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

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# A Letter From the Editor

Dear reader,

Seeking truth is an uncomfortable endeavor. It compels us to reconsider the personal narratives we hold about our identity and the nature of the world around us. As a result, it challenges our preconceptions and biases, encouraging us to explore, understand, and appreciate the perspectives of others. In a world overwhelmed by polarization, seeking and understanding the truth is imperative. With that said, our call as researchers is to seek the truth, regardless of the discomfort it may reveal or the biases it forces us to confront. Our goal should be to consistently employ the empirical evidence we uncover to stabilize the chaotic, polarized, and normative-driven political discourse. At times, this chaos may obscure the truth, yet it is our duty to persist in seeking and attaining it.

This edition of Sigma explores several critical and complex issues in today's political discourse, including the global effects of U.S. intervention, the link between public support for wars and militant desertion, the influence of public goods distribution on terrorism, and the domestic divisions and radicalization that sparked the French Revolution. Despite their challenging nature, each article offers valuable insights, refining our empirical understanding of these global phenomena and deepening our grasp of the truth.

The publication of this edition is entirely owed to the tireless efforts of our editorial team and the invaluable support of numerous campus departments. I extend my sincere thanks to the Political Science and International Relations departments and to the Kennedy Center for International Studies for their ongoing commitment to the funding and publication of Sigma. My gratitude also extends to the faculty members who graciously volunteered their time to review and provide feedback for this year's articles. I express special thanks to my remarkable and dedicated leadership team, Ellie Mitchell and Andrew Rushing, and to our faculty advisor, Doug Atkinson. Additionally, I thank Scott Cooper for his continued guidance and support of Sigma. I am grateful to the editorial board for their concerted efforts to elevate and celebrate the work of our authors; and, finally, I offer my immense gratitude to this year's authors for their patience and dedication throughout the revision process and for entrusting us with the privilege of publishing their work for the Sigma audience.

I am proud to present the 2024-25 edition of Sigma.

Hannah Smith
Editor-in-Chief

# From Revolution to Restraint: The Domestic Origins of France's Foreign Policy of Non-Intervention in 1830

Annabelle Crawford

## I. Introduction

The French Revolution of July 1830 overthrew the monarchy of the Bourbon Restoration and replaced it with a liberal constitutional monarchy under Louis Philippe. In August 1830, the Belgian Revolution began, at least partly inspired by France (Pinkney 1972, 307). Belgian nationalists agitated for freedom from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and for the establishment of Belgium as an independent state.

Many prominent theories of international conflict would predict that in the aftermath of the 1830 revolutions, France should have gone to war with the conservative powers of Europe on behalf of Belgium. However, despite military and political opportunities for war, incentives to spread or counter France's new liberal ideology, and misunderstandings between France and the other European powers, French leaders and leaders of the conservative great powers alike actively pursued a European peace. This presents a theoretical puzzle: why wasn't there a conflict between the French revolutionary state and other European states in the aftermath of the July Revolution?

I argue that the European peace of 1830 and subsequent years is rooted in France's domestic political environment. The centrist Orléanists, so-called because they advocated for a constitutional monarchy under Louis Philippe, the Duke of Orléans, were the ultimate victors of the 1830 Revolution. They were concerned about a right-wing royalist threat to King Louis Philippe's throne. However, I argue that they were more concerned about the threat of the radicalization of republicans on the political left. The Orléanists believed that radicalization of the republican faction could lead to war abroad, which could strengthen the political power of the republicans at the expense

of the Orléanists. Thus, Louis Phillippe and the Orléanists promoted peace abroad as a safeguard against the rise of the radical right and especially the radical left.

The decisions of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain—the great powers of Europe—to deliberately seek peace with France were also rooted in their perceptions of France's domestic political environment. Like the Orléanists, the great powers feared that conflict with France would embolden radicals and spark French territorial and ideological expansion, disrupting the balance of power which favored conservatives. Thus, this paper argues that following the French Revolution of 1830, France and the great powers of Europe did not go to war over the Belgian question largely because their leaders wanted to mitigate the possibility that the radical left would gain power in France.

Most prominent theories of revolution and war assume that revolutions almost always lead to interstate conflict. Fred Halliday (1999, 241) writes that "it is an almost universal generalization that revolutions lead to wars," and Stephen Walt (1996, 45) calls revolution a sufficient condition for war. However, when scholars do case studies on revolutionary conflict, they often select on the dependent variable, applying their theories only to revolutions that resulted in war and spending little time on those that resulted in peace. There is not enough attention paid in the literature to the conditions under which revolution does not lead to war. Walt (1996, 1, 18) sidesteps this puzzle by saying that even when revolution is not followed by war, it is followed by increased security competition. Even if his assertion is true,[1] he and others devote minimal attention to explaining why revolution can sometimes lead to war but in other cases only leads to increased tensions.

Many scholars have studied the French Revolutionary Wars that began in 1792.[2] However, few scholars have studied why the later French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 did *not* end in war. This could be because the French Revolution of 1789 resulted in much more significant upheaval than the later revolutions. Yet the upheaval was so significant largely because war further radicalized the revolution (Blanning 1996, 107). Why revolution did not lead to war in 1830 or 1848 is thus an important question.

The case of France in 1830 proves that states can overturn the old political regime without denouncing the incumbent international system and that agents can protect revolutionary changes at home without pushing risky conflict abroad. Although this paper does not attempt to articulate a general theory of revolutionary war, it will demonstrate conditions under which a revolution might not lead to war and suggest that the state of domestic politics is an important, and often neglected, determinant of revolutionary conflict.

[1] This is contrary to what I will argue in this paper. I claim that in the French case of 1830, security competition increased very little.

[2] This includes the political science literature (see Kidner 1971; Walt 1996) and the historical literature (see Clapham 1899; Blanning, 1986; Kaiser 2008; Schroeder 1994; Scott 2006).

## II. Theories of Revolutionary Conflict and Their Implications for France in 1830

Stephen Walt's book *Revolution and War* is the leading work on why revolutions lead to conflict abroad, and it embraces three causal processes: opportunism, ideological differences, and misperceptions (Walt 1996, 32–44). Opportunist theories argue that counter-revolutionary states take advantage of the relative weakness of the revolutionary state to gain territory and increase their relative security. Thus, revolution might not lead to war if the revolutionary state is not weakened or if the counter-revolutionary states lack the capacity to invade. Ideological theories argue that revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries alike promote conflict to either advance or impede universalizing revolutionary ideas. Thus, revolution might not lead to war if the new regime does not adopt a unique revolutionary ideology or if there is no domestic support in the counter-revolutionary states for said ideology. Misperception theories argue that revolutionary and counter-revolutionary states mistrust the other side and misunderstand their intentions, exacerbating tensions between them. In a similar vein, miscalculation theories argue that both sides miscalculate the abilities of the other side to wage war. Thus, revolution might not lead to conflict if the new revolutionary regime and the counter-revolutionary states do not misperceive or miscalculate the goals and actions of their rival.

In the following sections, I demonstrate that under each of these theories, 1830 France and the counter-revolutionary states had the motive and opportunity to initiate conflict. Opportunist, ideological, and misperception theories all suggest that security competition between the great powers should have increased in the aftermath of the French and Belgian Revolutions of 1830. Thus, I show that despite the breadth of Stephen Walt's explanation of revolutionary foreign policy, his theory and others that embrace similar causal pathways cannot explain the peace that followed the French Revolution of 1830. I also demonstrate that the influence of domestic politics (a causal pathway that Walt mostly ignores) is the most significant determinant of European peace in 1830 and the subsequent years.

### *A. Opportunism*

Walt and other realists like Ewenstein and Mearsheimer argue that because states want to ensure their own survival, they continually seek ways to gain power vis-à-vis other states. Walt's opportunist theory of revolutionary foreign policy holds that counter-revolutionary states take advantage of the weakness of revolutionary states, initiating conflict to seize territory or to preempt any change to international borders and balance of power instigated by the revolutionary state (Ewenstein 2020, 18; Mearsheimer 2001, 29; Walt 1996, 32–33). Opportunistic theories suggest that states should only *not* go to war following a revolution if the counter-revolutionary states lack opportunity to gain territory or if they do not have reason to be concerned that the revolution will change the international balance of power.

The great powers believed France was weak following the revolution (Metternich 1882, 50–51) meaning that by opportunist theory, they should have invaded to gain territory. The great powers also had a vested interest in preventing France from gaining actual or de facto control of Belgium. Given France's history as an invading power, the leaders believed a French annexation of Belgium would spell danger for the balance of power (Fishman 1998, 42). Just 15 years earlier, the great powers had concluded a long and difficult war which culminated in the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy and the creation of the United Provinces, a state that united the Dutch Republic with the Austrian Netherlands as a means to protect against possible French expansionism. A repeat invasion by the great powers may have safeguarded their Restoration and mitigated the likelihood of French expansionism. As a result of the French and Belgian Revolutions, the balance of power in Europe was altered and international borders were threatened. Yet at the London Conference of 1830, the five leading European powers—Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, and France—supervised Belgium's largely-peaceful separation from the Netherlands. No great power invaded France or Belgium. Classical opportunism thus lacks explanatory power in the case of France in 1830.

Walt's theory of opportunism centers on the motives of counter-revolutionary states to invade revolutionary states, but an alternative version of the opportunist theory might say that revolutions change political opportunities, and that *any* state with increased opportunities to strengthen their own power will take advantage of them. Such a theory would argue that France, which had both opportunity and geopolitical incentive to annex Belgium or bring it into the French sphere of influence, should have aided Belgium's revolution.

Taking Belgium directly, or at least strengthening Belgian revolutionaries to avoid the state entering a rival power's sphere of influence, would have enhanced France's power in Europe and abroad. Under Napoleon, Belgium had been part of the French empire, and the French government had proposed annexing Belgium as recently as 1829 (Pinkney 1972, 307). Belgium bordered France and some leftists argued that Belgium was within France's "natural frontiers" (Collingham 1988, 91). France also had reason to support Belgium or attempt to annex it as a means of preventing the European conservative powers from using Belgium as a "staging area for a descent on Paris" (Pinkney 1972, 308). Despite perceptions of France as a weakened power,[3] it is likely that France did have the capacity to defeat at least one European power and could have defeated a coalition of hostile powers if the government had been willing to raise a large mass army via universal conscription (Griffith 1989,

[3] Perceptions of France as weak existed for good reason. Many French troops were in Algeria and Greece, other troops were tied up preventing royalist revolt within the Hexagon, and insubordination was rampant throughout the army (Pinkney 1972, 303–304). The size of the army decreased by about 40,000 men from January to August of 1830 (Porch 1974, 38). Nevertheless, France still had the capacity to defeat another European state (Griffith 1989, 11–12).

11–12).[4] Yet despite these geopolitical incentives to intervene, France did not seek to extend its power.

Even if French leaders felt that they did not have the material resources to annex Belgium, this generalized opportunist theory suggests that they should have taken advantage of less militarized strategies to increase their geopolitical power. At least some Belgian revolutionaries called for Belgium to unite with France (Fishman 1998, 191) and some called for Louis Philippe's son to be made king of their new constitutional monarchy (Beik 1965, 78; Fishman 1998, 28; Collingham 1988, 191). Advocating for either of these goals, or even passively allowing them, would have increased France's international power. Yet contrary to opportunist predictions, France actively worked *against* these goals, deliberately preventing Louis Philippe's son from taking the throne of Belgium and refusing to allow Belgian unification with France (Collingham 1998, 191; Guizot 1859, 91; Howarth 1961, 202). Clearly, both classical opportunism and a modified version of the theory are insufficient to explain why France did not find itself embroiled in a war on behalf of Belgium following the July Revolution.

### *B. Ideological Differences*

Scholars who claim that ideological differences are the basis for international conflict argue that the revolutionary state will try to spread revolution via war, either because they believe that it is their moral duty to do so, because they fear the possibility of a counter-revolutionary state attempting to crush the revolution, or because they want to prove the viability of the ideology at home (Nelson 2023, 157).

Scholars also claim that counter-revolutionary states who fear the effects of revolution abroad on their domestic power will attempt to crush revolution via war (Haas 2005, 8; Halliday 1999, 139, 141; Nelson 2018, 246–247). Ideological theories predict that when status-quo states are ideologically different from the revolutionary state, they will adopt a counter-revolutionary stance, which increases the probability of conflict (Haas 2005). Other theories argue that in addition to being ideologically distinct, states will only adopt a counter-revolutionary stance if there is a revolutionary movement at home: states need not fear ideological change abroad if there is no constituency of would-be revolutionaries at home who would take up the cause (Nelson 2022, 4).

The 1830 French Revolution seems to present an ideal case for attempts to spread revolution or crush it: even without taking deliberate action, it inspired revolutionary movements in Belgium, Poland, and the Italian states (Church 1983, 34–38). Ideological theories would predict that France should have spread its ideology and that the counter-revolutionary states, fearing contagion, should have countered spillover effects (Nelson 2018, 265). The new French constitutional monarchy was ideologically threatening to the absolutist monarchies of the conservative powers. From the

[4] I argue that French distaste for raising a large mass army was rooted in Orléanist perceptions that such an army would be difficult to control and would likely contribute to radicalization, which would erode Orléanist domestic power. Despite opportunist incentives to raise such an army, there were domestic reasons not to do so. See Section IV C, Belgium.

outset, Austrian foreign minister Prince Klemens von Metternich (1882, 19) saw the members of France's new government as belonging to the "extreme left." France presented a grave danger to "conservative ascendancy" and there was widespread fear among European powers that the French Revolution was a precursor to revolution throughout Europe (Schroeder 1994, 668). There were also strong domestic constituencies for regime change or revolution in the revolutionary states, including Belgian revolutionaries in the Netherlands, Polish revolutionaries in the Russian Empire and Italian revolutionaries in Austria's sphere of influence.[5] Nevertheless, France did not intervene to support revolution, and the great powers did not intervene outside of their existing spheres to prevent it. Given the ideological divide between the powers, we would expect that if ideology is a sufficient cause for international conflict, France and the great powers would have gone to war in 1830. Ideological differences cannot explain the peace of Europe in 1830.

### *C. Misperceptions and Miscalculations*

Walt argues that revolutionary states and counter-revolutionary states tend to perceive each other as intractably hostile and that revolutions distort information, which increases hostility. States misperceive each other's intentions and miscalculate each other's abilities, increasing the likelihood of war (Haas 2005, 12; Walt 1996, 30–31, 33–37). If this theory has predictive power, then considering the hostility between France and the conservative powers (in 1830, Metternich called France the "central hotbed of all evil;" Metternich 1882, 52), any misperceptions of the intentions or abilities of the other states should have led to war or at least to increased security competition. The problem with this theory is that it uses a constant ("misperceptions") to explain a variable ("increased security competition"). States almost never fully understand their opponents' intentions and almost never accurately calculate their opponents' abilities. It is unclear why misperceptions and miscalculations lead to increased security competition in some cases but not in others.

Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that misperceptions were heightened in the wake of the French and Belgian Revolutions: despite French attempts to mitigate misunderstandings abroad,[6] the great powers recognized the incentives for France to come to Belgium's aid and distrusted French motives (Fishman 1998, 14, 57). Additionally, Metternich (1882, 23–28) told the French emissary to Austria that while he believed the new French government did not *intend* to meddle in international affairs, he did not believe that France would be able to "enforce what it wishes" or that the "the present order of things in France [could] last." Thus, even if Louis Philippe's efforts were persuasive in illustrating his intentions, they did not stop the great powers from questioning revolutionary France's ability to keep its promises. As mentioned earlier, the great powers also miscalculated France's weakness and its ability to wage

[5] I discuss the revolutionary factions within each of these states. See Section IV C.

[6] After the July Revolution, Louis Philippe sent emissaries to the courts of Europe's great powers with personal letters indicating his intentions not to claim territory. He also told his generals to avoid making any movements that could be construed as acts of war (Collingham 1988, 187; Fishman 1998, 50; Pinkney 1972, 304–306).

war. Since the great powers continued to distrust France and miscalculate its abilities, we would expect that by Walt's theory, they would declare war on France or intervene in Belgium. This did not happen, indicating that the misperceptions and miscalculations theories also lack explanatory power.

### *D. Risk Tolerance of Revolutionary Agents*

In contrast to Walt (1996, 10–11), other scholars argue that revolutionary agents can play a crucial role in whether revolutionary states go to war. Jeff Colgan (2013, 656, 662–664) argues that revolutionary leaders are almost always risk-tolerant and conflict-prone. The 1830 French Revolution counters this position, since the Orléanist victors of the revolution, chief among them King Louis Philippe, were decidedly averse to conflict. Colgan finds that because revolutionary leaders are inherently conflictual, they are more likely to initiate international conflict. The corollary of that finding, although not expressed by Colgan, is that a non-conflictual, risk-averse revolutionary leader should be *less* likely to initiate international conflict. This is true in 1830 France: "revolutionary" leaders were largely pacifists and unwilling to go to war. They viewed war as a danger to the stability of the domestic regime and explicitly promoted peace abroad. The Orléanist leaders of the revolutionary state prove that contrary to Colgan's position, revolutionaries are not inherently risk-prone and internationally ambitious.

Later in the paper, I briefly examine how a moderate (though increasingly conservative) group like the Orléanists became the leaders of a revolutionary government. I also examine the effects of the leading revolutionary party being relatively conservative on the likelihood of revolutionary conflict.

### *E. Domestic Politics*

Walt (1996, 9–10) argues that domestic politics lack explanatory power as an adequate determinant of revolutionary foreign policy.[7] The 1830 French case disproves this: domestic concerns in France in 1830 served as a strong deterrent for war, as the moderate Orléanists deliberately avoided war to protect their domestic power.

Robert Snyder (1999) demonstrates how the domestic political situation can promote either war or peace in the aftermath of a revolution. He argues that a revolutionary state may instigate conflict with other states to "externalize its domestic problems" and strengthen the revolutionary government at home. The revolutionaries specifically target a state that has ties to the "liberal bourgeoisie" within the revolutionary coalition, aiming to discredit these moderates and consolidate power. Snyder's argument for war following a revolution provides a strong explanation for

[7] Interestingly, despite his assertion here that, "domestic politics clearly affects the foreign policies of revolutionary states, but…cannot adequately explain the relationship between revolution and war," Walt later does explain that domestic politics are "a major cause of war" in the French Revolution of 1789 (62–69) as well as in the aftermath of the American Revolution, when conflict between Federalists and Republicans contributed to the moderation of foreign policy (273–237).

the French Revolution of 1789.[8] Snyder also outlines the scenario in which the domestic political situation after a revolution would instead lead to peace: he argues that if moderates are not part of the revolutionary coalition, and if the more radical faction actively wants to avoid alienating the moderates, they will not initiate conflict abroad. He argues that states can avoid foreign conflict if revolutionary elites observe that antagonizing potential rivals will not help, and could hurt, the revolutionary government.

France in 1830 is an interesting case because the leaders of the revolutionary government were the liberal bourgeoisie, rather than the radicals. Perhaps the radical republicans would have liked to externalize the conflict by initiating war with the great powers to discredit the moderate Orléanists. However, because the Orléanists were the group that ultimately gained power following the revolution, they did not want to externalize a conflict that would have hurt the domestic government and contributed to the radicalization of the revolutionary state. There were no potential "liberal" targets of war abroad, and thus attacking any state would only hurt the moderately conservative Orléanists at home. The Orléanists did not want to alienate the more radical republicans, and thus did make some foreign policy concessions towards them (Howarth 1961, 179; Schmidt 1994, 253) but for the most part, they actively avoided antagonizing the great powers.

In the absence of an advantage to externalizing domestic conflict, Snyder's theory predicts that we will *not* see international conflict following a revolution. As Snyder's theory would anticipate, France in 1830 did not pursue a war with the great powers on behalf of Belgium or any other revolutionary state.

## III. Theoretical Framework

I theorize that the domestic division in 1830 France and the threat of radicalization of the revolution made both the revolutionaries in France and the counter-revolutionaries abroad averse to initiating an international conflict. Domestic division in France and the salience of radical republican sentiment made radicalization of the revolution a real possibility. The Orléanist elites wanted to avoid radicalization because they believed it could perpetuate a vicious cycle: it could lead to war and further radicalization and could strengthen the radical republican factions at home at the expense of Orléanist power. They feared this could happen because these were exactly the outcomes of the French Revolution that began in 1789: radicalization led to war, which led to further radicalization and the (often fatal) deposition of the moderates. Thus, I theorize that the Orléanists actively pursued a foreign policy of non-intervention in the early years of the July Monarchy because they lacked an

[8] In 1789, the radical Girondins pushed for conflict with the conservative powers in large part to discredit the moderate revolutionaries who had advocated for constitutional monarchy. The subsequent wars radicalized the revolution, destroyed the power of the moderates, and eventually led to the Terror of 1793–1794. While the constitutional monarchists were not explicitly linked to the great powers, they were more ideologically similar to the leaders of the great powers than the radical Girondins were. See Section IV B.

advantage to externalizing conflict and recognized that externalizing conflict could hurt the revolutionary government.

Additionally, I theorize that the domestic situation of France also made the great powers averse to initiating a conflict with France. They too feared that radicalization could lead to a long war. Radical revolutionaries in France, if they took power, might be more aggressive internationally. They might pursue a war of territorial expansion that, like the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, would expand France's geopolitical and ideological power while sapping resources throughout the continent. The great powers believed that peace was the appropriate way to stop the spread of French revolutionary ideology and preempt the possibility that France would seek territorial gains. Thus, in the absence of overt French hostility towards them, the great powers were hesitant to initiate a conflict.

## IV. Cautious Foreign Policy by France

### *A. Division of Domestic Politics in 1830*

The 1814 Charter, established at the beginning of the Bourbon Restoration, created a limited constitutional monarchy that vested significant power in the hands of the monarch. In July 1830, after sixteen years of festering grievances between liberals and conservatives, revolution broke out when King Charles X repealed freedom of the press and changed electoral laws to benefit conservatives (De Sauvigny 1966, 443; Pilbeam 1991, 60). Within days, Paris was held by the protesters.

Most of the people who became Orléanists were the liberal deputies of parliament. They were members of the new middle class and wanted security and peace.[9] They abhorred the increasing absolutism of the monarchy and expressed their discontent in the press, but many of them did not actually want to depose Charles X (Pilbeam 1991, 81). However, they took control of the revolutionary movement to prevent the newly created power vacuum from being filled by a leader who was either too rightist or too leftist (Pilbeam 1991, 82). They chose Louis Philippe, Duke of Orléans and a moderate lover of peace in his own right,[10] as their new leader.

After the 1830 Revolution, three major factions retained support in French politics: the royalists, the Orléanists, and the republicans.[11] Wealthy landowners and lo-

[9] They also advocated adherence to laissez-faire economic principles, the protection of property rights, the education of the middle class, and the morality of government (Collingham 1988, 109).

[10] Many Orléanists saw 1830 as France's equivalent of the English "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, wherein England overthrew despotic rule in favor of a just constitutional monarch. Louis Philippe himself was emblematic of Orléanism's *juste milieu*, and especially its *résistance* faction. Louis Philippe admitted to promising Lafayette "a monarchy surrounded by republican institutions," but became increasingly conservative throughout his reign. He was a paradox: a mix of openness and prejudice, of liberalism and fears of revolution. Until the end of his life, he defended his peaceful foreign policy. (Beik 1965,109; Collingham 1988, 95, 97; De Sauvigny 1966, 426; Pilbeam 1991, 81; Pinkney 1972, 53, 128).

[11] Although the Bonapartist movement continued to have widespread popular support in the immediate aftermath of the July Revolution, it lacked a leader and organization, meaning it lacked viability as a potential rival to the Orléanists (Pilbeam 1991, 83; Pinkney 1972, 143–144, 153–154).

cal politicians supported Charles X and his descendants, but this royalist support was not widespread (Pilbeam 1991, 177). Although some did hope for another Bourbon Restoration supported by foreign aid, this possibility largely disappeared after the trial of the ministers of Charles X (Pinkney 1972, 332–333). There was also a potential threat that the Catholic Church in France would support a Bourbon Restoration, but this royalist challenge was alleviated when the Pope officially recognized Louis Philippe (Pinkney 1972, 310). Although the Orléanist elites did fear royalist challenges, the threats of a rightist co-optation of the revolution were not extremely serious.

More concerning was republican sentiment. Many people who viewed the revolution as a social conflict between the rich and poor began to feel that the revolution had been stolen from them by the elites (Pilbeam 1991, 9, 150–186). New radical organizations emerged, calling for support for revolutionaries abroad and styling themselves as Jacobin (Pilbeam 1991, 161–162), after the revolutionary republican movement of the Revolution of 1789. The National Guard, a radical symbol of the 1790s, was also reconstituted (Pilbeam 1991, 91). Prominent liberal leaders, like Lamarque[12] and Lafayette,[13] themselves relatively moderate compared to many republicans, criticized the conservatism of the new government (Pilbeam 1991, 154–156). The republicans had fought on the barricades in July, and they saw their participation there as both preparation and justification for further actionas early as August 1830, the Orléanists were warned that popular violence could again break out (Shafer 1994, 104–105). It soon did: in June 1832, a coda to July 1830 began as republicans reconstructed the barricades and agitated for revolution (Collingham 1998, 132–134). Although this June Rebellion of *Les Misérables* fame was put down relatively quickly, it demonstrated the power of republican sentiment against which the Orléanists elites had to contend.

In light of the division that plagued the beginning of the July Monarchy, Orléanist political philosophy was centered on finding a "*juste milieu*," or a "middle way," between the "abuses" of royalists and the "excesses" of republicans (Collingham 1998, 198). However, even among the Orléanists, there were factions, with the group dividing into the *résistance* and the *mouvement*. The *mouvement* wanted the new regime to promote "monarchy . . . founded on the concept of national will" (Pilbeam 1991, 7) and stressed the revolutionary character of its rise to power (Collingham 1998, 114), whereas the *résistance*, which ultimately gained power, was more conservative, restrictive, and elitist (Pilbeam 1991, 6). Contemporaries of the Orléanists and scholars today criticize the Orléanists as overly ambitious, driven not by ideological

[12] General Jean Maximilien Lamarque was an ardent opponent of the ancien régime under the Bourbon Restoration and was a strong critic of the July Monarchy. He advocated for French support of Polish and Italian revolutionaries. His death in 1832 led to the June Rebellion.

[13] Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette was instrumental in both the American and French Revolutions in the 1770s–90s. He was a liberal member of the Chamber of Deputies during the Bourbon Restoration. Lafayette supported Louis Philippe as king in 1830 but came to oppose him as the July Monarchy became increasingly conservative.

consistency but by the opportunity for power and the desire to hold onto it.[14] Other scholars are less critical of Orléanists, emphasizing their intelligence, rationality, and pragmatism (Craiutu 2003, 45), but they nevertheless do not identify a clear revolutionary ideology held by the Orléanists. Their political philosophy, if they can be said to have had one, was to maintain peace and ensure stability in the face of a volatile domestic situation.

*B. War and Radicalization*

War with the great powers may have threatened Orléanist power by presenting an opportunity for the restoration of the Bourbons (Pilbeam 1991, 82). However, the great powers' recognition of Louis Philippe as the legitimate king of the French by the end of October 1830 made a war intended to depose Louis Philippe an unlikely possibility (Pinkney 1972, 305–306). Therefore, the most salient reason for the Orléanists' aversion to war was their desire to forestall the power of the left at home.

For many Orléanists, the path of the *juste milieu* was likely informed by their fears of a reprise of the revolutionary wars and the Terror. The Orléanists feared radicalization because they knew that it could set off a vicious cycle: radicalization could lead to war, which could lead to further radicalization, which would worsen domestic stability and erode moderate power. This cycle had happened before, during the French Revolution of 1789. Thus, to understand Orléanist fears of radicalization, it is necessary to understand this first French Revolution, which had begun only 41 years earlier and which still loomed large in the cultural and political zeitgeist.

The initial leaders of the French Revolution of 1789 were relatively moderate constitutional monarchists (Blanning 1986, 97; Haas 2005, 42). However, the flight of Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette to Varennes in 1791 was a catalyst for the moderates losing power (Blanning 1986, 96; Haas 2005, 47–48), largely because radical factions of the revolutionary government and the wider French public came to see Austrian support of the royal family's flight as proof that foreign intervention was imminent (Scott 2006, 254). Radical warmongers like the Girondins pushed the idea (whether true or false), that Austria was bent on crushing the revolution and that it was essential for France to strike first. They were convincing in their rhetoric, and each successive step towards conflict increased their domestic power at the same time that it increased radicalization (Blanning 1986, 98–100, 105, 123). Tensions grew in the run-up to the war, as real and fabricated counter-revolutionary actions made French revolutionaries increasingly fearful of subversion of the new regime.[15] France declared war on Austria on April 20, 1792.

As the war continued, it seemed even more necessary to protect the regime, so increasingly radical factions deposed their predecessors (Furet 1981, 126–130). Blanning (1996, 83) argues that leaders like Minister of War Dubois de Crancé used the

[14] Collingham (1988, 109110) argues that because Orléanism attempted to have a king without supporting royalism, to create an oligarchy without having an aristocracy, and to reconcile revolution and order, the Orléanists "destroyed the logic of their position" (see also Fishman 1998, 44).

[15] For a discussion on the actions of various counter-revolutionary forces and their threat to France, see Kaiser 2008; Scott 2006, 251–260; and Walt 1996, 55–58.

"ubiquity of the new regime's enemies to justify radical action." And the regime's enemies *were* somewhat ubiquitous: counter-revolutionary violence throughout France further engendered fears of subversion and fueled radicalization (Blanning 1996, 97). The bloody Terror of 1793–1794 began because radicals faced a perceived assault on the revolution from external and internal threats (Blanning 1996, 107). In the first years of the revolutionary wars, radicalization and war appeared mutually reinforcing.

Many of the Orléanists had lived through the revolution and wars of the 1790s. Louis Philippe and many of the prominent Orléanists had lost their fathers, relatives, and friends to the instrument of Terror, the guillotine (Collingham 1988, 111), and they had observed the way successively radical groups displaced and disposed of the relatively more moderate groups before them. Orléanists thus shared "a horror of republics" that they felt "turns to blood or imbecility" (Howarth 1961, 217) and they abhorred the revolutionary factions who behaved, according to staunch Orléanist and résistance leader François Guizot[16] (1859, 80–81), as "blind heir[s] to the Convention and the Empire" which "does not admit any regular and stable system of society or of government." In his memoirs, the Duc de Broglie (1887, 395, 417), President of the Council of Ministers from August to November 1830 and later Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed his fears that if the more conservative *résistance* members of the cabinet were not sufficiently strong, they would lose power and authority to the radical minority of the cabinet, and in so doing, contribute to the "rising tide of a new revolution." It is little wonder then, that while the Orléanists tended to glorify some of the philosophical ideas of the Revolution of 1789, they tried to forestall a repetition of the Revolution of 1792 in 1830.

### *C. Foreign Policy of "Non-Intervention"*

The Orléanist foreign policy strategy is aptly summarized by Guizot (1859, 80–81): he wrote in his memoirs that "any great war ran the risk of becoming a war of revolution" and that was a prospect they "did not want to run." As Snyder's theory would suggest, any externalization of the conflict between moderates and republicans would have hurt the Orléanist government. Thus, the Orléanists actively pursued a foreign policy that would mitigate the likelihood of war and further radicalization.

In early August, France sent messengers to royal courts throughout Europe to request recognition of the new regime and to assuage fears that France would attempt to spread revolution or gain territory (Collingham 1988, 187; Fishman 1998, 50; Pinkney 1972, 304–305). Louis Philippe also stopped movements by the French armies on the edges of France which could have potentially alarmed the other powers of Europe (Pinkney 1972, 306). Further, he appointed conservative people to the foreign ministry, like Comte Molé,[17] who expressed that "anarchy will overwhelm us at

[16] François Guizot outlined the liberal deputies' protests against the July Ordinances of Charles X and was one of the strongest supporters of Louis Phillipe. Guizot held many cabinet positions during the 18 years of the July Monarchy, including Minister of Interior, Public Education, Foreign Affairs, and Prime Minister.

[17] Louis-Mathieu Molé was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the crucial period of August to November 1830 (although foreign affairs was led in practice by Prince Talleyrand at the time) and was later Prime Minister.

home and war will overwhelm us abroad" (De Sédouy 1994, 162), and who even the Austrian ambassador to France believed would not encourage Jacobinism (Collingham 1988, 1987). Most significantly, when revolutionary movements abroad began, directly inspired by France, the new French government did not offer their assistance.

**Belgium**

When the Belgian Revolution broke out on August 25, 1830, mere weeks after Louis Philippe was installed as the "King of the French," it presented an opportunity for him to demonstrate at home and abroad that his new government was strong, but also to show that he was not interested in pursuing a war with the rest of Europe (Schmidt 1994, 251). As earlier indicated, Louis Philippe could have taken advantage of Belgian weakness. However, Louis Philippe (*Biographical Memoirs of Louis Philippe the First 1848*, 50) wrote that "the thirst for conquest" would "never induce [him] to expose [his] country to a repetition of those calamities which war entails" and indicated that "the examples of Louis XIV and Napoleon" taught him "to prefer the maintenance of peace…to war." The King of the French recognized the risk of war diminishing his hold on power, just as it did for Louis XIV and Napoleon.

The Duc de Dalberg, who had been the colleague of Louis Philippe's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Prince Talleyrand[18] at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, wrote to Talleyrand that France was "on the verge of democratic anarchy" and that Belgian resistance to the Dutch would lead to a radical change of government in France and a war (Talleyrand 1891, 230–231). Though the Duc de Dalberg was not part of Louis Philippe's cabinet and cannot properly be considered an Orléanist, his opinions, which Talleyrand appears to have shared, indicate that elites were wary of the impact that the Belgian Revolution and France's relationship to it would have on Orléanist power and the likelihood of war.

Thus, Louis Philippe found himself pursuing the *juste milieu*, developing a foreign policy that would assuage the public without allowing the country to radicalize and without threatening the ire of the great powers (Howarth 1961, 179; Schmidt 1994, 253). Louis Philippe pursued an explicit policy of "non-intervention": the French would not help Belgian revolutionaries declare their independence, but should the Belgian revolutionaries be successful in the declaration of their new regime, France would not tolerate any imposition by foreign powers on Belgian autonomy (Collingham 1988, 187; Fishman 1998, 57; Pinkney 1972, 308; Schroeder 1994, 678). He hoped to show the great powers that France did not have "ambitious views," and France's highest objective was that "each Power should continue within its present limits" (Talleyrand 1891, 264).

France, in declaring this policy, did not profess to seek peace at any price: foreign minister Molé warned the Prussian ambassador at the end of September that intervention by the great powers in Belgium would lead to a war with France (Howarth

[18] Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord was a leading French statesman. He held important diplomatic roles under the First Republic, Napoleon, the Restoration, and Louis Philippe. He strove to consolidate peace and played a significant role in negotiating France's position at the Congress of Vienna of 1814 and the London Conference of 1830.

1961, 179). This policy also did not prevent France from seeking small territorial prizes for its moderation, which angered the British (Collingham 1988, 191–193; Schroeder 1994, 676). Yet the new policy did demonstrate that France was committed to assuaging fears of both domestic leftists and European reactionaries without giving too much power to either group.

A hallmark of the new policy was a tenuous friendship with Britain (Collingham 1988, 137; Schroeder 1994, 676). In September 1830, seasoned diplomat Talleyrand departed France for London to pursue recognition of King Louis Philippe's administration. Talleyrand (1891, 228) believed that Louis Philippe's administration "could only gain stability by maintenance of peace," and felt that "a revolutionary and general war" was the "most terrible of all evils." He thus informed France's new British allies that the Belgian question should be settled by the European powers without military intervention (Pinkney 1972, 306–307).

The London Conference of the five great powers began in November. Around the same time, Orléanists felt their hold on power become even more tenuous. As the Belgian crisis continued, the trials of the ministers of Charles X began. The Orléanists were concerned that leftist revolutionary factions would use the trials of the ministers of Charles X and the ongoing Belgian crisis to amass more power and erode the order the new government was working to maintain (Talleyrand 1891, 293). Thus, the French leaders remained committed to peace throughout negotiations with the other great powers, and by the new year, the powers had recognized Belgian independence, without military intervention. French leaders, like Casimir Périer,[19] appointed head of the Council of Ministers in March 1831, still had to deal with domestic French clamor to divide up Belgium. Yet French leaders were staunchly committed to peace and successfully avoided war (Howarth 1961, 201–202).

The recognition of Belgian independence was not the end of the Belgian crisis. First, there was the question of who would become the monarch of the nascent state. In keeping with the policy of protecting peace and attempting to mitigate the chance of war, Louis Philippe rejected both the candidacy of his son, the Duke of Nemours, which would have alienated the British (Beik 1965, 78), and of a Bonapartist whom Louis Philippe feared could threaten Orléanist interests (Schmidt 1994, 257). The Belgians accepted Leopold of Saxe-Coburg as the new king, a choice which was amenable to almost everyone except King William of the Netherlands.

In the summer of 1831, King William sent troops into the newly independent Belgium. In response, Louis Philippe sent troops, "in complete accord with the overall objectives of the [London] conference" (Schmidt 1994, 256). Correspondence between Minister of War Jean-de-Dieu Soult[20] and Louis Philippe's son Ferdinand, then

[19] Casimir-Pierre Périer was a leading liberal-opposition deputy during the reign of Charles X. He was President of the Chamber of Deputies (November 1830–May 1831) and Prime Minister (March 1831 to his death in May 1832). He was instrumental in re-establishing order in France and is known for re-interpreting the French policy of non-intervention to mean that France would protect French interests abroad, rather than intervene on behalf of oppressed peoples.

[20] At various times in the July Monarchy, Jean-de-Dieu Soult served as Minister of War and as Prime Minister.

serving in the French forces in Belgium, indicates that while French public opinion supported escalation of the conflict with the Dutch, Louis Philippe's cabinet advocated for moderation and maintenance of the principle of non-intervention. When the Dutch troops began to retreat, Soult wrote to Ferdinand that orders were to remove most of the French troops from Belgium and to leave behind a small force only until peace between the Netherlands and Belgium was reached (Griffith 1989, 28; Soult 1959, 10–13). Thus, French leaders followed the admonition of British Foreign Secretary Palmerston to get out of Belgium to avoid a war (Collingham 1988, 191; Howarth 1961, 203). When the Dutch refused to return the city of Antwerp to the Belgians in 1832, France again sent troops to Belgium to force the Dutch to capitulate. Yet in a testament to France's commitment to peace, France withdrew within days of Dutch capitulation (Howarth 1961, 191–193, 215). France had the military capability to overwhelm the Dutch forces in support of the Belgians and could have faced a coalition of the great powers with a larger army. But with republican factionalism still widespread among the troops, the Orléanist leaders were determined not to increase the size and power of the army. Doing so would create what scholar Paddy Griffith (1989, 11–12) calls "an uncontrollable monster."

It is clear that domestic considerations played a significant role in the peaceful foreign policy decisions of the Orléanists. The evidence that the Orléanists advocated peace abroad and chose not to use military force to support the Belgians specifically to forestall the rise of the radical left is admittedly circumstantial. However, when taken together, their evident fear of another revolutionary war which many believed could lead to a radical change in government, their unwillingness to take decisive actions despite broad support from the more radical elements of the French public, and their explicit pursuit of peaceful actions that were intended to show that the France of 1830 was not the France of 1792 suggest that the Orléanists wanted peace and chose not to start a war on behalf of Belgium because they wanted to maintain their domestic power amid political strife.

### Poland

The French response to the Polish crisis presents another case that challenges the conclusions of the prominent literature on revolution and war. In November 1830, insurrection against Russian oppression began in its satellite state Poland. There were opportunist incentives for France to support the Poles: exchanges between Talleyrand and Sébastiani,[21] who became Minister of Foreign Affairs at the end of 1830, indicate that they believed that an independent Poland would provide a geopolitical security benefit for France, because it would provide a buffer against the bellicose Russia (Lutostański 1918, 453–454).

There was also broad public support for the Poles among the French public (Lutostański 1918, 466) and strong ideological incentives to intervene: Lafayette is said to have remarked that "all of France is Polish" (Thureau-Dangin 1888, 189), the

[21] Horace François Bastien Sébastiani de La Porta was a liberal deputy during the Bourbon Restoration and served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from October 1830 to October 1832.

French newspaper *Le National* called for France to use revolutionary means to aid the Poles and potentially to declare war on all the great powers (Collingham 1988, 189), and many prominent French leaders agreed that Poland's continued status as a satellite of Russia was unjust. The Duc de Mortemart, who was the French ambassador to Russia, told a Polish representative that "without a doubt, the whole of France has the most ardent sympathies for you: the King, the Chambers, the ministers, everyone is in your favor" (Lutostański 1918, 466). Talleyrand and Sébastiani believed that infringement on Polish sovereignty was a grave blemish on Napoleon and on the Congress of Vienna (Lutostański 1918, 453–454).

Yet despite broad support for Poland and recognition of the strategic advantage that an independent Poland would provide for France, France did not initiate a war with Russia on behalf of Poland in 1830. For the regime's leaders, their most important goals were to respect treaties, to remain committed to European peace, and to maintain their status as a non-interventionist power, and they told the Polish leaders so (Lutostański 1918, 466–467; Thureau-Dangin 1888, 191). In December 1830, Talleyrand and Sébastiani thought that Polish independence, like Belgium's, could be achieved without a war. They hoped that France's improved position in global politics and her new relationship with Britain could be leveraged to attain a similar result in Poland as in Belgium (Lutostański 1918, 453–455). By March 1831, however, it became clear that Poland could not win her revolution by herself, and correspondence between Sébastiani and Talleyrand centered instead on appealing to the Emperor of Russia to be moderate and to allow the maintenance of Polish national identity. The correspondence indicates the Orléanist beliefs that France could help maintain the preservation of the European balance of power as then constituted through an appeal to moderation and with the help of Britain (Lutostański 1918, 464–465).

Although France sought Britain's aid in mediating relations between Poland and Russia (Thureau-Dangin 1888, 484–485) and advocated for moderation on the part of the Emperor of Russia (Beik 1965, 79; Howarth 1961, 185–186, 202–203; Thureau-Dangin 1888, 484–485), France gave no direct aid to the Polish. Casimir Périer reframed France's policy of non-intervention, claiming that the policy did not mean that France would intervene to protect revolutionary parties against oppressors. Rather, it meant that France would protect French interests (Church 1983, 139–140; Webster 1969, 100), which largely meant it would protect Orléanist interests.

Warsaw fell in September 1831, and although there were protests throughout Paris, the Chamber of Deputies apparently came to agree with the Council of Ministers: France had done all she could to support the Poles, and "the misfortunes of the Poles [did] not belong to the French government, but to those who gave them bad advice" (Thureau-Dangin 1888, 485–487). Even more than in Belgium, the Polish crisis demonstrated that the new French government would not behave as a liberator of oppressed peoples or seek to impose an ideologically satisfactory constitutional regime in a volatile state. Rather, it would do all it could to maintain the current balance of power and avoid war to protect itself. Although it is possible that another mechanism could explain the Orléanists' desire for peace, the circumstantial evidence

taken together suggests that the Orléanists wanted to protect themselves from the revolutionary clamor for change abroad and at home, even though doing so meant a sacrifice of the initial ideological character of their new regime.

### The Italian States

The crisis in the Italian states presents a third case wherein France had incentives to go to war with the great powers of Europe. Yet again, the Orléanists chose to forgo the potential advantages of war in favor of European peace. They likely did so because, as earlier outlined, they had pressing domestic concerns and feared the impact of a great power war on revolutionary sentiment in France.

Prior to the Congress of Vienna, most of Italy had been in France's sphere of influence (Church 1983, 127). However, after the Congress, the Italian states were returned to their pre-Napoleon Austrian sphere (Church 1983, 129–134). In 1820 and 1821, the Italian states had experienced a brief revolutionary fervor, as the Carbonari, a secret society of constitutional monarchists, tried to replace the absolute monarchs of the Italian kingdoms. The revolts were crushed by Austria and Italian revolutionaries fled throughout Europe, with many relocating to Paris (Vidal 1931, 22–24).

In the run-up to the July Revolution, Charles X was attempting to regain French influence in the Italian states that were not direct vassals of Austria (Vidal 1931, 18), and upon taking the crown, Louis-Philippe was personally interested in continuing this bid for influence in Italy (Vidal 1931, 44–45). This, coupled with the revival of the Italian revolutionary spirit of the previous decade (Vidal 1931, 27) and the pervasive attitude among the French public that their duty was to liberate Italy and restore France to its Napoleonic glory (Vidal 1931, 51–52), made the threat of an uprising supported by the French a real possibility. It is little wonder then that the King of Sardinia wrote to the Emperor of Austria in August 1830 that the revolution of 1830 was a greater cause for apprehension than the revolution of 1789 (Vidal 1931, 29).

Although the administration of Louis-Philippe was generally ambivalent about their support for general Italian uprising, the President of the Council of Ministers Laffite and the Minister of War Soult did issue a challenge to Austria when they emphasized in December 1830 that France would not permit "the principle of non-intervention to be violated" and that French respect for the principle was conditional on other great powers also committing to abstain from interference in the revolutionary processes of other states (Vidal 1931, 56–58). These statements echoed what the French emissary to the Emperor of Austria had emphasized in September: although France was committed to peace, it would not tolerate Austrian troops in Italy. This was especially true in the state of Piedmont, where sending troops would be "considered an act of hostility" on the part of Austria (Vidal 1931, 42). In January 1831, Louis-Philippe's cabinet refused to remove Italian refugees from the French department of Isère, despite requests from Sardinian and Austrian leaders (Vidal 1931, 58–59). Later, though, France did remove some of the refugees from Isère (Collingham 1988, 188; Vidal 1931, 62–63), demonstrating Louis-Philippe's commitment to peace above all else.

The Italian states began agitating in February of 1831, yet the attempted revolution failed by the end of March, partially because Italian hopes for diplomatic intervention by France did not come to pass (Vidal 1931, 118). France wanted to avoid a war with Austria, and as outlined in the Polish case, reinterpreted non-intervention as a policy that dealt exclusively with French interests (Church 1983, 139–140). When Austrian troops invaded the Papal States, Périer did send some troops to the Italian coasts to demonstrate that the Austrian presence was not welcome there, but the presence of French troops did nothing to encourage further revolution or liberalization in the Italian states, nor did the troops attempt to take territory for France (Collingham 1988, 190–191). Both sides threatened war, but agreements between Austria, France, and the Italian states prevented conflict from breaking out. France did not attempt to significantly undermine Austrian interests in the Italian states because French leaders did not want to support revolution abroad at the expense of peace.

A lot of the credit for the lack of war in the region must be given to the restraint of Austria. Nevertheless, Louis-Philippe and Orléanists were instrumental in maintaining peace. The regime had strong incentives to help the Italians. In addition to a large domestic constituency that advocated for intervention on ideological grounds, France had strong geopolitical incentives to bring Italian states back into the French sphere, not least of which was improving France's status after the humiliation of the Congress of Vienna. Nevertheless, Louis Philippe did not help the Italian people rise up against the absolute monarchs of Italy or against Austria. Nor did Louis Philippe and the Orléanists take the less direct path: they did not officially recognize the revolutionary governments when initially approached, preferring instead to wait and observe the outcomes of the Italian revolutions instead of professing immediate support for revolutionaries (Vidal 1931, 94).

The reason for the Orléanist aversion to war is succinctly outlined by Metternich. Speaking of the new French government's intentions, Metternich (1882, 23–25) claimed that their "foremost interest…is that of consolidation and preservation. Men on arriving at power naturally desire its maintenance." In the midst of political turmoil at home, the Orléanists ignored the calls of those who wanted the French government to amass more territory or behave as a liberator of oppressed peoples in Belgium, Poland, and Italy. The Orléanist writings indicate their fears both of repeating the mistakes of the Revolution of 1789 and of emboldening radicals who would change the government. Their actions indicate that their priority was to maintain peace at home above protecting revolution abroad. Although much of the evidence is circumstantial (which is what we might expect—leaders do not always provide the explicit reasons for the policy choices they make), the implicit evidence in the Belgian, Polish, and Italian cases suggests that the reason the Orléanists wanted peace was because they were committed to maintaining a domestic order that privileged them.

## V. Cautious Foreign Policy in Belgium by the Great Powers

In his memoirs, Talleyrand (1891, 234) expressed his apprehension that the great powers of Europe would not "consent to accept the consequences of the principles of non-intervention" in Belgium and that France "must appear still more dangerous to them, after the revolution she had just effected." Yet the conservative powers largely *did* accept French "non-intervention," because like the Orléanists, the great powers of Europe wanted to avoid a war. They too feared that radical revolutionaries in France, if they took power, might pursue aggressive territorial and ideological gains and further disrupt the European balance of power. The great powers viewed Paris as the center of a "revolutionary whirlpool" (Talleyrand 1891, 244–245) that they were unwilling to further agitate. As Comte Molé's biographer emphasizes, the memory of the revolutionary wars that began only 40 years earlier still loomed large, dissuading the conservative powers from intervening in France's internal politics (De Noailles 1930, 76, 87).

At the onset of the July Revolution and continuing into the summer as the Belgian Revolution began, the great powers did consider preempting any potential French aggression by invading France first (Fishman 1998, 14). The conservative powers saw France as a danger to the conservative system of governance in Europe, and they supported the Netherlands in spirit, if not with military aid (Fishman 1998, 57). However, the great powers soon came to see the situation in Belgium as a lost cause (Metternich 1882, 38–39). The powers saw that France had the potential to cause danger to the balance of power and thus wanted to avoid stirring up the former expansionist state (Pinkney 1972, 306–307). Historian Schroeder (1994, 675) argues that the leaders of the conservative powers likely saw Louis Philippe as the best of all possible bad options for the leader of France, believing that he was probably least likely to allow a radical turn which could disrupt the balance of power in Europe.

British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston recalled the territorial crusades and widespread French control of Europe during the first French Revolution and worried that a radical French regime that did not follow the policy of non-intervention might repeat this expansionism (Webster 1969, 100). Tory Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, agreed with Lord Palmerston, seeing the French Revolution of 1830 as a continuation of 1789 and 1793 (De Noailles 1930, 95). He understood the contradictions inherent in the French interpretation of the doctrine of non-intervention, but he wanted to avoid a war above all else and was thus willing to accept the French position (Webster 1969, 97). The new Whig Prime Minister, the Earl Charles Grey, took office in November 1830 and was less suspicious than Wellington and Palmerston, but he agreed that the British government needed to keep an eye on the *mouvement* faction of the Orléanist government (Webster 1969, 121). He too had concerns regarding the radical elements of the French government and what their influence could mean for the balance of power in Europe.

Metternich (1882, 23–28) had similar concerns, noting that Austrian leaders did not believe that the July Monarchy would be able to maintain their newly constituted

moderate regime. He also argued that in order for Louis Philippe to truly be the King of France, the Orléanists would need to "attack the majesty of M. de la Fayette" (De Broglie 1887, 364–365), indicating that, like the Orléanists themselves, the Austrians feared the revolution could radicalize. Metternich (1882, 46–47, 51–52) opined that the "dogmas of Liberalism" that influenced the young, who did not "witness the disasters of the past." He specifically noted that anarchy in France would lead to war, or at least political warfare. When France demanded Austria withdraw troops from the Italian states, Metternich acquiesced, because, as scholar Collingham argues, Metternich wanted to keep the conservative Prime Minister Casimir Périer in power to prevent someone more radical from taking control of the country (Collingham 1988, 190–191). Even if Metternich did not believe that the government of the July Monarchy would pursue active international conflict, he did believe that the French revolutionary government was tenuous, and if radicalized further, might pursue a war with the great powers.

Prussia too was concerned about the way a French radical faction could impact Europe's power dynamics. General Carl von Clausewitz illustrated Prussian concerns when he expressed that the leftist French view of its right to "natural borders" (Collingham 1988, 191) threatened the spheres of influence of the great powers, just as it did following the French Revolution of 1789 (Fishman 1998, 42). Russia was the most bellicose state and was the most interested in placing a more conservative leader on the throne (Pinkney 1972, 308; Schroeder 1994, 670). The Tsar believed that French territorial interests in Belgium would undermine negotiations for peace, and likely would have sent troops to fight France had he received the support of the other great powers (Talleyrand 1891, 251–252).[22] But the powers were not willing to work in concert to undermine either the French or Belgian revolutions.

At the outbreak of the July Revolution, Metternich and the Russian foreign minister Nesselrode agreed in what became known as the Chiffon de Carlsbad to recommend to their sovereigns that despite the treaty of 1814 ostensibly imploring them to act, they should not intervene in France's internal affairs, unless France itself attacked the borders established by treaty (Webster 1969, 93). Because they wanted the maintenance of peace above all else, the powers worked together in the Conference of London to ensure an acceptable outcome to the Belgian Revolution, despite broad concerns about growing French influence in Europe. All powers compromised on their interests for the conference's outcomes in favor of neutrality to ensure the highest probability of maintaining European peace and maintaining the balance of power (Thomas 1984, 20–23).

The French and Belgian Revolutions had "shaken nearly every throne in Europe" and "weakened the fundamental principle of authority" (Talleyrand 1891, 283). That authority would likely have been eroded further if France had radicalized. Thus, the great powers chose instead to focus on preventing Belgium from coming under France's sphere of influence via diplomatic means. They accepted the French and

[22] This information comes from a letter between Russian diplomats which Prince Talleyrand insists is "perfectly authentic," although he does not explain how the letter came to be in his possession.

English solution at the London Conference and did not support the 1831 and 1832 Dutch invasions of Belgium. As Snyder's theory would predict, the powers hesitated to initiate a conflict with France since France itself did not seem poised to commence conflict.

The leaders of the great powers were cautious in foreign policy. They had incentives to go to war with France but also had multiple reasons not to go to war. France's domestic political situation was one such reason: avoiding war would help keep the Orléanists on the throne and prevent the rise of a more radical revolutionary group. As is the case on the French side, the evidence here is largely circumstantial, but taken together, the writings and actions of the leaders of the other great powers of Europe indicate that the powers were apprehensive that a radical faction of the new revolutionary government, if permitted to gain power, could potentially lead to a repeat of the French Revolution of 1789 and the subsequent expansionist wars.

It is conceivable that the widespread aversion to war among the leaders of France and the other great powers of Europe could have led one or both sides to gamble on the other side's resolve for peace. Had France banked on the great powers' fears of radicalizing France via war, French leaders might have expected to be able to achieve geopolitical or ideological advantages in Belgium, Poland, and Italy without a great power war. Alternatively, had the great powers expected France's domestic constituency to accept a more conservative government without radicalization, they may have imposed one, or if they had expected the Orléanists to accept a limited territorial power grab by the powers on the periphery of France if it meant that they could hold on to power in the core of the country, the powers may have taken advantage of the opportunity. Such gambles could have escalated conflict until they led to increased security competition or war. Recognizing how important peace was to the other side, France and the conservative great powers might have pushed either other "eyeball to eyeball" and waited for "the other fellow [to] blink."[23]

The fact that neither side was willing to engage in a game of chicken following the French and Belgian Revolutions suggests how afraid of war both sides were—they were, above all other considerations, not willing to risk a repeat of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which had so devastated the continent. The unwillingness of the leaders of Europe to press their advantages indicates just how cautious they were.

## VI. Conclusion

The political science literature focuses on why revolutions cause war. It mostly ignores the pathways by which revolutions can instead cause peace. The French case of 1830 is illuminating because it poses problems for the main work on the subject, Stephen Walt's *Revolution and War*. Each of Walt's three causal pathways—opportunism,

[23] U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk whispered this phrase to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy on October 24, 1962, in regard to Soviet ships that had been en route to Cuba turning around during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The phrase was quoted in the Saturday Evening Post on December 8, 1962, and has become associated with brinkmanship.

ideological differences, and misperceptions—would suggest that the French, Belgian, Polish, and Italian Revolutions of the early 1830s should have drawn France into a war, or at least increased security competition between France and the other great powers of Europe. However, in the early 1830s, no European great power actively tried to enhance its own security at the expense of the other states. In fact, the opposite is true: all great powers attempted to maintain the balance of power as then constituted.

Walt and other scholars miss the mark because they neglect the influence of domestic situations on revolutionary foreign policy. In 1792 France, the radicalization of domestic politics was at least as important a determinant of revolutionary war as were geopolitical and ideological considerations. In 1830, the influence of domestic politics was the most significant determinant of revolutionary foreign policy, but this time worked in the opposite direction: despite other incentives to go to war, domestic politics was the biggest driver of French and European peace. In the aftermath of the French Revolution of 1830, states observed that the domestic environment was ripe for radicalization. Both revolutionary leaders and the counter-revolutionary states feared the impact of a war on their power. They wanted to ensure the maintenance of their domestic power in a volatile environment, and hindsight born of the two decades of conflict following the French Revolution of 1789 demonstrated that war was contrary to the protection of domestic power in the long term. The revolutionary French government and the counter-revolutionary states alike recognized that an externalization of the French Revolution of 1830 via war would likely hurt, rather than help, them maintain their hold on power.

The French case of 1830 suggests that traditional theories of revolutionary war are not sufficient to explain the foreign policy of all revolutionary states, especially because these theories do not consider the importance of domestic politics. This case also suggests that even when incentives for war exist, conflict may not be inevitable after a revolution or a regime change if states intentionally attempt to diffuse threats of war. The French response to the Belgian question and other revolutionary movements in 1830 underscores how domestic priorities, historical memory, and conservative leadership can override ideological and strategic incentives for international conflict.

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# Holy Disregard: Christian Nationalists More Likely to Accept Democratic Norm Violations from Fellow Citizens

Hannah Criser

## Abstract

How do Christian nationalists react to democratic norm violations from fellow citizens? Previous research on Christian nationalism shows that believers of the ideology prefer right-leaning, conservative politics with a particular affinity for Donald J. Trump, who has shown to support and participate in democratic violations, such as denying election results and advocating for media suppression. However, little is known regarding how Christian nationalists would react to the democratic norm violations committed by fellow peers. In a nationally representative online survey fielded in October 2024, I discover that Christian nationalists are more likely to identify with and support violating democratic norms, which include tolerance for the use of political violence, voter suppression, and refusal to accept election results in this study. There is no relationship between Christian nationalism and levels of religiosity, measured by self-reported weekly religious participation. There is also a statistically significant relationship between tolerance of democratic norms and age, because older Americans (65+) are even more likely to tolerate norm violations than Christian nationalists, which is an unexpected result. This research is beneficial to those who seek to understand political extremism in U.S. public opinion as well as those who wish to seek remedies against extreme partisan politics in American political discourse. Further research is needed regarding the consequences of pervasive norm-violating opinions, how Christian nationalists come to support norm-breaking behavior, and why there is no observed relationship between Christian nationalism and religiosity.

## Introduction

According to recent estimates, nearly three in ten Americans identify as Christian nationalists, and nearly four in ten in conservative states align with this ideology (PRRI 50 States, 2024). But what is Christian nationalism? It is a political ideology composed of identities, values, and historical narratives that primarily advocate for the fusion of Christianity and American civic life (Whitehead and Perry, 2019). In simpler terms, Christian nationalists reject the principle of separation between church and state as a core democratic value. Instead, they believe that the United States should either declare Christianity the nation's official religion or, at the very least, that the federal government should promote Christian values in policy and leadership (Rotolo, 2024).

This isn't a foreign ideology to many Americans. The Pew Research Center reports that more than 50% of Americans are aware of Christian nationalism, while a quarter of American adults hold unfavorable views toward it (Rotolo, 2024). Where do Christian nationalists stand concerning traditional democratic principles? Many Christian nationalists argue that First Amendment rights are privileges rather than inherent rights (Davis, Perry, and Grubbs, 2024), yet the relationship between Christian nationalists and democratic norms remains largely unexplored.

This paper seeks to understand how Christian nationalists respond to democratic norm violations committed by their fellow citizens, such as voter suppression, misinformation, and election denial. Specifically, it investigates whether Christian nationalists accept or reject the erosion of democratic principles when such violations occur at the citizen level in routine, everyday contexts.

To address this question, I fielded a nationally representative online survey in October 2024. The survey reveals that Christian nationalists are significantly more likely to tolerate and support democratic norm violations, including political violence, voter suppression, and refusal to accept election results. The data indicates another surprising finding: older Americans (65+) are even more likely than Christian nationalists to tolerate norm violations. Notably, the study finds no relationship between Christian nationalism and religiosity, measured by self-reported weekly religious participation.

Previous research indicates that Christian nationalists are more likely to condone presidential violations of democratic norms during national emergencies (Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs, 2020). However, it remains unclear how this perspective shifts when democratic violations occur at the citizen level. This study bridges this gap in the literature by starting with the premise that Christian nationalism's hierarchical view of rights prioritizes religious and cultural values over democratic principles. The findings contribute to the broader literature by demonstrating that Christian nationalists justify norm violations when these actions align with their vision of defending America's Christian identity.

More broadly, these findings raise important questions about whether other nationalist movements in the United States also exhibit similar tendencies in

prioritizing ideological values over democratic norms. For example, White nationalist and ethnonationalist movements in the U.S. frequently advocate for policies that restrict democratic participation, such as stricter voting laws or even exclusionary immigration policies, on the grounds of protecting a perceived "American identity." These patterns suggest that nationalism, across the ideological spectrum, can lead to a readiness to compromise democratic values when core beliefs or perceived national interests are at risk. These comparisons suggest that while Christian nationalism's justification for norm violations is rooted in a hierarchical vision of rights tied to religious identity, other nationalist groups may similarly engage in norm violations when their core ideological principles are perceived as under threat. Future research should examine whether the mechanisms underlying Christian nationalism's tolerance for norm violations, such as the belief in divinely sanctioned leadership or an apocalyptic sense of cultural decline, are also present in other nationalist movements in the United States.

In sum, this research is crucial for understanding the ideological underpinnings of Christian nationalism, the extent to which its adherents tolerate the erosion of democratic principles, and the factors driving political extremism in the United States. Further research is needed to explore the consequences of pervasive norm violation opinions, how Christian nationalists come to support such behaviors, and why religiosity does not appear to play a significant role in shaping these attitudes.

## Literature Review

How exactly does a Christian nationalist think? In the following sections, I will explore existing analyses of Christian nationalist cognitive processes, aiming to illustrate the intersections between this ideology and perceptions of politics and democracy in the United States.

## Christian Nationalism as an American Ideology

Christian nationalists hold very conservative views on certain cultural issues in the U.S. For example, they are more likely than other Americans to support adherence to traditional gender roles, more so than any other political or religious indicator (Whitehead and Perry, 2019). Put differently, identifying as a Christian nationalist reveals more about a person's views on gender roles in society than their political affiliation or self-expressed gender identity (Whitehead and Perry, 2019). Gender identity, however, is not the only divisive issue. Christian nationalists also tend to stigmatize historically marginalized groups, including communists, LGBTQ+ individuals, immigrants, people of color, and religious minorities (Davis and Perry, 2021). At the same time, they exhibit relatively higher tolerance for racist beliefs (Davis and Perry, 2021).

Demographically, Christian nationalists tend to be white evangelicals who strongly identify with the Republican Party and conservatism, and are concentrated

in the Southern and Midwestern United States (PRRI, 2024). There is also a clear correlation between Christian nationalism and voting for Donald Trump, particularly among white Christian nationalists (PRRI, 2024). Independent of other influences, such as Islamophobia, sexism, and racism, Christian nationalists supported Trump in 2016 largely to defend what they saw as America's Christian heritage (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker, 2018).

Research by Whitehead, Perry, and Baker—leading scholars in the study of Christian nationalism—reveals that although Christian nationalism is correlated with racist and sexist views, it operates as an independent ideology. In simpler terms, Christian nationalism is not merely an extension of these views but rather a distinct belief system rooted in the idea that America's survival depends on its Christian foundation. For many Christian nationalists, a vote for Donald Trump in 2016 was a vote to reestablish a Christian America (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker, 2018).

This means that Christian nationalism is likely to produce political attitudes and behaviors that differ from those of individuals who hold racist, sexist, or religiously conservative views but do not subscribe to Christian nationalism. For instance, while a person with high levels of religiosity may prioritize faith-based moral values in their voting decisions, they may not necessarily support policies that erode democratic norms or favor religious majoritarianism. Similarly, individuals who hold racist or sexist beliefs may support exclusionary policies but might not advocate for the explicit fusion of Christianity and American governance. Christian nationalism, by contrast, combines these elements into a cohesive ideological framework that justifies political actions, including norm violations, as necessary to preserve a divinely ordained national identity.

This distinction is particularly relevant when considering democratic norm violations. If Christian nationalism were merely a reflection of religiosity, we would expect highly religious individuals across different theological traditions to exhibit similar levels of tolerance for norm-breaking behavior. However, previous research and the findings of this study suggest otherwise: it is not religiosity per se, but the inherently *political*, not religious belief in a Christian nation that drives Christian nationalists' willingness to tolerate democratic violations. Future research should further disentangle Christian nationalism from overlapping ideologies to better understand its distinct impact on American political life.

## Democratic Norm Violations in American Politics

The second component of this analysis involves democratic norms, which are the unwritten, socially accepted standards of behavior that underpin the functioning of democratic societies (Metin and Georgarakis, 2018). These norms guide how citizens, political leaders, and institutions interact to maintain the health of a democracy. They include behaviors such as respecting the electoral process, ensuring that the voice of the people is heard through free and fair elections, and promoting accurate information in political discourse (Goldstein, 2022). For instance, while respecting election

results is crucial, it is equally important to safeguard the process itself by rejecting the spread of misinformation or efforts to delegitimize legitimate outcomes. The erosion of these foundational democratic norms, such as the promotion of misinformation or the refusal to accept the legitimacy of election results, can have a profound impact on the stability of democratic systems. This broader perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of how democratic norms are violated in practice, particularly in the context of events like the 2020 U.S. presidential election.

Former President Donald Trump is a notable violator of democratic norms. After losing the 2020 presidential election to Joe Biden, Trump claimed the election was "stolen" from him, promoting conspiracy theories that undermined public trust in the American electoral system (Hall and Druckman, 2023). Additionally, Trump frequently used Twitter to broadcast violations of democratic norms to his millions of followers. For example, on July 30, 2020, just months before the presidential election, Trump tweeted: "With Universal Mail-In Voting (not Absentee Voting, which is good), 2020 will be the most INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT Election in history. It will be a great embarrassment to the USA. Delay the Election until people can properly, securely and safely vote???" (Trump, 2020a). On May 11, 2020, he tweeted: "THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE. Sadly, our Lamestream Media is TOTALLY CORRUPT!" asserting that mainstream media could not be trusted to provide accurate information (Trump, 2020b). Furthermore, between November 4, 2020, and January 8, 2021, 60% of Trump's tweets sought to undermine the results of the 2020 election (Ratliff, 2021).

## Theory

For Christian nationalists who see Trump as a defender of America's Christian identity (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker, 2018), his norm-breaking actions may be viewed as justified, which has the potential of reinforcing their skepticism of democratic institutions that they perceive as hostile to Christian values. This skepticism manifests in their views on democratic norms, which are the basis of the theory I bring forward. When political leaders like Trump question the legitimacy of elections, it can ripple through segments of the population that already prioritize ideological or religious goals over democratic principles. For these supporters, particularly those who align with Christian nationalism, such actions from the president or other elected officials can further erode trust in democratic institutions. By aligning with leaders who question democratic norms, Christian nationalists may feel more justified in supporting anti-democratic behavior, as they see it as a defense of their Christian values rather than a violation of democratic principles. These dynamic highlights the complex relationship between religious ideology and the health of democratic systems.

It is from this angle that I seek to identify a relationship between Christian nationalism and everyday democratic violations. The closest theory we can get to an understanding of the relationship between Christian nationalism and democratic norms starts with how Christian nationalists view certain American rights. Christian

nationalism is already a leading predictor in determining how Americans interprets certain rights. These rights include strong favoritism towards gun rights, religious freedom, and states' rights, while at the same time deprioritizing freedom of speech, the press, right to a speedy and fair trial, and protection from illegal search and seizure. Additionally, identifying with the Christian nationalist ideology is the strongest predictor of viewing voting in U.S. elections as a privilege and not a right (Davis, Perry, and Grubbs, 2024). Christian nationalists also overwhelmingly support Trump, and he vocally supports democratic norm violations. (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker, 2018).

Here, I develop a theory of why Christian nationalists will be more prone to supporting democratic norm violations compared to other ideologies. This theoretical framework begins at the root of the Christian nationalist ideology. As stated previously, Christian nationalists are being drawn further and further into far-right political spaces that include support and defense of former President Donald Trump (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker, 2018). This trend towards conservative politics and ideologies can be related to an increasingly prominent conservative view that can predict the extent to which Christian nationalists view certain democratic rights as not rights at all, but rather a gift that can be taken away (Davis, Perry, and Grubbs, 2024). The hypothesis derived from this framework will aim to test the extent to which Christian nationalists are willing to support or reject democratic principles in their daily lives, particularly when they conflict with their ideological or religious priorities.

However, in examining the relationship between Christian nationalism and democratic norms, it is important to move beyond the idea that Christian nationalists' views are simply a response to elite cues, such as those set by President Donald Trump. While the influence of political leaders is undoubtedly significant, this alone does not fully account for the attitudes Christian nationalists have toward democratic principles. Instead, we must consider the unique ideological and religious commitments of Christian nationalism that shape its followers' approach to democracy in a peer-to-peer evaluation, rather than evaluating the effect of elite cues.

Christian nationalism often emphasizes a vision of society that prioritizes religious unity and moral certainty, both of which can clash with the pluralism, debate, and diversity of viewpoints inherent in liberal democratic systems. In these contexts, Christian nationalists may perceive the democratic emphasis on pluralism and diversity as problematic, undermining what they believe to be a divinely ordained social order. This ideological commitment to religious homogeneity and moral certainty can lead Christian nationalists to view disagreement or dissent not as a healthy part of democratic discourse, but as a moral or theological failure. Such views may push them to be more tolerant of—or even supportive of—violations of democratic norms, particularly when those norms are seen as reinforcing a morally compromised society.

This rejection of pluralism and ideological diversity is key to understanding why Christian nationalists might be more inclined to support democratic norm violations. When they view democratic processes—such as elections, free speech, or civil

rights—through the lens of their religious values, they may see these processes as tools for perpetuating moral decay rather than as essential elements of a just and stable society. In this light, undermining or rejecting democratic norms may appear justified to them, as they believe such actions are necessary to restore the moral and religious order they prioritize.

Thus, the relationship between Christian nationalism and democratic norms is not merely about following the cues of political elites, but rather about how the core tenets of Christian nationalism itself predispose its adherents to undermine the very foundations of liberal democracy. The unique religious and ideological orientation of Christian nationalists shapes their understanding of rights and democracy, making them more likely to support violations of democratic norms when these conflict with their religious or moral worldview. This theoretical framework offers a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics between Christian nationalism and democratic behavior, highlighting the importance of the specific religious and ideological beliefs that inform Christian nationalists' attitudes toward democracy.

## Hypothesis

Considering the previously outlined theory, I hypothesize that Christian nationalists are more likely to tolerate or even accept democratic norm violations by fellow citizens, especially when those actions align with their vision of protecting America's Christian identity. Unlike individuals who do not subscribe to Christian nationalism, those who hold this ideology may view such violations as justified if they believe they serve a higher, religiously motivated purpose.

The key variables in this hypothesis are adherence to Christian nationalist beliefs and tolerance for democratic norm violations. I expect that stronger adherence to Christian nationalism will predict higher tolerance for norm violations, while those without this ideological commitment will be more likely to condemn such behaviors. Specifically, Christian nationalists may justify actions like undermining election results or suppressing certain rights when they believe these actions defend their religious and cultural values. Conversely, those who don't subscribe to this ideology are likely to place more importance on maintaining democratic principles.

To strengthen the link between my theory and the hypothesis, it's important to highlight how the theoretical framework directly supports the anticipated behavior of Christian nationalists. As previously discussed, the foundation of Christian nationalism is rooted in a hierarchical view of rights, where certain freedoms, particularly those aligned with religious or cultural values, are prioritized over democratic principles like electoral integrity or freedom of speech, the latter two rights being democratic norms (Goldstein, 2022). This ideological hierarchy, coupled with Christian nationalist alignment with leaders who challenge democratic norms (Ex: Donald Trump), reinforces the likelihood that Christian nationalists will tolerate norm violations when these actions are framed as necessary for defending America's Christian identity. The theoretical basis of Christian nationalism's selective support for rights

directly informs the hypothesis that Christian nationalists will be more inclined to justify violations of democratic norms when those actions are perceived to align with their higher ideological or religious goals, being that Christian nationalists will attempt to defend the perceived Christian heritage of the United States by whatever means necessary. This is why adherence to Christian nationalism is expected to predict a greater tolerance for anti-democratic actions in everyday life.

The following sections will describe my data collection and evaluation process as I seek to study the combined effect of Christian national and democratic norm violations.

## Methods

To analyze Christian nationalism within a survey context, I took a six-question battery used commonly and consistently throughout academic research surrounding Christian nationalism. These are the same six questions used throughout most of the previous literature on the ideology, many of which were described above (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker, 2018; Whitehead and Perry, 2019; Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs, 2020). These questions were asked on a five-point scale with response options ranging from "Extremely Agree" to "Extremely Disagree," with "Neutral" being the moderating option. These questions can be seen in Table 1 below.[1]

**Table 1. Christian Nationalism 6 Question Battery**

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 | The federal government should advocate Christian values. |
| 2 | The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation. |
| 3 | The federal government should enforce strict separation of church and state. |
| 4 | The federal government should allow religious symbols in public spaces. |
| 5 | The success of the United States is part of God's plan. |
| 6 | I consider founding documents like the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution to be divinely inspired. |

To test the dependent variable of democratic norm tolerance, I developed three different survey questions, each analyzing a common democratic norm violation used frequently in American politics, all of which have roots back to statements or actions made by President Donald Trump during his first term in office. The first being political violence, has its roots in the January 6, 2020, riots in the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., when Trump repeatedly used the word "fight" in his

[1] It should be noted that question 3 of the sample is a reversed question, meaning a Christian nationalist would most likely respond "Extremely Disagree" to question 3 while responding "Extremely Agree" to the others. This is accounted for in the analysis. All Christian nationalist questions were scaled in the same way.

speech directed to his supporters in the lead-up to the attack.[2] Voter suppression stems from the frequent use of misinformation and disinformation spread online during the last 8 years in American politics, aptly called "fake news" by President Trump on multiple occasions.[3] Lastly, refusal to accept election results was chosen because many Trump supporters and Trump himself have refused to accept that President Joe Biden won the 2020 presidential election to this day. [4] In sum, all three of these norms were chosen for their relevance to politics today, as well as for their frequent use among political leaders. Each norm question is a forced-choice question, which requires the participant to choose either the democratic norm or the democratic violation as being closest to their view. These statements are not intended to reflect the most extreme violations but rather depict more gradual movements away from core democratic values. This approach allows for a finer assessment of how individuals perceive the flexibility or rigidity of democratic principles in specific contexts. Exact question wording can be seen below in Table 2.

The decision to focus on more moderate deviations was made to capture everyday attitudes and behaviors that participants might justify more easily, rather than asking them to consider extreme violations that would likely be more difficult to rationalize. By using less severe examples, the survey aims to explore how individuals navigate the moral and political gray areas where democratic norms are often subtly undermined. These gradual shifts are often more prevalent in public discourse and political behavior, as they are typically framed as necessary or acceptable actions in response to perceived failures in the democratic system.

Additionally, framing these potential violations in a way that participants may find more justifiable helps to reflect the reality that democratic norms are not always rigidly upheld by individuals, particularly when those actions align with personal or ideological beliefs. This approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of how people weigh democratic values against other priorities, providing insight into attitudes that might not otherwise be captured if only extreme violations were considered. Ultimately, the goal is to assess not only where participants draw the line on democratic principles but also how they rationalize or justify these line-crossings in everyday contexts.

Participants were asked about Christian nationalism first in the survey, with the order of the questions within the Christian nationalism battery being randomized. Immediately following the Christian nationalism battery, participants were presented with the democratic norm battery. All questions within the democratic norm battery were also randomized, ensuring that no specific pattern influenced participant responses. This design minimizes potential order effects and ensures that responses reflect genuine attitudes rather than being influenced by question sequencing.

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2 https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial

3 https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1297495295266357248
https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1288818160389558273

4 https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1328200072987893762?lang=en

**Table 2. Democratic Norms Forced Choice**

| General Topic | Democratic Norm | Democratic Violation |
|---|---|---|
| Political Violence | Protesting laws or government actions should always remain within legal boundaries, even if the government appears unresponsive. | When the government fails to listen, breaking certain laws during protests is sometimes necessary to make a stronger statement and force change. |
| Voter Suppression | It's important to ensure that everyone votes, even if some people might be misinformed or manipulated by false information. | It's acceptable to discourage people from voting if they have been misinformed or manipulated, because an uninformed vote can harm democracy. |
| Refusal to Accept Election Results | Citizens should always accept election results, even if they believe the process was flawed. | If people believe an election was unfair, it is okay to refuse to accept the results and legitimacy of the winner. |

To test if there is a relationship between Christian nationalism and democratic norm-violating behavior, we ran a survey on the Lucid Marketplace platform. The survey was fielded on October 18, 2024, and interviewed 3,024 respondents. Survey weights applied throughout the following analyses are designed to adjust for any demographic discrepancies between the sample and the U.S. population. These weights ensure that the results more accurately reflect the distribution of key demographic variables, such as age, gender, and race, in the general U.S. population. For analyses done on political parties, independent leaners are grouped with the party with which they lean.

After the survey was fielded, the Christian nationalism question scores for each participant were averaged together and scaled on a 0–1 scale, meaning that a score of 0 showed no self-reported levels of Christian nationalism while 1 represented total allegiance to the ideology. This is not a binary variable, but rather a simplified version of the averaged Christian nationalist scores for each participant. The same scale was then created for the democratic norm three-question battery by averaging each participant's scores together, then condensing the participant's democratic norm average into a 0–1 scale.

An additional measure of religiosity was included among the standard demographic questions, asking participants to report the average amount of time (measured in hours) they spent participating in religious activities, which can include attending church, scripture study, prayer, service projects, or other religious participation. Multiple options were given to the participant, with options ranging from 0 hours a week to 11+ hours a week, increasing incrementally in two-hour segments for

each option (i.e., 0, 1–2, 3–5, 6–8, 9–10, 11+). After the survey was conducted, I took this religious participation measure and a holistic religiosity measure by creating two conclusions from the participation question: high participation and low participation. Anyone who reported participating in religious activities three or more hours a week was classified as "high participation," while those who reported 0–2 hours were classified as "low participation" on the newly created religiosity measure. This newly created scale served the purpose of identifying whether religious involvement is a direct influence on self-reported levels of Christian nationalism. While religiosity is not the main relationship of interest, its inclusion provides keen insight into how Christian nationalism continues to develop as a significant ideology in American politics today.

A standard regression analysis was conducted with the final dataset, as well as analyses including religiosity and variation in both Christian nationalism and democratic norm tolerance by region. All these analyses can be seen below.

## Results

From the six-question Christian nationalism battery used to analyze how many survey respondents identify as Christian nationalists, most participants did not agree with Christian nationalist principles. The respondents also follow a notably consistent response deviation among all the questions, meaning that a similar proportion of respondents picked "Strongly Agree" consistently across all questions. The same can be said of the other response options as well. Those who picked "Agree," "Neutral," "Disagree," and "Strongly Disagree" did so consistently through each Christian nationalist question on the survey (see Figure 1).

Not many respondents identified explicitly as Christian nationalists, but still, a significant number did. On any given question, at least 10% strongly agree with Christian nationalist principles in every question (see "U.S. in God's Plan" in Figure 1 for the smallest proportion of "Strongly Agree"), and at most, 23% of participants strongly agree with Christian nationalist principles ("Divinely Inspired Documents" in Figure 1). Figure 1 shows this distribution of responses in a way that not many other papers do. Previous research studying Christian nationalism aims at identifying a cluster of Christian nationalists in the population (which I also do below), but Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses not just of members of the questionable ideology, but also how many people affiliate with the ideology as well.

**Figure 1. Distribution of Responses to Christian Nationalism 6-Question Battery**




Figure 2 tells a similar story to Figure 1. In Figure 2, we can see the distribution of all respondents' views on the three norm violation scenarios. As opposed to the distribution of responses to Christian nationalist principles above, Figure 2 tells a different story, showing that respondents picked the democratic norm over the norm violation every single time. These three questions were randomized in the survey, so the participants were not more likely to pick the democratic norm as they filled out the survey. Rather, something within the scenarios themselves makes their responses unique. Overall, it is striking that most participants chose the democratic violation over the norm in every question. While I initially expected to see a unique relationship between Christian nationalism and response to norms, I did not expect to see that most participants in the survey would choose the violation as being the most agreeable answer (Figure 2).

**Figure 2. Responses to Norm Violations by Christian Nationalism Level**




In terms of direct empirical relationships, there is a largely significant relationship between Christian nationalism and democratic norm violations. The coefficient for Christian nationalism is statistically significant at the *** level ($p < 0.001$), meaning there is strong evidence that adherence to Christian nationalist beliefs is associated with increased support for violating democratic norms. However, the effect size appears relatively small compared to other significant predictors, such as income or political identification. This suggests that while Christian nationalism is an important factor in predicting attitudes toward democratic norms, it may not be the strongest explanatory variable when compared to socioeconomic or partisan factors. Additionally, out of all the covariates added to the analysis in Table 3, only party identification had a significant relationship in addition to the Christian nationalism scale created. Party identification also had a stronger relationship to democratic norm violations than Christian nationalism did. Interestingly, church attendance is not a significant factor influencing one's acceptance or rejection of democratic norm violations (See Table 3).

**Table 3. Regression Output of Christian Nationalism Scale and Other Variables**

| Term | Coefficient | Std. Error | T-Statistic | P-Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | 0.557 | 0.120 | 4.627 | ***0.000 |
| CN Scale | -0.136 | 0.027 | -4.935 | ***0.000 |
| Church 1-2 | 0.002 | 0.013 | 0.176 | 0.860 |
| Church 3-5 | -0.014 | 0.017 | -0.853 | 0.394 |
| Church 6-8 | 0.0260 | 0.028 | 0.940 | 0.3473 |
| Church 9-10 | -0.030 | 0.040 | -0.756 | 0.450 |
| Church 11+ | 0.012 | 0.042 | 0.297 | 0.767 |
| 18-24 | 0.041 | 0.112 | 0.364 | 0.716 |
| 25-34 | -0.023 | 0.112 | -0.210 | 0.834 |
| 35-44 | -0.074 | 0.111 | -0.667 | 0.505 |
| 45-54 | -0.112 | 0.111 | -1.012 | 0.312 |
| 55-64 | -0.178 | 0.111 | -1.596 | 0.111 |
| 65-74 | -0.244 | 0.112 | -2.179 | *0.029 |
| 75-84 | -0.259 | 0.113 | -2.288 | *0.022 |
| 85+ | -0.207 | 0.120 | -1.720 | 0.085 |
| Race | 0.020 | 0.006 | 3.274 | **0.001 |
| Hispanic | -0.046 | 0.018 | -2.557 | **0.010 |
| $20,000-39,999 | 0.006 | 0.016 | 0.346 | 0.730 |
| $40,000-59,999 | -0.028 | 0.017 | -1.601 | 0.109 |
| $60,000-79,999 | -0.060 | 0.019 | -3.116 | **0.002 |
| $80,000-99,999 | -0.075 | 0.023 | -3.231 | **0.001 |
| $100,000-119,999 | -0.044 | 0.029 | -1.556 | 0.120 |
| $120,000-139,999 | -0.113 | 0.034 | -3.279 | **0.001 |

A visual representation of the regression results shown above can be seen below in Figure 3. When certain variables were broken out into their different subsections (i.e., "income" as a variable was broken into eight different income levels), we can see additional significant relationships to democratic norm violations. We can conclude from Figure 3 that individuals 55+ all have significantly negative relationships with democratic norms, meaning that most elderly individuals are more likely to pick the democratic norm violation as opposed to the norm.

Looking at other significant predictors, income appears to have a substantial role in shaping attitudes toward democratic norms. Specifically, individuals in the $60,000–$79,999, $80,000–$99,999, and $120,000–$139,999 income brackets all show highly significant relationships with democratic norm violations at the *** level. This pattern could suggest that individuals in the upper-middle class may be particularly likely to support norm violations, potentially due to perceptions of economic stability being threatened by political or social change.

Overall, these findings suggest that while Christian nationalism is statistically significant, its effect size is smaller compared to income and political identity. The broader takeaway is that economic and partisan factors may have a stronger influence on support for democratic norm violations than religious nationalist beliefs alone. Further research could explore whether the effect of Christian nationalism interacts with partisanship or economic status, potentially revealing more nuanced patterns in the data.

**Figure 3. Christian Nationalists More Likely to Tolerate Norm Violating Behavior**




The next two figures show where in the United States Christian nationalists are more likely to live (Figure 4) and where democratic norm violators live (Figure 5). Interestingly, the significant states differ from figure to figure. In Figure 4, Christian nationalists are more likely to live in the Southern U.S. and Rust Belt region, in addition

to Idaho and Colorado as outliers. However, Figure 5 shows that those more tolerant of norm violations tend to live in Idaho, Utah, and North Carolina, with Idaho being the only majorly overlapping state between the two variables (Figure 5).

The geographic distribution of Christian nationalists and democratic norm violators provides further insight into the relationship between ideological beliefs and tolerance for democratic violations. As highlighted earlier, the study hypothesizes that Christian nationalists may be more likely to support democratic norm violations when these violations align with their ideological values, particularly when defending a vision of America's Christian identity. The fact that Christian nationalists are concentrated in the Southern U.S. and Rust Belt region, as well as in Idaho and Colorado, aligns with historical patterns of conservative religious and cultural values in these areas. These regions have long been associated with Christian nationalist rhetoric, which suggests that individuals in these areas may be more attuned to, or accepting of, violations of democratic norms that align with their beliefs.

Specifically, the states highlighted in Figure 5 suggest that areas with higher concentrations of conservative and religious groups, such as Idaho and Utah, may foster environments where democratic norms are viewed as less rigid, particularly when those norms are perceived to conflict with ideological or religious values. This connection helps validate the study's prediction that Christian nationalists are more likely to tolerate or justify democratic norm violations when they are seen as necessary to protect core values, such as religious or cultural identity.

**Figure 4. Chrstian Nationalism Scores by State**



**Figure 5. Democratic Norm Violations Scores by State**




While not statistically significant, there is a notable relationship between Christian nationalism and religiosity. Those who attend church or participate in religious activities three or more hours a week are more likely to disagree with Christian nationalist principles, as opposed to those who attend less frequently or not at all. This finding challenges the assumption that higher religiosity necessarily correlates with Christian nationalist beliefs. Instead, it suggests that Christian nationalism may be less about personal piety and more about cultural or political identity.

For political science research, this underscores the importance of distinguishing between religious *behavior* and religious *ideology* when analyzing political attitudes. It also complicates the narrative that devout religious participation fuels anti-democratic or exclusionary politics. In the context of American politics, it raises questions about who is mobilizing around Christian nationalist rhetoric and why. It suggests that such mobilization may resonate more with individuals who identify with Christianity as a cultural or national marker, rather than those deeply embedded in religious communities, shifting the focus from churches to broader socio-political networks that frame religion as a symbol of national identity.

**Figure 6. Density of Christian Nationalism Scale by Church Attendance**




## Discussion

These results demonstrate that Christian nationalism does indeed predict if a person is willing to accept or reject democratic norm violations, by showing that someone who identifies with the Christian nationalism ideology is likely to accept democratic norm violations as commonplace in everyday political contexts. This confirms my earlier hypothesis, in which I stated "Christian nationalists are more likely to tolerate or even accept democratic norm violations by fellow citizens, especially when those actions align with their vision of protecting America's Christian identity." I did not, however, explicitly answer the latter half of my hypothesis of showing the reason for accepting norm violations because the violations "align with their vision of protecting America's Christian identity." While a relationship between the variables was shown, the mechanisms as to *why* the relationship exists remain unclear. Future research into this latter concern can shed further insight into the ideology.

These findings are incredibly relevant to American politics today, especially considering that the 2024 presidential election has brought former President Donald Trump back into office after defeating current Vice President Kamala Harris. Trump's second term is likely to amplify many of the political and cultural dynamics that have characterized his first term, which includes his alignment with Christian nationalist rhetoric and policies. His new term as president has the potential to serve as a springboard for embedding Christian nationalist ideals more deeply into everyday American politics. For example, Trump's presidency could normalize the blending of religious and political identity in ways that challenge traditional democratic norms, as seen in this paper. This is especially true as Christian nationalist frameworks often prioritize the preservation of a Christian culture over pluralistic democratic

principles. By explicitly establishing a relationship between Christian nationalism and the likelihood of tolerating democratic norm violations, such as undermining election integrity, restricting voting rights, or condoning political violence, this paper underscores the risks now posed to democratic governance.

What can these results tell us? Christian nationalist tolerance for democratic norm violations, especially those committed by fellow peers, has the potential to signal a bigger cultural shift in the United States, where respect for traditional, democratic principles is eroding among certain populations. This trend can continue to exacerbate threats to electoral integrity, freedom of the press, and other essential democratic institutions, which have the potential to undermine trust in American democracy and increase support for authoritarian tendencies in the U.S., where the latter is cognitively realized or not.

Christian nationalism, as seen in previous studies, often overlaps with conservative political ideology. This relationship between these two ideologies can tell us that support for norm violations could also be a uniquely conservative trend, which could serve as an interesting analysis in the future. These findings can also tell us that support or rejection of democratic norms could be driven primarily by loyalty to specific ideological/partisan camps, as opposed to a basic commitment to democratic values. If this is the case, this has severe implications for the future of democratic institutions in the U.S. government. Will the rejection of democratic principles become more commonplace as religious ideology becomes more popular in the U.S? Only time will tell.

About Figure 6, the lack of a relationship between Christian nationalism and religiosity suggests that Christian nationalism functions more as an overt political identity as opposed to a reflection of religious devotion. This distinction can have serious implications for understanding how religious rhetoric is weaponized by politicians by suggesting that appealing to Christianity can mobilize voters even when the political topics are not connected to the Christian faith.

Lastly, considering the three democratic norm violations included in this paper (see Table 2 and Figure 2), we can see that Christian nationalists' tolerance for norm violations can seriously affect future U.S. elections through voter suppression, election denial, or political violence can influence certain populations to sit out the vote in fear of danger or personal condemnation. This is a severe threat to election integrity in American elections.

## Future Research

There is still much to be analyzed regarding both the mechanisms behind support for democratic norm violations and the Christian nationalists' ideology. Future research in this literature would benefit from additional analysis regarding the specific psychological and social mechanisms that drive Christian nationalists to support norm violations. Considerations could include pressure from group identity, fear of losing political power, or increasing exposure to specific conservative media narratives, for both the formation of Christian nationalism as an ideology, the formation of

norm tolerance, and the relationship between the two. Because this paper only analyzes the existence of a foundational relationship, much is left unknown regarding its specific causal mechanisms.

Additionally, future researchers could investigate why there is no observed relationship between Christian nationalism and religiosity. Could this be due to differences in religious practice and beliefs, or is Christian nationalism *truly* an explicitly political ideology at its core? The answer to this question has the potential to be incredibly instructive for understanding uniquely American political ideologies, especially those that are so relevant to current political events.

A last angle to consider in future research is the relationship between non-Christian nationalists and Christian nationalists. In doing so, researchers could test how and why interpersonal relationships between two atypical ideologies (apart from the usual conservative-liberal ideology dichotomy) can influence tolerance for democratic norm violations from fellow peers, whether that peer is a Christian nationalist or not. This can be particularly instructive if the research design allows for different experiments, like a non-Christian nationalist who is a close family member/friend of the Christian nationalist breaking a norm violation, etc. (all of its different iterations).

While many questions regarding Christian nationalism and democratic norms remain unanswered, this paper does successfully establish that there is a relationship between the two. Continued conversations about this topic are crucial to fully realize the true impact of unique American ideologies on everyday democratic principles.

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# Public Support for War and Desertion

Joshua DeLaigle

## Introduction

Since the beginning of war, soldier desertion has been an issue for military leaders and the politicians supporting them. Desertion from the United States Military is defined in Title 10 of the U.S. Code Article 85 as a member of the armed forces who goes or remains absent from his or her unit or place of duty with the intent to remain away permanently ("10 U.S. Code § 885"). Desertions lessen both unit cohesion and combat readiness, potentially changing the tide of a war. For these reasons, military leaders and academic researchers have been concerned with understanding the phenomenon of soldier desertion to create preventative solutions that can increase military effectiveness and enhance the ability to wage war. Though often studied separately, public support for war and military desertion may be more intertwined than previously acknowledged. Without the public voicing their support for military intervention abroad, morale drops and other forms of support falter. For this reason, public support plays a crucial role in a military's ability to wage war. Without domestic support for war, a military is left without the necessities required to combat foreign enemies. This study explores the relationship between public support for war and military desertion, shedding further light on the decision-making process when a soldier chooses to desert.

## Literature Review

The existing literature surrounding military desertion focuses solely on the causes of desertion and preventative measures. Most of the surrounding causes behind desertion fall into two groups. The first group suggests that a soldier's failure

to adjust to military life creates an incentive to desert, and the second focuses on personal and family problems pressuring a soldier into their decision. In support of the first cause, it can be readily concluded that adjusting to military life is demanding. Military organizational structure is vastly different from any civilian organization. Though a civilian may be accountable to their employer, rarely are they answerable to the same degree as a newly enlisted soldier is to military officers. During basic training, newly enlisted military members are instructed on how to walk, talk, eat, sleep, and think. This sudden loss of personal autonomy is often a shock to the morale of the individual. A study from the U.S. Army Research Institute surveying Vietnam War deserters participating in the Ford Clemency Program found that around one-third cited failure to adjust to military life as their reasoning for illegally separating from the army (Bell and Bell 1977). August Hollingshead claims in his study "Adjustment to Military Life" that the ideally adjusted soldier would be "a military dependent who looked to the institution for all his personal, social, and emotional satisfactions." To achieve this level of adjustment, the military attempts to become a "substitute parent for an adult who has been reduced to infancy." However, Hollingshead notes the difficulty in achieving this outcome is due to the soldier arriving to the military with "a well-developed personality, civilian frame of reference, and set of cultural values that are often not compatible with the military organization" (Hollingshead 1946). In the end, tension between previously held civilian identities and new military identities often drives the subsequent failure to adjust to military life and, ultimately, a desire for separation. Since members of the military cannot simply submit a two-week notice of termination, the desire for separation or return to the previous civilian identity can lead to desertion.

The second group focuses on problems existing in personal or family life as potential motivations behind desertion. The study of participants in the Ford Clemency Program found that fifty percent of deserters cited personal or family problems as the reasons behind their abandonment of the military (Hollingshead 1946). Unsurprisingly, this category contains half of all deserters since personal and family problems are rarely narrowly defined, leading to the inclusion of a wide range of cases. In 2002, the Army Research Institute conducted a study investigating an increase in soldier desertions. In the study, family and personal problems were identified as leading causes behind the increase. The deserters in the survey were asked if they sought help within the military organization or other support groups before deserting and what actions would have prevented them from making their decision. One-third reported that they had not sought help, while the remaining two-thirds sought help through the chain of command, a chaplain, or various other administrative channels (e.g., hardship discharge). As to what changes would have prevented the soldiers from deserting, only one-third said a discharge from duty. The other two-thirds listed solutions to their personal or family problems (e.g., no overseas assignment, grant leave, change MOS, etc.) (Ramsberger and Bell 2002). These results seem to indicate that a satisfactory resolution of the soldiers' problem would prevent desertion. However, any test of this conclusion would prove extremely difficult to administer. It would

require identifying deserters before their desertion and examining their problems while testing to see if the solution to their problem prevented them from deserting. Considering the existing difficulty of identifying potential deserters, such a project would be infeasible.

The literature on desertion provides significant insight into the mentality of a deserter and what motivates military personnel toward desertion. However, the literature ignores the gap between the desire to desert and the act of deserting. For this study, the specific motive for desertion is not important. Instead, this study seeks to identify what converts the motive into action. More specifically, this study examines the timing of desertion and hypothesizes regarding the rationale behind deserter's decision. This study will analyze how the soldiers' perceptions of public support for war affect their likelihood to act upon their desire for desertion. The results of this study will strengthen the conclusions and analysis of previous studies to provide a deeper insight into the deserter's decision-making process.

## Theory: Why levels of public support for war affect soldiers' timing in desertion

When a soldier weighs the option of desertion, their primary consideration is the ability to do so without being caught. This concern breaks down into two parts: the initial escape from the unit and the sustainability of a new life away from the military. For the first part, it can be assumed that the soldier will seek a moment that maximizes the ability to leave without detection (e.g., on leave or during transit). However, concerns over the sustainability of life as a deserter introduces a host of new considerations, such as where they should relocate, who they can communicate with, and how they can avoid the authorities. Living as a deserter while avoiding detection requires relocation to an area where the soldier can maintain a hidden presence or establish a protective status. To increase the success of being hidden, soldiers are most likely to seek out communities that show empathy to their situation.

I argue that soldiers use the perception of public support for the war when deciding the timing and location of their desertion. This theory does not assume each soldier has the most recent public opinion polling in his or her possession before deserting. However, soldiers will use proxy materials such as anti-war leaflets, letters from home—in short, whatever media sources they have available to them in order to gauge public support for the war in which they are engaged. Only after the potential deserter has identified a potential haven will they decide to desert.

High public support for engagement in the current war will lead to lower levels of desertion. Deserters who choose to relocate to communities with high support for the war will find it more difficult to remain hidden. These communities will likely have a negative view of military servicemembers who are perceived as not supporting the war effort. The negative status of the deserters will bar them from community aid and leave them susceptible to being turned in to the authorities. Due to this, a soldier contemplating desertion will either not desert for fear of being caught or seek

a community with low support for the war. When low levels of support are widespread across a country, it can be assumed that there are many areas favorable to deserters. In environments of low support, the public will have more sympathy for the deserters, making them less likely to report them. Therefore, this increases the favorability of desertion as an option for a dissatisfied member of the armed services.

Thus, low levels of support for a war will lead to higher levels of soldier desertion. An example of this theory is seen in Nicholas Stargardt's work *The German War*. Stargardt tells the story of two German soldiers, Anton Brandhuber and Gerhard Schulz, who deserted their unit while serving on the front lines and returned home to their families. However, their home communities strongly supported the war effort, as did all of Germany at the time. Both soldiers ultimately returned to their unit following pressure from their families. Stargardt asserts that the clear lack of family support for their decision to desert helps explain why mass desertion never became an issue in the German Army during the Second World War. However, locations outside of Germany, such as Italy and occupied regions of Poland, experienced significantly high rates of desertion due to the "willingness of civilian society to absorb and hide men" (Stargardt 2015). Public support of war plays a critical role in a soldier's decision-making process, creating, in the soldier's mind, an ideal time and place to flee to, thus prompting action.

## Research Design

There are some challenges to testing this theory. Conducting any sort of experimental test would first require identifying potential deserters. This is a difficult task at best. Following identification of any potential deserters, there would need to be manipulation of their perception of public support for the conflict in which they are engaged. This manipulation would allow us to observe their rationale towards desertion. In short, identifying potential deserters alone would prove to be difficult, but isolating public support as the primary variable would create highly unique and complex challenges. A quantitative study also has a high level of difficulty due to a lack of detailed records on desertion that have been made available to the public. This study, instead, will use a qualitative approach to analyze deserters during the Vietnam War to understand a potential relationship between desertion and the individual soldier's perspective of public support at the time of their desertion. Interviews and stories from Vietnam War deserters create a valuable window into the decision-making process of the soldier, allowing us to determine what factors played key roles in sparking their action.

The Vietnam War will be used since the United States Military had large numbers of desertion throughout the war. From 1966 to 1973, the United States Military reported more than 500,000 cases of personnel being absent without leave for more than thirty days, defined as desertion under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Glatz 2022). During the same timeframe, public support for the continuation of the war also underwent significant changes. A Gallup poll ran throughout the Vietnam

War asked, "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" (McEvoy 2016). As shown in Figure 1, those who believed it was a mistake to send troops to fight were as low as thirty-one percent in 1966, around the start of the war. However, by the end of the war in 1973, it had risen to sixty percent. (McEvoy 2016) This research will use reports of the Vietnam War to trace how public support could have played into the deserter's decision-making processes, highlighting evidence that supports or contests the theory.

**Figure 1. US Public Opinion on Sending Troops 1965–1973.**[1]




## Hypotheses

*H1.* Desertion rates will have an inverse proportional relationship to the level of public support for war. Therefore, years with lower levels of public support for the Vietnam War will have higher levels of desertion.
*H2.* Deserters will relocate to areas perceived by the deserter to have low support for the Vietnam War.
*H3.* Deserters will use proxies to gauge public support for war, such as leaflets, the media, or letters from home.

[1] McEvoy, Olan. "Vietnam War: U.S. Public Opinion on Sending Troops 1965-1973." *Statista*, May 24, 2016. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1334328/vietnam-war-us-public-opinion-mistake/.

## The Vietnam War 1966–1972

In 1966, the U.S. began its second year of conflict in what came to be known as the Vietnam War. The number of involved personnel had reached 385,000 troops on the ground, with an additional 60,000 sailors stationed offshore ("Battlefield: Vietnam | Timeline"). U.S. fatalities reached over 6,000, with a further 30,000 wounded (Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics). On the home front, President Lydon B. Johnson committed to sending more troops to support personnel already engaged in Vietnam. This action, as well as the mounting casualties, sparked anti-war protests across the nation. However, despite some negative sentiment, that year, the Gallup Opinion poll found that fifty-one percent of Americans believed it was not a mistake to send troops to Vietnam, and thirty-one percent held the opinion that it was a mistake (McEvoy 2016).

With this domestic climate, assuming that the hypotheses above are correct, we would expect to see low levels of desertion. This is reflected in the data. In 1966, the desertion rate was at its lowest, with 8.43 soldiers out of 1000 deserting (Hartnagel 1974). For those who did desert, we would expect that they relocated to an area with low support for the war or where they had received some indication of support following their desertion. We see this with Private Gregory Graham of the U.S. Army, who deserted in December 1966. Private Graham left his post in West Germany and relocated to Amsterdam. His actions were motivated by a leaflet published by the War Resisters International, the Committee of 100, and the Vietnam Information Group in London that encouraged American G.I.s to desert. The leaflet also promised that potential deserters would find support from anti-war groups in Amsterdam (Glatz 2022). The leaflet acted as a proxy for public support surrounding the war at the time, signaling to Private Graham the existence of a community where public support for the war was low and support for deserters would be made available.

### *1967*

In 1967, public opinion began to shift towards a more negative view of the Vietnam War. At the beginning of the year, public support for the war was fifty percent, while against the war was only thirty-seven percent (McEvoy 2016). However, by the end of the year, it was nearly even, with support for the war and opposition to it coming at nearly forty-five percent (McEvoy 2016). Desertion rates had grown slightly, reaching 10.5 deserters per 1000 soldiers (Surrey 1982). In 1967, the number of anti-war protests increased as well. One of the largest of these demonstrations was held in San Fransico's Kezar Stadium. Speaking about the event many years later, Kipp Dawson, the executive director of the event, wrote the following,

> In addition to welcoming the huge assembly, I focused my brief remarks on saluting the then-nascent anti-war movement developing among active-duty G.I.s—to which the football stadium-filled crowd responded with a mighty roar that I can still hear. On that stage, I sat somewhere between Coretta Scott King

and Judy Collins, one of the first singers to oppose the war publicly. (Zinn Education Project 1967)

The fact that the executive director of the event chose to highlight the growing anti-war movement within the active-duty G.I. community demonstrates that San Francisco was becoming a potential relocation site for deserters. One of these deserters was named Jim Byrnes.

Jim Brynes served with the 196th Infantry Brigade in Vietnam when he decided to desert. While in Saigon, he talked his way onto an airplane bound for the United States. Upon arrival, he went to San Francisco, despite being from St. Louis. While in San Fransico, Jim went underground with the support of friends. Oddly, Brynes found the anti-war community to be hostile towards him. Even though he identified as an anti-war protestor, he was not viewed as one because of his active service in Vietnam. Jim described the situation: "You try to reach out and say, 'I'm on your side,' but no way. You weren't because you'd been there." Eventually, Jim Brynes feared the FBI would arrest him and chose to flee to a safer haven in Toronto, Canada (Haig-Brown 1996).

The case of Jim Brynes contains evidence supporting the second and third hypotheses that deserters tend to relocate to areas with low levels of public support for the war and will use proxies to gauge public opinion. At the time of Jim Bryne's desertion, support for the war was relatively high, making it necessary for him to search for an area that didn't reflect the national average in public support. Due to low public support for the war and high levels of anti-war protest, a deserter in 1967 seeking a safe haven would likely relocate to San Francisco, Los Angeles, or New York City (Miller n.d.). This was the case for Jim Brynes, who relocated temporarily to San Francisco instead of his hometown of St. Louis. While Jim Brynes might not have had access to public opinion polls, the large-scale anti-war protests in San Francisco were constantly headlining the news, which would have been easily accessible to him (Hofmann 1967).

*1968*

1968 was a turning point in the Vietnam War, both on the battlefront and domestic front. It was this year that the U.S. military sustained its highest number of casualties compared to any other year of the conflict (Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics). A significant reason for the high casualty rate was the surprise attack from the Viet Cong on American forces during the Tet holiday, known as the Tet Offensive. At home, social tension surrounding the war seemed to be at an all-time high. For anti-war advocates, 1968 seemed to have had several setbacks. It was the year of Martin Luther King Jr's and Robert Kennedy's assassinations and a presidential election year. In addition, the two leading presidential candidates, Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, both supported the continuation of the Vietnam War. Regardless of these difficulties, the anti-war movement continued to grow. The largest anti-war protest occurred at the Democratic Party nomination convention in Chicago, where several anti-war groups gathered outside the event. Ten thousand protestors

faced off against over twenty thousand law enforcement and military personnel. The protest quickly turned into a deadly riot, with the news spreading like wildfire across every media outlet (Waxman 2018). Overall, 1968 became the first year in which national opinion polls recorded that more respondents believed that sending troops to Vietnam was a mistake than those who supported sending troops (McEvoy 2016).

According to the first hypothesis, desertion levels should be higher than in previous years because opposition to the war now exceeds support, whereas in earlier years, support for the war was greater than opposition. The data does indeed point to a significant spike in desertion. The desertion rate in 1968 rose from 10.5 per 1000 in 1967 to 89.7 per 1000 (Hartnagel 1974). The overall number of soldiers who deserted in 1968 reached over 50,000 (Glatz 2022).[2] In a single year, the U.S. had suffered more desertions than in the totality of the Korean War, which totaled 47,000 (Brown n.d.). Evidence that the spike in desertion came from worsening public opinion comes from the Department of Defense itself. Phil Goulding, undersecretary of defense for public affairs, wrote in a memo titled "Problems We Can Anticipate in U.S. Public Opinion" that the high casualty rate, slowed momentum from the Tet Offensive, and additional troop requests had significantly contributed to a decline in public support for the war. Phil Goulding asserted that the low support for the war negatively impacted the war effort, emphasizing its effect on draft resisters and troop morale (Goulding 1968).

High levels of war opposition in U.S. public opinion led to more desertions, partly due to the increased ability of potential deserters to gauge public opinion in 1968. For soldiers stationed in the United States or Europe, daily newspapers were filled with evidence of low public support for the war, especially with extensive coverage of events like the Chicago riots, with one headline reading "POLICE BATTLE DEMONSTRATORS IN STREETS; HUNDREDS INJURED!" (Lukas 1968). Not only was mainstream media coverage of domestic dissatisfaction making its way to potential deserters, but there was also a steep increase in the production of desertion propaganda and leaflets. In his study on Vietnam draft resisters and deserters, David Surrey describes the Vietnam War in three phases.

The first phase was a general period of dissent among individual soldiers, lasting from 1965 to 1967. The second phase started in 1968 with the rapid growth of underground news and propaganda aimed at servicemembers like the G.I. underground press, coffee houses, and the American Servicemen's Union (Surrey 1982). In February 1968, the first issue of a popular underground press newsletter titled Act was published. Each edition printed in 1968 encouraged desertion and contained helpful hints on escaping the military, as well as contacts for beneficial organizations and lawyers helping deserters in Europe (Glatz 2022). At this time, underground newsletters advertised Sweden as the most secure location for deserters due to its favorable treatment. These underground newsletters flooded Europe, targeting US troops stationed in West Germany. One soldier who heeded the call was Private Ralph Denman, who fled his post in West Germany, eventually escaping to Sweden. Once in

[2] Glatz, Paul Benedikt. *Vietnam's prodigal heroes: American deserters, International Protest, European exile, and amnesty*. S.l.: LEXINGTON BOOKS, 2022.

Sweden, Ralph became a writing contributor for the underground newsletter (Glatz 2022). For troops in Vietnam, access to public opinion proxies increased as well. Former Marine Clarence Fitch, speaking on his experiences in Vietnam in 1968 as an African American, said, "We weren't living in no vacuum in Vietnam. There was a certain growing black consciousness that was happening in the states, and also over there in Vietnam (Moser 1996)." The words of Clarence Fitche demonstrate the extent to which social movements and opinions developing in the states found their way to the front lines and influenced soldiers to abandon the military.

*1969*

When Richard Nixon was sworn in as President in January 1969, he brought a glimmer of hope that the Vietnam War would end because of his commitment to "peace with honor." In June 1969, Nixon announced that 25,000 troops would be brought home, which began the gradual pullout of American military assets in Vietnam. However, the war was still raging, and the number of casualties had reached 58,220, surpassing the total number of deaths in the Korean War (Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics n.d). Public support for the war had dropped to its lowest level at thirty-seven percent, and opposition reached fifty-two percent (McEvoy 2016). David Surrey marks 1969 as the beginning of the third phase of the war, defined by "widespread mutinies, disobeying of orders, AWOL's and desertions" (Surrey 1982). Amidst this decline in public support, the desertion rate increased to 112.3 per 1000 (Hartnagel 1974).

A competitor to Sweden for being the most secure place for deserters emerged when Canada announced that its immigration officials were prohibited from asking about an immigration applicant's military status (Clerks 2006). Draft resisters and deserters had fled to Canada since 1965, but once Canada extended protection to deserters via their immigration policy in 1969, it became well-known as a safe haven (Glatz 2022). One such deserter who fled to Canada was named Charles Belcher. In an interview for Alan Haig-Brown's book *Hell No We Won't Go*, Charles recalls joining the Marines to see the world and partly to escape the reality of becoming a husband and father. Charles found his time in the Marines to be difficult due to racial prejudices against him as an African American. Charles ultimately decided to leave his unit and fled to a new city with his wife. For a few months, Charles was able to avoid the authorities looking for him. However, Charles began to lose support from members, such as his mother, who constantly begged him to return to the Marines (Haig-Brown 1996). What makes Charles's case unique from white deserters is that he was seeking a haven not only for wartime deserters but for African Americans. Surprisingly, the public opinion proxy Charles used was a Playboy magazine. While reading a Playboy ad for the Montreal Playboy Club, he noticed an African American present in the photo. Charles took the ad as evidence of the presence of African Americans living in Canada, and with his existing knowledge of Canada being a popular destination for resisters and deserters, he fled to Montreal. Once in Canada, the Toronto Antidraft Program arranged his lodgings as well as employment (Haig-Brown 1996).

In the case of Charles Belcher, we see evidence for all three hypotheses surrounding deserters and their attitudes. For the first hypothesis, confirmation exists in the overall desertion rates compared to the Gallop public opinion poll. As public support for the war declined rapidly, the desertion rate increased equally rapidly. The second hypothesis is evident in Charles Belcher's decision to relocate to Canada due to his expectation of finding an African American community and an anti-war populace willing to help deserters. As for the third hypothesis, Charles uses a Playboy magazine to gauge support for the African American community in his anticipated destination. In his interview, Charles does not mention how he knew Canada would be a safe location for deserters. However, Canada's role in draft resistance and desertion had been widely publicized in mainstream media for years. One *New York Times* article published before Charles's desertion titled "Underground Railroad Aids Deserters to Canada" described the havens that Montreal and Toronto became for American deserters (Kifner 1969). Therefore, it's not unlikely that Charles gauged the public opinion of Canada using similar media publications.

*1970*

As the Vietnam War continued into the 70s, so too did Richard Nixon's troop pullout. At the end of 1969, U.S. troops in Vietnam totaled 475,200. By the end of 1970, U.S. forces had shrunk by around 140,000 to around 334,600 personnel (The Vietnam War Interpreting Statistics n.d.). At home, support for the war continued to drop as well, with respondents supporting the war measuring only thirty-three percent and those not supporting the war reaching fifty-seven percent (McEvoy 2016). The desertion rates also reached a new high at 122.6 per 1000 (Surrey 1982). Again, in 1970, the inverse proportion of public support to the desertion rate is consistent with the first hypothesis. While Canada and Europe remained popular locations for deserters, the collapse of public opinion surrounding the war in the United States during 1970 allowed for higher success rates amongst deserters who chose to remain in the country. In fact, over this year, more deserters went underground in the United States than in Canada or Europe (Glatz 2022).

One of these deserters, Ed Sowders, was a medic during the Vietnam War. During an interview, he recounted that he initially volunteered to go to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people. After four years of service and in his second tour of duty, Ed decided to desert, believing his desertion and the removal of U.S. forces would be the best thing for the Vietnamese people. Back in the States, Ed had heard of an underground community for deserters. Ed described the community saying, "It's a couple thousand people who give a damn and who would help someone in trouble." Ed not only received help from the underground community but also his community back home, saying,

> I used to sneak home in the wee hours of the morning to visit my family in Detroit. What I didn't know at the time was half my neighbors knew that. Somebody always saw me, but nobody ever reported me. In fact, my mother told me

> one time the FBI had been around questioning neighbors about my whereabouts. She got calls from neighbors: 'If you see Ed, tell him to get out of town—they're serious this time.' If people wanted to, they could have done a McCarthy number—ratted on dozens of kids who didn't register for the draft. Everybody knew somebody who resisted the war in one way or another. (Moser 1996)

Ed's experience is an excellent example of the effect public opinion has on the ability of a deserter to avoid exposure successfully. Take, for instance, Jim Brynes, the deserter in the 1967 case study. Both Jim and Ed were from the Midwest; however, they had two vastly different experiences. Jim relocated first to San Francisco and then to Canada, both in search of a supportive community and to escape from a hostile community. Ed, on the other hand, was able to remain in the Midwest without difficulty. The main difference between the two was that Jim deserted when public support for the war was in the fifty percent range, and when Ed deserted, public opposition to the war was in the fifty percent range. From Jim's difficulties to the relative ease of Ed's experience, the logic becomes apparent that a deserter seeks to desert when there is low support for war or chooses to relocate to an area with low support for war. Deserting during times of low public support for war becomes much easier.

*1971*

In 1971, the pullout of U.S. troops continued with soldiers actively engaged in the war dropping to 156,800, nearly half of the 334,600 in 1970 (The Vietnam War Interpreting Statistics n.d). Public support for the war decreased to thirty-one percent, and public opposition rose to fifty-nine percent, while the desertion rates peaked in 1971 at 142.3 per 1000 (McEvoy 2016) (Surrey 1982). Within the first ten months of 1971, the U.S. Army reported 68,449 deserters, equivalent to six full combat divisions (Kelly 1971). A *New York Times* article published in August 1971 titled "Desertion Rates—Up, Up & Away" explores the large volume of deserters, saying, "Desertions have been traditionally high when wars are winding down, and tired men are impatient to get home, but this explanation does not explain the current variety." The article goes on to describe that the large volume of deserters is not isolated only to those on the frontlines but also to those who had never been to Vietnam (Kelly 1971). The article accurately identifies that the desertion rates at the end of the Vietnam War were not due to war fatigue. Public opinion towards the war had created an environment that potential deserters perceived as both encouraging and supporting desertion. This attitude is evident in the crew of the USS Coral Sea, who had joined the Stop Our Ships movement protesting the use of their ship in the Vietnam War. During an onboard protest, the crew released the following statement,

> It has become apparent that the majority of the Americans oppose the war in Vietnam. But the government has refused to be guided by public opinion. Members of the USS Coral Sea have begun taking a part in ending the war by starting the Stop Our Ships movement, which began with a petition to Congress with the goal of stopping our ships from deploying to Vietnam. This petition has now

> been signed by over 1,000 members of the crew. We are going to stop our ships, and we, the military men, are going to stop this war. (Moser 1996)

In the end, thirty-five sailors jumped ship and deserted in San Diego, and an additional fifty-three jumped ship in Honolulu. The USS Coral Sea crew's statement explicitly links their actions to American public opinion. In 1971, it was no secret that the war in Vietnam was deeply unpopular, and there was little need for potential deserters to covertly gauge public opinion. It was now out in the open. At this point in the war, any soldier with the desire to desert knew that they would find a supportive community if they were to flee the military.

*1972*

In 1972, the Vietnam War was almost over for the United States, with only 24,200 troops left in the country (The Vietnam War Interpreting Statistics n.d.). The South Vietnamese army was involved mainly in the ground war while the United States continued to involve its military, but mostly by utilizing air power (Battlefield: Vietnam | Timeline n.d.). Desertion rates had dipped only slightly from 1971, sitting at 138.9 per 1000 (Surrey 1982). Domestically, not much has changed since 1971, with public support for the war at twenty-nine percent and opposition reaching sixty percent (McEvoy 2016). At this point in the war, the floodgates of desertion were open. In 1971, the US Military had 98,324 desertions, and 1972 looked like it was going to be a similar year (Surrey 1982). A news article published in 1972 aptly described the situation, titled "Army Makes Little Effort to Find Deserters." The article tells the story of an army deserter, Charles Hatton, who, after spending several months as a deserter, had to travel to three different military bases to find someone willing to accept his surrender. An army officer familiar with Charles Hatton's case details said, "There is little effort to find these guys. Unless an A.W.O.L. (absent without leave) turns himself in or is picked up on a traffic violation or something like that and then found to be A.W.O.L., he could stay away until kingdom come" (Kovach 1972). This example demonstrates the overwhelming situation the U.S. military found itself in because of the flood of desertions.

Regarding the three hypotheses, the high number of desertions is still inversely proportional to the low support for war. For the second hypothesis, deserters no longer intensively sought out communities with low support for the war because the whole nation had become that community. As put by the army officer in the article, a deserter could walk off base and "stay away until kingdom come." Finally, the potential deserter in 1972 was constantly surrounded by different means with which to gauge public opinion. Mainstream media and underground newsletters repeated what was already commonly known: the Vietnam War had lost the support of the American people, and the GIs followed.

## Conclusion

The analysis of public support data, desertion rates, domestic and foreign contextual information, and personal stories from deserters demonstrates the existence of a causal link between changes in public support for war and desertion rates. Year by year, desertion rates were inversely proportional to public support. Case studies of individual deserters show their care in determining areas with low support for war and high support for deserters. In addition, the case studies presented have demonstrated that deserters use proxies such as underground newsletters, mainstream media, and even adult magazines to gauge public support. The seven years of the Vietnam War provided opportunities to compare similar cases across different levels of public support. These comparisons show strong support for the idea that public opinion has a substantial effect on the decision-making of the deserter. This study provides a temporal element to the literature on military desertions. These findings, combined with the existing literature, provide a broader understanding of the military deserter from motivation to execution.

The increased accessibility of media during the Vietnam War, compared to earlier conflicts such as the Civil War, significantly influenced soldiers' perception of public sentiment. However, despite these advancements in communication, the fundamental relationship between public support and desertion likely remains consistent across time. Regardless of the specific means by which soldiers access information—whether through letters, newspapers, radio broadcasts, social media, or underground networks—the core principle remains unchanged: When public support for a war declines, soldiers are more likely to consider desertion and eventually choose it. While contributing to the understanding of this phenomenon, this study is limited by the availability of historical data. As more archival material, personal accounts, and declassified government records become accessible to researchers, future investigations can refine and expand these findings. This paper hopes that continued scholarly inquiry into the relationship between public sentiment and military desertion will yield deeper insights into historical and contemporary conflicts.

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# Forcing Freedom: An Analysis of Liberal Intervention from 1945–2017

Will Ford

## Introduction

The United States has a unique role on the international stage. Over the course of its history, especially since the Cold War, it has shown a proclivity for intervening in other country's affairs (Peceny 1999, 1–2; Muravchick 1991, 222). This is no surprise, given that the U.S. has long borne the self-assigned role of the "world's policeman" (Etzioni 2016, 508). One of the driving factors behind U.S. intervention is the United States' commitment to a grand strategy that uses liberal intervention to create a world friendly to the U.S., its allies, and its interests (Pickering and Peceny 2006, 540). The United States often does this by using forceful intervention to promote liberal democracy abroad, usually either by overthrowing regimes perceived as a threat or defending friendly regimes (Pickering and Peceny 2006, 540). Many theorists and academics oppose U.S. intervention, suggesting that it creates instability by provoking resistance, inciting ethnic conflict, and furthering selfish motives other than the promotion of democracy, among other critiques (Jahn 2007, 224; Chua 2003, 274; Cavell 2002, xvii). While the concept of U.S. intervention may conjure up images of Cold War operations, the issue remains quite relevant today. With American politicians on both sides of the aisle turning against "nation building" and other forms of liberal intervention, it is a worthy endeavor to study liberal intervention so as to better ascertain if turning away from it is a wise choice (Abbot 2024, Waldman 2021).

When discussing intervention, it is important to examine why some states respond differently to intervention than other states. For example, some states like South Korea and Panama are now healthy democracies, while states like Vietnam and Libya remain authoritarian states. An important question that arises from this puzzle is whether or not states are likely to democratize if the U.S. meets its diplomatic or

military objectives during an intervention. Many politicians and pro-intervention foreign policy analysts use the promotion of democracy as a normative justification for intervention and as a way to rally domestic support for it (Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre 2007, 1; Peceny 1999, 36). If intervention can be used to promote democracy, we should expect to see interventions in which the U.S. achieves its military or diplomatic objectives lead to the emergence of liberal democracy.

In addition to considering whether intervention is viable, it is also important to consider what methods are used to intervene. Over the course of its history, the United States has used a variety of methods of intervention, ranging from economic sanctions to violent military operations (Corrales 2020, 50; Whitcomb 2001, 132). In deciding which of these methods are best utilized by intervening states, it will prove useful to examine the potentially varying degrees of effectiveness and consequences of different types of intervention. Since some scholars suggest that the negative effects of military action hinder democratization, we should expect peaceful interventions to be connected to higher levels of freedom (Mesquita and Downs, 2001, 628; Coyne 2008, 187).

To answer these questions, it is helpful to look at how countries the U.S. has intervened in fare nowadays in terms of civil liberties and democracy. In this paper, I seek to develop an x and y relationship between successful U.S. intervention and the current level of freedom of the countries in which the U.S. has intervened. It is my theory that successful U.S. intervention will be imperfectly, but positively correlated with higher levels of civil liberties and political freedom in target states, and that peaceful interventions will prove more effective at leading to democratization.

To test these theories, I have created a list of countries in which the United States has intervened for the purpose of democratization and/or defending the "liberal world order", then classified the nature of U.S. intervention according to level of success and type of intervention. I then use the current Freedom House Index (a well-respected measure of civil and political liberty) to see how these countries fare nowadays in terms of liberal democracy. These variables, along with controls, effectively allow me to quantify the results of my study.

## Literature Review

Several academics have studied whether it is possible to effectively promote democracy by intervening in other country's affairs. The paradoxical nature of enforcing liberty and democracy through force makes it a natural subject of fascination in academia, as well as a vexing dilemma for many liberals (Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre 2007, 39–40). Many scholars have come to quite differing results.

Many academics present a pessimistic view of the U.S.'s ability to promote democracy by intervention. Lowenthal argues that democratization requires consistency. The U.S., with its volatile domestic politics, has had little success promoting democracy, (specifically in Latin America) its attempts at democratic intervention being "usually negligible, often counterproductive, and only occasionally positive"

(Lowenthal 1991, 383). Some suggest that intervention fails to bring about real democratic reform and often merely brings about "symbolic trappings" of democracy, often resulting in rigged elections and regression to authoritarianism (Mesquita and Downs 2006, 647; Gleditsch, Siljeholm & Havard Hegre 2007, 41).

Some scholars have found more mixed results as to whether intervention leads to democracy. Pickering and Peceny found that intervention is largely ineffective at promoting democracy, with only 18.1% of hostile U.S. interventions, where the U.S works against an incumbent regime, leading to democratization (2006, 554). Peceny discusses military interventions and if there is a connection between the U.S. using pro-liberalization policies during the intervention and the target states democratizing. He finds that interventions where pro-liberalization policies are used are sometimes linked with democratization, and that when the U.S. attempts to bring about democracy, it can sometimes be successful (1999, 200–201). Downes and Monten suggest that intervention usually cannot bring about democracy from scratch, but that it can effectively restore democracy to states that have been democracies in the past (2013, 130). These studies paint a more mixed picture of U.S. intervention and suggest that it's neither highly effective nor always futile.

It is interesting to note that critics of intervention are far from uniform in their diagnoses of why exactly interventions are usually unsuccessful in bringing about democratic change. Some scholars are open to the idea that intervention can be successful at times, but suggest that there are a variety of complications and inhibitions that make it difficult for the United States to bring about lasting liberal democracy via intervention (Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre 2007, 39–40; Schraeder 2002, 234; Coyne 2008, 173; Downs and Monten 2013, 94). Some inhibitions to democratization are previous inexperience with democracy, armed resistance to foreign interference, or a lack of democracies in the region. Other literature disregards the idea of liberal intervention entirely, suggesting that it is nearly impossible for the United States to successfully promote democracy via force for political reasons (Lowenthal 1991, 383; Mesquita and Downs, 2001, 647). Alternatively, some literature suggests that U.S. interventions have little to do with democracy and are merely an excuse for the United States to pursue global hegemony (Cavell 2002, xvii; Go 2011, 243–244; Blum 2013, 16). The literature all seems to suggest that intervention is unreliable at best for democracy promotion and futile at worst. However, knowing which of these diverse critiques is most accurate will shed light on whether or not intervention is viable and should even be considered an option in the first place.

Additionally, despite the wealth of studies done on the subject, there are still several questions that have been left unanswered. Most of these studies focus exclusively on military intervention (Peceny 1999, 1; Peceny and Pickering 2006, 539). Little research has been done on whether nonviolent interventions can be used to promote democracy. Schraeder noted that there exists a "spectrum of violence" involving different tools of intervention from classic diplomacy to military involvement, but did not explore the concept in much detail or analyze the effectiveness of different forms of intervention (2002, 219–220). Nonviolent interventions constitute much of the work

done by government agencies in promoting U.S. interests abroad (Longley 1993, 150; Mistry 2006, 301). For example, the Trump administration's aggressive push to oust Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro via sanctions and diplomatic pressure could be classified as an intervention (Corrales 2020, 50). It likely offended the Maduro government's sense of sovereignty and constituted an effort to change Venezuela's government. To only consider military interventions would be to examine only a fraction of the whole picture. My study adds to the literature by examining peaceful as well as military interventions.

Additionally, much of the existing body of research on the topic is outdated. After the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, there was an explosion of literature regarding democracy promotion as it became a major objective of U.S. foreign policy (Dalpino, 2000). There was also an increase of literature on the subject in the 2000s, largely as a result of controversy surrounding U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Mesquita and Downs 2001, 627). Since then, the U.S. has been involved in several interventions. My research updates this work by including interventions that have happened recently (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan) in addition to cases from the Cold War.

Past studies generally focus on intervention as a whole and whether or not they are a net positive for democratization. These studies often point to the fact that the U.S. has intervened in other countries for reasons that have nothing to do with democracy. The purpose of this paper is not to assess the morality of U.S. intervention and goals, but to see whether U.S. intervention can strengthen democracy when it tries to and meets its objectives. For these reasons, I have excluded many cases of intervention where the promotion of democracy or defense of the liberal world order was not at least a contributing motive.

In summary, this paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature on the topic of intervention and democratization by including recent events in my analysis, focusing exclusively on cases in which the promotion of democracy was an explicit or implicit motive, adding nuance to the discussion by asking whether or not successful interventions are more likely to lead to democracy than failed ones, and analyzing peaceful in addition to violent intervention.

## Theory

The theory behind this study is simple: when the United States successfully intervenes in another country's affairs with the intent of promoting democracy and/or defending the liberal world order, the country will be more likely to take steps towards liberalization (holding elections, supporting political rights and civil liberties, etc.). When the U.S. fails, or is only partly successful, countries will be less likely to democratize and may regress to authoritarianism. Peaceful interventions will likely be linked to higher levels of freedom.

There are many reasons for why successful U.S. intervention can lead to the creation of liberal democracies. For one, when the U.S. intervenes, it is likely to support

governments that are friendly to the U.S., its allies and the "liberal world order" (O'Rourke 2019, 110). These governments are then more likely to be aligned ideologically with liberalism and other U.S. values, which can lead to greater civil and political freedom. Second, U.S.-friendly governments are more likely to be economically linked to the U.S.-led world order, which can also have a dramatic impact on a state's democratization. Coyne points out that several autocracies such as Taiwan, Mexico, and South Korea democratized while they engaged in large-scale trade with the United States (2008, 185). Even if a state doesn't democratize immediately following a U.S. intervention, it may be predisposed for liberal democracy as a U.S. ally. A perfect example of this is Greece, a country that has had a turbulent political past, but has been a stable democracy for much of its history since World War II. After the United States intervened and stopped the country from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence, the transition to a liberal democracy was far from smooth. However, after being ruled by a right-wing dictatorship for a few years, it eventually became a successful democracy (Britannica 2024). It's possible that being a member of the U.S.'s sphere of influence, which tends to emphasize political and civil rights over economic ones, played a role in leading Greece to democratize, as U.S. diplomats put pressure on Greece's military government to free political prisoners and return to a constitutional form of government (Frieden, Lake and Schultz 2019, 506; Drew 1968).

Greece's experience with democracy can be contrasted with Albania's. Greece and Albania are geographically close and share a history of being torn between communist and pro-western forces. The United States tried to intervene in Albania in 1968 to prevent it from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence, but was unsuccessful, and, as a result, Albania became a Soviet influenced state (CIA 2007). Albania did not develop democratic institutions until the USSR collapsed, and currently has a functioning, though flawed, democracy (Britannica 2024).

One of the main arguments against intervention is that it is often carried out for nondemocratic motives (Cavell 2002, xvii; Go 2011, 243-244; Blum 2013, 16). While that is a valid critique, it is still highly possible that interventions without purely democratic motives may still inadvertently lead to democratization. Successful U.S. interventions often destabilize regimes and encourage new regimes to become more aligned with the U.S. and its values. This can happen even when the primary motivation for the intervention is economic or to protect U.S. citizens abroad (Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre 2007, 40).

Another important consideration on intervention is the methods used to intervene. One of the main critiques of violent intervention is that it leads to destabilization, doing significantly more harm than good to a target state. Jahn suggests that violent interventions lead to violent resistance, potentially plunging a nation into chaos, leading to long-term damage, and reducing the chances of successful democratization (2007, 224). Coyne suggests that countries are unlikely to accept democratic ideals that are forced on them at gunpoint (2008, 187). If these suggestions are true, we would expect peaceful interventions, such as diplomatic pressures and support to

peaceful pro-democracy groups, to be more highly correlated with liberal democracy than violent interventions.

In this study, intervention will be defined as any time the United States has involved itself in a civil conflict (or situation of political unrest or nonviolent strife) in another state with the expressed or implied purpose of supporting the liberal world order that the U.S. has traditionally sought to establish. This may include instances when the U.S. has supported proxy forces, even if American troops were not deployed. It may also include aggressive diplomatic attempts at regime change or sanctions. When I mention democracy, I am referring to liberal democracy, or a specific style of democracy that includes a respect for individual civil, political and economic rights (Coyne 2008, 11). This type of democracy has traditionally been embraced and promoted by the United States (Peceny 1999, 26). "Success" in intervention refers to whether or not the

U.S. meets its expressed or implied objectives and/or goals of the intervention operation. By "goals," I refer to the objectives of an operation. Common objectives include overthrowing a certain leader, protecting U.S. citizens abroad, or providing humanitarian relief. I hypothesize that states where the United States has successfully intervened will have higher Freedom House Index scores than states where the United States has unsuccessfully intervened. I also hypothesize that peaceful interventions will prove more effective than violent interventions in future state democratization.

## Hypotheses

*Hypothesis 1:* U.S. success will be positively correlated with a high score of the Freedom House Index, (FHI) even after controlling for potentially confounding variables

*Hypothesis 2:* Peaceful interventions will be more positively correlated with FHI than violent ones

## Research Design

In my study, I compile a dataset of all relevant instances of U.S. intervention, where the U.S. intervened to support democracy, since 1945. Using this data, I test my hypothesis using quantitative analysis. For each instance, I determine to what level the U.S. intervened, whether

U.S. intervention was successful, the country's 2024 Freedom House Index score, and relevant control variables. I determined what instances to add to my dataset based on records by the Council on Foreign Relations, scholarly literature, declassified CIA documents, encyclopedias, and news sources. The full table of cases with coded variables can be found in appendix B.

Following my in-depth research, I coded 37 cases that represent the United States' effort to defend the liberal world order and/or promote liberal democracy.

Every case was carried out either explicitly in the name of democracy, with the purpose of assisting regimes aligned with the U.S., or by bringing down a leader opposed to the U.S.'s interests and ideology. Some interventions were staged in defense of a regime fighting against potentially authoritarian insurgents or invaders. Several of these cases were not publicly announced and some were only recently declassified, meaning that it has been up to my best judgment to determine which cases were in favor of democracy/liberalism and which ones were not. The reason I exclude some prolific cases of U.S. intervention is because they were not carried out in the name of democracy or with the intent of defending the liberal world order and are thus not aligned with the focus of my study. As mentioned previously, this paper does not seek to assess the broad effects of U.S. intervention, but to ask whether or not interventions in which the U.S. tries to promote liberal democracy and succeeds in its goals leads states to become more democratic. More information about the coding process and case selection can be found in appendix A. The sources I used to determine each case are listed in Appendix C. I chose to only use cases from 1945 to present because this is the era when the United States has been most proactive in upholding the liberal world order (Muravchick 1991, 222).

In order to detect a correlation between successful intervention and democratic health, I have analyzed each case's level of success (my x variable). If the U.S. achieved all or most of its goals, I coded it as a "1." For example, the successful defense of South Korea during the Cold War received a "1" because the U.S. was successful in stopping it from falling under Soviet influence and ensuring that it remained a member of the liberal world order (Millet 2024). A failure, such as the CIA's support to the Kuomintang rebels operating out of Burma to retake China, is classified as a 0 (Kaufman 2001, 443–444). Many conflicts are not so easily categorized. For example, in Iraq the United States quickly overthrew Saddam Hussain's regime, but failed to establish stable democratic institutions or keep the nation in order-which were motives of the invasion (Britannica 2024). I classified this case, and similarly complicated cases, as "0.5", given that they are not outright failures, but they also did not fully reach the United States's desired outcome. For more effective statistical analysis, I have, in some regressions, used dummy variables for "victory" (success = 1) and "stalemate" (success = 0.5) to avoid problems with the zero-conditional mean assumption (a useful condition for good statistical analysis).

My y-variable is the 2024 Freedom House Index (FHI) for each country. Freedom House is a well-respected non-profit political organization dedicated to monitoring civil and political rights across the world. Each year, they rate each country on a scale of 1–100 (1 being the lowest and 100 being the highest) based on civil and political liberties in a country. They analyze the right to vote, freedom of speech, and other measures of how free and democratic a country is. It is an excellent operationalization of how much a state embodies liberal democracy. I use the current FHI rather than FHI right after or a couple of years after an intervention because I am most interested in the long term effects of the interventions. A country may be influenced by the U.S. for some time following intervention, as seen in the aforementioned cases of Greece,

Taiwan and South Korea (Coyne 2008, 185; Drew 1968). The Freedom House Index also only exists in its current form, as a scale from 1–100, from 2017 onwards, complicating attempts to look at FHI trends over time. Given that the Freedom House Index is an extremely comprehensive measure of liberal democracy and ideal for this kind of study, I decided to use the current FHI instead of looking at another index.

Another factor I examine is the level of intervention by the United States. I used the following classification to organize levels of intervention from the least to most heavy-handed. I also used a dummy variable called "peaceful" that is equal to one if the level of intervention is Levels 1 and 2, and zero if the level of intervention is 3 or 4. I used sources in my works cited page to make these determinations.

1. Unofficial support/advice
2. Diplomatic backing/funding to groups, sanctions
3. Military financial aid/training proxy forces
4. Direct U.S. military involvement

## Controls

As any student of statistics knows, correlation does not imply causation. There always exists the possibility of spurious correlation, where some variable that is linked to both X and Y confounds the observed relationship between them. In order to effectively account for this possibility and to achieve a causal estimate, I identified four main control variables.

*Democratic traditions (DemTrad)*

Some countries in my study, such as Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, had traditions of democratic governance before the U.S. intervened.

Others, such as South Korea and Ethiopia, did not. It is possible that if a country had strong democratic traditions, it would be easier for the United States to achieve its goals when intervening. These countries also may have higher FHIs because of their history with democracy. To account for this variable, I coded a variable to record whether or not a country had democratic traditions before U.S. intervention, particularly in terms of electoral democracy. If the country was a functioning democracy for a significant period of its history I classified it as a "1."

Venezuela, which was a functioning democracy for decades before U.S. intervention, fits into this category (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). Countries that briefly experimented with democracy, have quasi-democratic constitutions or are very new to democracy are classified as a "0.5". For example, Albania had its first election in 1923 as part of an experiment with democracy, but quickly returned to authoritarianism (Austin 2012, 158). Countries with no significant experience with democracy are classified as a "0."

*U.S. sphere of influence (USSPHR)*

It is possible that countries within the United States's traditional post-WWII sphere of influence are easier for the United States to intervene in and are more likely to embrace liberal democracy, due to a shared cultural heritage or influence by the U.S. To account for the possibility of spurious correlation, I included a dummy variable coded as a "1" if the country is located in the U.S.'s sphere of influence and a "0" otherwise. (Specifically Europe, the Americas, and the Caribbean) I use these regions because this is where the U.S. has historically had the closest ties, be it through a direct emergence from Europe or being involved via the Monroe Doctrine (State Department).

*Global Peace Index (GPI)*

A wealth of literature confirms a correlation between peace and democracy (Frieden, Lake and Schultz 2019, 179). Whether peace leads to democracy or vice-versa is a subject of debate among international relations scholars, but we can expect that peaceful states will have higher FHIs. Peacefulness may also affect whether the United States is successful in intervention, as chronic conflict can make it more difficult for the U.S. to advance its interests. Because of this, I included the Institute for Economics and Peace's 2024 Global Peace Index as a control variable. This index ranks each country on a scale of 1-4 (with smaller numbers being the most peaceful) in a given year, accounting for various factors ranging from civil conflict to crime to interstate wars, making it an excellent indicator of how peaceful a country is.

*Real GDP Per Capita (GDP)*

The literature indicates that economic growth and stability can lead to democratization (Mousseau 2013, 196). Economic factors may also impact how the United States intervenes in a country and whether that intervention is successful. I included the country's most recently reported real GDP per capita as a control variable, using the most recent edition of *The CIA World Factbook*.

Using all the data I collected on these variables, I ran multiple regression models to test my two hypotheses. To get an effective causal estimate, I factored my control variables into the regression equations, helping to better isolate the effect of successful intervention on FHI. I also employed heteroskedasticity-robust equations to account for the possibility that the variance in the data is not consistent across the data.

## Results

> *Hypothesis 1*: U.S. success will be positively correlated with a high score on the Freedom House Index, even after controlling for potentially confounding variables

Before getting into linear regression, I decided to use a simple scatterplot with a line of best fit to look at the raw correlation between US Success and FHI. The results

appeared to confirm my hypothesis, (The correlation coefficient between success and FHI is 0.56) but to get a better causal estimate I used multiple linear regression to factor in control variables and get a more accurate image of what the effect of success on FHI is. The results of these regressions are listed on table 1.

**Table 1. The Effect of Success and Controls on FHI**

| VARIABLES | (Model 1) FHI | (Model 2) FHI | (Model 3) FHI | (Model 4) FHI | (Model 5) FHI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Victory | 25.67*** | 33.66*** | 19.38** | 33.78*** | 22.92** |
| | (8.485) | (7.398) | (9.353) | (7.900) | (9.914) |
| Stalemate | 15.57** | 18.72** | 4.498 | 19.29** | 10.76 |
| | (7.516) | (7.444) | (8.479) | (8.327) | (8.574) |
| Democratic Traditions | 24.09*** | | 26.65*** | | 23.58** |
| | (8.634) | | (8.071) | | (9.207) |
| U.S. Sphere of Influence | 2.965 | 16.40** | | | |
| | (7.490) | (6.839) | | | |
| Real GDP per Capita | 0.659*** | | 1.128*** | | 1.039*** |
| | (0.235) | | (0.155) | | (0.212) |
| Global Peace Index | -20.00*** | -29.20*** | | -25.23*** | |
| | (5.321) | (4.866) | | (6.108) | |
| Constant | 48.76*** | 82.82*** | -0.0118 | 81.10*** | 0.0437 |
| | (15.87) | (13.50) | (7.679) | (15.99) | (10.16) |
| Regional Fixed Effects | N | N | N | Y | Y |
| Observations | 36 | 36 | 37 | 36 | 37 |
| R-squared | 0.799 | 0.696 | 0.736 | 0.703 | 0.787 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of the regression support my theory. In each model, the U.S. having achieved its goals is strongly, positively correlated with FHI at least at a 0.05 significance level. Stalemates were correlated with a higher FHI, but the correlation was relatively weak and wasn't statistically significant in each model.

I used three different equations to estimate the effect of U.S. success on FHI in order to account for various statistical concerns. First, I included the dummy variables for "victory", "stalemate", and every control variable. While equations that use a high amount of variables with a (relatively) low N are good for making predictions, it is difficult to say that they accurately reflect the true value of each parameter's coefficient due to the one in ten rule (a statistical convention that suggests it is unwise to test more than one variable for every ten observations). There are also concerns that some of the control variables may be highly correlated with each other, bringing up the risk of multicollinearity and making it difficult to accurately assess each parameter. For example, real GDP per capita and GPI had a correlation coefficient of -0.63. Because of this, I ran two regressions using only two control variables each, separating the variables so as to minimize multicollinearity.

Another concern I encountered was that GDP per capita was strongly, positively correlated with successful intervention, potentially creating an upward bias on my results. To address this concern, I decided to rerun models 2 and 3 and include regional fixed effects for the five regions in which cases of intervention are classified (the Americas, Asia, Europe, The Middle East/North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa). U.S. sphere of influence was omitted because of multicollinearity. Since certain regions were strongly correlated with GDP per capita, including regional fixed effects served as an effective way to address this bias, even if it doesn't completely disentangle GDP per capita from the level of success in an intervention.

As the table suggests, the link between success and FHI remained statistically significant in each equation. All of the control variables were also positively correlated with FHI except for GPI, which we should expect to be negative, given that a lower GPI indicates a more peaceful state. This suggests that the models were somewhat accurate. The estimates also didn't change much when fixed effects were included, strengthening the correlational link between successful intervention and FHI.

My statistical findings echoed descriptive findings from the raw data. Out of the 37 cases of intervention included, 20 were considered entirely successful. Out of those 20, 9 were considered "free" by Freedom House and 6 were considered "partly free." Out of the 6 cases with only partial success, only 1 was considered "partly free" while the others were considered "not free." Out of the 10 cases where success was equal to zero, only 2 were considered "partly free" while the rest were ranked as unfree.

*Hypothesis 2:* Peaceful interventions will be more positively correlated with FHI than violent ones

**Figure 1**




**Table 2. Effects of Success, Peaceful, Interaction Term and Controls on FHI**

| VARIABLES | (Model 1) FHI | (Model 2) FHI | (Model 3) FHI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Success | 31.78*** | 29.30*** | 16.67 |
| | (10.68) | (8.805) | (9.950) |
| Peaceful | -28.91 | -13.50 | -26.80** |
| | (20.79) | (10.46) | (10.96) |
| PeacefulxSuccess | 50.97** | 24.87* | 28.50** |
| | (24.22) | (12.97) | (13.00) |
| U.S. Sphere of Influence | | 15.27* | |
| | | (7.724) | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global Peace Index | | -26.93*** | |
| | | (4.286) | |
| Democratic Traditions | | | 30.19*** |
| | | | (8.467) |
| Real GDP per Capita | | | 1.106*** |
| | | | (0.157) |
| Constant | 22.72*** | 79.99*** | 0.527 |
| | (7.258) | (12.92) | (6.741) |
| Observations | 37 | 36 | 37 |
| R-squared | 0.392 | 0.714 | 0.756 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The data offers less robust support for this hypothesis. The average FHI for the 8 states in which the U.S. intervened peacefully was 55.9, compared with an average FHI of 41.9 in the 29 cases of violent intervention. However, when "peaceful" was included as a variable in regression equations, I found little statistically significant evidence of a link with FHI. In addition to looking at "peaceful" as a variable, I created an interaction term with "peaceful" and "success" in order to determine if U.S. success has a different effect on states in instances of peaceful intervention. The results (as displayed on table 3) proved interesting. When the interaction term was paired with peace and success, it had a statistically significant and positive correlation, suggesting that U.S. success has a greater effect on FHI in instances of peaceful intervention.

However, when I added control variables, the parameters failed to hold statistical significance and keep consistent values. It is difficult to come to conclusions about the interaction between U.S. Success and peaceful intervention since the model in which the interaction term was greatest lacked control variables.

While there is some evidence that peaceful intervention is more effective than violence, the results were far from conclusive. These results by no means rule out the possibility that peaceful intervention is a more effective tool in American grand strategy than violent intervention, but they fail to decisively suggest any causal link with FHI.

In addition to hypotheses 1 and 2, I tested another theory common in the literature: that U.S. intervention can only lead to sustained liberal Democracy in countries that already have some experience with representative government (Downes and Monten 2013, 130). This argument seems compelling when one considers cases such as Panama in 1991, in which U.S. help to overthrow Dictator Manuel Noriega helped bring democracy back to Panama, or Somalia in the 1990s, where the U.S. failed to implement democracy to a country that had little experience with it, despite a somewhat successful humanitarian intervention (Britannica 2024; Coyne 2008, 143–146). In order to test this idea, I ran an interaction term between success and democratic traditions to see if the positive impact of successful U.S. intervention on FHI is any stronger in countries that already have democratic traditions in place. The results are in the table below.

**Table 3. Effects of Success, Democratic Traditions, Interaction Term and Controls on FHI**

| VARIABLES | (Model 1) FHI | (Model 2) FHI | (Model 3) FHI | (Model 4) FHI |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Success | 14.12 | 4.384 | 21.12* | -5.748 |
| | (14.30) | (15.97) | (11.44) | (9.400) |
| Democratic Traditions | 4.022 | -16.85 | 9.815 | -6.218 |
| | (9.146) | (13.68) | (11.12) | (6.900) |
| SuccessxDemocratic Traditions | 44.15** | 51.91** | 30.39* | 50.29*** |
| | (18.46) | (21.09) | (17.41) | (11.14) |
| U.S. Sphere of Influence | | 21.39** | | |
| | | (9.515) | | |
| Global Peace Index | | | -30.93*** | |
| | | | (4.176) | |
| Real GDP per Capita | | | | 1.202*** |
| | | | | (0.170) |
| Constant | 18.37** | 22.15*** | 87.77*** | 12.94** |
| | (6.751) | (6.590) | (12.39) | (5.370) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Observations | 37 | 37 | 36 | 37 |
| R-squared | 0.507 | 0.580 | 0.771 | 0.794 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As shown on the table, the interaction term between "success" and "democratic traditions" is statistically significant in each regression, suggesting a link between the two. Moreover, the fact that success and democratic traditions lose their significance outside of the interaction term suggests that success isn't strongly linked to FHI in countries that totally lack democratic traditions. This supports the idea that liberal interventions work best in countries that have experience with democracy, and that the U.S. cannot build liberal democracy from scratch. Democratic traditions also aren't linked to FHI in cases of failed intervention, which is an interesting finding and may warrant further study.

**Figure 2**




## Conclusion

My study suggests that, in many cases, successful intervention is correlated with liberal democracy, as evidenced by higher FHI scores. The United States has a far from perfect track record in promoting democracy abroad, but this study suggests

that successful interventions are linked with liberalism (Coyne 2008, 5; Peceny 1999, 200-201). However, despite the wealth of literature condemning the use of military force in intervention, this study failed to conclusively demonstrate that peaceful interventions are significantly more effective at promoting democracy than violent ones (Coyne 2008, 187; Jahn 2007, 224; Mesquita and Downs, 2001, 628). My study also found that the link between success and FHI was much stronger in states wit preexisting democratic traditions, echoing the idea that U.S. intervention won't reliably create liberal democracy in states that lack democratic experience (Coyne 2008, 143-146; Downes and Monten 2013, 130).

These findings do not endorse a grand strategy of democratic crusades, but they may challenge those who unilaterally condemn intervention as a fundamentally ineffective means to promoting democracy (Mesquita and Downs, 2001, 647; Cavell 2002, xvii; Go 2011, 243-244; Blum 2013, 16). If intervention and democracy were wholly unrelated, we wouldn't expect interventions in which the U.S. achieved its objectives to be more linked with democracy than unsuccessful interventions. This is especially after controlling for factors such as real GDP per capita, preexisting democratic traditions, being within the U.S. 's sphere of influence, and peace. For policymakers and those interested in intervention, this study suggests that intervention may, in some circumstances, be a viable option to promote democracy and/or protect the liberal world order. However, in order to maximize chances of success and behave ethically, policymakers must carefully weigh the odds of success, proposed level of intervention, and conditions in the target state before taking action.

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Waldman, Paul. 2021. "Opinion | Biden Is Rejecting Nation-Building. but Not Our Right to Use Force Anywhere." washingtonpost.com, September 1, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/09/01/biden-is-rejecting-nation-bu ilding-not-our-right-use-force-anywhere/.

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## Appendix A: Selection of cases

As previously mentioned, the purpose of my paper is not to ask about the broad effects of U.S. intervention on all states that have been affected by U.S. foreign policy, but to measure whether or not efforts to promote liberal democracy and/or defend the liberal world order are linked to liberal democracy in target states. As such, I have excluded some prolific cases of U.S. intervention. To better assist the reader in understanding which cases were excluded and why I decided to exclude them, I will explain a couple of specific exclusions and my reasoning behind each one.

- **Guatemala 1954:** The infamous operation PBSuccess was largely driven by the seizure of land belonging to the United Fruit Company by the government of Jacobo Arbenz (Frieden, Lake and Schultz 2019, 139). The company lobbied extensively for the coup and had close connections to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (Schlesinger and Kinzer 2005, 76). While it has been argued that anticommunism was a motive for this coup, it probably had more to do with the protection of U.S. material interests than the promotion of liberal democracy and overthrew a legitimate government (Muravchick 1991, 119).
- **Iran 1953:** The overthrow of Iran's government in 1953 is another case in which U.S. material and corporate interests led to intervention rather than a desire to promote liberal democracy or defend the liberal world order. In 1950 Iran's Prime Minister Mohammed Mussadiq threatened to nationalize the nation's oil, presenting a critical threat to U.S. businesses in the region. In 1953, the U.S. orchestrated a coup (Go 2011, 126). In 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama admitted the US's role in the endeavor as having brought down a democratically elected government (Go 2011, 243-244).

Both of these cases were excluded from my analysis because they do not represent an effort by the U.S. to promote democracy or uphold the liberal world order and were driven by other foreign policy objectives. Even Joshua Muravchick, a neoconservative scholar who otherwise supports U.S. efforts at democracy promotion via regime change, didn't consider these cases as being pro-democracy (1991, 119).

## Appendix B: Table

| Year | Country | Level of Intervention | Success | DemTrad | USSPHR | RGDPPC (Thousands) | GPI | FHI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1945-48 | South Korea | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 50.6 | 1.848 | 83 |
| 1946-49 | Greece | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 36.3 | 1.793 | 85 |
| 1948 | Costa Rica | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 25.8 | 1.95 | 91 |
| 1949-53 | Albania | 3 | 0 | 0.5 | 1 | 18.1 | 1.809 | 68 |
| 1957 | Syria | 1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 2.9 | 3.173 | 1 |
| 1949-52 | Philippines | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9.7 | 2.21 | 58 |
| 1950-53 | China | 3 | 0 | 0.5 | 0 | 22.1 | 2.101 | 9 |
| 1957-59 | Indonesia | 4 | 0 | 0.5 | 0 | 14.1 | 1.857 | 57 |
| 1958 | Lebanon | 4 | 1 | 0.5 | 0 | 12.3 | 2.693 | 42 |
| 1959-62 | Cuba | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 12.3 | 2.16 | 12 |
| 1959-63 | Vietnam | 4 | 0 | 0.5 | 0 | 13.7 | 1.802 | 19 |
| 1959–75 | Laos | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8.4 | 1.861 | 13 |
| 1961 | Dominican Republic* | 3 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 23.1 | 2.157 | 68 |
| 1974-1991 | Ethiopia | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2.8 | 2.845 | 20 |
| 1980-89 | Poland | 2 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 44.1 | 1.678 | 80 |
| 1981-90 | Chile | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 29.5 | 1.978 | 94 |
| 1981-90 | Nicaragua | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7.3 | 2.295 | 16 |
| 1982-90 | Honduras | 3 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 6.5 | 2.415 | 48 |
| 1983 | Grenada | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15.9 | . | 89 |
| 1985-91 | Angola | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7.2 | 2.043 | 28 |
| 1989-90 | Panama | 4 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 35.8 | 2.14 | 83 |
| 1994 | Haiti | 4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1 | 2.9 | 2.827 | 30 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998-2002 | Colombia | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 18.8 | 2.887 | 70 |
| 2001-2021 | Afghanistan | 4 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 2.0 | 3.294 | 6 |
| 2003-2021 | Iraq | 4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 12.6 | 3.045 | 30 |
| 2004 | Ukraine | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 16.2 | 3.28 | 49 |
| 2005 | Kyrgyzstan | 2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 6.4 | 2.053 | 27 |
| 2011 | Libya | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 17.7 | 2.528 | 9 |
| 2012-17 | Syria | 3 | 0 | 0.5 | 0 | 2.9 | 3.173 | 1 |
| 2019 | Venezuela | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7.704 | 2.821 | 15 |
| 1945 | Italy | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 52.7 | 1.692 | 90 |
| 1995 | Bosnia | 4 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 19.9 | 1.961 | 51 |
| 1962 | India | 3 | 1 | 0.5 | 0 | 9.2 | 2.319 | 66 |
| 1990-92 | Iraq | 4 | 1 | 0.5 | 0 | 12.6 | 3.045 | 30 |
| 1945-55 | Austria | 4 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 64.6 | 1.313 | 93 |
| 1992-1995 | Somalia | 4 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 1.5 | 3.091 | 8 |
| 1970-1973 | Cambodia | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5.1 | 2.028 | 23 |

## Appendix C: Sources By Case

In this appendix, I list the sources I used to identify the level of success, presence of democratic traditions, and level of intervention for each case. Cases are listed in the same order they appear in on the table.

### *South Korea*

Millet, Alan R. 2024 "Korean War." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, August 25, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War.

### *Greece*

Drew, Elizabeth B. 1968. "Democracy on Ice: A Study of American Policy toward Dictatorship in Greece." *The Atlantic*, July 1968. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1968/07/democracy-on-ice-a-study-of-american-policy-toward-dictatorship-in-greece/660958/.

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"Greek History since World War I." 2024. *Encyclopædia Britannica.* Accessed April 23, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/place/Greece/Greek-history-since-World-War-I.

### *Costa Rica*

"Costa Rica (07/07)." n.d. U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/costarica/88435.htm.

Longley, Kyle. 1993. "Peaceful Costa Rica, the First Battleground: The United States and the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948." *The Americas* 50, no. 2 (October 1993): 149–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/1007137.

### *Albania*

Austin, Robert C. 2012. *Founding a Balkan State: Albania's Experiment with Democracy, 1920-1925.* University of Toronto Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctt2tv0q6.

Plan for Albania purposes the nature of the ... - cia, June 15, 1949. n.d. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/OBOPUS BG FIEND VOL. 1 (COUNTRY PLAN ALBANIA)_0029.pdf.

Prifti, Peter R. 2025. "Medieval Culture." *Encyclopædia Britannica.* Accessed April 3, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Albania/Medieval-culture.

### *Syria (Both Cases)*

Akkoc, Raziye, and Fulya Ozerkan. 2017. "Tillerson Says Assad's Fate up to Syrian People." Tillerson says Assad's fate up to Syrian people - Yahoo7, March 31, 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170330231421/https:/au.news.yahoo.com/world/a/ 34856857/tillerson-says-assads-fate-up-to-syrian-people/#page1.

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Waxman, Olivia B. 2017. "The U.S. Intervened in Syria in 1949. Here's What Happened." Time.com, April 13, 2017. https://time.com/4735438/america-syria-war-coup-history/.

## *Philippines*

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Editors of. 2024. "Hukbalahap Rebellion." *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Accessed September 28, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/Hukbalahap-Rebellion.

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"Philippines (09/04)." n.d. U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/philippines/47535.htm#:~:text=The%20Philippines%20has%20a%20representative,to%20one%206%2Dyear%20term.

## *China*

Kaufman, Victor S. 2001. "Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd Nationalist Division." *The China Quarterly* 166 (June 2001). https://doi.org/10.1017/s0009443901000213.

"The Chinese Revolution of 1911." n.d. U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/chinese-rev.

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## *Cuba*

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"The Bay of Pigs." 2024. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Accessed September 28, 2024. https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-bay-of-pigs.

### *Vietnam*

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"Laos Profile - Timeline." 2018. BBC News, January 9, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15355605.

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### *Dominican Republic*

"The Dominican Constitution and Its Origins." 2023. DominicanToday, November 23, 2023. https://dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2023/11/04/the-dominican-constitution-and-its-origins/.

Wayback Machine. n.d. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20170123002412/https:/www.cia.gov/library/reading room/docs/CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100003-2.pdf.

### *Ethiopia*

Lyons, Terrence. 2010. "Ethiopian Elections: Past and Future." *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 5, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 107–21.

Schmidt, Elizabeth. 2023. "US Policy toward Ethiopia Is a Story of Cynicism and Self-Interest." Jacobin. Accessed September 28, 2024. https://jacobin.com/2023/01/us-policy-toward-ethiopia-is-a-story-of-cynicism-and-self-interest.

### *Poland*

MacEachin, Douglas J. 2001. Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/us-intelligence-and-the-poli sh-crisis-1980-1981-2/.

### *Chile*

Carmagnani, Marcello A., and John J. Johnson. 2025. "History of Chile." *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Accessed April 1, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Chile.

Peceny, Mark. 1999. *Democracy at the point of bayonets*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

### *Nicaragua*

"Nicaragua (01/02)." n.d. U.S. Department of State. Accessed April 1, 2025. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/nicaragua/22764.htm.

Peceny, Mark. 1999. *Democracy at the point of bayonets*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

## *Honduras*

Moncada R, J. Roberto, and Ralph Lee Woodward. 2025. "The 20th Century." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, March 27, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Honduras/The-20th-century.

Peceny, Mark. 1999. *Democracy at the point of bayonets*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

## *Grenada*

Encyclopædia Britannica. 2024. "U.S. Invasion of Grenada." *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Accessed September 28, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/U-S-invasion-of-Grenada.

"Explore All Countries- Grenada." 2025. Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed April 1, 2025. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/grenada/.

## *Angola*

Hanson, Stephanie. 2008. "Angola's Political and Economic Development." Council on Foreign Relations, July 17, 2008. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/angolas-political-and-economic-development.

Peceny, Mark. 1999. *Democracy at the point of bayonets*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

## *Panama*

Anguizola, Gustavo, and Richard L. Millett. 2025. "Government and Society." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, March 27, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Panama/Government-and-society.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Editors of. 2024. "Operation Just Cause." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, September 25, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-States-invasion-of-Panama.

## *Haiti*

Bunyan, Rachael. 2019. "How Operation Uphold Democracy Still Affects Life in Haiti." *Time*, September 24, 2019. https://time.com/5682135/haiti-military-anniversary/.

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## *Colombia*

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## *Afghanistan*

Petrov, Victor P., and Frank Raymond Allchin. 2025. "Political Process." Encyclopædia Britannica, March 29, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Political-process.

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## *Iraq*

Encyclopædia Britannica, Editors. 2024. “Iraq War.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, September 14, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War.

Grassmuck, George. 1960. "The electoral process in Iraq, 1952-1958." *Middle East Journal* 14, no. 4 (1960): 397-415.

## *Ukraine*

“Ian Traynor: US Campaign behind the Turmoil in Kiev.” 2004. *The Guardian*, November 26, 2004. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa

## *Kyrgyzstan*

Allworth, Edward, and Denis Sinor. 2025. “Government and Society.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, March 29, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Kyrgyzstan/Government-and-society.

White, Greg. 2005. “In Putin’s Backyard, Democracy Stirs -- with U.S. Help - WSJ.” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 25, 2005. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110929289650463886.

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Fowler, Gary L., and Dennis D. Cordell. 2025. “The Discovery of Oil.” **Encyclopædia Britannica**, March 28, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/The-discovery-of-oil.

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Corrales, Javier. 2020. "Authoritarian survival: why maduro hasn't fallen." *Journal of Democracy* 31, no. 3 (2020): 39-53.

Seelke, Clare Ribando. 2019. *Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10230

“Venezuela’s Chavez Era.” 2013. Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/venezuelas-chavez-era.

## *Italy*

Muravchik, Joshua. 1992. *Exporting democracy fulfilling americas destiny*. Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1992.

Mistry, Kaeten. 2006. “The Case for Political Warfare: Strategy, Organization and US Involvement in the 1948 Italian Election.” *Cold War History* 6, no. 3 (August 2006): 301–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740600795451.

## *Bosnia*

Daalder, Ivo H. 1998. “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended.” Brookings Institution, December 1, 1998. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia- ended/.

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## *India*

Alam, T. G. Muzaffar, and Philip B. Calkins. 2025. "Government and Politics." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. May 28, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/India/Government-and-politics.

Peceny, Mark. 1999. *Democracy at the point of bayonets*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

## *Austria*

Bischof, Gunter and Hans Petschar. 2025. "The U.S. Occupation of Post-World War II Austria." The U.S. Occupation of Post-World War II Austria (1945–1955). Accessed January 20, 2025. https://www.austriainusa.org/occupation#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20Forces%20in,some%2014%2C000%20soldiers%20in%20Austria.

Roider, Karl A., and Lutz Holzner. 2025. "Economic Reconstruction and Political Strife." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, January 20, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Austria/Economic-reconstruction-and-political- strife.

## *Somalia*

Coyne, Christopher J. 2008. *After war: The political economy of exporting democracy*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008.

## *Cambodia*

Chandler, David P. 2023. "Tai and Vietnamese Hegemony." *History of Cambodia*, June 20, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Cambodia/Tai-and-Vietnamese-hegemony.

"The U.S. Incursion into Cambodia." 2025. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Accessed January 20, 2025. https://adst.org/2017/04/u-s-incursion-into-cambodia/.

# Wealth, Public Goods, and Terror Damage

Annie Ackerman Speers and Kendra Pinegar

## ABSTRACT

The connection between macroeconomic status and terrorism is disputed; some find links between macroeconomic status and terrorism while others find no link between overall economic status and terrorist occurrence. We theorize that a country's economic status, defined as overall GDP, is linked to the damage that terror groups do. However, we theorize that this link is contingent on public goods distribution by terror groups. More specifically, we theorize that terror groups provide public goods to compensate for a lack of public goods spending by governments. Using OLS and instrumental modeling, we find a negative link between GDP and terror damage, defined as casualties and property damage; as a country's GDP increases, terror damage tends to decrease. This link becomes amplified with the instrumentation of public goods provision by terror groups. We then illustrate these findings in the real-world application of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

*Note: Figures and tables referenced in the following paper with the prefix A are found in the attached appendix.*

## Introduction

In reference to the state of Lebanese schools during and after the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent Lebanese recession, Sayyed Nasrollah, Secretary General of Hezbollah stated the following: "We must maintain the educational process, especially in these difficult circumstances, and we must work in order to educate generations . . . We must support our educational institutions and provide them with support and

assistance to enable them to perform in the best way possible." This quote highlights the essential role of public goods in the relationship between government wealth and terrorist success.

Understanding the success of terrorist groups and from where such success stems is a major theme in studies on terrorism, since there is such an emphasis in counterterrorism policy on how terror groups can best be immobilized. Due to a lack of direct data from terrorist groups themselves, scholars often focus on data derived from terrorist attacks and convert said data into a framework that accurately models the relationship between an explanatory variable and the success of terror groups. General poverty of a country and its inhabitants has repeatedly been shown to have mixed effects on the uptake of terror activities; however, poverty is a complex variable with many nuances, and scholars have yet to explore various aspects of relative wealth of a country as an explanation for terrorist activity. Among the less-studied aspects of macroeconomic links to terrorism is public goods distribution by terror groups, especially when such public goods distribution compensates for state failure to provide public goods.

As such, this paper will go as follows: first, we describe the literature that identifies the framework for our paper and the gap our research will fill. Second, we describe the theoretical understanding, conceptual definitions, and data that we use to form our model. Third, we review the results of our model and analyze the subsequent implications. Fourth, we use the example of Hezbollah to highlight key mechanisms for which we do not have data measures. Finally, we recognize the limitations of our study and suggest further steps that can be taken to correct such action.

## Literature Review

There has long been a subliminal association of economic status with participation in terrorist activities. However, recent empirical analysis shows mixed results for the association of economic conditions with participation in or support for terrorist activities. While there is some evidence supporting an association with terrorist activity and macroeconomic contractions (Brock Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 2004), many transnational studies fail to show a link between general poverty and terrorist activities (Abadie 2006; Kreuger and Laitin 2008). On the individual level, again the link between poverty and terrorism appears unclear. Krueger and Malečková (2002), for example, use qualitative data from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as quantitative data from Hezbollah activities in Lebanon, to show the lack of a link between poverty, education, and terrorism. Meanwhile, other studies demonstrate the opposite, arguing that terrorist participation comes as a result of economic deprivation, conditions that make opportunity costs for participating in acts of terrorism significantly lower (Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieks, and Schneider 2011). Some of the disparities in findings likely result from a broad range of use of socioeconomic indicators, ranging from measures of individual household income and employment to data on macroeconomic business cycle contractions.

Some of the more consistent findings among leading scholars concern theories of comparative socioeconomic inequality. Though general poverty may be unrelated to terrorist activities, studies show that having knowledge of personal deprivation, due in part to proximity to economically successful groups, can increase terrorist participation on a group level. Kavanaugh (2011) revisits the findings from Krueger and Malečková (2002), instead investigating support for Hezbollah with an interactive effect between poverty and education, finding that there is a clear link between poverty and support for Hezbollah only for well-educated individuals who face employment roadblocks. Several other studies have found similar results, which emphasize the link between poverty and support for terrorist activities only on a group level among those facing some form of relative economic deprivation (Bravo and Dias 2006; Obaidi, Bergh, Akrami, and Anjum 2019; Richardson 2011; Yusoufzai and Emmerling 2017). These studies use unemployment rates as an indicator of relative deprivation, which may accurately model the stability of economic conditions like basic good consumption and disposable income. However, unemployment does less to measure the overall wealth of a country, which may otherwise influence how pervasive terrorist groups can be among economically deprived populations. Public welfare spending, while certainly influenced by low good consumption, may do more to explain the overall wealth of a country and how inequitable levels of welfare spending may affect the prevalence of terrorism among areas that are inordinately deprived.

Inequitable public welfare spending is linked to both a country's GDP and the damage that terror groups can do. Slav et al. (2021) notes that deprivation in a community from inequitable access to government resources is a cause of political violence. Ghatak (2014) takes this observation further, suggesting that when individuals are deprived from government-provided public goods, the tendency to resort to terrorism increases. In fact, some research suggests that when terrorist organizations double as benign providers of public goods, they are able to produce more lethal results, namely suicide attacks, than other terrorist organizations due, at least in part, to better rates of mobilization (Berman and Laitin 2008; Mele 2012). Terrorist organizations have increasingly begun to fill the gap on public goods provision, providing welfare-centered services like education, health care, public safety, and law and order where the government has failed to do so (Mele 2012). When terrorist organizations provide those goods of which populations are deprived, they not only relieve economic deprivation, but they also induce loyalty among their recipients.

Despite this strong role that terrorist organizations play in public good provision, studies associating terrorist-provided public goods with higher civilian mobilization are fairly few and far between. Moreover, these studies fail to assess the link empirically via use of data concerning governmental public service spending, opting instead to utilize qualitative or quantitative data on terrorist public good provision and mobilization directly. This data is, however, somewhat sparse and relatively unreliable, especially when it comes to recruitment or mobilization techniques. Instead, we intend to model the overarching relationship here: relative country wealth and the uptake of terrorism. We intend to utilize quantitative data to demonstrate a link

between the relative wealth of a country via its ability to provide public welfare to its populations and the effectiveness of terrorist attacks, in theory modeling the amount of public support that a terrorist group receives.

## Theory

In this research, we intend to study two key factors in two different contexts, with theoretical and statistical defense for each context. The first of these contexts is considering both wealth and public goods as independent variables, the combination of which measures relative deprivation. This approach lends itself to classic OLS estimation. The second context considers the impact of public goods distribution as contingent on the wealth of the country in impacting damage from attacks. This approach lends itself to instrumentation of public goods distribution.

In the first context, we may consider both the wealth of a country and the public goods distribution by terrorist groups as independent variables, for which there may be some collinearity. As mentioned above in the literature review, many studies have found inconclusive or nonexistent evidence concerning the link between overall wealth indicators and propensity for terrorist attacks, other than attacks often occur in wealthy countries. Even so, the lack of a relationship is often due to the weakness of indicators of what "terrorism" entails, whether it be attacks, casualties, or recruitment. Therefore, there is still merit in exploring the potential relationship between a country's wealth and the damage done by terrorist attacks in that country. This logic supports the notion that low wealth indicates relative depravation, as noted in the literature review, which mobilizes in-groups to support terrorist attacks. Similarly, public goods distribution may also mobilize in-groups via capitalizing on salient in-group identities to mobilize public support for terrorist attacks. Either way, a terrorist group may capitalize on economic conditions to increase support of attacks from the populous. However, this causal logic, while illustrating a basis relationship and highlighting some mechanisms, has high potential for endogeneity. Public goods provision is often contingent on country GDP and damage done in attacks may decrease GDP from that year due to worker and asset casualties, which decreases economic output. Therefore, OLS models may be faulty in illustrating the relationship between public goods, wealth, and damage.

We may then consider that the link between public goods distribution and damage done in terrorist attacks is deeply contingent on the inverse relationship between GDP and public goods distribution. Rather than being considered as two distinct and unrelated independent variables, public goods distribution may be instrumental to the relationship between country wealth and terrorist attack damage. When a government is poor, they will be less capable of providing public welfare to populations, leaving some populations, specifically those who are not able to satisfy basic needs with their own income, deprived. Instead, terrorist groups can provide the public goods that governments would normally provide, like education, health care, and

public safety. In essence, terrorist groups can, and often do, provide public goods when a country is too poor to provide welfare itself.

It then follows that populations that are sustained by the private funding efforts of terrorist groups are more likely to support them in return, which is equitable to greater support and mobilization of the public. Greater mobilization is likely to lead to greater efficacy as a terrorist group, meaning that terrorist groups can perform more attacks and inflict more damage in said attacks. The wealthier a country is, the less success terrorist groups will experience in their attacks because there is less need for terrorist-provided welfare in the event that a country's government can afford these provisions itself. In the case of poorer countries, terrorist groups will experience more success in their attacks because the general population will support their efforts as a result of being dependent on the terrorist-provided welfare.

Our central hypothesis is that the wealth of a country is related to the damage that terror groups do. The wealthier a country is, the less damage a terrorist organization will be able to inflict.

Based on this logic, we outline the following hypotheses:

*H1:* As the wealth of a country increases, the damage caused by terror groups decreases.

*H2:* Groups with public goods provisions cause greater damage than groups without public goods provisions.

## Methodology

Instrumentation of terrorist-provided public goods lends itself directly to quantitative modeling. As such, we first model this relationship using data that most closely conceptualizes the variables at hand. The data we use is mainly derived from a dataset titled Reputation of Terror Groups (RTG), compiled by scholars Efe Tokdemir and Seden Akcinaroglu for use in two papers measuring the reputation of terrorist groups (Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu 2016; Akcinaroglu and Tokdemir 2018). The dataset covers terrorist groups that have been included in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD 2022) from 1980–2011.[1] This dataset defines public goods as being provided by terrorist groups when goods that are often considered necessary to basic survival, like free education, food, security, communication services, and health services.

Our independent variable, the overall wealth of a country, can easily be measured using logged gross domestic product (GDP), which reflects a country's ability to provide public goods (UNSD 2010). The wealthier a country is, the more able it will be to provide public welfare to its citizens, especially to citizens deprived of most basic needs. As previously iterated, measuring success of terrorist groups is difficult.

[1] This source collected data from a variety of sources to understand which terrorist groups distribute public goods, including newspaper databases and online articles and books. Among these sources include START by University of Maryland, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC), Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Think Security of Africa (TSA), Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World by Szajkowski (2004).

For example, recruitment rates for terrorist organizations are sparse and not widespread enough to build a reliable model. Additionally, terror group election results, while initially appealing, has a limited n-size and cannot plausibly be used to measure terrorist group success, since it is subject to higher error rates and low statistical power. Therefore, we measure success based on effectiveness of a terrorist group, creating a damage index that calculates an average in each country of the number of property damaged events caused by a terrorist group and the number of people killed by a terrorist group. While this measure does not perfectly substitute a measure more directly indicative of the public's support for and mobilization around terrorist organizations, this damage index should demonstrate how a country's wealth affects the success of terrorist groups, at least in terms of efficacy.

Because we hypothesize that terrorist provision of public goods is linked to the damage that those groups do, we run both a classic OLS and two-stage least squares regressions, where terrorist provision of public goods acts as an instrumental variable in the model. By controlling for terrorist public good provision, we can demonstrate that the relationship between a country's wealth—or its ability to provide public welfare—and terror group damage is a stronger, more negative one than would originally be considered without accounting for the provision of public goods. Considering this logic, we introduce a final hypothesis:

*H3:* Instrumentation of public goods accounts for endogeneity in OLS modeling.

The first stage of the 2SLS regression calls for regressing logged GDP, our main predictor in the model, on the dummy public goods variable, our instrumental variable. The first stage is modeled as such:

$$LogGDP_{it} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 PublicGoods_{it} + v_{it}$$

The first stage produces a predicted logged GDP variable in which changes in logged GDP as captured by the instrumental variable influence changes in the outcome variable, the damage index. In the second stage, we include the logged GDP variable as predicted by terrorist organization public goods provision, as well as other covariates that may influence the effect of public good provision. This includes the number of military personnel in the country where the terrorist group in question operates and a dummy politics variable which indicates whether a terrorist group has a political wing, has an affiliation with a political party, or is a political party turned terrorist group. We explain all variables and their measurement more thoroughly in Table 1.

**Table 1. Variable Descriptions**

| Variable | Description | Origin |
|---|---|---|
| Logged GDP | Logged GDP of the country where the terrorist group operates in a given year. | UN Statistics Division |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Logged GDP per capita | Logged GDP of the country where the terrorist group operates in a given year divided by Logged population of the country where the terrorist group operates in a given year | UN Statistics Division, original computation |
| Public Goods Provision by Terror Group | =1 if terrorist group engages in public good services such as providing free education, health services, free communication services, security services in a given year. | RTG Dataset |
| Damage | Average of number of people killed by terrorist group and number of property damaged events caused by terrorist group in a given year. | Global Terrorism Database, original computation |
| Politics | =1 if terrorist group has political wing, if terrorist group has an affiliation with a political party, or if a political party transformed into terrorist group | RTG Dataset |
| Logged Military Force | Logged number of military personnel of the country where the terrorist group operates | World Bank Database |

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{LogGDP}_{it} + \beta_2 Politics_{it} + \beta_3 Military_{it} + u_{it}$$

To further ensure that this model is as representative of the behavior of terrorist groups, we exclude outlier data points in the damage index by calculating the interquartile range (IQR) for the data and then adding and subtracting 1.5*IQR to the upper bound and lower bound of the 75% quartile. This excludes any suspected outliers from the data we analyze (N = 2,099).[2]

Finally, to demonstrate the mechanism at play by which public goods distributed by terrorist organizations mobilizes deprived populations, we draw upon a case study of Hezbollah as it functions in Lebanon. We will demonstrate how Hezbollah's prevalence in regions of Lebanon that lack prominent government-provided public welfare has allowed the organization to take advantage of relative government poverty, fund public services, and as a result, strengthen loyalties with and mobilize citizens. The Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah are all examples of radical religious organizations with active local public good provision, which could make all three groups valid cases of public good provision (Berman and Laitin 2008). However, Hezbollah is unique as a terrorist organization for its recognition as a legitimate political party in the state of Lebanon, which can make it appear to be a more credible provider of public services. Furthermore, because Hezbollah has legitimated political roles in the state, this makes data collection and research on Hezbollah's public good provision role in Lebanon better documented and more accessible. It is harder to use Hamas and the Taliban as case studies, given the nature of the contexts in which Hamas and the Taliban reside. The complex Israeli-Palestinian conflict and military insurgency,

[2] The N size for our data including suspected outliers is N = 2,458.

respectively, make documented data hard to come by. Thus, we use Hezbollah as a model example of the role that public goods provision plays in terrorist organizations' mobilization tactics.

*Justifications for Instrumentation*

While we recognize that public goods provision is an important component to this theory, especially for such a dynamic independent variable that is vulnerable to endogeneity, we deem it statistically fit to proceed with instrumental modeling. However, we recognize the apparent limitations with instrumentation of public goods. Here, we hope to provide a defense of instrumentation as a valid statistical method.

As visualized in Figure A2, the relationship between public goods, terrorist damage, and wealth is likely endogenous. Wu-Hausman results reported in Table A5 indicate that this potential endogeneity is indeed present in many OLS models conducted in lieu of instrumentation. Therefore, we opted to define public goods distribution as an instrument with the intent to decrease model endogeneity.

At a basic level, potential instrumental variables must pass three criteria to be considered valid: the relevance, exclusion, and exogeneity criteria.[3] The first of these, the relevance criterion, calls for demonstration of a relationship between the suggested instrumental variable and the independent variable. This is statistically testable via basic OLS results, reported in Table 2. Information about the dataset used is described in depth in the methodology section.

**Table 2. Testing the Relevance Criterion**

| | **Logged GDP** | **Logged Per Capita GDP** |
|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) |
| Terror Group Public Goods Provision | -0.572*** | 0.873 |
| | (0.049) | (0.564) |
| Constant | 8.738*** | 2.838*** |
| | (0.029) | (0.337) |
| Observations | 2,458 | 2,458 |
| R2 | 0.053 | 0.001 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.053 | 0.001 |

[3] The relevance criterion is that the instrumental variable must exhibit a statistically significant correlation with the key independent variable. The exogeneity criterion is that the instrumental variable is that the instrumental variable is not correlated with the error term of the main model, or that the instrumental variable is independent and ignorable. The exclusion criterion is that the only way the instrumental variable can impact the dependent variable is via the key independent variable.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Residual Std. Error (df = 2456) | 1.156 | 13.400 |
| F Statistic (df = 1; 2456) | 138.146*** | 2.391 |

Note: *p<0.1; >**p<0.05; >***p<0.01

We considered both logged GDP and logged per capita GDP to be equally valid indicators of government wealth. We found that public goods distribution was significantly and inversely related to logged GDP, but not per capita GDP. Therefore, we opted to use logged GDP as the key indicator of government wealth, or the key independent variable, in future analysis. Results with both OLS and instrumental models with per capita GDP are contained in the appendix. The significance of the above results indicates that public goods provision by terror groups meets the relevance criterion.

The second criterion, the exogeneity criterion, is a little more difficult to prove. Given the nature of data having been collected in a non-experimental manner, public goods provision is non-random. To begin, terrorist provision of public goods is not exactly randomly distributed; as Berman and Laitin (2008) note, provision of public goods is the result of rational acting on the part of terrorists. They function as efficient suppliers of high-demand goods and services during a shortage (underfunding). Therefore, while GDP is clearly linked to public goods provision, such provision is non-random. While a non-experimental instrumental variable can be problematic, the data can be considered as from a natural experiment and thus quasi-experimental. In the absence of a true experimental scenario from which we can take a truly randomized treatment variable, the public goods provision variable suffices.

The third criterion, the exclusion criterion, calls for two things; that the instrumental variable only be related to the dependent variable by way of the independent variable, and that the chosen independent variable is the only way by which the instrumental variable can affect the dependent variable. There does appear to be a baseline relationship between terror group damage, as displayed in Table A6; however, we note that this model accounts for very little of the variation in annual attack damage, as indicated by a low R2 value of 0.031, and so it's likely that part, if not all, of this relationship is endogenous.

Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that the GDP-public goods relationship may be exclusive. The primary alternate theory to our model is the relationship between democracy, wealth, and public goods provision. There is a positive and fairly significant relationship between democracy and wealth (Acemoglu et. al 2019). There is also the theoretic possibility of a positive relationship between democracy and public goods provision. This theory, however, relies on one key assumption and produces one key prediction, both of which may be used to assess the validity of democracy in violating the exclusion criterion. The primary assumption of this relationship is that there is a positive and significant relationship between democracy and public goods provision. This, while theoretically plausible, is not shown in

pre-existing literature. Raabe, Sander, and Schneider (2024) note that electoral systems offer a blend of public and private goods, with electoral incentives for private good provision to appeal to specific voter demographics. Thus, as democracies become more heterogenous (as has been the trend in a globalizing world) net public goods provision does not increase with democratic systems; in fact, in non-democracies, there is nearly no relationship between heterogeny and public goods provision, indicating that goods may be provided at the same net amount in democracies and non-democracies, contingent only on government budget. Other studies have shown similar complications between a seemingly simple relationship between democracy and public goods; wealthy Americans with political power do not favor extensive social programs (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013), less visible public goods are under-distributed in democracies (Mani and Mukand 2007), and public goods provision is dependent on the quality of democracy and governance more than the institutions themselves (Povitkina and Bolkvadze 2019). In alignment with these findings, Table A7 proves statistically and substantively insignificant[4] link between a country's level of democracy and propensity for terror groups to provide public goods when controlling for GDP.

In sum, while public goods distribution may be non-random, it is likely exclusive. Meanwhile, public goods distribution is deeply dependent on the wealth of a country, regardless of institutions, as shown in Table 2.[5]

## Results

Table 3 shows the results of the 2SLS regression that excludes outliers, specifically concerning the damage index as it accounts for the number of individuals killed and number of properties damaged in terrorist events. This regression suggests that as a country's GDP increases, the prevalence of success among terrorist groups decrease. Table A3 in the appendix shows the results of the 2SLS regression including outliers and similarly shows significance of a country's GDP as accounting for the instrumentation of public goods. Even running a model excluding outliers, we still see a significant effect of a country's logged GDP on the index of terrorist effectiveness. We can confidently say that as a country's GDP decreases, the annual damage from terror groups increases, even when accounting for the provision of public goods by terrorist groups. All models listed above pass the Wu-Hausman test,[6] indicating the likely presence of endogeneity in a traditional OLS model, thus justifying the use of public goods as an instrument.

[4] At the 0.05 level.

[5] Allocation of GDP to counterterrorist efforts (such as the size of a military) is a potential model confounder, but likely not spurious to the exclusion of public goods and GDP. Select potential model confounders are included as model controls (Table 3).

[6] See Table A6.

**Table 3. GDP and Terrorist Attack Damage, Public Goods Instrument, Outlier Exclusion**

| | Annual Attack Damage: | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Per Capita GDP (Logged) | -4.455*** | -4.652*** | -4.898*** |
| | (0.632) | (0.688) | (0.827) |
| Terror Group has Political Wing | | | 0.039 |
| | | | (0.438) |
| Military Personnel (Logged) | | | 0.662*** |
| | | | (0.193) |
| Year FE | No | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 43.828*** | 47.493*** | 46.790*** |
| | (5.429) | (6.284) | (7.056) |
| Observations | 2,099 | 2,099 | 2,076 |
| Residual Std. Error | 8.253 (df = 2097) | 8.329 (df = 2067) | 8.442 (df = 2042) |

Note: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

**Figure 1. GDP and Terrorist Attack Damage, Public Goods Instrument, Outlier Exclusion**




Even so, we acknowledge the apparent weaknesses in our instrumental modeling, namely, the weaknesses of meeting the exclusion criterion. While we believe there is substantial theoretical and statistical support for instrumental modeling, we performed additional OLS modeling to highlight the relationship between wealth, public goods provision, and damage from terror attacks. While there is likely endogeneity in these models, as affirmed by Wu-Hausman results in Table A5, OLS modeling confirms that GDP and public goods provision both are statistically linked to annual damage from terror attacks. This confirms, at a base level, our hypotheses that higher GDPs are negatively correlated with damage from terror attacks and public goods provision on the part of terror groups does influence damage outcomes, as seen in Figure 2. Full OLS results are given in Table A4.

**Figure 2: Comparison of OLS and Instrumental Model Estimates, Excluding Outliers**




While there is statistical significance for our findings in both the instrumental and OLS models, it is worth noting the relatively small substantive significance of our results for logged GDP in any given model. While the instrument clarifies the effect of logged GDP on damage outcomes, even in the instrumental model, a one percent increase in a country's GDP is only estimated to decrease annual attack damage by 0.5 "casualties," defined as a life lost or a property destroyed. The World Bank reports that most countries have an annual real GDP growth rate of between 2% and 4%, with effects heavily stratified by geography. Even if a country is performing at very high-income growth, terrorist casualties may only decrease by 2 annual casualties, according to the most generous model estimate. With Model 3's constant (Table 3) sitting at approximately 495 casualties, these effects are somewhat small. Even so, our results still show a significant link between GDP and casualties, providing evidence to a divided literature base.

## Results in Practice: The Hezbollah Case

Our quantitative results highlight the relationship between overall GDP, public goods distribution, and damage that terror attacks inflict. However, according to our theoretical modeling, this relationship relies on two mechanisms unrepresented by the data. We attempt to highlight support for these mechanisms by responding to the following questions: Do terror groups offer public goods in an attempt to compensate for state failure? Does terror group public goods provision increase support for terror groups and/or mobilization of those who support terror groups?

The case of Hezbollah shows that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Though it is somewhat difficult to find statistics about Lebanon's public service

distribution, data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2024) shows relatively low levels of public service spending across several public goods, such as education and health spending. However, to determine if Hezbollah attempts to fill the gap in Lebanon's public service spending, we must look at regional variation in public service spending within Lebanon. The most reliable regional map from Lebanon concerning public service distribution across regional divides is Figure A3, which highlights disparities in household connection to water supply lines, taken from Lebanon's Ministry of Health. According to the map, the areas most unconnected to water supply lines are the more rural provinces in the North, specifically the governate of Baalbek-Hermel. Additionally, much of southern Lebanon is not completely connected to water supply lines. Figure A4 contains a map of Hezbollah's area of de-facto control, taken from Stratfor in 2021. Based on a comparison of the images, there is a strong overlap between areas of Hezbollah control and areas that are under connected to water lines, meaning that these same areas are underserved by the Lebanese government in terms of public goods distribution. Therefore, there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that Hezbollah operates public services in the same locations that are somewhat underserved by the Lebanese government. Thus, we may cautiously conclude that Hezbollah provides public goods to compensate for state failure to do so, at least in part. However, this conclusion is driven by a lack of hard data made available by both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government.

As for the second causal mechanism, we find some evidence that areas in which Hezbollah operates public services are also the same areas from which Hezbollah recruits its fighters. A major link in the causal mechanism between wealth and damage is the ability of terror groups to mobilize support in terms of recruitment and donations by compensating for state failure. Though we do not have adequate data to fully understand Hezbollah's recruitment processes, Figure A5 provides a rough estimation of divisions in regional recruitment by identifying the governate of origin for Hezbollah fighters killed in Syria over time. The top 3 native governates for these fighters, when they are known, are Bequaa (specifically Baalbek-Hermel), Mount Lebanon, and Nabatiyah, followed closely by the Southern governate. These are also the same areas where Hezbollah operates its public services. Though this link is anecdotal, this shows some evidence that Hezbollah recruits in areas where it operates public services. Given the assumption that it operates these services to account for state failure to do so and is incentivized to offer services to increase support for their cause, we can say that operating public services in these areas functions as a recruitment tactic, as evidenced by demographic evidence from their fighter casualties. Therefore, we may also cautiously say that these services increase mobilization via recruitment.

## Findings and Limitations

Our statistical model, as well as the anecdotal data we discuss concerning Hezbollah's prevalence in Lebanon, point to the likelihood that terrorist public good

distribution plays a role in mobilizing deprived populations to support terrorist groups in their resident country, especially in the absence of consistent government-provided public goods services like education, clean water infrastructure, and hospital centers. We thus see evidence in support of the conclusion that countries that are relatively poorer suffer from greater damages in terror attacks (and in the reverse, that countries that are relatively wealthier suffer from fewer damages in terror attacks). The difference in attack damages may not be substantial, but it is significant, and the result is further exacerbated by the provision of public goods and services.

Though the clear description of Hezbollah's public goods provision and demographic information about casualties shows substantial evidence in favor of our mechanisms, we acknowledge the likelihood of spuriousness. As mentioned earlier, these mechanisms could be measured using other variables that relate to public support, like election data, but were unquantifiable due to the lack of extensive public opinion data concerning Hezbollah since 1980. Similarly, recruitment rates are understandably unknown. Additionally, as we previously recognized, there are limitations to the instrumentation of public goods provision. There are a few ways in which future research could expand upon our initial findings and improve the instrumentation of public goods. In order to locate data that more directly supports the mechanisms we have outlined in this paper, future researchers may consider conducting their own general public opinion poll, a task that would not be unreasonable considering Hezbollah's status as a political party in Lebanon. A public opinion poll offers a few possibilities to strengthen the statistical modeling of our causal mechanisms. For example, to further expand on the idea of in-group mobilization, future researchers may conduct opinion polls for Shiites that do and do not benefit from Hezbollah public goods distribution (i.e. Shiites living in Mount Lebanon compared to Shiites in Beqaa). Such opinion polls would further highlight the mechanisms of increased support for Hezbollah due directly to public goods distribution to regional communities. Additionally, to focus on improvement of the instrumentation of public goods, future researchers may conduct opinion polls in regions where Hezbollah-provided public goods are present, as well as in regions where public goods are not Hezbollah-provided, specifically recording whether survey respondents partake of or participate in Hezbollah-provided public goods. In this manner, while participation in public goods is not necessarily randomized, assignment to public goods regions is more randomized. Lebanon's relationship with Hezbollah is one that provides a unique opportunity to collect data that is not readily accessible in most countries with a prevalent terror group presence, and we suggest that this be taken advantage of.

In light of the more relevant data that researchers can collect for future studies, we affirm that there is sufficient data to support the mechanisms we have outlined for the effects of a country's relative wealth on terror group damage. This occurrence is both anecdotal and consistent in nature.

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## APPENDIX

**Table A1. GDP UN Statistical Methodology**

| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
| Logged GDP | The GDP and GNI data in US dollars and growth rates of GDP include aggregations of data by regional groupings as well as individual country data. The GDP and GNI data in national currency, the percentage share of components of GDP and gross value-added data, the implicit price deflators, the exchange rates, and the population data only include individual country data. |

**Table A2. OLS Per Capita GDP and Public Goods Impact on Terror Damage, Outlier Exclusion**

| | Annual Terror Damage: | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Per Capita GDP (Logged) | -0.018 | | -0.070 | 0.134 |
| | (0.139) | | (0.138) | (0.942) |
| Terror Group has Public Good Provision | | 27.662*** | 29.033*** | 26.455*** |
| | | (3.840) | (3.863) | (4.192) |
| Group has Political Wing | | | | 5.709 |
| | | | | (4.213) |
| Military Personnel (Logged) | | | | -5.024*** |
| | | | | (1.490) |
| Year FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 27.748*** | 17.833*** | 8.752 | 30.162** |
| | (1.909) | (2.293) | (11.121) | (14.454) |
| Observations | 2,458 | 2,458 | 2,458 | 2,434 |
| $R^2$ | 0.00001 | 0.021 | 0.037 | 0.044 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.0004 | 0.020 | 0.024 | 0.030 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Residual Std. Error | 92.145 (df = 2456) | 91.187 (df = 2456) | 91.014 (df = 2425) | 91.149 (df = 2399) |
| F Statistic | 0.016 (df = 1; 2456) | 51.884*** (df = 1; 2456) | 2.889*** (df = 32; 2425) | 3.215*** (df = 34; 2399) |

Note: *p<0.1; >**p<0.05; >***p<0.01

**Table A3. GDP Results with Outliers**

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Annual Attack Damage: | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| GDP (Logged) | -48.343*** | -52.851*** | -55.647*** |
| | (7.612) | (8.150) | (10.325) |
| Terror Group has Political Arm | | | 1.300 |
| | | | (5.286) |
| Military Personnel (Logged) | | | 4.730* |
| | | | (2.551) |
| Year FE | No | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 440.242*** | 490.580*** | 495.002*** |
| | (64.990) | (74.413) | (86.640) |
| Observations | 2,458 | 2,458 | 2,434 |
| Residual Std. Error | 103.417 (df = 2456) | 105.268 (df = 2426) | 106.913 (df = 2400) |

Note: *p<0.1; >**p<0.05; >***p<0.01

**Table A4. OLS GDP and Terrorist Attack Damage, Outlier Exclusion**

| | Annual Attack Damage: | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| GDP (Logged) | -8.018*** | | -6.364*** | -5.356*** |
| | (1.557) | | (1.603) | (1.661) |
| | | 27.662*** | 25.468*** | 23.863*** |
| | | (3.840) | (3.947) | (4.242) |
| Group has Political Wing | | | | 5.279 |
| | | | | (4.206) |
| Military Personnel (Logged) | | | | -4.151*** |
| | | | | (1.490) |
| Year FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 96.119*** | 17.833*** | 66.037*** | 75.630*** |
| | (13.412) | (2.293) | (18.288) | (19.183) |
| Observations | 2,458 | 2,458 | 2,458 | 2,434 |
| $R^2$ | 0.011 | 0.021 | 0.043 | 0.048 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.010 | 0.020 | 0.030 | 0.034 |
| Residual Std. Error | 91.651 (df = 2456) | 91.187 (df = 2456) | 90.724 (df = 2425) | 90.953 (df = 2399) |
| F Statistic | 26.532*** (df = 1; 2456) | 51.884*** (df = 1; 2456) | 3.392*** (df = 32; 2425) | 3.534*** (df = 34; 2399) |

Note: *p<0.1; >**p<0.05; >***p<0.01

**Table A5. Wu-Hausman and Weak Instrument Results**

| Model | Weak Instruments P-Value | Wu-Hausman P-Value |
|---|---|---|
| Table 3, Model 1 | < 2e-16 *** | 9.6e-11 *** |
| Table 3, Model 2 | < 2e-16 *** | 3.12e-10 *** |
| Table 3, Model 3 | < 2e-16 *** | 1.44e-08 *** |
| Table A4, Model 1 | < 2e-16 *** | 7.02e-10 *** |
| Table A4, Model 2 | < 2e-16 *** | 1.32e-10 *** |
| Table A4, Model 3 | < 2e-16 *** | 2.06e-08 *** |

**Table A6. Exclusion Criterion Testing, IV and DV Relationship**

| | *Dependent variable:* |
|---|---|
| | Annual Attack Damage**:** |
| Terror Group has Public Goods Provision | 2.726*** |
| | (0.334) |
| Constant | 4.700*** |
| | (0.189) |
| Observations | 2,099 |
| $R^2$ | 0.031 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.030 |
| Residual Std. Error | 7.131 (df = 2097) |
| F Statistic | |

Note: *p<0.1; >**p<0.05; >***p<0.01

**Table A7. Exclusion Criterion Testing, IV and Other Variable Relationship**

| | *Dependent variable:* |
|---|---|
| | Polity |
| Terror Group has Public Goods Provision | 0.350* |
| | (0.205) |
| GDP (Logged) | 2.249*** |
| | (0.082) |
| Constant | -16.811*** |
| | (0.937) |
| Observations | 2,374 |
| $R^2$ | 0.266 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.256 |
| Residual Std. Error | 4.608 (df = 2341) |
| F Statistic | |

Note: *p<0.1; >**p<0.05; >***p<0.01

**Figure A1. Causal Logic of OLS Modeling**



**Figure A2. Causal Logic Necessitating Instrumentation Modeling**




**FIGURE A3. Lebanese Connection to Water Supply Lines**




*Lebanese Ministry of Environment Report. 2002.*

**Figure A4. Areas of De-Facto Hezbollah Control**




*Hezbollah influence in Lebanon: Abi-Hanna, Thomas. 2021. "Lebanon's Crises Force Hezbollah to Turn Inward." Stratfor.*

**FIGURE A5. Hezbollah Fighter Casualties by Native Lebanese Governate**




*Hezbollah fatalities in the Syrian War. The Washington Institute. (n.d.). www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollah-fatalities-syrian-war*

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