, suggesting that relatively high levels of female opportunity correspond with dramatically lower levels of corruption. While I cannot include the female opportunity index and female representation variable in the same model due multicollinearity, comparing the coefficients across otherwise identical models suggests that overall female opportunity has a substantively larger negative effect on corruption than representation alone. I argue that because the index accounts for female opportunity in general rather than focusing solely on political representation, the index is a better indicator of political culture and, ultimately, a stronger predictor of corruption.

To put this difference in perspective, the female legislative representation variable produces a coefficient of -2.08 in 2010, more than one and a half times smaller than the -3.35 coefficient value achieved by the female opportunity index in the same year. In 2005, the female opportunity index coefficient was more than twice as large as the female representation variable. Although I cannot formally test the difference-indifferences for the two variables (via an interaction term) due to collinearity, I argue that the markedly consistent differences in magnitude provide at least suggestive evidence that the female opportunity variable has a larger negative effect on corruption. I am further encouraged by the results of robustness checks that replicate the Table 4 models using the expert survey measure (see Table 5). These alternative models yield similar results, with the female opportunity index registering an even larger negative effect on state corruption levels relative to female representation. Based on these findings, I assert that female opportunity in general has a stronger negative impact on corruption than female legislative representation alone. Moreover, because female opportunity, inherently bound up in a state's political values, norms, and ideas about gender roles, is a representation of political culture, models 3 and 4 suggest that cultural factors have a substantively stronger cross-sectional effect on corruption than the institutional factors that I consider in my empirical tests.

Fixed-Effect Models

Of course, it is highly plausible that the female opportunity measure serves as a proxy for underlying societal constructs also related to corruption. In order to further evaluate the relationship between corruption, gender, and the latent cultural factors that female representation and opportunity may represent, I use fixed-effect regressions to analyze panel data that spans between 1983 and 2010. Fixed-effect regressions cre-

ate a series of dichotomous variables, designating the state to which each observation pertains, allowing me to control for omitted independent variables that vary between

	(1) 2010	(2) 2005	(3) 2010	(4) 2005
Variables	Log of Normaliz Average)	zed Corruption	n Convictions (Five-Year Lagged
Women in Legislature	-2.077***	-1.970***		
	(0.533)	(0.435)		
Female Opportunity Index			-3.346***	-4.117***
			(0.891)	(0.741)
Real GSP Per Capita	0.025*	0.024**	0.038**	0.038***
	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.009)
% Urban	-0.004	-0.003	-0.012	-0.009
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Per Capita Income	0047	-0.014	-0.012	-0.022
	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.025)
Ln (Revenue)	-0.099	-0.348***	-0.137	-0.352***
	(0.092)	(0.113)	(0.095)	(0.090)
Term Limits	0.604***	-0.040	0.565**	-0.0795
	(0.208)	(0.175)	(0.226)	(0.181)
Direct Initiative	-0.218	0.450**	-0.176	0.279
	(0.223)	(0.202)	(0.245)	(0.207)
Transparency	-0.015		-0.011	
	(0.011)		(0.011)	
Political Competition	0.411	0.851	-0.341	-0.796
	(0.599)	(0.696)	(0.689)	(0.713)
Citizen Ideology	0.008	0.001	0.010	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Legislative Professionalism		1.305*		1.147*
		(0.722)		(0.620)
Constant	2.762*	4.525***	4.715**	6.989***
	(1.467)	(1.194)	(1.874)	(1.304)
Observations	49	47	49	49
R-squared	0.47	0.51	0.45	0.53

Table 4: Corruption: Combined and Female Opportunity Models

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Robustness Check: Combined and Female Opportunity Models

	(1) 1999	(2) 1999	(3) 1999	(4) 1999
Variables	State Corrup	ption: Survey of House of Representatives Reporters		
% Women in Legislature	-2.155**	-2.167**		
(Rescaled 0–1)	(0.936)	(0.947)		
Female Opportunity In- dex			-6.627***	-6.613***
			(0.888)	(0.945)
Real GSP Per Capita	-0.020	-0.017	0.019	0.022
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.025)
% Urban	0.038**	0.040***	0.039***	0.040***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Per Capita Income	0.020	0.050	0.030	0.059
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.054)
Ln (Revenue)	0.010	0.183	-0.208	-0.043
	(0.213)	(0.255)	(0.176)	(0.206)
Term Limits	-1.943***	-1.944***	-1.503**	-1.509***
	(0.633)	(0.597)	(0.574)	(0.523)
Direct Initiative	0.208	0.138	0.191	0.114
	(0.367)	(0.379)	(0.292)	(0.281)
Political Competition	3.321***	3.174***	1.946**	1.798*
	(1.008)	(1.084)	(0.901)	(0.933)
Citizen Ideology	-0.003	-0.001	0.003	0.005
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Legislative Professional- ism		-1.309		-1.203
		(1.271)		(1.118)
Constant	0.646	-1.698	4.949**	2.717
	(2.372)	(2.738)	(2.209)	(2.425)
Observations	45	43	45	43
R-squared	0.50	0.52	0.69	0.72

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

states but do not vary over time (Stock and Watson 2003). In addition to fixed effects for state, I use cluster robust standard errors based on the state variable and include

dichotomous variables indicating the five-year period to which each observation pertains. Panel regression is useful for this analysis, because it provides a way to determine whether the relationships between female representation and corruption and female opportunity and corruption are significant across time, controlling for omitted withinstate variables. These results will also help me determine whether the variables for female representation and female opportunity are mere proxies for other within-state cultural values, institutions, and characteristics I cannot include in my models.

The fixed-effect regressions in Table 6 include variables similar to those in the cross-sectional models, though some variables are omitted because data are not available over the course of the entire panel.⁷ Instead of using the lagged average of normalized corruption, the dependent variable used in the cross-sectional regressions, I use the log transformation of yearly corruption counts, normalized by population. Model 1 shows that controlling for time period and fixed-effects for states, the proportion of female legislators ceases to have a significant negative effect on corruption convictions. Instead, most of the variation between states is explained by unobserved state factors, as evidenced by the large and highly significant constant value. While female legislative representation is no longer significant, the female opportunity index continues to have a significant negative impact on logged conviction rates, though the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly lower than in cross-sectional models. Based on the large, significant constant values (which represent the impact of between-state differences for which the model does not account), it seems that female opportunity may serve as a proxy for other within-state factors in cross-sectional models. The variable for overall education is also significant when regressed against corruption rates over time, suggesting that states with higher-than-average percentages of college graduates tend to have lower corruption conviction counts over time.

That the variables for both overall education and female opportunity (which is partially comprised of a measure for female education) remain statistically and substantively significant over time, while female political representation does not suggests that education may have the largest impact on corruption counts. Indeed, when I replace the female opportunity index with the female education variable (Table $_{6}$, model 5), the coefficient of the female education variable (-1.47) alone is nearly identical to the female opportunity index variable. That said, a similar model (not shown) indicates that the percentage of women in the labor force is also a significant (p=.06) and substantive (\Box =-1.11) correlate of low corruption levels.⁸ Moreover, an index measure that combines the female education and women in the labor force variables has a substantively large coefficient (\Box =-1.87). The discrepancy between this two-item index and the three-item female opportunity index illustrates the need to find additional measures of female opportunity. That said, the continued significance of female labor participation and female education suggests that low levels of normalized corruption convictions cannot be attributed to overall education alone. Rather, uniquely female factors appear to be strongly related to low levels of cor-
Table	6:	Fixed	Effect	Regressi	ons:	1983-	-2010

	Log of Corr				
Variables	(1) Gender	(2) Female Opportunity	(3) Educa- tion	(4) Female Education & Labor	(5) Female Education
% Women in Legislature	0.218				
(Rescaled 0–1)	(0.328)				
Female Opportunity Index		-1.488**			
		(0.720)			
Education			-1.293***		
			(0.407)		
Female Education & Labor				-1.874***	
				(0.603)	
Female Education					-1.467***
					(0.346)
Real GSP per capita	0.005	0.009	0.012	0.012	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.0104)
Income per capita	-0.0003	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ln (Population)	-0.854***	-0.928***	-0.834***	-0.834***	-1.211***
	(0.308)	(0.329)	(0.301)	(0.301)	(0.337)
Term Limits	0.140	0.133	0.142	0.142	0.154
	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.099)
Citizen Ideology		-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Government Ideology	0.001				
	(0.002)				
Constant	13.64***	15.62***	13.98***	20.08***	15.71***
	(4.540)	(4.963)	(4.458)	(5.098)	(4.419)
State Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Time Period	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,190	1,190	1,190	1,190	1,190
R-squared	0.38	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.40

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ruption.⁹ In short, while the variable representing the proportion of women in state legislatures ceases to be significant over time, female education and the percentage of women in the labor force remain strong predictors of corruption convictions.

While the female opportunity index, education, and modified index variables are significantly related to corruption convictions, much of the variation in indictments can be attributed to within-state factors that I cannot capture in my quantitative models. Since the factors that contribute to the large constant values in the panel analyses cannot be observed, it is unclear whether the remaining variation in corruption convictions can be explained by institutional or cultural factors or something else. However, because the female opportunity index and overall education variables are significantly related to lower levels of corruption, it seems that political culture has an important effect on indictment rates, controlling for many important state institutional, demographic, and economic traits.

Discussion

To recap the results of my empirical tests, I revisit my initial hypotheses. I first postulated that the cross-sectional relationship between the proportion of females in the legislature and corruption would be statistically significant among the American states. Evidence from cross-sectional regressions for two years and two distinct corruption dependent variables suggests that corruption and female legislative representation are significantly related. Next, I hypothesized that the correlation between corruption and the proportion of female legislators would hold in the presence of institutional controls. My results offer support for this hypothesis and suggest that institutional factors alone fail to explain substantial variation in corruption convictions. Furthermore, because the association between female representation and corruption remains statistically and substantively significant within the highly democratic context of the U.S., democratic institutional factors alone do not adequately explain the relationship between gender and corruption.

I also speculated that institutional deterrence would not have an independent negative effect on corruption. Models with controls for institutional corruption disincentives, combined with the inherent controls of independent federal enforcement, suggest that accounting for deterrence does not alter the relationship between gender and corruption. Finally, I hypothesized that overall female opportunity would have a stronger negative correlation with corruption levels and that the significance of the female representation variable would diminish in longitudinal models. My analysis suggests that female opportunity has a stronger impact on corruption in both the short and long term. I contend that a broader conception of female opportunity that considers female opportunity in education, politics, and the labor force is a more comprehensive representation of political culture, with female education and labor force activity being the most powerful drivers of the correlation between female opportunity and low levels of corruption.

I stress that this study does not assert that the number of women in government influences corruption because of innate feminine superiority, since the data I use does

not lend itself to these types of inferences. Instead, I argue that state political cultures that encourage women to participate equally in various aspects of community life tend to support other values that discourage corrupt behavior. Thus, while achieving higher levels of female political representation is a goal that should be pursued for its own sake, artificially adding women to government may not prove a viable solution to corruption unless accompanied by corresponding shifts in cultural values. Future attitudinal research may provide insights into whether American states with higher support for gender egalitarianism are actually less corrupt. The enormous amounts of variance attributable to between-state differences in the fixed effects regression models indicates that unique local dynamics have a profound effect on rates of corruption. At the same time, the significance of female opportunity as a negative correlate of corruption suggests that measures of overall female opportunity are a useful way to evaluate the effect of political culture on corruption conviction rates.

Conclusion

In sum, after analyzing the relationship between female legislative representation and corruption in the U.S., I have introduced evidence suggesting that the correlations observed in cross-national studies hold within a highly liberal democratic context in the presence of various institutional, demographic, and cultural controls. I have also introduced an original index to measure female opportunity and found that this index has a meaningful, negative relationship with state corruption. My analysis indicates that significant variation in corruption rates can be traced to between state factors that go unobserved in the models I present. Though the link between gender and corruption is far from clear, my research suggests that levels of female opportunity are a useful way to understand the effect of political culture on corruption in the United States.

NOTES

- 1. I focus on term limit laws that have taken effect, because after term limits are enacted, there is often a significant lag between passing and implementing the actual limit, during which time several laws have been stricken down or repealed (NCSL 2014a).
- 2. The following variables were obtained through both the U.S. Census Bureau and the State Politics and Policy Quarterly data center: percent population living in urban areas, education, gross state product, state revenue, and police expenditures. Data in years 1983–2005 are provided by SPPQ, while data from later years is collected from the census. The percentage of females in the labor force was collected by SPPQ for years before 1999; I retrieved later data from the U.S. Statistical Abstract.
- 3. Omitting the variable for percentage of college graduates in the state actually improves the fit of the model, suggesting that education correlates highly with another variable in the model. I provide further discussion of the education variable in subsequent models.
- 4. In line with previous research, I would like to control for variables that explain degrees of enforcement such as the number of U.S. attorneys per capita and state U.S. attorney office prosecutorial expenditures (see, for example, Alt and Lassen 2011). Unfortunately, I cannot include these variables due to a lack of publicly available data.
- 5. I do not test legislative professionalism in the 2010 model due to data availability constraints.
- 6. In order to report the exponentiated coefficient in percentage terms, I first run the model using the original the percentage of women in the legislature (not rescaled). Because the variable

has the same relative values, other coefficients are identical for both versions of the female representation variable.

- 7. Because no new states adopted a new open primary or direct initiative measure after 1983, the binary fields representing these statutes are not included in the panel analysis, since they do not vary over the years covered by the panel sample.
- 8. For purposes of comparison, I rescale the female political representation, female education, overall education, and female participation in the labor force variables to run between zero and one.
- 9. Ideally, I would compare the relative magnitude of these coefficients directly via an interaction term in the same regression model. Due to multicollinearity concerns, however, I cannot include the variables in the same model.

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